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 An enquiry into the origins, content and subsequent treatment of certain major 
business strategy classification schemes by Miles and Snow, Michael Porter and Henry 
Mintzberg found little supporting theory within existing organisational and management 
science literature for a principled critique thereof. Furthermore, there is little discussion 
within such literature that addresses the ontic and epistemic status of cross-cutting 
abstract institutional kinds that might apply to the categorisation of generalised strategic 
behaviours. Accordingly, this thesis develops an eclectic synthesis of theoretical 
contributions from philosophy, (Richard Boyd, John Dupré, Ian Hacking, Ruth Millikan, 
Amie Thomasson, inter alia), semiotics (e.g. Umberto Eco, George Lakoff ) and 
cognitive science (especially, Susan Gelman and Douglas Medin) to produce a new, 
bespoke theoretical framework for the subsequent case studies of these business strategy 
classification schemes. It recognises the artifactual nature of such schemes and endorses 
a pragmatic and pluralistic approach that proposes a typology of classification schemes 
and acknowledges the possibility of intransigent homologating forces being responsible 
for at least some of the postulated similarities. It steers between essentialism and 
nominalism, in ‘accommodationist’ mode. The framework recognises that some such 
schemes are more ‘successful’ than others and attributes this to a number of their ontic 
and epistemic features in the three detailed case studies. The use (and abuse) of these 
schemes in our epistemic practices is critiqued. Some consequential recommendations 
are made concerning the promulgation and subsequent use in research and pedagogy of 
business strategy classification schemes. Recommendations that may hold wider 
relevance for social sciences in general. 
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Chapter  ONE   
 
 
ON  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  BUSINESS  STRATEGY. 
 
 ‘In science it is usual to make phenomena that allow of exact measurement into 
defining criteria for an expression: and then one is inclined to think that now  
the proper meaning has been found. Innumerable confusions have arisen this way’.  
( L. Wittgenstein. 1967. Zettel. para 438.[cited in Phillips, 1977]). 
 
 
1 GENERAL  INTRODUCTION. 
 
1.1 The evolution of this study. 
 
 Like many research projects, the end product is little like that envisaged at the 
outset. This started as an enquiry into the origins and nature of the various heuristics we 
introduce to business students for the purposes of strategic analysis, particularly case 
study analysis. The research question being where do these ‘didactic representations for 
strategic analysis’ originate ? and why do some become widely adopted into the 
academic canon, whilst others prove of little consequence ? The initial literature and 
thinking engaged mostly with questions of pedagogy, the ‘faddishness’ of  many 
business techniques and the way that a disciplinary community establishes its ‘canon’. 
However, this had to start with a particular example, and the random event of hearing a 
colleague describe his problems with applying the ‘Miles and Snow typology’ to his 
research study of Chinese township and village enterprises suggested this as the starting 
point. Despite thirty years of  public and private sector employment in what might be 
loosely described as ‘strategy’, I had not come across the typology in practice. It had, 
however, figured early in the teaching of strategy and had proved itself of value in 
relation to some case study work with students. However, I recognised to my chagrin, 
that, despite having taught the typology, I had only the flimsiest notion of where it had 
originated and how it had come to figure in the most prominent strategy textbook of the 
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day, Exploring Corporate Strategy (Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 1984-2011 ~ 9 
editions).  
 
 Accordingly, the initial phase was that of taking the Miles and Snow typology as 
a case study; tracing its origins in early working papers, culminating in the major 
promulgation via their book ~ Organisational strategy, structure and process (1978), as 
described in the first case study here. However, the investigation included also the way 
in which the typology was taken up in strategy research, particularly in the USA, but 
also worldwide, including economies structurally very different to the Anglo-Saxon 
model of capitalism. This raised many questions as to the exact nature of the 
conceptualisation of the types by those seeking to deploy the typology in their 
investigations. Why was it that this research largely ignored the putative causal 
mechanism underpinning the types as postulated by Miles and Snow ? What justified 
the extension of those types to entirely different contexts ? (One would not, for example, 
apply a classification of alpine flora to rain forest species). Could the typology sensibly 
be instrumented in the manner subsequently adopted in strategy research ? Why did 
such research privilege a sharp-edged quantitative approach to performance of 
organisations as if naturally found to belong to one or other of the various categories ? 
Do the classes we determine in the social realm apply in the same way that they might 
in the physical sciences ? This prompted what, at the time, was a subsidiary interest, ~  
what does categorisation in the highly abstract, institutional field of business strategy 
entail ? In order to understand, and, in particular, to critique the manner in which Miles 
and Snow’s work was being employed in academe it was necessary to delve more 
deeply into the processes involved in categorisation itself. 
 
1.2 The ‘gap’ and the ‘contribution’. 
 
 So, this subsidiary interest soon became the main focus of this research as it 
narrowed and shifted to the current track; far more focussed upon the origination, nature 
and uses of business strategy classification schemes. However, the organisation and 
management science literature on this subject, as found mainly in the field of business 
research methodology, lacks theoretical engagement with the metaphysics of the entities 
being categorised or their psychological and sociological roots. It is not unusual to find 
that the literature dealing with information sciences starts with some examination of the 
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(classical) philosophical roots to categorisation. That literature, however, tends fairly 
quickly to enter into technical matters regarding data handling, retrieval, etc. (e.g. 
Lambe, 2007). There are some ‘near misses’ within the qualitative research texts; for 
example ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001) is deeply concerned 
with the analysis of coded data as an epistemological issue, but provides little 
enlightenment as to why and how the concepts and categories to be coded were brought 
into existence. The ontology of the categories themselves is just not explicitly 
problematised in this literature. In a somewhat different vein, Bowker and Starr’s 
Sorting things out: classification and its consequences (2007), does introduce the nature 
of social classification from a philosophical standpoint. Here, however, it is the 
‘downstream’ social consequences of sorting into categories that they were concerned 
with, rather than how the categories had originated in the first place. They are strong on 
the examination of the sociological consequences of sorting society’s members, but 
relatively silent on the segmentation (sorting) process itself.  
 
 Similarly, there is an extensive and growing contemporary literature in the 
sociology of organisations that engages with empirical studies of the emergence and 
pliability of product, informal and institutional categories in fields as diverse as political 
parties, professional and financial services, cars, film genres and cuisines, etc., e.g. Hsu 
et al 2010. Despite proximity of interest in categorisations, the engagement here is 
sociological, not metaphysical. An indication of the ‘gap’ between this literature and the 
approach here is perhaps indicated by the fact that the introductory chapter to Hsu et al 
2010, is titled ‘Research on categories in the sociology of organisations’ (Negro et al) 
and sets out a review of published work in this area. It contains 111 references. Only 
five of these are common to the references given here – Berger & Luckman, 1966; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Hannan & Freeman, 1977 & 1986; and Weick, 1979. This is 
not to argue that the two fields of research are incompatible or antithetical, simply that 
at present, despite their complementarity, they are relatively independent of one another. 
A position that, in all probability, could change for the better understanding and 
progress of both. 
 
 However, ‘emancipatory’ literature, especially that dealing with gender and race, 
does probe the biological, natural sciences, as well as the social aspects of 
categorisation. As this literature demonstrated, if one wanted to probe and critique the 
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ontology of business strategy classification schemes, as adopted by the field, it was 
necessary to go deeper. Accordingly, the literature search was widened to domains 
outside organisational and management sciences to include an eclectic mix of 
contributions from the philosophy of natural (and social) kinds, epistemology, 
linguistics and cognition. The resulting thesis makes no claim to originality in these 
disparate fields, but does, however, claim to be a substantive, original contribution to 
the field of the study of business strategy by bringing to bear a fresh and thorough 
review of some major case studies of attempts at its classification, grounded in the 
relevant perceptions afforded by certain of these extra-field theoreticians. Further, it is 
claimed that the findings reported here are of material relevance to the general field of 
management and organisational science, and of potential application in the social 
sciences more generally construed. 
 
2 THE  FITNESS  OF CATEGORISATION. 
 
 The fundamental importance of the human capacity to categorise from instances 
to generalities has been widely reported (Braisby, 2005; Goswami, 2008; Harré, 2002(a); 
Millikan, 2000; Smith & Medin, 1981). If this berry tastes good and that one made us 
sick, it is a fitness characteristic that we can recognise each subsequent encounter as 
being of the same respective kinds. There are innumerable ways in which we can 
segment the world. It is vital that we can distinguish between animals that we can eat 
and those that would, given the chance, eat us. We can also distinguish between animals 
with fur and those without, those that we can pat and those we can’t, those that fly from 
those that swim, etc. What matters is how useful those segmentations are to human 
survival and pursuits. The instinct to categorise is central to humanity. And the ability to 
identify, label and communicate sameness is core to the language capacity that enables 
human progress. The world and the word are interwoven in all our understandings 
(Goodman, 1978; Thouless, 1953; Tsoukas, 1998). Every indefinite noun is a category 
of being, every verb a category of action, every adverb a distinguishing property. 
Categorisation and language are inseparable and contribute to the development of 
enduring, intersubjective bodies of knowledge. But the concern here is not with the 
unconscious and unreflective capacity for recognising and naming acquired with 
language in childhood, but the effortful classifications and nomenclatures created in 
pursuit of knowledge. This thesis is about the ways in which we create and disseminate 
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concepts relating to an abstruse topic; that of business strategy. It is directed to 
strategists and organisational scientists, but may be of interest to all who create and 
consume knowledge in the social sciences. It argues that we seldom pause to think 
about where our conceptualisations of our subject matter have come from, nor whether 
they are truly intersubjectively understood. Yet a key step in being more ‘scientific’ 
about our subject matter is the recognition of the contingent origination and contextual 
constraints of the conceptual terms and categories, the ‘kinds’, we deploy.  
 
3 THE  CENTRALITY  OF  KINDS  TO  (ANY)  SCIENCE. 
 
 Gerring (1999) cites Max Weber as suggesting that progress in the social 
sciences occurs largely through conflict about terms and their definitions, and their 
eventual resolution. Intellectual expertise, of any sort, consists of knowing whereof one 
speaks in a community of practice (Collins & Evans, 2007; Wenger, 1998). Higher level 
thought and theorising engages concepts, schema and scripts that manipulate 
generalities rather than singularities, representative abstractions rather than concrete 
individuals, postulates rather than results. Central to this uplift from the particular to the 
universal is our ability to classify and refer to, or name, phenomena and to recognise 
their associated structures and relations. It is difficult – impossible even ? – to envisage 
being able to express anything meaningful about the world without relying in some 
manner upon an intersubjectively accepted lexicon of the terms employed to describe 
that world. Such terms direct our attention and define what we perceive (Weick, 1995). 
The very possibility of a science depends upon knowing the kinds of things within its 
domain. Being a ‘scientist’ in any domain entails grasp of the special terminology and 
concepts particular to that field; its ‘kinds’. Putnam, (1975), refers to the ‘linguistic 
division of labour’ within all specialisms. Fodor (1974) situates his critique of 
reductivism in an explicit assumption that the different disciplines of the ‘special 
sciences’ such as psychology and economics differentiate themselves by virtue of 
holding their own distinctive natural kinds. And each field of knowledge will develop 
its own ‘styles of reasoning’ (Hacking, 2002(a)) or ‘disciplinary matrix’ (Boyd,1991; 
McDonough, 2003) in which the kinds particular to that field are central. Bhaskar’s 
(1979) radical conceptualisation of the possibility of naturalism in the social sciences is 
to take the categories of phenomena deployed in the methods of that science and ask 
what reality must be like for those methods to have purchase. Whilst Boyd’s 
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accommodation thesis (1991; 1999(a&b); 2010) posits that the key criterion for the 
utility or truth of any of the transitive kinds recognised in a science is their conformity 
to the intransitive causal structures operative in that domain. (See Chapter 2). 
 
Furthermore, the principle is amply supported in practice. There are many well 
known examples where the development of a structured relational classification scheme 
has been fundamental to accelerating progress within a science, even to the recognition 
of that area of enquiry as a separate and legitimate field worthy of serious study. Thus, 
whether it is Linnaeus’ classification in the biological sciences, or Mendeleyev and the 
Periodic Table for chemistry, such structured codification was important to the 
establishment of the discipline concerned (and this even prior to the subsequent 
discovery of underlying causalities in genetics or sub-atomic structures). As McOuat 
(2009) points out; the contribution is not just an intersubjective lexicon, but the 
associated facilitation of knowledge exchange and accumulation. This contribution of 
the categorising of phenomena continued with the spread and recognition of sub-fields 
such as geology, palaeontology and meteorology. (Hamblyn, 2001). As Aunger & 
Curtis (2008, p317) remark; ‘Sciences able to identify appropriate analytical units for 
their domain, their natural kinds, have tended to be more progressive.’ Proposed 
classification schemes in the natural sciences can often be empirically tested, using 
hypothetico-deductive methods and, where attempts at falsification fail, scientific laws, 
or at least regularities, can be established with some confidence. This is facilitated by 
the fact that simple ostention to physical entities (copper, Rosa multiflora) or artefacts 
(toaster, Ford Mondeo), is possible to a degree unmatched in other domains of 
knowledge. 
 
When we look at classification in the social sciences, the position is somewhat 
more complex. Our special interest is in the domain of organisation and management 
studies and, in the even more specialist branch of business strategy. The object of our 
case studies is the attempted categorisation of business strategy as generalisations about 
rather abstract aspects of a firm’s intentions and behaviour. Now, ‘strategy’ (for the 
purposes of this thesis) is the collective sense of what needs to be done on the part of 
those charged with responsibility of steering a particular commercial organisation 
towards its superordinate goals. This puts the work squarely in the domain of a specific 
socially constructed world, but one which, nonetheless contains real causal forces 
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operating at both specific and general levels. The setting of strategic objectives will be 
constrained by external social forces (markets, laws, economic and political conditions, 
technological potentials, etc.), but will also be subject to the individual and collective 
perceptions, motivations and prejudices of the top management team. Thus, in addition 
to societal mechanisms, we are also interested in the cognition, agency and social 
interplay of the protagonists; an internal dynamic of the players. More of this, and the 
challenges it brings, in Chapter 2; but for now we need to register that an understanding 
of our ‘kinds’ is absolutely central to making sense and progress in our field. Inattention 
to this point may be a contributing factor to the disappointment at progress in 
organisational and management science often voiced in its academic literature (Rynes et 
al, 2001; Starkey & Madan, 2001). 
 
 But these ‘kinds’, as discussed above, are referring expressions (Ben-Yami, 
2001), given shared meanings within a language community. They are not all of the 
same ontic nature. In particular, just as there are differences between the types of 
phenomena which fall within the domain of a particular field, so there are differences 
between kinds of kinds to be found as objects of study. Note that one will encounter 
also different epistemic types of classification schemes devised by the language 
community that is the organisational and management sciences field. These types of 
classification schemes are discussed and developed in Chapter 3. But in this chapter, the 
concern, for now, is to simply delineate the different ontological kinds that are the focus 
of that epistemology. 
 
4 SOME  PRELIMINARIES  ABOUT  KINDS. 
 
 The nature of kinds and kindhood in general is itself a contested arena. In 
particular, there are three ‘fault lines’ that appear to divide authorities in their 
conceptualisations. These issues are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2, however, 
the nature of these core differences in approach are briefly outlined here. The first is the 
rival construal of kinds within two main schools of thought – essentialism and 
nominalism (albeit they are different positions within each). Under a broadly essentialist 
construal, a kind is given by a determinable set of necessary and sufficient property 
conditions that are independent of any uses of the categories so determined. Kinds are, 
or would be, unambiguously recognisable in the world, whether or not there is anyone 
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to recognise them. Kinds group similar things together. The similarity recognised in a 
kind term is considered the intransitive product of causation, whether the causal factors 
are forces of nature or social structures and mechanisms. Kinds reflect the world as it is 
since they are caused by the world.  
 
 On the other hand, some writers point out that innumerable similarities can be 
found between the things we encounter in the world and that it is inescapably a matter 
of human choice that determines which properties are singled out as significant and 
used as sortals. Similarity is really found in the eye of the beholder. Thus, under a 
broadly nominalist construal, kinds are simply groupings of entities or phenomena that 
meet the current cognitive and processing requirements of human projects. Without 
human determination, kinds do not exist as such. So, for an essentialist, kinds are given 
by the natural or social world; for a nominalist they are entirely human creations ~ our 
way of handling these worlds. There are, of course, intermediate positions; particularly 
that taken by Umberto Eco (2000): that the world is not segmented into kinds per se, but 
has ‘grain’ that our kinds do well to respect. A similar intermediate position, ~ Richard 
Boyd’s ‘accommodation thesis’, ~ is outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
 The second main ‘fault line’ is with regards to the nature of ‘sortals’ ~ the 
boundaries that determine the qualification of some entity or phenomena for kindhood. 
The full extent of the qualifying entities is termed the ‘extension’ of a kind. Do all 
proper kinds have to have firm boundaries or are ‘fuzzy’ boundaries acceptable ? Some 
expect, or impose by definition, that whether or not something belongs to a kind is clear 
cut. In large measure, such a construal accords with an essentialist viewpoint that 
kindhood is determined by possession of the necessary and sufficient properties. 
Something either qualifies as a member of the kind or it is disqualified, there are no 
intermediate grades. However, as indicated above, kinds are particular concepts 
embodied in language and its uses. Research by linguists such as Eleanor Rosch and 
others (Lakoff, 1987; Taylor, 2003) has shown that membership of kinds (whether in 
the natural world, such as ‘bird’, or the social world, such as ‘furniture’) is graduated, 
with some more central or typical than others. Thus, sortals are sometimes vague and / 
or relate to similarity comparisons to prototypes or examplars. Some members of a kind 
are better or more representative, more ‘generic’, than others in our everyday usage of 
categories. 
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 Finally, there are different positions as regards the range of phenomena over 
which these questions of essences and sortals are relevant. For some, only certain 
instantiations of inanimate physical entities, as might be encountered in the fields of 
physics or chemistry, would qualify for consideration as ‘proper’ kinds. Whilst others 
are prepared to extend the conceptualisation of kindhood to a much broader field of 
application, including artefacts and social phenomena. 
 
 Of interest here is the fact that, as the case studies of business strategy 
classification schemes reveal, there is a tendency for different construals, based upon 
different ontological commitments of the protagonists, to compound difficulties in the 
acceptance and use of our classifications for knowledge creation and decision-making. 
Wittgenstein’s ‘innumerable confusions’ seems particularly rife in our field. 
 
5 KINDS  OF  KINDS. 
 
So far, the outline given above treats the notion of ‘kinds’ as a single category 
interpreted differently across contested fault lines. However, discussion of ‘kindhood’ is 
replete with alternative qualifiers before the word ‘kind’, revealing the different 
ontological orientations and commitments of the writers concerned (that third fault line). 
In a sense then, the various contributions on the philosophy, semantics or cognition of 
kinds differ in their approach due, at least in part, to different construals of the central 
notion of the kind of kind that is being typically addressed. There may be irreconcilable 
differences in how belief in kinds is argued, but there may also be problems arising 
from the fact that they are approaching the question from different angles. At core they 
are not discussing the same thing. Accordingly, a nominal classification of the main 
types of kindhood that figure in the various debates is presented below. This leads to an 
indication of the atypical and problematic ontological, epistemological and semantic 
status of the business strategy kinds to which this whole work is oriented. This 
discussion is the author’s, but owes acknowledgement to the treatment provided by 
Thomasson (2003) and Ben-Yami (2001). It argues for accepting a plurality of kinds as 
a means of unravelling the complexities inherent in a discussion of kindhood. 
 
5.1 Natural Kinds. 
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These are defined for our purposes as the prototypical, pure kinds to which the 
analytic philosophers usually refer. They are strongly homogeneous kinds that result 
from the forces of nature and which are unmoved by human endeavours or cognitions. 
Natural kinds would exist without human existence or human minds to comprehend 
them. One such natural force or motivation is (usually) prime and provides the defining 
necessary and sufficient condition of membership. Ideally, they are entirely uniform and 
stable and the causal motivation of such kinds is both supervenient (nested 
hierarchically) and invariant over eons of time. A compound can be a natural kind, in 
that the proportions of components are fixed by nature, but a mixture is not one. 
Perversely, satisfactory examples of such substances encountered naturally are rare, if 
not entirely absent – ostension to naturally found mineral substances such as gold or salt 
are seldom to pure samples, and even purified water as condensed steam is not pure 
H2O, given the existence of isotopes. Subatomic particles, elements, photons and the 
like are cited as examples, but our knowledge thereof is owed entirely to the artifice of 
humans in their detection and grasp. Thus one may, for the purpose of discussion of 
kinds and kindhood, refer simultaneously to ‘natural kinds’ as if they exist in nature, yet 
in the knowledge that all examples of such to which we refer are idealisations. The 
semantic reference can be by ostension to phenomena which are artefacts of human 
refinement and discernment, possibly via scientific instrumentation devised by us for 
that purpose. Definitions are based upon such refined and idealised products. So, 
counterintuitivly, one may conclude that exemplars of natural kinds are frequently, if 
not always, epistemically ‘unnatural’; since practical knowledge thereof is a 
consequence solely of human intents and purposes. 
 
Those that hold to an essentialist view of kindhood generally have the idealised 
natural kinds described above in mind as the central concept around which their ideas 
coalesce. Albeit that essentialists may extend their criteria to include some or most 
historical kinds (see below), and even into the social realm with major ceteris paribus 
qualifications, the defence of essentialist views seems nearly always to rest upon 
examples of natural kinds drawn from the physical sciences, especially physics and 
chemistry. A positivist about natural kinds will hold that there is some essential 
determinant of kindhood and that, if not currently known, it is the mission of science to 
discover. The question of fuzzy or firm extensions is simple for those who hold to the 
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idea of natural kinds since there is a firm definition and sine qua non determining 
factors that provide unambiguous sortals given, where necessary, the suitable equipment 
for their detection. Above all, the epistemic superiority of natural kinds resides upon 
their nomological potential for affording sound inferences. If we are dealing with a true 
natural kind, all sorts of deductions, inductions and abductions are possible with a high 
degree of reliability. 
 
5.2 Historic Kinds. 
 
In fields such as astronomy, physical geography, geology and meteorology 
physical forces such as gravity, friction, heat and pressure acting (often simultaneously) 
upon the properties of the natural materials concerned result in mind-independent 
homogeneous outcomes at different times and places. Asteroids, geodes, ox-bow lakes 
or cumulonimbus clouds are all historic kinds. Yet such phenomena do not achieve the 
characteristics of pure natural kinds since the forces motivating them and the materials 
upon which they act are less uniform and stable over time. For example, iron ores are 
highly variable in their mineral content and clouds are ephemeral. Yet, in terms of our 
encounters with the world, historical kinds are far more common than the natural kinds 
referred to above and are almost invariably thought of as natural kinds in folksonomies 
(Medin & Atran, 1999). A historic kind is simply a homogeneity that results from some 
reliable reproduction process in the world that owes nothing to human existence. What a 
member of the general language community, but not a member of the appropriate 
epistemic community, takes as a natural kind is more often than not a historic kind. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the biological sphere. ‘Species’, a typical ‘natural 
kind’ to such people, are not invariant over very long passages of time, and are more 
properly treated as historical kinds, the result of prior events. A horse is a horse because 
its parents were horses; and they were horses because their parents were….. 
Furthermore certain characteristic properties of horses are variable as a result of 
variability of the genetic components involved in the reproductive process and 
characteristic properties may be inessential ~ a three legged horse is still a horse. 
 
Under this formulation, historical kinds are the product of the forces of nature 
operative in the absence of humanity. However, there is scope for human intervention in 
an open system that governs the homogenizing or reproduction process (as distinct from 
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the intervention in a closed scientific experiment which is always possible for natural or 
historic kinds). The stud farmer or rose breeder are able to impact upon these natural 
forces and this is more than the obstruction or destruction that might be found with 
mankind’s dealings with natural kinds; here there is potential to share and shape the 
natural forces. Rather than create a new sub-division between human mediated and 
unmediated historic kinds – which is unnecessary for our current purposes - we shall 
accept that humans may be one of the shaping forces at work. (Although it is possible to 
extend this idea of human-mediated historical kinds into the social realm and refer to, 
say, reproduction of the Mona Lisa or a branch of Marks & Spencer as a historic kind, 
they are dealt with as artefacts and institutional kinds below as more salient features for 
our purpose. As pointed out by Bowker & Star 1999, another form of historical kind is 
that of language itself. We traditionally apply a historic principle of ‘descent’, as in 
genetics, in sorting the languages of the world ~ Nilotic, Indo-European, etc. Again, the 
approach here is to regard languages as social kinds).  
 
Historical kinds, therefore, are close to natural kinds but fail to be as ‘pure’ in 
terms of sharing identical properties and being invariant over human timescales. The 
distinction as recognised here is that a historic kind is one where some force(s) other 
than mankind is(are) causing the homogeneity and that this extends beyond some single 
characteristic property to the likelihood of many similarities. A mixture such as sea 
water or grass can be a historic kind. Thus, whilst natural kinds must share some single 
essential property, historical kinds may be similar on a range of discernable 
characteristics without necessarily sharing any single one of these. Thus the sortals are, 
or can be, fuzzy and the definitions work more by convention than precision. In 
consequence the extension or boundaries of historic kinds are prone to error. However, 
given correct extension, there are few problems in reference to historical kinds; they are 
all around us in the observable world. There may be a greater degree of uncertainty 
about sorting criteria to determine the historical kind category concerned when 
compared with the procrustean definition of natural kinds. But, if the identification of 
the extension of the kind is correct, the entities so determined are amenable to certain 
reliable inferences and can thus carry sound nomological potential. The overall 
properties and potential behaviour of historic kinds can be reasonably predictable. 
 
5.3 Moving on to ‘social’ kinds. 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
20 
 
The two kinds discussed above – the natural and historical kinds – are both 
typically associated with the sciences, essentialism, firm sortals and causation extrinsic 
to the classifier. They are what some, following J S Mill, would term ‘real kinds’ in that 
both are ontologically mind-independent. Whilst social kinds are not ‘real kinds’ in the 
Millian sense, it is argued here that, notwithstanding their mind-dependence, social 
kinds can be every bit as real as natural kinds in their consequences. It is also possible 
that with greater scientific progress certain historic kinds may become viewed as natural 
kinds. Alternatively, scientific discovery may downgrade what were hitherto taken to be 
natural kinds as being historic in that the essential discerning feature is found to be 
misleading or illusory in some way.  
 
We now turn to three kinds that result from human interventions in the world 
and are thus irreducibly mind-dependent and are related to our intentions. They are 
termed ‘social kinds’ in that they would not have existence, except perhaps as relics of 
past societies, were humans not existent with projects in mind. The first of these kinds, 
however, is simply a human consequence in the world that results without intent; it is 
the by-product of other intentions. This is termed an ‘unintended kind’ and is treated 
very briefly below. The other two are kinds that result from human intentions. The first 
type are termed ‘artefactual kinds’, where the phenomenon is (usually) concrete, and the 
original motivation is usually individual, albeit a team may be involved in the 
realisation and subsequent reproduction of the kind. The second type are the 
‘institutional kinds’ where the intension is inescapably collectively determined and 
where the kind may be concrete or abstract. Since business strategies are essentially of 
the latter type these two sub-kinds are treated separately. It may also help to know that 
Searle distinguishes between artefacts and institutional kinds in that the latter are 
interactive with their kindhood or ‘self-referential’. Similarly, Hacking (1999) draws the 
distinction between artefacts as indifferent to their categorisation ~ a chair is not altered 
by the label attached to it ~ whereas institutional kinds such as ‘star pupil’ or ‘feral 
youth’ may behave differently as a consequence of their categorization; what he refers 
to as ‘looping effects’. Bowker and Star (1999) describe how a group of individuals in 
an occupation such as nursing will behave in a particular manner in response to the 
acquisition of its status as a profession.  
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Before, however, discussing the various types of social kinds there is the 
fundamental question of whether such kinds must be ‘unreal’, in the sense that being 
socially caused and socially picked out there can be no justifiable claim to mind-
independence. This issue is addressed further in Chapters 2 and 3, but for the present it 
can be asserted: - First, (Searle, 1995; 1999), that there are social features of the world 
that are epistemically objective social facts and just as ‘real’ and causally potent as 
natural features, albeit their reality is intrinsically different, as will be discussed below. 
Secondly, that some social objects exhibit similarity due to the causal powers of social 
structures and processes that engender homogeneity (Bhaskar, 1979; Elder-Vass, 2007, 
2010; Gindis, 2009; Harré, 2002(a)).They resemble one another in some salient respect 
due to procrustean forces operating in social affairs. And, thirdly, the results of such 
homologation are operative, whether the similarity has been noted or not, i.e. that real 
social kinds can be ‘discovered’ as well as ‘invented’. Real social kinds can exist, due to 
these ‘homologating forces’,  but not all social categories are real social kinds. 
 
5.4  Unintended Kinds. 
 
A key dimension used below as applicable to the discussion of social kinds is 
that of the intentions of the humans that provide the motivation or power behind the 
creation of similarities and homogeneity in the (social) world. So it is necessary to 
discuss, very briefly, those phenomena that display regularity and commonality but 
which are the by-products, generally unintended, of other intentions. Following 
Thomasson (2003) let us take the example of a ‘path’. Now, one can consciously set out 
to build a pathway across the lawn from the back door to the compost heap at the back 
of the garden, and the path that results is clearly an artefact. However, one may create a 
‘path’ (i.e. something another person would apply that label to) across the lawn by the 
intention of reaching the compost heap; not only is the resulting path worn through the 
grass unintended, it may be viewed as highly undesirable. It could even be that the 
motivation for our artefactual path was to avoid wearing out the lawn. Although this is a 
somewhat minor point to create a ‘kind’ around, there is particular  salience in business 
strategy since the kind ‘unintended strategy’ (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985) is both a 
concept and term well recognised in discussion of strategy classification. 
 
5.5  Artefactual Kinds. 
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Such kinds result from human intentional impositions upon material substances. 
They are the product of human purposeful interaction with the material world, rather 
than being the unmediated consequences of nature’s forces.  Normally, this involves an 
object produced by human art or workings for some clear purpose, either functional or 
decorative. The motivating force can be an individual’s intention, the intentions of a 
group of people fired by the motivation of a single member, or it can be the intentions 
of an organised set of individuals within an institutional kind such as a factory or office. 
The intended fruits of engineering and applied sciences in production and of more 
individual arts and crafts are artefactual kinds:- a chair, some wine, an aeroplane or a 
motorway. That word ‘intended’ distinguishes artefacts from accidental by-products 
such as sawdust, (an unintended kind), but also allows for mistakes in the execution of 
the intention as in the wonky and misshapen chair that looks nothing like the original 
intention of the novice amateur carpenter (Thomasson 2003). 
 
The notion of ‘kind’ obviously entails that there is some similarity or 
homogeneity amongst these artefacts and the motivating force of a social kind is a 
human intentionality that is social in the sense that it follows an intersubjective 
consensus. Where this is to make another one ‘like that’ we must have in mind the 
prototypical specimen, the socially held concept of what ‘one of those’ relates to. This 
Thomasson terms the ‘substantial concept’ of what a particular kind of artefact will be 
in terms of function and form. This provides the design element in the maker’s intention 
and, as long as this is reasonably efficiently executed, creates an artefactual kind. 
Furthermore, the recognition of that design component in any artefactual kindhood 
permits one to conclude that an individual may consciously create novelty: that ‘like 
that’ can become ‘like this’, and that ‘one of those’ can become ‘one of these’. Thus 
innovation and creativity (perhaps motivated by search for recognition or for 
improvement, efficiency and profit) can be a source of the evolution in the reproduction 
of artefactual kinds that largely match previous versions, yet allowing for change. For 
example a ‘key’ was once invariably a metal object that interacted mechanically with a 
lock, and such keys abound still today. However, the key to my car is an electronic 
signal and that to my hotel bedroom a plastic card. Function has been retained or 
enhanced, but form is radically different. 
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It also helps to distinguish an artefactual kind from a concrete institutional kind 
thus:- Concrete institutional kinds (as will be seen below) are objects where a function 
has been imposed upon an object by collective intentionality that is not a direct 
consequence of its material composition – A goal post is an artefactual kind. A jumper 
is an artefactual kind. But a jumper can become an institutional kind where, by the 
agreement of the players in the park, it stands for a goal post. Many institutional kinds 
are abstractions imposed upon token material artefacts, such as £10 notes or marriage 
certificates. Harré (2002(b)) draws the distinction between wine as an artefact and 
communion wine as an institutional kind. Conversely, it is also possible to construe 
certain human non-material products, such as a symphony, as an artefact, in that it is the 
product of human intentional effort and stands for what it is, without standing in for 
something else.  
 
The treatment above indicates that the protean nature of artefactual kinds makes 
problematic the setting of boundaries. There are no natural boundaries to enlist. Form 
itself in terms of structure, shape, materials, aesthetics etc, can be highly variable and is 
an unreliable sortal, especially where it is not unknown for a functional object to be 
deliberately made to look like something else. Function as the holder of intention, or 
teleological purpose, is the more important as a classification principle; but a single 
artefact may combine non-separable functions that can, in addition, also overlap other 
artefactual kinds. Our notions of artefactual kinds confront blurred boundaries and 
uncertain extensions. So, it is somewhat inescapable that one ends up looking to 
consensual, socially held definitions where sorting is contextual and spatio-temporally 
determined. Our notions of what constitutes a ‘chair’ is somehow acquired through 
enculturation; from the child’s alphabet picturebook version – hard, four legs, flat and 
horizontal seat, wooden construction – to the chair on which one sits at the computer – 
soft, a single pedestal, five wheeled feet, seat adjustable for height and rake, steel, 
synthetic foam and cloth. There are immense cognitive challenges in the derivation and 
interpretation of any ‘generic’ for even such a simple artefact as a chair (as those 
grappling with computer visualisation recognise). 
 
The types of discipline one most associates with artefactual kinds are those of 
the crafts and the applied sciences – architecture, engineering, printing and design, fine 
art and textiles. Furthermore, despite their quotidian nature, our knowledge of 
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artefactual kinds is also a function of our interest therein. A tailor might classify 
‘jackets’ in a dozen or so ways, whilst her customer uses the same word to cover all. 
This highlights another important feature of artefactual kinds (one that is shared with 
institutional kinds); that ‘there can be no reference to the kind without someone having 
a relevant concept that in turn plays a role in determining the term’s extension’ 
(Thomasson, 2003, p 604). The variety of human intentions and the protean nature of 
artefactual kinds and their fuzzy boundaries means too that, compared with ‘scientific’ 
kinds, there is a lower expectation of reliable extension and more limited valid inference 
about their properties and behaviour.  There is, however, one very important rider to this 
observation – if the artefactual kind is produced by some regulated or homeostatic 
process such as machine manufacture there is likely to be very considerable similarity 
between individual artefacts so produced. Here uniformity and reliability is built into 
the system.  
  
5.6  Institutional Kinds. 
 
Institutional kinds cover social collective constructions that exert powers in society 
through its intentionality that they are empowered so to do. There are two sorts of 
recognised institutional kinds; the concrete and the abstract, or intangible, dealt with 
separately below. First, however, some explication of ‘intentionality’ and ‘social 
construction’ is required. Intentionality is a mental state of willing a purpose; it is an 
aim in mind. An abstraction such as this cannot be directly observed, only the 
consequences in behaviour are discernable. Nor, given their individual mental status, 
can there be joint ownership of intentions without their expression in some external 
form – usually language, but including all semiotic means of communication of 
meaning embodied in both material and insubstantial, but sensible, things. Thus, it is 
argued here, collective intentionality, a sine qua non of modern society, is made 
possible through various concrete and abstract institutional kinds at work in society. But 
it also was itself responsible for creating those institutional kinds in the first place. 
Society is the product, inter alia, of the interacting institutions created by building upon 
earlier institutional kinds, from the Burj Khalifa in Dubai back to the Parthenon. And it 
is in this sense that it is possible to write of the social construction of the modern, highly 
collectivised, world. Indeed it is only through the operation of collective intentionality 
that culture is possible. John Searle (1995; 1999) is the prime source of authority here, 
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albeit others have refined and re-formulated his notion of collective intentionality. 
(Elder-Vass, 2010; Gindis, 2009; Thomasson, 2003;). 
 
Searle writes of the way in which we can assign functions to substances or concepts 
that are over and above their intrinsic properties or content. Thus, the assignment of 
roles in society, including that of ‘Registrar’; a declarative speech act , such as ‘I now 
declare you man and wife’; coupled with certain acts like the giving and receiving of 
rings; and the inscriptions of signatures on a piece of printed paper called a ‘Marriage 
Certificate’; can all combine to act with enormous power and consequence in our 
individual lives. This Searle explains as the collective agreement upon these actions as 
being constitutive of a role of being married. Where the assignment of functions to, for 
example, roles, words, rings and printed paper all amount to an institution of marriage. 
This is summed in his expression that covers all such acts of collective itentionality that 
confer function ~ ‘X counts as Y in context C’ ~ or, to revert to an earlier example, a 
jumper can act as a goal post as long as the parties agree to, or intend, this being the 
case. 
 
Importantly, not only does the ontology of institutional kinds fail (by definition) any 
test of mind-independence, they also fail on the same grounds to have natural 
boundaries to set their extension. The extensions or sortals for institutional kinds are not 
‘discovered’, because they are not ‘out there’ to be discovered. They are instead defined 
in their intersubjective agreement on what constitutes the kind’s boundaries. Further, 
provided the collective understanding is owned by the relevant epistemic community 
the sortals or extension, whilst ontologically challenged, are beyond gross epistemic 
error – Thomasson, phrases this as; ‘if we collectively accept any set of conditions C as 
sufficient for there being a [kind] K, it could not turn out that we are wrong. [In 
that ] .….given that acceptance, if the acceptance conditions are fulfilled, there is some 
x that is K’. (Thomasson, 2003, p 589). Hence a concern, evident later in this work, in 
knowing how (well) strategy classifications are delineated and communicated when first 
proposed. 
 
Finally, as Thomasson (2003) points out, it also follows that, given the mind 
dependence of such kinds, we can be in gross epistemic error about them where the 
criterial conditions are not fulfilled. The Registrar may be an impostor, the Marriage 
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Certificate a fake, the groom a bigamist. When the impostor, fake or bigamist are 
exposed as such, what happens is that the constitutive rules are shown to have been 
broken;- that X did not after all count as Y, or the context was not C. The collective 
intentionality has broken down because the function was not conferred. This marks an 
important difference with real kinds. Whilst real kinds can exist unknown to society 
because we are in ignorance of the existence of their motivation, such cannot by 
definition be true of institutional kinds. If it is true that we collectively accept that a 
putative member of such a kind can and does meet the sufficient conditions that we 
have laid down for its existence, then it exists, full stop. Put another way, and relating 
this to business strategy classifications, if just one organisation meets the stipulated 
conditions for being, say, a ‘Defender’, then such a category’s existence is beyond 
doubt. In these matters the differences between real and institutional kinds as regards 
extension and falsification are highly significant for our epistemological practices. 
 
5.6.A Concrete Institutional Kinds 
 
 The creation of concrete institutional kinds such as £20 notes or driving licenses 
involves the creation of constituitive rules which specify general conditions under 
which anything that meets those conditions qualifies as belonging to the kind. Thus, the 
extension of such kinds can be fairly determinate; albeit the constituitive rules may 
themselves prove less than exact, and it is possible that the rules themselves are subject 
to dispute or, as discussed above, were broken. For remember the rules are collectively 
held and, whilst some may be precisely defined (as by law), others, like jumpers for 
goal posts, are transient and contextual; they are local rules. Even where the rules are 
precise, the consensus that holds them to the case can break down, and the reliability of 
individual agents respecting the rules is weak ~ the existence of laws does not guarantee 
their observance, as anyone can observe in motorway traffic. This is in complete 
antithesis to natural and historic kinds and offers a lesser, but still potent, contrast with 
artefactual kinds. The reliability of inferences about concrete institutional kinds is 
subject to considerable subjective judgement about the conditions obtaining in their 
constitution and the circumstances and motivations of the individuals and the kinds 
involved. The laws of nature, even when they remain obscure to us, are more reliable in 
their manifestations than are social rules. One may loose faith in Zimbabwe dollar, but 
not in the value of the sweetcorn one is attempting to buy. 
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5.6.B Abstract Institutional Kinds. 
 
In addition to the institutional, or socially constructed material kinds as 
described above, there are institutional entities that depend upon the creation of new 
abstract institutional kinds. What creates such kinds is not the ascription of new 
functions to a particular material object, but the acceptance of certain constitutive rules 
regarding such activites as ‘passing a law’ or ‘establishing a football club’ that endows 
society with the capacity to create a new abstract social entity such as ‘The Road Traffic 
Act’ or ‘Millwall FC’ (Thomasson, 2003). Albeit that it is usual to associate certain 
tokens with the existence of such abstract institutional kinds ~ the yellow lines or speed 
restriction signs by the roadside, or a club mascot, shirt or web site ~ these are not 
concrete institutional kinds, since the abstract entity would exist without these tokens, 
or with an alternative set.  
 
Organisations, and in particular corporations, an abstraction of a ‘person-like’ 
socially constructed entity under the law, are an abstract institutional kind case in point 
(Gindis, 2009). And strategies,  ~ the collectively agreed selection of activities and their 
means of execution to achieve collective and abstract goals ~ are the motivating forces 
within corporations that constitute collective abstract institutional kinds that are 
particularly challenging to classify (See chapter 2). We are dealing with a projectable 
abstract property of an abstract entity. 
 
There is a ‘pooling of wills’ to create the joint commitments and associated 
normative guidelines for shared obligations and rights that is found in organisational life. 
This is more often implicit than explicit in the collective intentionality involved here; 
such that the setting of boundaries and definitions for abstract institutional kinds is more 
challenging than for concrete ones. It is easier, for example, to intersubjectively agree 
that a piece of A4 paper printed with certain symbols constitutes a particular kind ~ an 
‘invoice’ or a ‘degree certificate’ ~ than it is to establish a common agreement as to 
what constitutes a ‘debt’ or a ‘higher education establishment’. This means that the 
reservations expressed above concerning inferences regarding concrete institutional 
kinds apply with even greater force to abstract institutional kinds. 
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5.7 Some implications. 
 
 This attempt to define kinds of kinds is a nominal classification of diverse 
phenomena as falling under descriptions that follow in very broad terms the manner in 
which subjects or disciplines are construed, say, by a University or an encyclopaedia. 
This is not accidental, in that an element of this thesis will be that the distinctions 
sketched here are highly consequential for the nature of the truths we pursue in all 
academic fields and the manner of that pursuit. Overall, and despite their sometimes 
highly contentious nature within that community of practice, the physical sciences 
(physics, chemistry, biology, geology, meteorology, engineering and the like) know 
their real kinds and treat them appropriately in measurement and experimentation. The 
arts and humanities, lacking real kinds in the main, tend to recognise the human 
contingency of their artefactual kinds and the subjectivity of their institutional kinds and 
do not ape the methods of the sciences since it is patently evident that closed experiment 
and quantitative analysis have little enlightenment to offer. 
 
By and large, the social sciences (economics, business, sociology) have paid 
little heed to the complex and context-sensitive nature of their predominantly 
institutional kinds, whilst subconsciously adopting a quasi-scientific set of expectations 
about them as received facts (Lawson, 1997, 2003). Expectations which, as explicated 
above, are largely unjustified. Their research methods are frequently indifferent to the 
true nature of the conceptualisations and classifications that underpin their subject 
matter. In reality, social scientists are more likely to impose categories on their objects 
of study than to ‘discover’ categories lurking within them. This imposition of categories 
is a little acknowledged part of the normal modus operandi of a social scientist in 
making sense of the material and presenting his or her work. The term ‘findings’ almost 
inextricably connotes the discovery of something within the material, rather than the 
researcher’s own fashioning of a useful lens through which to interpret it. These 
impositions will, of course be de-contextualised and reified by the next generation of 
scholars. Subjectivity masquerades as objectivity. To make for social progress, rather 
than constant re-interpretation of self-referential social matters, we need to give greater 
recognition to the distinctive and problematic nature of our institutional kinds and act 
accordingly. 
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This discussion has been given life by what is at core a philosophical debate 
regarding the very nature of kindhood; and that debate is animated largely by the fault 
lines about their ontological foundations, set especially around the essentialism / 
nominalism divide. It has culminated here in a proposition that it may prove more 
productive to recognise that there are different kinds, and that these differences are 
consequential. In chapter 3 classification systems employed by those constituting the 
epistemic community concerned with the social realm are seen as variegated in their 
nature, as are kinds, but are also viewed as devices or heuristics that aid in the drawing 
of inferences from the resultant kinds without imputation that the resulting categories 
are kinds in the sense described above. The making of classification systems is 
inescapably a human imposition upon the world and one where we can select and 
fashion to our purposes. All kinds are categories, but not all categories are kinds. This 
raises the question; why do we create classification schemes ? 
 
 
6 THE  CONTRIBUTION  FROM  MAINSTREAM  ORGANISATIONAL  AND 
MANAGEMENT  SCIENCE. 
 
 At the outset, the natural start point for this study was the literature dealing with 
classification of strategy or, more generally, the categorisation of phenomena in 
management and organisational science, and the texts describing research methods in 
this field (e.g. Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). But, as remarked in the introduction, this 
literature ultimately disappoints. It tends to describe the handling of (data) categories as 
derived, for example from observer categorisations or structured questionnaires, but 
lacks deeper consideration of the ontological origins of the similarities picked out in 
these researcher-constructed categories. The critique adopted here is more challenging in 
examining the source(s) and uses of categories; it deals with issues mostly not 
problematised in existing studies, and goes beyond the treatment conventionally found in 
mainstream organisational and management literature. Notwithstanding this lack of 
penetration in such literature, however, there are certain basic points of principle and 
terminology concerning classification in the social sciences that underpin the reporting 
of the findings of this research, and it is important to establish the outline of these 
fundamentals. They provide the point of departure for the deeper exploration that follows 
in Chapters 2-7. 
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6.1 The nature of classification schemes. 
 
  Classification schemes are artefacts. As deliberate human creations, they 
are inextricably bound up with our need and desire to acquire and apply knowledge 
about the world and, as discussed in regard to cognition and linguistics in Chapter 2, to 
do so in an efficient manner. In this case, knowledge of the social world of institutional 
kinds within the domain of organisational and management science. Whilst, in Chapter 
3, the fact that these schemes may serve different purposes is elaborated under four 
headings. However, the purpose of all such classification, in general terms, is to divide a 
set or population of items within a specific phenomenon (companies, costs, leadership 
styles, projects, etc ) into meaningful sub-groups or categories that share some salient 
characteristic(s) on the basis of which some reduction of complexity and improvement 
of data manageability and comprehension can be achieved. The resultant sub-groups are 
alike, in some significant respect, within the category and significantly different, at least 
in that respect, from other items within the set or population. In other words, 
classification involves the sorting of entities into sub-groups on the basis of similarity, 
seeking to minimise the within-group variance and maximise the between-group 
variance. The aim is internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity leading to the 
possibility of reduction of variation and complexity and, thus, simplifying the 
management and analysis of the population.  
 
 A classification system consists of a number of categories and a specification, or 
algorithm, or set of heuristics, to determine how entities should be allocated or sorted 
among the categories.  It is a general aspiration that:- (a) The division criteria (sortals), 
and, hence, category specification enable meaningful distinctions to be made. The 
classes are mutually exclusive and entities belong in only one class; (b) That there are 
categories to cover the main bulk, if not entire, domain’s contents. The classification is 
exhaustive in that there is an appropriate class for each entity within the entire 
population. Classification is more challenging where the phenomenon of interest may 
be intangible and inferred, or what Lazarfeld & Henry (1968) term ‘latent’, with no 
discernable external direct signifiers their presence. In the abstract, specialist field of 
corporate and business strategy, the objective of classification is to achieve a 
parsimonious concept which will help to simplify by means of categorisation the variety 
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of strategic behaviours arising from differences in the resources, motivations and 
methods of the dominant coalition of senior management within a multitude of large 
and small organisations. The resulting divisions must be based upon fairly superficial 
and arbitrary criteria, or the categories based upon a subtle and intuitive interpretation of 
emergent direction and choice, or some combination of the two. Either way, it is more 
problematic than a system of classification based upon physical features.  
 
 Much has been written, within the broad sphere of management science 
methodology, on the subject of classification of organisations and their strategies. For 
example, Carper & Snizek, 1980; Conant et al, 1990; Doty & Glick, 1994; Hambrick, 
1984; McKelvey, 1975, 1979; Oliver, 1982; Pinder & Moore, 1979; Pugh et al,1969; 
Snow & Hambrick 1980;  Venkatraman & Grant 1986; have all written on the 
classification process as well as, in some cases, offering their own findings. Whilst 
authors such as Chrisman et al,1988 and Kald et al, 2000 have attempted to synthesise 
classification systems developed by others or, such as Galbraith & Schendel, 1983, to 
devise their own empirically based strategy classifications. Despite such work, the 
absence of a consensus upon the appropriate classification scheme(s) for the phenomena 
of business strategy leaves us with a number of contending perspectives and, oft-times, 
contradictory terminology. There is a de facto plurality of co-existing and competing 
business strategy classification schemes, but little ground in this literature for 
discrimination between them. One major methodological divide is that deriving from 
the basis upon which the classification is initially conceived ~ typologies versus 
taxonomies. This is an area where the ‘semantic confusion’ about terminology, is rife. 
The interpretation given in sections 6.2-4, is based largely upon Bailey’s (1994) 
monograph on classification in the social sciences and his other writings on this topic 
(1984); but draws additionally upon Ackroyd & Hughes, 1992; DeVellis, D, 1991; 




 The start point for a typology is conceptual. It is a process of classification based 
upon either some notion of the extreme or ‘ideal’ archetype, setting out the pure, perfect 
and simplified characteristics of the feature or phenomenon of interest. Or, it may be 
based upon the description of a ‘representative specimen’ of the category, which need 
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not, in fact, be represented by any particular empirical entity. The individual categories, 
cells or ‘types’ are deductively arrived at and, in essence, are often idealised  
typifications of the entity population. It is possible to construct a simple typology from a 
single characteristic of the entities comprising the population to be classified. For 
example the strategic position of companies as seen from their market share relative to 
the largest competitor might result in the creation of two or more cells – Strong, Tenable, 
Weak, etc. However, typologies are generally portrayed on at least two dimensions to 
create unique cells in conceptual space, termed the ‘property space’. (The tendency is for 
strategists to stick to just two dimensions and two scale points, giving the 4 cell 
classification diagrams typically scattered throughout the textbooks.) Yet the construct 
itself, in creating the types and associated labels yields a new set of descriptors as nouns. 
The classifications are generally verbal and qualitative and often derive their potency 
from the labelling associated with the categories so defined. Hence the risk, ever present, 
of reification.  
 
 Despite the a priori origination of a typology, there must be some experiential 
familiarity with specimen forms or activities for such concepts as the ‘ideal type’ (a 
polar extreme, or perfect reflection of the class at maximum or minimum extent on the 
selected criteria) or the ‘constructed type’ (a central example, a representative example, 
or typification, whether real or synthetic, of the characteristic occupant of a cell) to be 
postulated. Thus, a typology is not created from a vacuum. As mentioned above, the 
format of a typology in business strategy is frequently from two conceptual dimensions 
(such as ‘customer’ and ‘product’) with just two scale points (‘existing’ or ‘new’) to 
create a four box cell (the ‘Ansoff Matrix’) with simple labels to each ~ ‘Product 
Development’, ‘Diversification’ etc.~ (Ansoff, 1965 ) It is the generation and 
juxtaposition of the, (generally, unquantified) dimensions in labelled conceptual space 
that distinguishes a typology from its cousin the taxonomy.  
 
 Any individual member of the population can be allocated to a particular 
category and the categories are distinctly compartmentalised by means of, as far as 
possible, unambiguously specified characteristics and a unique label (O’Keefe, 
2007).They are designed. It is a top down deductive process, from the conceptual 
framework, to the specification of the type, to the classification of the individual entity. 
The key to a successful typology is to have characteristics that are mutually exclusive 
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and discrete rather than overlapping and continuous. Like the design of a suite of 
pigeonholes, the classification system, once constructed, is fairly rigid and change 
involves de-construction and re-design. Typologies are, therefore, somewhat 
procrustean in their operation; in that the member of the data set may have to be 
somewhat forced into the category nearest to that matching its characteristics or 
somewhat arbitrarily separated from similar entities by falling either side of the 
specified division. This ‘forced fit’ problem arises particularly with the application of 
two of the case study business strategy classification schemes:- Miles and Snow’s 
typology and Porter’s generics (see Chapters 4 and 5). It is not possible to allocate to 
partial or multiple categories within a typology; just as it is not possible to allocate a 
single parcel to more that one pigeonhole. Yet, given the conceptual origins of the 
typology, it is quite possible to create type classes for which there are no empirical 
examples. ( e.g. the female Pope). The elimination of superfluous cells is termed 
‘reduction’. The regeneration of a complete typology from knowledge of only part 




 The start point for a taxonomy is empirical. It involves the recognition of 
discernable similarities of entities within a population to form categories and the ability 
to distinguish the similarities and dissimilarities of such categories to one another such 
that, where appropriate, a hierarchy can be built. It is a bottom up inductive 
classification system. In contemporary statistical taxonomy the classification criteria are 
usually dimensions or discrete data of some sort, and individual categories or taxa 
(singular; taxon) are inductively derived from empirical data, arising from precise, 
comparative measurements or careful discrimination among the various delineations of 
components / elements of the individual entity. As with all classification, the aim is to 
minimise within group variance and to maximise between group variance. In the social 
sciences, taxonomies are generally derived a posteriori by computation using statistical 
techniques such as ‘clustering’ or regression based upon analysis of association and 
variance among empirical measures or dimensions gathered for such purpose. The 
relationships between the dimensions or elements that constitute and define the taxa are 
‘discovered’ and rationalised to give discrimination in the subsequent application of 
such taxa, and labels affixed to give ease of identification and management. It is 
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unlikely that redundant taxa will be produced in that each taxon is the result of 
empirical investigation. Despite the appeal of statistical validity that may be associated 
with taxonomies, they may lack statistical reliability in replication; are difficult to label 
appropriately (group ‘G5a’ v ‘Defender’); and sometimes disclose correlations that are 
counter-intuitive or irrelevant. In short, the classification system may not find 
immediate resonance and acceptance by potential users. There is seldom an easy way to 
generalise. Taxa are not types. 
 
  Epistemic practices in biological classification and in information science are 
often based upon taxonomic approaches. In the social sciences, the position of 
taxonomies is less clear. A very significant activity that generates quantitative 
taxonomies is cluster and multivariate statistical analysis, found across the whole field. 
However, despite yielding taxa for research purposes, the applications in the strategy 
research field seem not to have passed over into general classification systems for 
business strategy. (Some discussion of DeSarbo et al’s 2005, 2006, attempt to classify 
business strategies taxonomically is given in the case study discussion of the Miles and 
Snow typology). Overall, there is a marked propensity for business strategy theorists to 




 The above is a simple typology of classification systems that sets out a 
conceptual dimension of induction / deduction and posits as polar types the taxonomy 
and typology as described above. Practice often creates a synthesis of the two, both in 
the origination and the subsequent development of the classification system. Bailey 
(1994) relates this to the ‘level’ of analysis, with the abstract/conceptual at one pole and 
the concrete/empirical at the other. He terms the intermediate or composite level  the 
‘Indicator’ or ‘Operational’ classification and we, thus, find that much of the 
classificatory systems in use in strategy, organisational sciences and social science in 
general as having the characteristics of both. See Figure 1.1. They tend to start as types 
or taxa, but, over time, are synthesised, as suitable empirical examples are found for 
types and higher levels of generalisation or composite, simplified measures are found 
for taxa.  
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 Consider, for example, the design of a market research questionnaire: there is 
inevitably some conceptual ontological and epistemological basis for the selection and 
definition of the population to be sampled, the data to be collected and the envisaged 
subsequent coding and analysis. This will invoke both typological and taxonomic 
considerations. The concepts of interest may be frequency of shopping trips, means of 
transport and average spend. In the composition of the stratified verbal categories 
( ‘daily’, ‘two or three times a week’, ‘weekly’…’never’, etc ) the prompts represent 
points on a univariate scale of frequency. However, the responses will comprise part of 
the empirical data for taxonomic analysis and a possible multivariate cluster will form a 
taxon within that analysis ( ‘two or three times a week’, ‘by car’ and ‘over £ 100 ’ – a 
taxon that might be labelled ‘Frequent, High Spender’ ). The taxonomy is derived from 
analysis of the ‘relevant’ data ~ we ask about a respondent’s car ownership since we 
impute some relationship with shopping habits; whereas we do not ask about shoe size, 
or education since we impute none. It all rests upon tacit theories.  
 
FIGURE 1.1. SYNTHETIC CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES. 
 
Epistemology  Original system Application /Development 
      Remains ( largely ) conceptual 
DEDUCTIVE  TYPOLOGY     TYPOLOGY 
  
Thought based.    Examples found 
Principles based. 
           
         
           
 
      Typifications found  
       
INDUCTIVE  TAXONOMY     TAXONOMY 




Source : Author, developed from K. Bailey, 1994. 
 
 What, however, this instrumentation achieves is often a seemingly plausible set 
of ‘measurements’ that suit a positivist approach to the subsequent handling of the 
investigatory process. It plays into a version of scientific epistemic practices based upon 
an ontology of atomistic natural or historic kinds, but inappropriate to the social realm, 
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misconception of some consequence. As Ackroyd & Fleetwood (2000) note, there is a 
tendency to confuse realism with a justification for treating social phenomena in 
research as if they were natural kinds. Such implicit positivistic assumptions often 
underpin the organisational and management science methodology literature, such as 
Bailey, and spills over into the treatment of business strategy classification schemes as 
is critiqued in the case studies. The base case this thesis explores is that our epistemic 
practices here are generally mismatched with the ontology of their material. 
  
7 CLASSIFICATION  AS  THEORY 
 
 There is another important overlay to the development of typologies, taxonomies 
and synthetic classifications in our epistemic practices. Insofar as a typology is a 
purposeful artefact created from theoretical concepts, it is itself a theoretical construct 
purportedly enabling explanation and prediction. Insofar as a taxonomy is developed 
from the particular to the general, it too represents a theoretical construct; one of 
generalisation. Paul Davidson Reynolds (1971), dealing with theory construction, 
recognised that a typology is a means of organising and classifying phenomena that 
entails some underlying theory as to what will be useful. (See also Doty & Glick 1994; 
McKelvey 1975 and Pinder & Moore, 1979 on the relationship between classification 
and theory development.) Reynolds, further, argues that all substantial, scientific 
knowledge of a theoretical nature is derived from sets of statements organised so as to 
constitute that theory. The statements can be organised in such a way that theory is 
arrived at by what is, in principle, one of only three routes. The first, the set-of-laws 
route does not concern us here and, since it involves relationships between concrete, 
measurable phenomena, few business strategy constructs are so derived. (An example, 
that might qualify, would be would be the ‘experience curve’ which relates one 
measurable, that of cumulative quantity produced, to another measurable, that of cost 
per unit ~ see Grant, 2002  pp253-5 for a brief summary). However, the concern here is 
with Reynolds’ other two routes – the axiomatic and the causal process forms. As 
described in the case studies, the Miles & Snow (1978) typology is a causal process 
based theory (the ‘adaptive cycle’), whilst the generic strategies of Porter (1980) are 
axiomatic based, drawing upon basic microeconomic reasoning (See Chapters 4 and 5). 
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 In the development of the corpus of knowledge that constitutes the field of 
business strategy there are strong positivist pressures to subject theory to empirical test. 
The positivist endeavour that underlies mainstream organisation and management 
science is to convert social phenomena into tractable types or taxa for quantitative 
analysis. Journals in the social sciences are replete with articles setting up hypotheses 
and subjecting them to statistical validation tests. So it is with business strategy 
classification. For example, Doty & Glick (1994) argue that for a typology to be useful 
in its role of simplifying, describing and explaining complex, latent phenomena the 
types must be fully developed and specified such that their first order, or observable, 
profiles can be measured and subjected to empirical test i.e. quantitative methods can be 
employed to ascertain the type’s validity. This, it will be seen, is a powerful factor in the 
development, extension and reification of the original classification schemes into what 
are synthetic (operational or indicator) classification constructs. Strategy is a field where 
relatively few replication studies have been published (Singh et al, 2003). However, one 
should also recognise, along with Hubbard et al (1998), that compared with the physical 
sciences, there is a lower prestige for external replication and replication with extension 
work in the study of strategic management. In some respects, therefore, the two most 
prominent business strategy classification schemes examined here are exceptions to the 
rule, since the follow-up literatures are so extensive. Yet, a review of the follow-up will 
reveal that the nature of the theory testing as regards these business strategy 
classification schemes is often based upon a misunderstanding of what such schemes 
represent. 
 
 The ontology of social kinds admits of the possibility of there being real social 
kinds. A realist approach to organisation and management science is to ask what causal 
structures and mechanisms must be operative in the world to produce the homologies 
we note therein. But, as discussed later, there are many different potential facets of 
similarity that one may observe. The challenge to our epistemic practice is to select 
those with the most potential utility.  It is when the classification systems that we adopt 
pick out types and taxa that reflect the relevant causal structures of the social world that 
our discipline can claim to have identified its kinds and can aspire to become a well-
founded, progressive science. For only then do our theories and our epistemic practices 
match the ontology of our subject material. 
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8 PLAN   OF  THESIS. 
 
 The remainder of the thesis comprises the following chapters: Next is an attempt 
to define the subject matter ‘business strategy’ and provides a summary of the various 
viewpoints ~ drawn from philosophy, linguistics and cognitive science ~ which 
underpin this analysis of attempts to provide generalised categorisations thereof. The 
following chapter provides a discussion of the ways in which classifications of various 
types are applied in this field. Then follow three specific case studies of attempts to 
classify business strategy that draw upon the theoretical framework provided in the 
preceding chapters. They are the Miles and Snow typology, Michael Porter’s generic 
strategies, and Henry Mintzberg’s comprehensive framework. (A further case study ~ 
Cliff Bowman’s ‘customer matrix’ and its incorporation in the ‘strategy clock’ ~ is 
provided in Appendix 4). Finally, certain findings and suggestions are presented as to 
the nature of this material and how current and future attempted conceptualisations of 
business strategy classification schemes might be presented and employed. 





BUSINESS STRATEGY: OBJECT AND LENSES. 
 
‘According to accommodationism, the real definitions of natural kind terms, and thus 
the reference relation, are determined by the (epistemic reliability enhancing) features 
of actual linguistic, classificatory and inferential practices…..The nature and reliability 
of such practices thus depends not only on the conceptual resources, theoretical 
commitments, and referential inclinations of the relevant practitioners but also on the 
actual reference-grounding causal interactions they have with their subject matter.’ 




 We can only intersubjectively know business strategies by a set of defining 
words (‘a short-haul, point to point, low cost airline’), or by an exemplar (‘like easyJet’) 
or in contradistinction (‘not a full service airline flying an integrated network between 
major airports’). There are many descriptions, both specific as employed by situated 
protagonists of strategy, or promulgated (as generalities) by the scientists of strategy, 
for intersubjective discourses. Like preparing a sample for microscopic examination, 
such descriptions attempt to pin down and stain relevant attributes to reveal an 
otherwise insubstantial concept as a  tractable target of inquiry; to make the intransitive 
object for detailed examination. It is, in particular, the promulgated general business 
strategy classification schemes that are at the centre of this work. So first, this chapter 
deals with the elusive nature of the manifest organisational behaviour patterns which 
general business strategy classification schemes seek to categorise and label. But, as 
Hacking (1981) points out, the image seen through a microscope is a product of mind; 
of the viewer learning how to see. The intransitive object and the observer ~ the 
transitive component of the pairing ~ create the representation. All knowledge is created 
from the perspective of the viewer and classification schemes are a means of sorting our 
perceptions under generalised descriptions. 
 
But, as will be explicated in the first two sections of this chapter, a business 
strategy is many-faceted and can be viewed from many different angles. So, this is one 
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of those microscopes with a revolving eyepiece containing, in this case, three different 
lenses. This one object can be viewed from many different perspectives, here reduced to 
three root disciplines: – philosophy, psychology and linguistics. Concepts are presented 
under these three chapter sub-headings (4-6) that throw light upon the processes 
involved in creating classification schemes and in categorising abstract social kinds. 
Looking in depth at the origins, promulgation and adoption of the business strategy 
classifications that form our case studies, gains from an understanding of the relevant 
contributions that these three disciplines can lend to the viewer. And it is in their 
application to the field of business strategy – one where consideration of such matters 
has been in little evidence to date – that the contribution of this thesis lies. 
 
Any object which falls under a description, whether material or mental, has two 
fundamental properties:- (a) its intension ~ what makes the thing what it is; for a 
conceptual item, its meaning; ~ and (b) its extension ~ the extent or range of objects 
which properly fall under this intension. If the object lacks the intension it is outside the 
extension. But objects can be identical (atoms), much alike (acorns), very broadly 
sharing some feature (assets), or almost indefinably similar (impressionism in art). For 
most natural material objects ~ water, tiger ~ the intension and the extension are fairly 
unproblematic for most of us. However, even here, when absolute precision is needed 
the intension and, hence, extension have to be specified e.g. as regards purity and 
isotopic forms (sea water ? heavy water ?) and hybrids (tigon ?). When it comes to 
mental objects ~ peace, politician, poverty ~ the extension has to be considered with 
care since meanings (intensions) shade into one another and, without the physicality to 
determine the ‘thisness’ of the intension and thus the edges of the extension, we rely 
upon context, or a formal definition. Thus, the extension of ‘politician’ is different 
depending upon whether the discourse concerns thanking an aunt for a Christmas 
present, or how one earns one’s living. But, even here, there are many ways of 
regarding qualifying individuals – A local councillor ? A cross-bencher neurosurgeon in 
the House of Lords ? A non-elected ‘policy wonk’ ? etc. The term business strategy, as 
we shall see, has no clear intension or extension. In what follows the description of 
business strategy is explored by looking first at its extension and then at its intension. 
This is not as an attempt to settle an age-old subject of contention among strategists, but 
in order to provide some contextualisation to the object under the eyepiece. 
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2 THE OBJECT – BUSINESS STRATEGY CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES. 
 PART ONE – EXTENSION. 
 
 The nature of social science is that many of its more abstract objects are held in 
mind, not just by their tokens, nor their exemplars, but in our conceptualisations of what 
constitutes their essence and lies beneath those tokens or examples. Familiar 
illustrations of such abstract social objects would be democracy, poverty or identity; we 
can identify examples or symptoms, yet generally construe there to be something that 
transcends these and represents the core of the notion. This is so even where that core 
essence is inchoate or only vaguely imagined. Business strategy is a more specialised, 
but similarly abstract notion and it requires some initial preparation to get the object 
somewhat more clearly into focus. Strategy affords different approaches to its content. 
In this section the general nature of strategy and the particular field of business strategy 
are delineated, largely by differentiating ‘business strategy’ from adjacent terms. In the 




First, ‘strategy’ is itself a term that is polyvalent, with origins in military conflict, 
indicating an orchestrated and concerted effort to achieve strategic (i.e. top level, overall) 
objectives or aims in a particular manner. Where strategic aims are differentiated from 
tactics by virtue of a greater resource and spatio-temporal dimension. Tactics are a 
means of achieving strategies. A strategy can be predicated of or attributed to an 
individual, a position, a top team or the whole enterprise. It is applied in organisational 
science to all types of enterprises, covering large and small, private and public, for 
profit or not-for-profit organisations. Following the train of events, or emergent strategy, 
following the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico we can talk of Tony Haywood’s strategy, 
the Chief Executive’s strategy, the BP Board’s strategy, and BP’s strategy. The point to 
note is that strategy is something intentional possessed of an individual agent or group 
of agents and intentional objects are neither material nor stable. Immaterial, unstable 
objects are not easy to identify and classify in a ‘scientific’ manner. 
 
Secondly, whilst in broad usage a strategy can be predicated of anyone’s 
intentionality, the more common understanding of the term is that the strategy is 
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formulated and promulgated by someone, or some group, able to direct the actions of 
others. It can be represented as the command, the policy document, the plan of action 
issued from the top of some social structure that others are to follow. So predicating a 
strategy of any social organisation is suggesting that the individuals that comprise the 
organisation possess a collective sense of concerted direction or grasp of overall 
objectives sanctioned by the authority and status of the agents that have formulated it. 
The absence of strategy is anarchy. But the presence of strategy is not guaranteed to be 
efficacious, or productive of intended results. Authority can be contested or usurped; the 
rhetoric may not be matched by the reality of resources; execution can be flawed; and 
circumstances seldom unfold as expected. In other words, even where perceptible 
evidence of strategy is available, such evidence must be interrogated with care and the 
association between some token of the strategy and its reality is by no means to be taken 
for granted. 
 
2.2 Business strategy. 
 
 Our research interest is ‘business strategy’. As the additional word implies, the 
context here is (a) one of a commercial organisation operating in a market place, (b) to 
some degree at least, in competition with other organisations for customers and 
resources. Albeit the discussion of strategy in this context is likely to offer some 
relevance to organisations lacking one, or even both, these conditions there are other 
terms that might more clearly be appropriate. ‘Organisational strategy’ is a broader term 
that would include; Governmental and public organisations, including educational 
establishments; other private not-for-profit organisations; or non-competitive, yet 
commercial, organisations lacking competitors or where competition is controlled by 
some regulatory body. So there is one core meaning to our use of business strategy that 
stands at the centre of this discussion and is separated out from the broader term 
organisational strategy. None the less, observations relating to the classification of 
business strategies will, mutatis mutandis, apply to other attempts to classify 
organisations (and much else besides). Whilst the Miles and Snow typology and 
Porter’s generic strategies are both described here as business strategy classification 
schemes, the former is more pliable to the broader field of organisational strategy as a 
whole than is the latter. 
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 There is, in addition, another meaning to ‘business strategy’, certainly when the 
term is used by the linguistic community of strategists in contraposition to the term 
‘corporate strategy’. This is to indicate that, whether the organisation as a whole 
comprises one business seeking to achieve its goals in one market, or whether the 
organisation comprises a number of separate business units operating in different 
markets within the same holding structure, there are two levels of strategic decision-
making in play. The first, corporate strategy, is about where to compete; which 
businesses or markets to be in. The second, business strategy, is about how to compete 
in the specific business; seen as a market for products or services in which alternative 
suppliers compete for the demand of one, few or many potential customers. Business 
strategy is our focus. Here, the observation that what is claimed of business strategy 
classification schemes is likely to hold relevance to corporate strategy classification 
schemes applies a fortiori to the similar claim regarding organisational strategy made in 
the preceding paragraph. In fact, the third of the case studies, Mintzberg’s 
comprehensive framework, as the name implies, embraces both business and corporate 
strategy.  
 
Other seemingly contiguous terms might be ‘industry strategy’, ‘industry recipe’ 
and ‘strategic group’. The first term usually implies collective action by firms. The 
notion of an industry is not merely about shared markets, but also, usually, shared 
production technologies, and it is not unusual for this commonality to be reflected in 
joint action by business units through some trade or research association to either 
defend their common interests against some threat or to pool capabilities to exploit 
some opportunity. For example, firms in the music industry collaborating in an 
‘industry strategy’ to prevent or deter illegal downloads. The second term ‘industry 
recipe’ is associated with J C Spender (1989) and refers to the fact that there is often a 
common pattern to be found within an industry as to ways to compete ~ a generalisation 
of strategies found at the level of the industry. That is undoubtedly a business strategy 
categorisation, but one specific to a certain industry, whereas our focus is upon more 
general schemes. The third contiguous term is ‘strategic group’ (Dess & Davis, 1984; 
Hawes & Crittenden, 1984; Ketchen & Shook, 1996; Porac et al 1989; Porter, 1979). 
This generally refers to a number of firms operating in the same market in a similar 
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fashion, often as regards some important functional strategy such as high / low R&D 
spend or capital investment, or a broad / narrow portfolio of products or spread of 
markets served. Again, this is undoubtedly a business strategy category, but is both 
specific to the industry context and is a sub-set, or variety, of the species of business 
strategy that is being identified here.  
 
Finally here, there is the issue of what may be termed the ‘entrepreneurial 
strategy’ overlay. A single person (entrepreneur) contracting with other agents at a 
formal level will have both a business strategy and a corporate strategy. It is simply 
what he or she does, or instructs others to do, to achieve the self-set goals for the chosen 
line of business, in the light of emerging circumstances. Whilst this  undoubtedly 
includes a business strategy on the part of the agent, it does not necessarily call for the 
degree of deliberation in depth nor articulation in managerial discourse associated with 
the treatment of business strategy afforded in most texts on the subject. On the other 
hand, it is not unusual for the entrepreneur to require start-up capital from third parties. 
This, most decidedly, will require a careful and persuasive articulation of the business’s 
intended strategy as part of the business plan, complete with dates and quantities. The 
‘entrepreneurial strategy’ / ‘business strategy’ border is unclear. However, the literature 
recognises a distinction, and it is common to encounter business strategy and 
entrepreneurship being taught as separate elements of, say, an MBA. Moreover, it is 
evident from reviewing the literature that there is a large company orientation to the 
theory and examples used in discussing business (and corporate) strategy. Accordingly, 
we here construe a business strategy to be that operated by an established business with 
a number of employees.  
 
2.3 Functional strategies. 
 
A key feature of a strategy is that it is an overarching sense of direction and goal 
for the organisation as a whole. But, of course, any complex entity will have 
components and these parts will also require motivation. Strategy is, therefore, also an 
input to and guideline for the various sub-divisions of the organisation that contribute to 
the whole. In the case of business strategy it is conventional to term the strategies 
operated by these subsidiary units or components of the whole as ‘departmental’, 
‘functional’ or ‘divisional’ strategies. So, another conceptualisation of a business 
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strategy is that it provides the glue that coordinates and reconciles these functional 
strategies and enables the organisation to act coherently. Or, put another way, a lack of 
success in providing balance, effectiveness and focus of organisational capabilities is 
generally held to indicate an inadequate business strategy. 
 
Whilst this description implies an apparent ease of discrimination between a 
business strategy and a functional strategy, in practice it can be more difficult to make 
the distinction. Where, for example, the functional strategy is particularly strong it can 
dominate and invert the relationship with the business strategy. If, for example, the 
managers of production resources dominate the organisation’s strategy-making, it is not 
unknown for a functional strategy, for example, to maximise output, to thereby become 
the over-riding aim of the other functions (to expand distribution channels, introduce 
sales incentives, etc) to the overall detriment of organisational balance and long-term 
success. It is a feature of Bowman’s ‘customer matrix’ that, when presented by others as 
the ‘strategy clock’ (see Appendix 4), it privileges sales growth over a more balanced 
approach to business strategy. 
 
2.4 Stakeholder strategies and the strategy process. 
 
 It is assumed in the above discussion that a coherent strategy can be formulated 
and implemented since all the agents involved in setting and executing the strategy are 
of a like mind and their authority unquestioned. This can be very far from the truth. 
First, it must be acknowledged that external stakeholders can be very influential in the 
strategy-making process. The classic potential division of incentives between the 
owners or shareholders of the organisation and the professional managers employed to 
run the business is exhaustively explored in the literature referred to as ‘the agency 
problem’. But, in addition, it can be that major suppliers or customers may have direct 
and powerful influence upon strategy. Further, the notion that all the internal agents 
involved in setting strategy will have the same view as to the desired direction for the 
organisation is hopelessly idealistic. Strategy distributes rewards and challenges, 
allocates resources and prestige, promotes and relegates cherished ambitions and 
determines careers. It is a political as well as a rational process. The mantra will be 
shared organisational success, but the motivations are inevitably personal to some 
greater or lesser degree. 
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 The analytical, political and managerial processes by which business strategies 
are formulated, executed and controlled is not central to this enquiry. It is an important 
strand in the work of Henry Mintzberg, but figures as no more than a backdrop to the 
case study of his comprehensive strategy (as product, not process) classification scheme. 
Processes are, however, very much the subject of contemporary writings about business 
strategy; a growing literature often labelled ‘the practice turn’ (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 
1992; Jarzabkowski, 2004; Jarzabowski & Wilson, 2006; Mueller et al, 2007; Seidl, 
2007). This has yielded much by way of contextualised observations and consideration 
of their implications for management, for example for change management processes. 
But such work has not, so far, produced well-known formal strategy process 
classification schemes (See, however, Goold & Campbell, 1987). That decision-making 
regarding business strategy is a contested process of power and persuasion is not denied, 
merely that we choose here to focus upon the outputs of that discourse. Product, rather 
than process, is the core focus of the business strategy classification schemes in our case 
studies. 
 
 The distinction between a process and a product classification is, however, not 
always that easy to draw. For example, the well-known global / local strategies of 
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1998) concern both the processes of globalisation in large 
multinational organisations and the product in terms of organisational structures, 
missions and strategic orientations of strategic business units. 
 
2.5 Parallels with biology; phenotypes, genotypes, and environmental change. 
 
 One has to acknowledge that the paradigm of classification and how it works is 
often the lay conception of biological taxonomy. The parallels between biological and 
organisational classification have been noted before (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 
McKelvey, 1979). There are three important points to register here. First, is that when 
we are looking at causes of homogeneity among strategies there is no equivalent to the 
reliable (mostly) replication process found in the biological sphere. One exceedingly 
powerful reason why a starling resembles another starling, is because at the 
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physiological level they are made the same way from the same sets of chromosomes – 
they are genotypes. Organisations do not replicate in such straightforward (if complex) 
manner. Each is sui generis, and the result of conscious design choices; there is no 
equivalent of a mechanistic set of blueprints or genotypes for the organisation and 
management scientist to discover. However, long before scientists had unravelled the 
unseen DNA base to species, dating back to the time of Linnaeus, biologists had 
developed an effective classification system based upon the reproductive systems of 
plants and animals and their visible structural features, body patterns, etc. coupled with 
observational data on their behavioural characteristics, often linked to environmental 
factors. This, the phenotype, was a satisfactory system. Thus, it is not too far fetched to 
think of reasons in the social sphere why organisations, albeit architects of their own 
structures and strategic behaviour, might not select similar patterns to one another; i.e. 
that there may well be ‘natural’ forces at work for the organisational and management 
scientist to reveal ~ organisational blueprints or ‘phenotypes’. 
 
 The second point is that biological classification (‘taxonomy’ or ‘systematics’) 
is not the placid consensual field we generally imagine it to be. Indeed the principles 
upon which biological classification systems should be based are frequently the source 
of much contention between those who would base it strictly upon genotypes, or on 
phenotypes, or on clades (line of descent from common ancestors) or some pragmatic 
mixture of all (Dupré, 2002; Wilson, 1999). In this there seems to be a trade off between 
principles and pragmatism which may well be a more appropriate model for 
organisational and management science. Thirdly, it should be noted that anthropological 
studies of biological classification in tribal societies (Medin & Atran, 1999) has 
demonstrated that ‘folksonomies’, or primitive naming of familiar flora and fauna; (a) 
often complement the systems developed by scientists and; (b) match them for 
effectiveness. Indicating, perhaps, that close familiarity and observation has a very 
strong potential contribution to effective generalisations in the social sciences too. 
 
 Another parallel between the field of organisational science and that of biology, 
is that of a successful fit between organism or organisation and its environment as a 
determinant of survival and growth. In organisation and management science achieving 
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‘fitness’ is ascribed to two complementary processes. Internal adaptation of the firm to 
the requirements of the environment (see Miles & Snow’s ‘adaptive cycle’, Chapter 4) 
and environmental selection favouring those firms that best meet external resource 
landscapes. The latter perspective is closely associated with the works of John Freeman 
and Michael Hannan (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977 & 1986) regarding the ‘population 
ecology’ of organisations, and aspects of this work regarding ‘niche’ strategies are 
relevant to later discussion of Porter’s generic strategies (Chapter 5). However, rates of 
change in the social sphere are far faster than found in most biology (with the possible 
exception of viral mutation), such that adaptive environmental fit is a very potent arbiter 
of competitive success. Thus, classificatory frameworks in organisational science are 
likely to prove less enduring than those found in the field of biology. That is to say that 
there are potentially sound ontological reasons for the waxing and waning of particular 
business strategies and their classification schemes that supervene upon the also well-
established and separate fact that such conceptualisations are likely also to be subject to 
the fads and fashions of management science (Abrahamson, 1996; Abrahamson & 
Fairchild, 1999; Scarborough & Swan, 2001). 
 
2.6 Classification structures and the biological mind-set. 
 
 Implicit in the above explication is a picture of a branching hierarchical 
classification system (‘genus et differentiae’), as applied in biology, extended by 
analogy to social science. In biology we refer to levels;- varieties, species, genus, 
phylum, domain, kingdom and the like; and we need something similar for strategy. 
There is, however, no ‘overall picture’ in the social sciences as there is in the Linnaean 
system in biology. We, thus, have to place business strategy somewhere on this mental 
structure. In empirical studies of real language classification hierarchies (Lakoff, 1987; 
Taylor, 2003) it is found that there is a ‘basic level’ (cat or chair). It is the one most 
frequently used in general discourse and the one first called to mind when subjects are 
asked to suggest an exemplar. (It is often also the shortest word in the hierarchy that 
contains it). This contrasts with the higher or superordinate generic classification, ~ a 
hyperonym ~ (‘household pet’ or ‘furniture’) or lower level, subordinate category 
(‘Siamese cat’ or ‘rocking chair’). 
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 For convenience, and somewhat arbitrarily, we have selected the specific 
choices of strategy (low cost, defender) as the basic or species level, allowing for 
possible industry recipes / strategic groups (‘no frills’ or ‘flag carrier’) at a subordinate, 
sub-species (varietal) level.  It is, thus, the ‘genus’ of business strategy as a whole that is 
the superordinate term, the hyperonym,  whose extension we are examining. It is the 
superordinate term ‘business strategy (genus)’ that is broken down or segmented into 
basic individual ‘business strategy (species)’ categories, in our classification schemes. 
Compared with the ‘basic’ level of species in biology, however, we have a fairly 
elevated conception of the extension of business strategy per se. This, it must be 
stressed, is at the most abstract and generalised level of similarities across all industries 
where contestable markets are found. Our unit of analysis is the small set of similar 
individual strategies found at the core of a vast range of different types of competitive 
contexts. These are highly abstract homologies found across all types of industries. 
Thus the biological analogy of species / genus could prove misleading in one respect. 
We are looking at something much broader; equivalent, perhaps, in biology to the 
carnivore / herbivore / omnivore categories. 
 
 Ali Khalidi, (1998) terms such high level hyperonyms ‘cross-cutting kinds’. His 
paper refers to the phase categories of ‘gas’, ‘liquid’ and ‘solid’ that cut across the 
Periodic Table, and the entomological categories of ‘larva’, ‘pupa’ and ‘imago’ which 
cut across the Linnaean categories. They are, claims, Ali Khalidi perfectly sound 
classifications that provide greater inferential power and scientific utility than would be 
the case had they been deemed merely a nominal convenience. The same argument is 
advanced here in relation to the behavioural kinds of business strategy classification 
schemes examined in the case studies. 
 
2.7 Business strategy classification schemes as extensions of fuzzy categories. 
 
Our approach to focusing the target object that is the business strategy genus is 
the identification of the individual business firms or business units that comprise the 
relevant population set within organisations as a whole. In more formal terms the 
‘extension’ of  the business strategy genus is all those organisations to which a business 
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strategy can properly be predicated. The question in hand is whether this organisation is 
one of the set that qualifies as having a ‘business strategy’ rather than some other type 
of strategy ? Will it necessarily have a predicate feature that can be identified as a 
business strategy ? As intimated, the borders between business strategy,  including the 
strategies of strategic business units and other types of organisational strategy, are more 
easily roughly conceptualised than precisely defined. Furthermore, the object of study is 
not the processes by which business strategies are formulated, implemented and 
controlled, but the product of that process ~ the business strategy itself with all its 
contextual idiosyncrasies. This task can be approached by use of indicative distinctions 
as those outlined above, but like Wittgenstein’s ‘games’, in part, requires in addition a 
reference to background knowledge to make the pragmatic judgments that prove 
unavoidable. Our extension then is not that found in a classical classification system of 
categories each with a defined set of necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure clear 
cut membership ~ no ambiguity; the entity is either in or out. It is instead what is 
sometimes referred to as a prototype, or an exemplar, or a ‘fuzzy set’ category; one with 
blurred boundaries and degrees of membership (Lakoff, 1987; Ragin, 2008; Smithson & 
Verkuilen, 2006; Taylor, 2003).  
 
‘Organisations with business strategies’ is a categorisation with a graded internal 
structure (not an either / or one with a single defining feature); and some organisations 
are more central to the concept while others are on the periphery. So, returning to the 
analogy of the microscope, the sample we prepare is from a population with fuzzy 
boundaries and, when examining it, we need to be aware of the pool from which it was 
drawn and whether we have drawn from the centre of that pool, or from the edge, or if it 
comprises a full cross-section of degrees of membership. But, when mounted on the 
slide, there is another question: what is it that we are looking for in the behaviour of 
these organisations ? If we are seeking to differentiate within this population by the 
distinctive versions of business strategy ~ to speciate it ~ which particular aspect of 
behaviour, what attributes and properties are we looking at ? In what distinctive ways 
can a business strategy present itself ? We must now introduce the second element of 
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3 THE OBJECT – BUSINESS STRATEGY CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES. 




To re-cap. If some general property ‘X’ - like having a business strategy – is 
projectable to individual cases – only certain types of organisations can have a business 
strategy - there are two questions to be examined. The first, what kinds of things are 
‘X’ ? or the extension of X. This has been explored at some length above. We now turn 
to the second question; are there different ways of being ‘X’ ? This is termed the 
intension of ‘X’. Some kinds of things have a single determining feature that makes it 
what it is – a gas is either argon or not-argon, never a type of argon. Argon’s extension 
and intension coincide. But a colour or a dog can be one of many different types. We 
are able to identify, not just graded membership, as discussed above as regards fuzzy 
boundaries of extension, but also variants of the way the property itself is manifested in 
different individuals (green, blue, etc; greyhound, spaniel, etc):- a range of intensions. A 
business strategy genus is a general property (as colour is a general property) but can 
only be exemplified by a particular choice of business strategy species as to how to 
compete (just as green is a particular choice of colour). Our main interest is in, and our 
case studies deal with, attempts to generalise and categorise in a relational structure the 
options available;- a business strategy classification scheme. 
 
The intension refers to the content of the concept or category. Its meaning. The 
final research object here is not just the population of organisations that can properly 
possess a business strategy but is, more importantly, the sub-division or segmentation of 
the contents of their business strategies into a limited number of discernibly different 
types of strategy. We are examining generalisations arranged as categories in a 
relational structure which delineates them as much by relation to others as by the 
content itself (just as our understanding of green is as much determined by its 
relationship to blue and yellow as it is to the wavelength of light  ~ Lakoff, 1987; Taylor, 
2003). This relational structure of speciation of business strategies is evidenced in the 
frequency with which such classification schemes are presented, not as a set of 
descriptions, but in the familiar four box quadrant format e.g. Ansoff (1965); Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, (1987); Porter, 1985. 





 To address this, the different characteristics of strategic behaviour need to be 
examined in what will be characterised as a more ‘perspectival’ approach to the strategy 
content i.e. intension. All knowledge is created from the perspective of the viewer and 
concepts and classifications are a means of sorting our perceptions under descriptions. 
We are now looking at the various species that can be found under the genus of business 
strategy. However, whilst there are natural mechanisms that give rise to speciation and 
homogeneity of life forms in the biological realm, each business organisation is sui 
generis, and the homologating tendencies of technology, law, economics and culture 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Elder-Vass, 2010; Oliver, 1991) are less procrustean than 
those of DNA. Put another way, the scope for differences between the individual agents, 
their command of resources and economic and cultural settings of businesses is greater 
than the nature / nurture setting for biological similarities. Sticking with the analogy of 
biology, scientists hold different interpretations of the ontological nature of species. 
Biologists do not conventionally seek to classify by mode of survival and growth and, 
when they do, we find that alternative viewpoints can be applied and are appropriate to 
different questions. It could be by what they eat, (carnivores, herbivores, omnivores); or 
where they live, (aerial, arboreal, aquatic, etc.). Another key distinction, probably 
closest to strategy, is that of predator or prey ? and how, (i.e. what strategy is employed), 
to catch prey or avoid being caught (speed, camouflage, poison, entrapment, etc). The 
point being illustrated here is that a wide cross-section sample of animals can be 
interrogated and sorted in different ways according to what question is being asked of 
the individual animals. This same ‘perspectival question’ applies to business strategy 
classification. 
3.3 Business strategy intension offers many facets. 
 Business strategy is a notoriously multifaceted object (Bakir & Bakir, 2006; 
Chaffee, 1985). It can be viewed in different ways and the difficulty stems from three 
main issues. The first is that strategy is abstract rather than tangible ~ a sense of 
direction that, unless deliberately formulated and expressed, can be hard for other 
parties to discern, or even the top management team to articulate. It is ‘fuzzy’ in 
intension (Rittel & Webber 1973), as well as extension, and is often ‘latent’, detectable 
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only indirectly (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968). Some even deny business strategy any 
ontological ground; as a hyperreal simulacra (Grandy & Mills, 2004) or ‘an abstraction 
with no obvious referent’ (Gergen & Whitney 1996). In some instances, businesses will 
make formal plans and issue public statements as to their intended strategy; to their 
employees for obvious reasons, or to other stakeholders for other objectives. Such 
statements tend to contain a strong element of public relations and should be viewed 
with some suspicion as to true motivation and realism; what is intended for public 
consumption and true, covert intent can be different, and both can differ from what is 
brought to fruition (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). On the other hand there may be no 
statement or plan, whether overt or covert. Strategy is largely extemporised and is a 
reaction to external circumstances rather than formal planning, but this may, 
nevertheless, represent a coherent pattern of organisational responses. The only 
evidence of strategic behaviour here is past behaviour, and that can be misleading as to 
the future in a number of ways. 
 
  The second issue is that, not only is the abstraction that is strategy hard to focus 
upon, but there is variety in the position from which the perspective can be taken. There 
are rival views of how we should construe the core nature of strategy. There is a copious 
business strategy literature dealing with the problem of defining strategy that recognises 
it as multifaceted and listing different perspectives thereon. For example, Arnoldo Hax 
(1990) writes of the six dimensions of strategy; Henry Mintzberg and his co-authors 
(1998) describe five definitions of strategy and ten schools of thought or perspectives; 
Richard Whittington (1993) describes four generic approaches to strategy; and one 
could go on at some length. (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992 refer to the ‘crazy quilt of 
perspectives’). These examples illustrate the contested nature of the subject matter of 
(business) strategy and explains the difficulty of situating this work and the discussion 
of ‘perspectives’ or ‘dimensions’. 
 
The third issue is that there is little consensus as to what we should consider a 
‘business strategy’ to be: what are we looking for ? Is it the process of arriving at 
decisions affecting the long term future growth and prosperity of the organisation ? is it 
the content of the ‘strategic plan’ (however arrived at or manifested) ? is it the sum of 
the functional plans ? is it the contextual reading of what things the organisation should 
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do in order to grow and prosper ? or to satisfy its stakeholders ? In addition it must be 
recognised that a business strategy is so intimately contextualised in the organisation’s 
external environment, constrained by its resource endowment and is so dependent upon 
its unique history that it is seldom articulated in terms that can be generalised. The path 
dependency and ‘bespoke’ nature of strategy is such that its vocabulary of discourse is 
highly context specific, and the field is not effectively professionalised such that 
appropriate terminology is sanctified by formal or institutional definition.  
 
In this vague and elusive field of business strategy, the management and organisational 
scientist is hard put to discriminate any properties as strategic elements or indicators 
identifiable for a single business, let alone to be able to generalise across businesses to 
create and promulgate a strategy classification scheme for discourse and intersubjective 
use amongst strategists in different organisations be they businesses or academies 
(Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2006). Yet, notwithstanding the above, as pointed out in 
chapter 1, the ability to intersubjectively discriminate its kinds is a key development if a 
field of interest is to be a ‘science’. Accordingly, certain schemes for strategy 
classification have been adopted within the community of practice and in formal 
pedagogy thanks to the contributions of a number of academics and the incorporation of 
their schemes in research and in teaching. Two of the most familiar and successful 
schemes are the ‘typology’ put forward by Miles & Snow (1978) and the ‘generic 
strategies’ of Michael Porter (1980, 1985). These, together with the lesser-known 
comprehensive framework of Henry Mintzberg (1988) form the bedrock of our 
empirical exploration of this topic in the case studies. However, the ostensible 
properties of a business strategy, those that determine its classification, are just not 
definable in the necessary and sufficient conditions expected of a classical, scientific 
classification scheme. So what we are looking at in the case studies are not inadequate 
or botched attempts at the task, but bold attempts at the very challenging; there can be 
no counsel of perfection here. 
 
3.4 ‘Perspectives’ versus ‘lenses’. 
 
 Furthermore, we must now confront the problem of employing near synonyms.  
As discussed above, there are often incommensurable interpretations of the nature of 
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strategy that prove genuine obstacles, at times, to full intersubjective communication 
between those engaged in strategy formulation. But this is not the place to develop that 
theme. For the rejection of ‘perspective’ or ‘dimension’ and substitution of ‘lens’ and 
the analogy of the microscope as offered here is intended to break with the 
presuppositions accompanying associations with such terms in strategy discourse. When 
describing the viewpoints adopted in this chapter, we are dealing with a more 
fundamental level of distinction. What is going on when we generalise and categorise 
abstract social objects ? This is the question explored here, albeit with particular 
reference to the application of these principles or concepts to the phenomena of strategy.  
 
 We are here drawing upon various concepts from different disciplines dealing 
with the general process of classification of abstract concepts. By and large, that 
literature does not engage with management and organisational science, nor 
organisational and management science with that literature. The forthcoming discussion 
is about the underlying meanings of the terminology deployed when discussing business 
strategy classification schemes, fundamental concepts which originate in disciplines 
outside organisational and management science: what philosophy, psychology and 
linguistics, in particular, offer us by way of conceptual tools for analysing such schemes. 
Notions that will help us to grasp what is going on when we postulate business strategy 
classification schemes. So, is business strategy a philosophical concept, a psychological 
construct, or a linguistic contrivance ? It is all three, and, given its causal powers in 
human affairs, much more. No wonder it is difficult to bring into focus. 
 
3.5  What are we saying here ?   
 
 In Chapter One it was established that having a good set of kinds is a 
fundamental requirement for any progressive science and that, despite the problems, it is 
worth pursuing the task of finding sound classification systems in social sciences in 
general and organisation and management science in particular. This chapter has, so far, 
explored the difficulties of pinning down the concept of business strategy:- of 
differentiating it from other types of organisational strategy and thus settling its 
extension; of determining the nature of the types of business strategy that the 
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classification schemes will try to pin down, the various intensions potentially embraced 
within that extension; and locating a notion of business strategy classification in a 
notional hierarchy of ‘genus’ and ‘species’. We have argued that business strategy is 
‘fuzzy’ in both extension and intension and that, accordingly, the application of straight-
forward presumptions of scientific classifications of natural objects by means of 
definitions of necessary and sufficient conditions are highly problematic. We are here 
trying to carve out a particular way examining this abstract social object; one that has 
not hitherto been explored in depth. If pushed to define a business strategy, we adopt as 
a working definition, the following:- 
 
‘ A business strategy is a local, intersubjectively agreed means by which a 
business unit achieves coherence and coordination of future activities in seeking 
fulfilment of its overall objectives in the face of its interpretation of the salient 
commercial environment.’ 
 
And a definition of a business strategy classification scheme (our object) as:- 
 
‘A relational structure of conceptual and generalised business strategy 
categories, or types, asserted, or assumed, to be relevantly defined and arranged for 
intersubjective use, pertinent to the efficient sorting and consideration of alternative 
choices of business strategy.’ 
 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, we explicate the various concepts to be 
deployed in the analysis that will follow in Chapter 3 and in the case studies. These 
concepts we have assigned to three root disciplines and termed these ‘lenses’ through 
which the phenomena of business strategy classification schemes will be examined, 
recognising that there is little that these lenses reveal that is particular to business 
strategy. These are concepts appropriate to an informed discussion of abstract social 
objects in general. The three are philosophy, psychology and linguistics. 
 
Note that there is a fairly arbitrary selection of which conceptualisation of 
classification processes is selected for ascription to whichever of the three disciplines. 
In large measure they address similar issues from slightly different perspectives. Yet 
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another instance of fuzzy categories. As far as possible, the notional allocations here are 
cognisant of the main authors’ own departmental allegiances. Of course, go back to 
earlier centuries and they are all philosophers, for want of recognition of psychology or 
linguistics as separate disciplines. Whilst on the other hand, there are contemporary 
linguists and psychologists whose writings about the philosophical underpinnings to 
their work are of most interest to this enquiry. (We are in enough trouble classifying 
business strategies, without digressing into the demarcation of the disciplinary 
ownership of these concepts). 
 
4 THE  PHILOSOPHY  LENS 
 
This section develops some of the more important concepts and terminology 
regarding classification in general, building upon Chapter 1.4.’s ‘preliminaries’. It then 
examines in greater depth five important contributions that one can assign to the field:- 
Wittgenstein on ‘language games’ and ‘family resemblance’; the descriptivist 
contribution of the analytic philosophers and their realist critics (Kripke and Putnam) on 
the question of denotation; Hacking’s interactive kinds; Millikan’s treatment of 





Essentialism can be traced back to the ancient Greeks. It is the belief that what 
makes an entity or phenomena a type of something, what makes it belong in a category, 
is the possession of some inherent characteristic ‘essence’ common to all members of 
that category. By this account similarity amongst things and phenomena is not 
accidental, but caused by some essential component of being. This essence, whatever 
form it takes, is the necessary and sufficient condition for membership of a category. 
Kinds are given to us by natural powers or human agency or social structures or some 
other causal force, that would be operative in the absence of human knowledge that 
such exist, i.e. that things naturally belong to appropriate categories is not dependent 
upon our recognition that this is so. Essentialism is, thus, associated with a realist 
worldview. It provides a stable ontological basis of kindhood that a visitor from Venus 
would also recognise as operative and useful. It is up to us in our scientific activities to 
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discover and categorise what is ‘out there’ in the natural or social realm. Science, 
including social science, progresses most when it is sure of the ontological basis of its 
categories.  
 
A purist essentialism would posit only a kindhood that is eternal and invariable, 
(more or less), such as might apply to electrons or stable chemical elements. This belief 
poses few problems in relation to some natural kinds – argon, with its characteristic, or 
essential, atomic structure would exist in the atmosphere as a gas whether or not we had 
discovered it there. Venus was a planet aeons before mankind had named it and 
discovered its planetary motion. When it comes to biological kinds a strict requirement 
for immutable essences is more difficult to sustain, (Boyd, 1999b; Dupré, 2002). The 
positing of impersonal, mind-independent ‘essences’ of artefacts or social kinds such as 
armchair or architect is vastly more challenging. Artefactual, social or institutional 
kinds cannot aspire to the natural essences of elements or planetary status. The concept 
of an eternal and invariable essence has to give way to a more contingent, 
contextualised essence, but, even here, some form of ‘social essentialism’ is tenable 
where there are ideals or prototypical armchairs or architects as tenable notions of some 
irreducible essential properties of ‘armchairness’ or being an ‘architect’ means being 
registered as such. 
 
It will be suggested in the next chapter, that an abstract social kind can be taken 
under the umbrella belief in essences as ‘motivated’ by some teleological purpose, be 
that the unaided nature of human agency and institutional structures, or the will of God, 
or the natural way of things. That is to say that the homogeneities we note in social 
objects, be they tangible or intangible phenomena, are the product of forces that brought 
them into being and shaped their way of being.  Organisations as a whole are produced 
and shaped by a varied range of non-trivial forces. Hence the concern to define with 
care those organisations of which a business strategy can be appropriately predicated. 
For here, at least, a set of forces loosely described as market regulation and competition 
might be claimed as causal in creating meaningful, generalised, cross-sectoral categories 
of business strategies. Further, it is suggested below under ‘psychological essentialism’, 
that there is powerful predisposition amongst humans from childhood to assume that 
our categories and kinds are the result of possessing some unknown, inherent essence. It 
is hard to erase any trace of essentialism from our consideration of categories. 





 The alternative, polar extreme, is the belief that the separation of entities and 
phenomena into categories is entirely arbitrary and subjective. It is the work of human 
projects such as science and communal convenience such as language, and this can vary 
over time, space and culture. Individuals are all that exist, but we can find similarities 
among them and it serves our purposes to combine them into categories in cognition 
and discourse. Similarity here lies in the conceptions of the observer, but a culture or 
scientific community shares notions and terminology for intersubjective exchanges. As 
such, a kind or category can be said to exist in the collective mind. This is ‘nominalism’ 
and can be traced back to the Middle Ages, (Hacking, 2002(a)) but was articulated in 
more modern form in John Locke’s Essay concerning human understanding (1690). 
Locke viewed it as the task of science to reveal any essences that underlie similarities, 
but since contemporary efforts had not provided convincing results, all that was 
available were nominalist categories. Locke’s version of nominalism has resonated 
down the centuries (Uzgalis, 2002). In more contemporary guise, there can be two 
nominalist positions:- 
 
 (a) The broadly ‘social constructionist’ view that the categories marked out by a 
 society in general, or by a specialist community of practice, are consensually and 
 communally held. They are reasonably stable intersubjective kinds, predicable 
 of both natural and social phenomena. Such a position would construe 
 institutional kinds (concrete or abstract) as being epistemically objective,  
 because it is a  presupposition of such kinds that they have been assigned their 
 status by society at large, i.e. are externally determined and determinable for the 
 individual agent. They are socially constructed givens of social life. They are, 
 however, ontologically subjective in that things might have been determined 
 differently by  another society or community of practice, or that consensus may 
 break down and an alternative disposition of kinds substituted (Searle, 1995, 
 1999; Hacking,1997). 
 
 (b) The broadly ‘postmodernist’ or ‘poststructuralist’ view that all categorization 
 is either i) personal and variable at will ~ the Humpty Dumpty position in Alice 
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 in Wonderland: Through the Looking Glass ;~ ‘words mean what I want them to 
 mean’; or ii) is the product of some ideological imposition that the individual is 
 free to reject in an emancipatory effort. Such categories are construed as 
 subjective at both epistemic and ontic level. (Belsey, 2002). 
 
 Both of the postmodern positions above have given rise to copious literature, 
especially in regard to the sociology of scientific knowledge post-Kuhn, and 
‘emancipatory’ studies of gender, race, sexuality, and the like. This literature would 
reject any serious consideration of business strategy classifications as being anything 
more than making sense of a shopping list (Fleetwood, 2005). It is not explored further 
here.  
 
 Whilst it is possible to discount the presence of any ‘essence’ in some social 
phenomena such as the arbitrary categories used to determine market segments for 
breakfast cereals, or ‘drive time’ to define a supermarket’s catchment, it is hard to 
discount some element of essence in most social categorisations. If a social category 
appears meaningful to us, we intuit it to be more than an empty label. However, as 
Hacking (1999) points out, in the social realm it is possible for the labelling to have 
social consequences, whilst argon and Venus are indifferent to our labelling.  
 
 The position to be adopted in Chapter 3 is one of pluralism. It accepts the 
importance of kinds rooted in social ontology to any ‘science’ of strategy, but also 
acknowledges the utility of some purely nominal categories for managerial and 
organisational practices. 
 
4.3  Bone fide v fiat boundaries (Sortals) 
 
 It follows from a strict essentialism that memberships of categories are 
determined by defining necessary and sufficient properties as sine qua nons of 
qualification for that kindhood; say atomic number of 18 for argon, but, currently, 
posing definitional problems for a ‘planet’; albeit the large spheroid in orbit second 
from our sun, and designated by us Venus, is clearly one of them. Thus, we can 
characterise a sound essentialist boundary-setting as given by the nature of whatever is 
being segmented and categorised. Such an extension is a ‘bone fide’ reflection of the 
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material or phenomena in question. The phrase that encapsulates this is ‘cutting nature 
at its joints’. On the other hand, there are many instances, particularly in the social 
realm, where no boundaries are ‘given’ by nature. There are no natural joints. Here we 
use what are termed ‘fiat’ boundaries; these are boundaries set somewhat arbitrarily by 
us in order to make the multiplicity and variety of experiences more tractable to our 
purposes. This is a nominalist approach to extension. It enables us to collect individuals 
into categories such that the subject of a discourse can be intersubjectively interpreted 
or the object of an enquiry reducible to data for analysis in the same way that atomic 
weights give us the ordering of the elements in the periodic table. From some 
postmodernist / poststructuralist positions, all socially salient boundaries are fiat 
boundaries. 
 
 However, as indicated above, the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
planethood are both given by astrophysics and human convention. Or, put another way, 
we have set definitions that reflect our knowledge of astrophysical phenomena, but 
selected them in a way that suits our purposes. Further, the exposition of the extension 
of ‘business strategy’ as given in Section 3 above is little more than a grounded account 
of how it is regarded for the purposes of this treatment.  We will return to this notion of 
a ‘grounded account’ later (see Boyd section 4.10); but for now the point to register is 
that boundaries, especially in the social world, are seldom clear cut, nor entirely fuzzy, 
such that there is no telling what is included or excluded. There are elements of 
essentialism and nominalism at work. Characteristic of an essentialist / nominalist 
tension in boundary-setting is that of the feminist position seeking to throw off the 
social constructions of gendered roles in society, whilst recognising that certain physical 
attributes are grounded in natural kinds. For our purposes the term ‘sortal’ is used to 
indicate the distinguishing characteristic(s) upon which extension is fixed, recognising 
that the nature of sortals can vary on a spectrum from strict essentialism to pure 
nominalism. That, however, raises a further question ~ what makes for a ‘good’ sortal ? 
 
4.4 What makes a ‘good’ sortal ? 
 
This question is one that lies at the heart of the detailed considerations of the 
case studies of business strategy classification schemes. Good kinds make for good 
science and good sortals (along with clear intensions) make for good kinds. An 
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essentialist view is that nature has discontinuities and the properties of these divisions 
are natural sortals. Originally, such sortals were attribute-based partitioning or 
classification criteria derived from naturally manifest properties. However, as scientific 
methods of closed experiment and the artificial enhancement of our powers of 
perception via microscopes, spectrometers, magnetic nucleic resonance, etc and 
mathematical techniques such as Fourier transforms and the like, the nature of our 
understanding and sorting changed to define, on occasion, according to conceptual 
rather than (directly) perceptual properties. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that 
kinds as found in nature are seldom of the pure sort found in the laboratory; the natural 
world is also composed of isotopes, hybrids, crosses and the like. Argon’s atomic 
number 18 is an artefact. Even the apparently simple question found in a drop down box 
of the standard form provides just two choices ‘Male’ or ‘Female’, when it took over 
nine months of (scientific) argument to answer that question for the athlete Caster 
Semenya.  
 
When we move to the social realm the scientific methods referred to above are 
not available to us and the social phenomena we seek to categorise are contingent and 
transient products of human agency, social structures and history. The categories we 
impose thereon are the product of our interests, and often those interests are best served 
when our categories are grounded in underlying real circumstances (Boyd, 1999b; 
2010). Social categories are observer-shaped and -relative and are conditioned by our 
projects. Sortals tend to be either arbitrary (Married/Single; 6’0” – 6’3”; SE7 post code) 
or vague (rich / poor; tall / short; inner city / suburbs). Making our sortals precise, when 
the phenomena just do not fit with precision, or making them vague when our interests 
and projects are certain, just will not avoid the inescapable conclusion that sortals are 
generally much harder to fix in the social sciences. A point that is under-theorised in 
much of the literature, but is very evident in the contested nature of much social 
categorisation ~ not just gender and race, but also, for example, ‘disabled’, ‘under-
privileged’, ‘terrorist’, etc. However, this is not a counsel of despair, for let us admit 
that, far from ideal they may be, nevertheless these arbitrary or vague delineations of 
category edges are a necessary part of helping in our sortings and understandings, 
provided that their limitations are fully acknowledged and accepted. 
 
Good sortals, in the sense of ideals, are unambiguous, enduring and universal. 
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They make distinctions or divisions which provide meaningful categories. Categories 
that enable us to draw useful deductive, inductive and sense-making (abductive) 
conclusions from certain knowledge of the categories concerned. If we can make sound 
inferences about natural and social phenomena and events from knowing into which 
category they fall, then our categories, objectively determined or arbitrary, precise or 
vague, hold value. Eco (2000) considers the world as a continuum, itself unsegmented, 
but this unsegmented world has a ‘grain’, and our segmentation works better with the 
grain than against it. If we construe the social world as consequent to social forces, we 
can assume some granularity in social phenomena and construe the work of the social 
scientist as seeking out how to work with the grain. 
 
4.5 Wittgenstein’s language game and family resemblance. 
 
 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, Philosophical Investigations, published 
posthumously in 1953, is considered by some (Lakoff, 1987) to mark the end of the 
‘classical approach’ to categories where, despite differences of some considerable 
importance (as described above), the general presumption was that our kinds (however 
conceived) had clear boundaries and common defining properties. Wittgenstein 
challenged this very structure. He moved our thinking about categories from reflecting 
the way the world is, towards the world reflecting back to us the way our categories (of 
thought and speech) are imposed upon it. 
 
 Wittgenstein rejected the reduction of language to simple representation. To him 
any thought is a sentence and a sentence is a picture of the fact it represents. Our 
systems of concepts form the frame in which our words paint the picture of the world. 
The meaning of a particular word is given by its use, but we must recognise the 
diversity of uses to which words and language can be put. Life, for humanity, is a 
‘language game’ that only humans can play and the meaning of language depended 
upon the use to which it was put. (Biletzki & Matar, 2009). Thus, the meaning of our 
concepts is best understood through examining their use, rather than through a 
dictionary or logic. We will grasp the meaning of specialist knowledge by examining 
the experts’ deployment of their terms. Conversely, if we don’t follow the embodied 
and social meanings of language, we cannot communicate and the acquisition of 
advanced realms of knowledge is impossible (Collins & Evans, 2007). The properties of 
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certain categories are as a consequence of the nature of our biological make up and the 
experience of functioning in a social environment. (See Section 5 Lingusitics below). 
 
 The understanding that it is possible to have a satisfactory, workable concept 
without having sharp defining criteria is Wittgenstein’s prime contribution to our area 
of interest. His rejection of the philosopher’s ‘craving for generality’, as exemplified in 
the search for essences, might be considered as bringing a proto-postmodern perspective 
to our understanding of kinds. Boundaries claimed Wittgenstein are extendable and 
permeable. Recognition is possible without prescription. The example he uses here is 
that of the concept of a ‘game’; almost impossible to define, yet easy to grasp and use in 
normal discourse. We have an innate ability to recognise that is not reducible to a 
defining set of rules for identification (see also Millikan, 4.7 below). Not all sortals are 
sharply defined ridges in the topography of thought, some are ill-defined waterways that 
drain the marshes of the mind. This idea is reflected in his notion of ‘family 
resemblance’ as a way to create a class. In an extended family, two distant members 
may have very little in common, but will share some characteristics with other closer 
relatives, such that the intermediate ground can be filled and the broad family discerned. 
In this manner we might be able to link, say, soccer to darts to bridge to sudoko within 
the ‘game’ family.  
 
 Clearly in postulating family resemblance as a means of dealing with similarities 
among individuals, Wittgenstein is suggesting that the notion of essences is inessential, 
at least in some classification schemes. Boersema speculates on Wittgenstein’s position 
by pointing out that it is not antithetical with the concept of a natural kind, or even of 
essences as an epistemological question:- ‘one might say that so far as we know a given 
kind has no essence, but maybe we just haven’t found it yet.’(Boersema, 2009, p182). 
By allowing a spectrum of category participation, Wittgenstein also challenged the 
notion that, since all category members are defined by a shared character, no individual 
member should be more central than any other. Yet this is denied in our daily discourse. 
In our usage we recognise that some examples are better choices as exemplars than 
others. He cites the case of ‘dice’ as being a ‘game’ but rather less central than other 
games to our notions of what being a game comprises. This too is picked up by later 
theorists such as J L Austin, Lofti Zadeh’s ‘fuzzy sets’ and in Eleanor Rosch’s 
‘prototype’ theory. (See section 5.2, Lakoff et al, below).  
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 A second major salient theme of Wittgenstein’s work is the recognition of the 
collective, communal nature of language and kinds. He held that there could be no such 
thing as a private language. Although there is significant controversy about different 
interpretations of his text, it appears that Wittgenstein was committed to the view that 
language is essentially social (Candish & Wrisley, 2008). This stems from his belief that 
the use of language is made possible by the human ‘form of life’ and his use of the term 
‘grammar’ to describe the workings of this public, socially governed ‘language game‘. 
To quote Boersema:- 
 
 ‘Words, like Wittgenstein said, are tools, but they should be thought of as less 
 of a screwdriver and more like a steamship; they are tools that we use, 
 certainly, but they are ones that require collective, cooperative use.’ 
 Boersema, 2009, p 94. 
 
 The social embeddedness of our terminology in a form of life is also part of 
what Harré (2002a) refers to as the ‘conceptual presuppositions’ that create the 
background to all thoughts, feelings and actions. Such preconceptions are a) shared; b) 
play a role in shaping what we experience; and c) maintain local standards of 
correctness. The shared background of normative expectations and anticipations provide 
us with the standards or criteria by which we judge the meanings and values of others. 
Relating Wittgenstein‘s insights to the process of management, Shotter remarks; ‘For if 
Wittgenstein is right, meanings are not hidden in people’s heads, but occur out in the 
ceaseless flow of living, language-interwoven relations between ourselves and the 
others and otherness around us’ - Shotter 2005, p130. 
 
4.6  Denoting - Descriptivism and its critics (Kripke and Putnam). 
 
 In the first half of the twentieth century developments in analytical philosophy 
included a focus upon the meaning of terms and had major implications for the whole 
sphere of language and denotation. In brief, the school of thought that resulted ~ 
labelled ‘descriptivism’~ examined the relationships between;- the referring term and 
the object or individual referred to thereby; the reference and the meaning of the term; 
and the relation between reference and the associated truth conditions (Reimer, 2009). 
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As regards the proper name of an individual – David Cameron – the reference between 
the name and its object is held in the descriptive content associated by the speaker with 
that name. It may be ‘our Prime Minister’ or ‘my husband’ or ‘my party leader’ etc, 
depending upon the speaker’s relationship with the individual referred to. The theory 
was extended to cover the extension of general nouns and substance concepts where a 
description, or cluster of descriptions, uniquely identify the object. According to this 
view meaning was the ‘description’ held in the ‘mind’. As we learn language, so we 
learn meanings as dictionary entries in a private lexicon describing their referents in the 
world. 
 
 Although Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (1975) differ in detail, the 
bracketing of their thinking on reference and classification is warranted by the overall 
similarities in their rejection of an inherent nominalism in ‘descriptivism’. Ben-Yami 
(2001), Millikan (2000) and Reimer (2009) all bracket Kripke and Putnam as being 
‘anti-descriptivist’. However, their position is not simply a positivist / essentialist 
rejection of nominalism, for it also entailed a rejection of the denial of social 
dimensions to cognition and reference that had been associated with essentialism.  
 
 A proper name is not, according to Kripke, a description that falls within a 
classification, but an identifier; it points to the phenomenon in the world that is its 
referent. Thus, had Pablo Picasso died at the age of three none of the descriptions we 
now associate with the name would apply, yet he would still have been Pablo Picasso. 
Names are what Kripke called ‘rigid descriptors’ – they refer to the same designated 
object in every possible world (i.e. outcome of events) in which that object exists or 
existed (Cumming, 2009; LaPorte, 2006). The descriptivists had argued that the sense of 
a term determined its reference, so that two words with the same sense must refer to the 
same thing. But Kripke pointed out that we can have a posteriori necessities; facts that 
are necessarily true, though they can be known only through subsequent empirical 
investigation. For example the ancients identified two stars ‘Hesperus’ (the Evening 
Star) and ‘Phosphorus’ (the Morning Star), that were subsequently demonstrated to be 
separate sightings of the planet Venus. Gold, once defined as a metal of particular 
properties, is now defined as that element with atomic weight 79. There is, thus, 
compelling demonstration that the object and its referent are not determined by our 
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descriptions, but by the external object itself. The object out there is stable, it is we who 
revise the description in the light of new knowledge. 
 
 Putnam’s theory of ‘semantic externalism’, as exemplified in his well-known 
‘twin earth’ thought experiment, similarly sought to demonstrate that reference was to 
external criteria, not merely internally held descriptions. Putnam, in particular, rejected 
the descripivists’ position that meanings of our words can vary over time according to 
information acquisition. To him, the designated object did not change, only our ideas 
thereon. His classic claim being ‘Cut the pie any way you like, “meanings” just ain’t in 
the head’. (Putnam, 1975, p 227).  Thus, for Putnam, the reference of a term such as 
‘elm’ or ‘beech’ are extant in nature and natural kind terms do not work by being 
associated with a set of properties given in their definitions, but simply by pointing to 
what is out there. This he termed the indexicality of reference. Putnam emphasised the 
importance of stereotypes and what he termed ‘paradigms’ – exemplars, samples, 
tokens - in establishing ostensive reference. However, the external realism that Putnam 
espoused allowed for the creation of natural kinds by virtue of possession of a common 
inner nature of some sort, - atomic structure, genetic code, or whatever - and from 
which the observable properties follow. Hence Kripke, Putnam and their followers can 
be seen as rejecting nominalism and promoting a return to essentialism in a new social 
incarnation. 
 
 Albeit referred to in the literature, as the ‘Kripke Putnam Theory’ (KPT), as 
summarised above, it is nowhere directly attributable to either author, and in various 
guises, and in different respects, is critiqued as much as accepted by contemporary 
writers on kindhood. Indeed Millikan criticises their work as pointing out what was 
wrong with descriptivism as a doctrine without substituting a coherent alternative of 
their own. In fact she refers to their work as tending to ‘collapse into more complicated 
descriptionist views’ (Millikan, 2000, p 49). Thus, the overall picture may be that the 
KPT was a contribution to the erudite argument within analytical philosophy that is 
more of historical and polemical significance than practical consequence for discussion 
of kinds. The KPT marked a turning point rather than a final destination. Indeed, it must 
also be noted that both are still alive and have contributed further elaboration of their 
views as the years have passed. 
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 However, a formulation by Putnam of how the layperson acquires an 
understanding of phenomena from specialist discourse, is of interest to later sections. 
This is his notion of the ‘linguistic division of labour’; that as science progresses the 
discoveries and understandings at micro and macro level are beyond human sensibilities 
and the grasp of many. The meanings of some terms e.g. ‘quark’ or ‘quantitative easing’, 
are held by a subset of specialists on behalf of the community in general and these terms 
can be employed sensibly by lay persons only by relying on publicly held meanings. 
This returns him closer to a descriptionist point of view, at least as regards such terms. 
 
4.7 Millikan;- substance; similarity; classification; and ‘ontological grounds’. 
 
Ruth Garrett Millikan’s engagement with kinds is driven by her interest in 
philosophy of mind, language, ontology and human cognitive processes. In particular, 
the thesis of her book ‘On clear and confused ideas’ (OCCI, 2000) is that human 
cognition’s central task is that of ‘reidentification’ of ‘substances’. Both terms require 
elaboration. First, to her, a substance is an empirical concept and embraces almost 
anything that retains its properties from encounter to encounter. This is a very wide 
definition. It includes ‘individuals’ such as the river Thames, or Buckingham Palace, or 
Arsenal  FC. And it covers the whole panoply of things we can group and classify; what 
she terms ‘real kinds’. Thus, natural kinds such as argon are obvious candidates, but so 
are what she terms ‘historical kinds’, such as biological entities (a mouse is a mouse 
because it is born of a mouse) and her ‘functional kinds’ which can be artefacts such as 
a Phillips screwdriver or Romanesque church, or social and abstract kinds, such as a 
retail chain (Tesco) or ‘the no 13 bus’ (both concrete and abstract) or ‘dentists’ – where 
she terms the category ‘an actual-world group’ that can be empirically researched and 
meaningfully referred to as in ‘9 out of 10 dentists recommend….’. She even extends 
the notion of substance to Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony which will sound pretty much 
the same next time you hear it or ‘The Little Match Girl’ who will freeze to death at 
each re-telling. Thus, a substance is anything that will provide a similar set of stimuli on 
the next encounter and, to this extent, Millikan is enunciating her own version of 
‘meaning externalism’ and applying it to a range of things that would include social 
institutions and abstractions.  
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‘Reidentification’ (her word for what one might equally term ‘recognition’, with the 
emphasis on re-cognition) is identifying on a second or subsequent encounter with a 
substance the characteristics of similarity that indicate the individual as the same, or the 
class member as of the same type, as has previously been encountered. This even where 
the circumstances of that encounter are not identical. The extension of a substance 
concept is, thus, external to the person noting the similarity. It is grounded in nature or 
society rather than our disposition or capacity to recognise it. It is recognition via 
similarity. However, one must be able to identify too, and distinguish between, those 
characteristics which are enduring features of the substance and those which are 
transient; that do not carry over from one encounter to another. Between, say, baldness 
and wearing a tie; between the snow-covered car and the one normally found in my 
drive. Here Millikan makes use of the notion of a ‘substance template’ by which she 
means the knowledge of what kind of things can be learnt about a substance and this 
includes the sort of things which carry over from one encounter to the next. And, finally, 
she distinguishes between the ‘concept’ of a substance and a ‘conception’ of that 
substance, in that our concept is the reference point and the conception is the full entry 
in our personal directory of knowledge.  
 
Albeit our interest is in classification (which assumes repetition or duplication in 
types) rather than reidentification (which accepts individuals too), Millikan goes a long 
way to explaining what constitutes the act of classifying. She takes some trouble to 
distinguish classifying from identifying since, though intertwined, they serve different 
cognitive tasks. To classify one needs to know the relevant properties of the substance 
and the purpose is storage, retrieval or transfer. To (re)identify is to act upon incoming 
information in order to come to know its relevant properties and to make subsequent 
inferences via a substance concept that is univocal, stable and nonredundant.  First 
(re)identify, then one may classify. It can’t be done the other way round. What is more, 
the substance concept will, in most cases, come within some substance template(s) 
which both designate(s) properties and indicate(s) what further properties may 
meaningfully be obtained. (Her terminology for what others have referred to as ‘falling 
under a description’ – see 5.1 below). Some of these properties may be used for 
classification purposes in the diagnosis of a substance – a predicate found for a definite 
subject that can be stored in a particular mental index. But she firmly rejects the idea 
that a kind is simply a definition of properties.  
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There is equally an entwined relationship between all this (i.e. substance concepts 
and classifying) and language, since it must be recognised that spoken and written 
words form an important input to the cognitive system and that the acquisition of 
language provides an additional and powerful ability to capture new substance concepts. 
She argues that language is just another form of sensory input like vision. ‘Learning a 
language is, in part, just learning more ways to pick up information through the senses 
and put it away in the right boxes’. (OCCI, 2000, p88-89). But, importantly, language 
provides a unique means of acquiring a substance concept where there are, for the 
majority of us, no other relevant sensory inputs; e.g. our concept of Aristotle, or an 
electron. She writes ‘Words serve in huge numbers as seed crystals around which fuller 
conceptions of substances are then quickly formed.’ (OCCI, 2000, p 91). This would 
include words that serve as class labels and, provided there is a grasp of the relevant 
substance template and enough relevant grammar, the concept may be fleshed out over 
time. The existence of an accepted class label in our public language does not, however, 
require that we associate that label with exactly the same properties as others in the 
same language community. A flexible and personal designation as opposed to the rigid 
designation of the dictionary entry. 
 
Of particular interest is the central role that Millikan’s 2000 book attaches to 
inferences that can be drawn from the substance concepts, templates and tracking. Here 
she is dismissive of classes that are not founded upon some reason. As regards what 
others term ‘essences’, Millikan uses the words ‘ontological grounds’ where the cause 
of sameness in real kinds is grounded in natural necessity, including (one assumes) 
homeostasis that results from social structures and forces. ‘The very first function of 
a…… cognitive representation is to be ready to participate in inferences.’ (OCCI, 2000, 
p202). Her ‘real kinds’ are real because there is good reason for the similarities. She 
points out that it is substances, rather than classes, that are of interest to science. But 
there are many other classes of things brought together by us, but lacking such 
ontological grounds, and these she describes as being ‘mere classes’. This, however, is 
discussed further in Chapter 3 below, for which Millikan has proved a rich source.  
 
4.8 Hacking and social (interactive) kinds. 
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 The philosopher of science Ian Hacking’s writings ( 1991a,1993, 1999, 2002a, 
2002b) approach the question of kindhood very much from a  sociological perspective, 
albeit the jumping off point is the tradition of natural kinds (1991). The key distinction 
that Hacking (1999) draws is between ‘indifferent kinds’ – those that are unaffected by 
the labels we attach to them – and ‘interactive kinds’ where there is a potential for 
consequences to follow from consciousness of the labelling. Consequences which 
Hacking terms ‘looping effects’; meaning a reflexivity between the attribution of a 
classification and the individual or group so classified. Whilst these two terms are close 
at the indifferent kinds end to what includes, inter alia, ‘natural kinds’, the distinction 
regarding his interactive kinds, is more exclusively drawn. First, many of the kinds that 
one would associate with social, rather than natural, originations and distinctions – that 
between, say, breakfast and lunch or the seven of spades and Jack of hearts or coin of 
the Realm and metal disc – are not ‘interactive’ with their classifications because they 
are insentient to them. On the other hand, classifications of certain social properties 
such as social status, gender roles or educational attainment not only provide 
distinctions, but these are actively made and re-made over settings and time in such a 
manner as to influence (deliberately or inadvertently) those so categorized or 
categorizing to respond to, or aspire to, or avoid, etc., the social classifications so 
provided. These are Hacking’s ‘interactive kinds’. Thus, he writes about ‘madness’ or 
‘child abuse’ as being of interest both as socially created categories (which he traces as 
historico-spatio entities), and as classifications that interact with those entangled therein. 
See also Bowker & Star, (1999) and Hsu et al (2010) on social classification schemes 
and their consequences. A distinction that is of importance to our enquiry, since strategy 
classifications when communicated to individuals within firms about their own 
organization or about another firm can influence subsequent behaviour – business 
strategy classifications fall within the Hacking category of interactive kinds.  
 
 It is possible to regard all classifications recognized by or introduced to society 
as being social constructions and some of the sociology of science literature would 
advance the theory that all that passes for scientific knowledge is a social construct. 
(This is nominalism in a social constructionist guise, which, one supposes, is the 
foundation of all modern nominalism, albeit the nominalism of, say, Locke and John 
Stuart Mill arose prior to what is today called social constructionism). However, 
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Hacking is only partly within the broadly social constructionist camp, and is prepared to 
concede the existence of natural kinds alongside kinds that are contingent upon 
historical and social processes. He is, however, less clear on the distinction of where 
that divide lies, perhaps because he sees no clear cut distinguishing criteria. Between 
Hacking’s narrowly defined socially constructed ‘interactive kinds’ and ‘natural kinds’ 
of the traditional type, lie a range of artifactual, biolooping or other types of kind, all 
within the realm of ‘indifferent kinds’. Hacking’s well-known paper of 1991 ‘A 
tradition of natural kinds’, argues that social kinds do not qualify as natural kinds and, 
moreover, that natural kinds are a (by implication, tiny) proportion of kinds useful to 
mankind (he is inclined to use Nelson Goodman’s term ‘relevant kinds’ to embrace the 
latter – Goodman, 1975). He points out that all kinds of which we are aware are, ipso 
facto, socially situated and notes approvingly George Lakoff’s contribution as described 
below (See 5.2). This leaves Hacking as a fairly uncommitted adherent to any 
essentialism as regards kindhood, but acknowledging the possibility of an ontological 
basis to some categorisations. 
 
 It is also important to acknowledge the connection made within this thesis 
between Hacking’s narrative of the social construction of certain social kinds, such as 
‘anorexic’ or ‘abused child’ and the coverage of the fads and fashions of management 
and organisational science, where it seems concepts such as ‘defender’ or ‘cost leader’ 
may be subject to similar social constructionist forces (see the subsequent discussion of 
the individual business strategy classifications). A connection that, otherwise, appears to 
be little recognised within the existing strategy or management fashion literature.  
 
4.9       Dupré’s pluralism. 
  
 The main sources for this section are John Dupré’s books The disorder of things, 
1993 and Humans and other animals, 2002. Albeit a philosophy chair, his main 
perspective upon the question of kindhood is from that of the biological sciences. He 
explores in particular the paradox that whilst ‘species’ is a paradigmatic classification 
concept for the lay person, professional biologists are deeply divided over an 
appropriate universal basis for classification (see 2.5 above). Conventionally, 
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classification is based upon the differentiation of species and the modern concept of 
species entails evolutionary processes. However, there are both theoretical and practical 
problems for the professional biologist seeking a classification system based upon the 
teleological purpose of genetic variation and natural selection leading to superior 
survival for the ‘fittest’. If evolutionary theory is accepted there cannot be clear 
demarcation lines between species. And even the conventional differentiation of species 
based upon unique reproductive groups is found wanting in practice.   
 
 Having somewhat undermined all theory-based approaches to biological 
classification, Dupré is highly pragmatic in his approach to the subject – let not the best 
be enemy to the good. He is prepared to sacrifice purity of principle for adequacy for 
purpose and ends up with a contextual perspective of classification for purpose (not by 
purpose or cause), that he terms ‘promiscuous plurality.’ The claim is that there are 
multiple legitimate strategies for representing nature and no ideal representation that is 
sufficient for all explanatory purposes. The reduction of nature to molecular biology, is 
rejected in favour of a layered structure of autonomous explanations. Dupré 
acknowledges the fact that the Linnaean system is established in the fields of 
horticulture, birdwatching, plant and stock husbandry, gardening, environmental science, 
etc., and concludes that, since there is no unquestionably correct alternative 
classification, we should stick with it. If we then require a rigorously grounded 
classification in relation to a particular enquiry or application, we should select that 
which best matches the context. Dupré, thus, is arguing for a highly pragmatic and 
pluralistic notion of kindhood.  
 
 This pragmatism means that Dupré is also willing to explore in greater depth the 
expectations that we hold of kind terms. He provides a critique of the traditional notions 
of natural kinds that highlights the assumed nomological properties of such kinds. 
Members of a traditional natural kind are held to operate within a set of natural or 
scientific laws that govern things of such a kind and, thus, behaviour and properties can 
be inferred from the abstract kind to the particular individual member. Such views, 
argues Dupré, are incompatible with contemporary beliefs that laws are probabilistic 
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and the product of heuristic models rather than universal determinism. To Dupré 
‘concepts’ (see 4.7 above) rather than kinds may seem more appropriate:- 
 
‘we should think in terms of concepts rather than kinds. It is just that the 
application of important theoretical concepts will, among other things, serve to sort 
individuals into groups. The construction of models will typically involve 
distinguishing between the roles of members of these groups. Concepts, in short, 
classify things, and it is with views of classification that I am here 
concerned…..The fact that there are objectively correct ways of classifying 
organisms for particular purposes of enquiry, but that these classifications vary 
from one enquiry to the next, should lead us to prefer the weaker conception of 
natural kinds that I have suggested.’ (Dupré, 2002, p 108-9) 
 
 This view is Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’ about joints or ‘the grain’ in nature 
providing us with potential sortals, but how we sort entities as being a matter of human 
discretion. This contrasts with an essentialist interpretation that ‘naturalness’ carries 
with it a feature of exclusivity – the belief that where there are natural joints there can 
be just one set thereof and that this is independent of any ‘interests’ on the part of the 
classifier(s). A viewpoint Dupré strongly resists. 
 
4.10 Boyd’s accommodation thesis and HPC kinds. 
 
 The tension between the intransitive causal structures of natural or social reality 
and the epistemic, transitive constitution of our categorisation schemes is reconciled in 
Richard Boyd’s account of classification practices as being successful when grounded 
in reality: his “accommodation thesis” (1991, 1999(a), 1999(b), 2010). In short, Boyd’s 
conception is that all sciences are inescapably social endeavours which function at their 
best when supported by the ontology of the objects of their enquiries. ‘What is to be 
explained is the ways in which the accommodation of classificatory and linguistic 
practices to causal factors in the world contributes to the reliability of those practices’ 
(Boyd, 2010, p 214). To Boyd a folksonomy or a scientific classificatory scheme found 
in intersubjective use ~ within what he terms a ‘disciplinary matrix’ ~ is an everyday or 
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specialist lexicon that attempts to cast a net of explanatory and inferential concepts over 
the ontology of its central entities – be they trees of the rain forest or enzymes or 
internet service providers. How far that endeavour succeeds will depend both on the 
conformity of that net to the underlying intractable reality it targets and the utility of the 
practices within the disciplinary matrix concerned. Good kinds reflect a harmony 
between ontology and epistemology. An analogy of epistemic and ontic conformity in 
language is like that of an overcoat thrown over a chair and reflecting the underlying 
structure. Extending the analogy, a highly useful or successful classification scheme, 
such as the Periodic table, would represent a set of fitted covers. 
 
 Whilst other philosophers have approached the issues of the relation between the 
world and reference by asking how is it that we are able to refer to real things, Boyd 
reverses the direction by asking how is it that our references equip us to deal with the 
real world. In this he reflects the same question as that posed by the critical realists – 
what must reality be like for this human construal thereof to be of practical value ? (see 
Bhaskar, 1979; Lawson, 1997, 2003). He is, thus, concerned with the conceptual and 
linguistic practices of the sciences and, albeit, somewhat focused upon natural science, 
his approach is (he argues) appropriate to the social sciences. In anticipation of the case 
studies, the categories postulated by Miles and Snow or by Porter seek to provide 
projectable kind terms for real world organisational strategic behaviour that enables 
such terms to offer sensible explanations and to be fruitfully used in inferential thinking. 
In Boyd’s terms, neither would be seen as proposing a methodology for detecting kinds 
so much as suggesting a way of using their categories for the task of strategising.  
 
 Boyd is a realist about kinds, accepting that some natural kinds of the traditional sort 
may exist, but also proposes that quasi-natural kinds be recognised as possibly lacking 
any definitive essence, but nevertheless representing stable sets of attributes shaped by 
the causal structures of the world, including the social world. If a central problem with 
essentialism is that of fuzzy extensions (Wittgenstein, Rosch), then Boyd’s ‘homeostatic 
property clusters’ or ‘HPC kinds’ offer an alternative conceptualisation. An HPC kind is 
the result of the existence of some set of causal factors in the world that bring about a 
relatively enduring clustering of the attributes of some entity about which inductive 
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generalisations are reliable. These HPC kinds can be intransitive objects of our enquiries, 
just as much as a traditional natural kind, albeit the composition and qualities of the 
attributes may be somewhat variable between different tokens of the kind. For Boyd, 
species can be claimed as HPC kinds, but he extends the argument (more by inference 
than detail) to social kinds, such as race and intelligence. 
 
 Other philosophers (e.g. Hacking, 1991b; Millikan, 1999) have taken issue with 
aspects of Boyd’s thesis and his work is little known in social science (see 
Engelskirchen 2011 for exception), let alone management and organisational science. 
However, it does offer in HPC kinds and accommodation theory two very useful 
notions for deployment in puzzling the very nature of the case studies of business 
strategy classification schemes. 
 
4.11 Where does the ‘philosophy lens’ get us ? Summary of main points. 
 
 The initial focus in this section has been upon the establishment of what is 
termed the traditional or classical view of ‘natural kinds’ as categories determined by 
robust definitions giving necessary and sufficient conditions of category membership 
based upon knowledge of essential characteristics given by the inherent properties of the 
external reality being classified. Intensions are given by essences and extension by 
clear-cut sortals. By tacit analogy, social kinds are expected to follow the same 
prescription. From this has developed a ‘scientific’ representation of classification 
schemes of all sorts as per genus et differentiae, giving a ‘natural’ hierarchical structure 
to such schemes. This tradition is still very much alive today, largely in a positivist 
orientation of a world-to-mind nature, in which the social sciences, as much as the 
natural sciences, conceive of their material. As will be seen later, in relation to the case 
studies of business strategy classification schemes and research thereon, this conception 
of their material is prevalent amongst many organisational and management scientists as 
a presupposition about their material. 
 
 However, starting from John Locke, an alternative interpretation has gradually 
been refined that holds that our categorisations and our schemes of classification seldom 
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conform to such traditional expectations. This especially so in the social sciences, where 
a total rejection of any objective ontological basis to our classifications sometimes 
characterises approaches and attitudes. Under this view, our categories are creations of 
the mind, malleable to our purposes. Classifications are imposed by us upon nature in a 
relativist, mind-to-world direction. The similarities that we note are coincidences of 
structured cognitions which have been shaped by language / concept acquisition in 
socialisation. The, post-modern, often ‘emancipatory’, literature here is very copious. It 
has not been developed above since it offers little to this thesis.  
 
 Instead, this section has identified a number of important philosophers who have 
rejected this relativist nominalism, yet without recourse to classical theory. Whilst 
equivocal about essences in the traditional sense, they all attend and attest to the 
ontology of at least some of our kinds. Philosophers who, to varying degrees, 
acknowledge the social nature of classification systems, yet ascribe some ontological 
basis to at least some of our categories. In various ways, all endorse a mind-meets-
world position. In particular, the following points of view, some of which contain 
mutual contradictions, have been explicated above:- 
 
(i) The boundaries of categories are seldom as clear-cut as implied by the 
traditional view. In fact, many robust and perfectly serviceable categorisations 
are, nevertheless, fuzzy in their intensions and extensions and some members are 
more central or typical than others. (Wittgenstein, Boyd). 
 
(ii) Meanings or intensions are ‘out there’, not just in our heads. They are not 
simply descriptions, but are ‘donated’ by the entity concerned in mutual 
interaction with social cognitions and language. (Kripke/Putnam). 
 
(iii) Extensions of concepts, their sortals, are also ‘out there’, as well as held in 
the mind as ‘templates’. Our ability to reidentify anything is an interaction 
between the internal template and the external phenomena. (Millikan). 
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(iv) It is important to acknowledge in our dealings with classification and its 
consequences that some social kinds are interactive with their categories in 
‘looping effects.’ (Hacking). 
 
(v) That since the purposes and projects we pursue in classification are varied, it 
is permissible to hold as valid and useful a number of different ways of 
classifying the same phenomena. There is no single right way, but multiple 
legitimate ways of representing nature. (Dupré)  
 
(vi) The utility of human recognition of homogeneities in the world is the 
product of the ways in which reality is constituted and the inferential and 
explanatory uses to which that recognition gives us access. (Boyd).   
 
5 THE  LINGUISTICS  LENS 
 
 Classification involves putting similar individuals, phenomena, actions, etc. into 
appropriate categories and using the same word or label for all members of that category. 
For that word to have intension or ‘meaning’ as commonly understood, it must ‘signify’ 
or refer to the same object, phenomena, action, etc for other members of the same 
linguistic group. Meanings are shared. To truly understand the classification of abstract 
institutional kinds such as business strategies, we must grasp the intension and 
extension of the words we employ to signify categories lacking physicality.  Simple 
ostensive reference is problematic. Philosophy and language are inextricably interwoven 
and in the previous section the selected aspects of Wittgenstein’s work, in particular, 
has focused upon coverage of his theories of language. This includes his belief in the 
public, social nature of language and this is the matter we explore first. 
 
5.1.  Action under a description and collective intentionality. 
 
 A business strategy classification scheme is an intersubjective set of terms or 
labels which ‘call up’ more complex descriptions of coherent organisational and 
functional action(s), possibly by pointing to (i.e. ostensive reference to) typifications or 
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exemplars of such activity. Since business strategy in our context is elusive of easy 
specification and involves collective action, the ‘intersubjectivity’ of strategic activity 
has been emphasised. That is to say, the importance of collective understanding via 
common terminology and its shared interpretation has been stressed. Only with some 
ability to share meanings can collective intentionality be achieved.  
 
 Elizabeth Anscombe, John Searle, and Ian Hacking, (philosophers all) have 
developed various themes of ‘acting under a description’ which underpin two important 
points for our discussion of collective intentionality and language. Anscombe, a student 
of Wittgenstein’s, writing in the 1950’s, pointed out that actions are intentional under 
some descriptions and not others:- a man observed regularly raising and lowering a 
pump handle is acting intentionally under the description of ‘pumping water’, but not so 
with regard to all sorts of other descriptions that could validly be offered for that same 
action (exercising muscles, beating out a rhythm, etc). Searle built upon Anscombe’s 
work, and that of J L Austin (1955) on ‘speech acts’, in emphasising the constitutive 
nature of collective intentionality in establishing institutional facts. He describes the 
imposition of status-function through collective intentionality, usually expressed via 
speech acts, and stressed the importance of the provision of some label at the same time. 
This label he describes as ‘epistemically indispensable’, since institutional facts cannot 
be recognised by virtue of their physical properties (i.e. status symbols) alone. These 
labels are units of meaning in communication. Such institutional facts are constituted by 
and constitute descriptions under which we create and act in the social world (Searle, 
1995, 1999). Hacking claims that the range of descriptions provided by a culture 
constrains and conditions the range of intentions available to the individual agent. He 
points to the importance of language, the media and expert communities in providing 
and enriching that range of descriptions (Hacking, 1999, 2002b).  
 
Thus, one critical role of a formal proposal for a means of classification of 
business strategies is that it provides a set of labels or descriptions under which to 
communicate collective action. These labels ~  intersubjective descriptions (often 
contrastive) ~ establish categories of prospective action under which business strategies 
can be conceived, evaluated and communicated. The second important role, is that 
shared knowledge of the descriptions called up by these labels thereby enhances the 
possibility of the collective intentionality itself coming to fruition. We can only inspire, 
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motivate and direct with the words at our command. Having good business strategy 
labels aids achievement of the intended strategy. Words do not only reflect the world, 
they also affect the world.  
 
5.2 Lakoff, et al – linguistics, cognition and metaphorical origins of meanings. 
 
George Lakoff takes a somewhat different perspective on categorisation; arguing 
from how we use natural language and classification to how the mind works. He 
provides a socio-linguistic and cognitive science view of categorisation and much else 
besides.  His main contribution is in postulating that the way that people organise their 
knowledge is by means of mental structures that he terms ‘idealised cognitive models’ 
(ICMs). For Lakoff, category structures and prototype effects are by-products of that 
organisation, rather than the assumed essentialism that underlies the classical view – a 
view he labels as ‘objectivist’. His 1987 book debunks the objectivists’ idea of 
‘correspondence’ in categories when dealing with socially constructed phenomena and 
stresses the use of metaphor (often based in physiognomy) in language and 
classification. There is much here that moves us from an abstract, philosophical 
approach to one grounded in experiment and case study and Lakoff writes of the new 
views derived from cognitive science – contrary to the view of categories being internal 
representations of external reality, he argues that they stem from the nature of ourselves 
as organisms capable of reason. The contribution of his colleagues at Berkeley, and in 
particular the mathematician Lotfi Zadeh and cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch 
(Heider), to his thinking is amply acknowledged in this work. 
 
 Zadeh is best known for his 1965 work on systematising ‘fuzzy sets’ for 
categories with graded membership, making them more tractable for quantitative work. 
Fuzzy categories are those where membership is by degree or partial rather than the 
binary in / out membership implicit in essentialism. Zadeh’s work provided practical 
tools for dealing with non-dichotomous concepts. As well as application in engineering 
and computing, Zaheh’s fuzzy sets and systems can be applied in qualitative analysis of 
social phenomena, where the concepts under examination have vague boundaries and 
degrees of compliance (Ragin, 2008; Smithson & Verkuilen, 2006). The salient 
significance here is that Zadeh was able to turn Wittgenstein’s intuitions and evidence 
of fuzziness about categories into a practical demonstration of how such phenomena can 
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be made tractable and applied to practical effect. Lakoff’s interest being in application 
of such concepts to polysemy in language, where word / concept meanings are nested in 
networks of adjacent meanings. 
 
Rosch has a particular interest in categorisation and is best known for her 
‘prototype theory’ developed with a number of colleagues over many decades from the 
early-1970s. Her many empirical studies of natural language cognition also provided 
empirical confirmation of Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance and of the 
importance of category structures held in the mind in determining the course of human 
reasoning and inference. Such structures include the hierarchy of superordinate, basic 
and subordinate classifications that have been described above. They are found across 
all cultures, with ‘basic’ categories being foremost in cognition and knowledge 
organisation.  However, our categories are clusters of interactional properties; they are 
not simply in the world, but have to do with how we interact with the world. She also 
demonstrated ‘prototype effects’ where some examples of a general category are held to 
be more central or typical of that category e.g. ‘robin’ is more likely to be cited as an 
example of a ‘bird’ than a ‘penguin’ or ‘ostrich’. Her work with children also 
demonstrated that early category acquisition is mostly at the ‘basic’ level, with 
relational and hierarchical structures acquired later in development. Categories are 
certainly not acquired in childhood in the way that formal classification schemes are 
taught later in life. 
 
Lakoff, in addition, summarises the works of others on frames, scripts and schemas, 
his own contribution being rather more focused upon language(s) and his notion of 
Idealised Cognitive Models and, together with Mark Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson 
(1980/2003), his work on the importance of metaphor, metonymy in the creation and 
structuring of conceptual categories. He also described other linguistic features which 
yield prototype effects in what he terms ‘radial categories’.  
 
The claim is that in the light of the experimental evidence on perception, language 
and categorisation, the real world cannot be understood in terms of classical or 
essentialist theories about our categories. ‘The main thesis of this book is that we 
organise our knowledge by means of structures called idealised cognitive models, or 
ICMs, and that category structures and prototype effects are by-products of that 
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organisation’ (Lakoff, 1987, p 68). In brief, the ICM is a mental network of meanings, 
which draw upon other meanings that provide a gestalt, that is, finally, constitutive of a 
fully rounded concept. For example; the concept ‘Sunday’ can only be grasped in 
relation to a frame that contains the measurement of time, a (Christian) tradition of a 
seven day week, the sequence of these days, the conventional working week, etc. (A set 
of anchors increasingly less potent). For Lakoff, the fundamental building block of 
categorisation, the basic level, reflects the nature of the human body as determined by 
human neuro-physiology, gestalt perception and motor movements, and also by our 
imaginative processes of many kinds and our ability to construct and use idealised 
models and to extend these from central to non-central members via metaphor, 
metonymy, mythological associations, images and other relationships. These basic level 
concepts ‘are directly meaningful because they reflect the structure of our perceptual-
motor experience and our capacity to form rich mental images.’ Upon this foundation of 
direct meaning structures we base indirectly meaningful symbolic structures built by our 
imaginative capacities. ‘But despite the fact that we rely centrally on our bodily natures 
and our imaginative capacities, experientialism has maintained a form of basic realism, 
since our conceptual structures are strongly (though by no means totally) constrained by 
reality and by the way we function as an inherent part of reality.’ (Lakoff, 1987, p 372) 
 
Lakoff’s approach is less that of the experimental exercise than the examination 
of everyday speech. He explores metaphor, metonymy and figures of speech, not as 
features of literature and poetry, but as natural components of how we think about the 
world. Thinking that is often traced back to our bodily nature (‘the embodied mind’). 
Thus, expressions such as ‘just give me five minutes’; ‘Germany is pulling the 
European economy out of recession’; ‘world food prices are rising’; or ‘the economy 
has stalled’ are examples of how we think about time, economics, increase, or the like. 
These are not ornaments of style, but ways in which we have structured thinking about 
the abstractions that figure so strongly in our complex understandings of science, 
society and economic life. So, conceptual categories are, as set out above;- not just 
characterised by objective properties of category members but are determined, at least 
in part, by our bodily nature and in part by our imaginative processes such as metaphor, 
metonymy, scripts and frames, mythological associations, mental imagery and other 
conceptual relationships. They provide the basis upon which we derive our broader 
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inferences from the cues provided by language. So embedded is this that we are very 
largely unaware of these processes.  
 
Words are pliable to our purposes and language is a living means of extending 
our meanings to new ends via the mechanisms that Lakoff describes. Intensions in the 
social sphere are not stable and given, but are constructed and shared in a linguistic 
community. A community that shows endless ability to modify and extend meanings in 
meeting the challenges of what we need or want to conceptualise and frame in words. 
Lakoff provides the rationale for the potency of richly connected category labels such as 
‘defender’ over simple identifiers such as ‘category D’. This is, potentially, a more 
positive spin on the way that meanings, e.g. in organisational and management science, 
are subject to what others term fads and fashions. 
 
5.3 Contemporary linguistics; Ungerer & Schmid; and Taylor. 
 
The outline of Lakoff’s work, and that of his colleagues, provided above is 
similar to that found in Ungerer & Schmid’s An introduction to cognitive linguistics 
(2006) and in John Taylor’s work Linguistic categorisation (2003). Both follow a 
similar exposition of the empirical evidence from perception and linguistic studies to a 
rejection of the necessary and sufficient version of category construction. The rich but 
complex picture that emerges might be taken as providing a broad consensus within a 
substantial group of contemporary linguists. However, as is often the case, the 
individuals comprising that group may be more concerned to differentiate their own 
views from near, but subtly different, views of colleagues. We select here some 
additional notions that figure in these works. 
 
Ungerer and Schmid, in exploring fuzzy sets, make an interesting distinction 
between graded structures or degrees of typicality within categories (robin v ostrich in 
‘bird’) as outlined above, and the blurred nature of category boundaries, particularly in 
relation to artifactual and social kinds. Thus, the boundaries between ‘cup’, ‘bowl’ and 
‘vase’ can be demonstrated to be vague or fuzzy and our sortals are characterised by 
contradistinction as much as by definition or prototype. They also place more emphasis 
upon ‘part / whole’ (e.g. table > kitchen > house > town) as well ‘type of’ (e.g. 
greyhound > dog > mammal > animal) hierarchies as classification structures. Whilst 
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acknowledging that the latter are the conventional form of taxonomies, Ungerer and 
Schmid emphasise the importance that part / whole relations play in cognition and 
enhancement of inferential potential. ‘They are often more tangible than taxonomic 
relationships and seem to play a more decisive role in structuring cognitive models in 
our memory.’ ( Ungerer & Schmid, 2006, p 343). Their text also develops at some 
length the notion of perspectival choice in language. This stresses that for any 
‘objectively given’ situation the observer has a virtually unlimited choice of lexical 
items (words) and grammars with which to foreground and frame the scene. The 
observer is, thus able to ‘window’ the attention of others to his or her own interpretation 
of that situation, despite the variety of alternative, equally plausible, interpretations 
available. 
 
Taylor’s book follows very similar ground. He does, however, expressly locate 
himself in the middle position between essentialism and nominalism, in what he 
describes as ‘conceptualism.’ He argues as follows:- Language imposes a set of 
categories upon its users, but the fact that something is conventionalised does not entail 
that it is arbitrary. It will be motivated by existing discontinuities in the world. But it 
will also be motivated by culture and cognition. So social conventions and ontological 
motivations are both at work. This explains why different languages generally are found 
to have words equivalent to each other for the same phenomena, but this is far from a 
one-to-one correspondence. Languages are diverse with respect to the categories they 
encode, but this diversity is far from being unconstrained.  
 
5.4 Eco and Cognitive types. 
 
The Italian academic and popular novelist Umberto Eco has approached the 
question of kindhood from a European tradition of semiology that originates from the 
works of Ferdinand de Saussure, which is distinctive from CS Peirce’s semiology. Eco, 
however, is fully cognisant of Peircean claims and draws heavily, but not uncritically, 
thereon. Eco’s work Kant and the platypus; essays on language and cognition, (1997) 
and Boersema (2009), are the main sources of this discussion of what Eco calls his 
‘contractual realism’ about how we refer to classes of things. The key question that Eco 
addresses is that of the degree to which our ability to comprehend the world rests upon 
innate cognitive ability and how much upon our linguistic reserves.  
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According to Eco, since there are many more entities in the world than there are 
symbols in the mind, some of these symbols must stand for many entities; thus the 
world is not so much segmented as segmentable to our purposes. The central focus is on 
the question of what it takes for expressions to be meaningful to a community of 
speakers. He attempts to reconcile external realism with internal realism via a 
recognition of the collective conspiracy that is language and accepts Strawson’s claim 
that referring is not something that an expression does, but something that people can do 
using expressions. Speakers, not expressions, refer. This requires a contract or 
negotiation between speakers; a mutual agreement to use this symbol to refer to that 
object in the world. There is no causal relationship between the term and its meaning 
and designations rely upon this initial contract which assigns a generic label. Eco argues 
that, whilst the descriptions we apply to the world are always perspectival, there can be 
‘good’ and ‘bad’  interpretations. He cites Habermas as saying that reality imposes 
restrictions on our cognition only in that it refuses false interpretations – some can be 
plain ‘wrong’. Using examples of early encounters with the rhinoceros and duck billed 
platypus or even men mounted on horseback, Eco argues that ‘the first impressions on 
our senses are not representations of certain things unknown in themselves, but that 
these very first impressions are something unknown until the mind manages to wrap 
them up in predicates’ (Eco, 1997, p 61). He is, however, sceptical of Kripke’s rigid 
designations, arguing that names have an ability to refer, as well as providing us with 
that ability. 
 
Rejecting what he terms as C S Peirce’s ‘compulsive triadism’ and ‘naïve 
iconism’, Eco propounds his own triadic semiotic theory of cognition. The three 
elements being:- 
 
a)  Cognitive Type (CT) ;- An internal mental compilation of information 
pertaining to an entity. Eco likens this to a Kantian schema that allows us to mediate 
between the concept of the thing and the manifold of sense and other data relating to it. 
It is what enables the individual to recognise tokens of the type ‘deposited in memory’. 
Eco refuses to look into the ‘black box’ of how cognition, recognition and felicitous 
reference works – citing the failure of the cognitive scientists to come up with any better 
answer than that provided by the common sense acknowledgement that we have the 
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capacity to perform the task. Whatever it may be, a CT is what enables us to recognise 
and in this associate the recognition with a name, type, schema or what have you. Eco 
relates how the Aztecs or the curators of the British Museum were faced with unknowns 
– horsemen and the platypus respectively – and how naming is the first social act that 
enables us to recognise various individuals at different times and places as nevertheless 
tokens of the same type. 
 
b) Nuclear Content (NC) ; - Once the area of consensus and a label has been 
established under the CT, it is possible for the linguistic community to proceed to a 
collective interpretation in a set of homologised descriptions that Eco terms the Nuclear 
Content (NC). This establishes what the salient features of the entity are as regards 
some third party identification. Eco rejects the natural term that springs to mind – 
‘meaning’ on the grounds that we equate meaning with an individual’s mental 
experience, whereas he wishes to preserve the collective nature or public sense of the 
CT that is expressed in the NC. Whilst the CT is a private perceptual semiosis, the NC 
is a public communicative consensus. ‘The NC represents the way in which we try 
intersubjectively to make clear what features go to make up a CT’ (Eco, 1997, p 138). 
The NC can be tangible, the CT cannot. The NC provides the child with the means to 
identify, at first sight, say, a giraffe at the zoo (and to recognize it again on the next 
visit) and the ability to retrieve information regarding, say, the identification of an 
individual one has not personally met, or giving directions to a foreign tourist to a 
destination one has not personally visited. The NC is the basis of the dictionary 
definition. 
 
c) Molar Content (MC) ; - This notion is less well fashioned by Eco, but refers 
to the broadened knowledge that accretes around the NC as one learns and experiences 
more. It is, for example, the knowledge of where giraffes are found in the wild, that they 
are mammals, their typical diet and ecological niche, and so on. It is data that is 
inessential to identification, but otherwise expected of an informed member of the 
linguistic community and indispensable for any expert in the field. The zoologist will 
have a MC of a horse, and so will a jockey, even though the content may vary between 
the two; and Putnam’s ‘division of linguistic labour’ will occur, albeit Eco prefers the 
term ‘division of cultural labour’. To Eco, the sum of MCs regarding an entity or 
concept will sum to an encyclopaedia entry for it. 
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 There is much else in Eco’s contribution that is distinctive, but the focus here 
has been upon his contribution to the linking of token to type, to dictionary, to 
enclyclopedia. This complements Lakoff’s ICM and is, in chapter 3, combined with 
Millikan’s work to provide an explanatory framework within which we explore the 
pragmatic value of business strategy classification schemes in terms of their potential 
value in generating sound inferences. 
 
5.5 Contribution to understanding classification schemes. 
 
The arguments advanced in sections 5.1 – 5.4 above all amount to an exposition of 
five central points:- 
 
(i)  First, the indispensible nature of language labels attached to concepts 
  and categories where ostensive reference is inadequate to convey  
  meaning. 
 
(ii)  The set of categories imposed upon language users is motivated both by 
  discontinuities in the world and by culture and cognition.   
 
 (iii) The importance in achieving intersubjectively shared meanings such 
  that the social or collective intentionality of a strategy can be achieved.  
 
(iv) The inadequacies of the classical view of classification have been  
  underlined in much empirical work in linguistics. The suggestion is 
  that linguistic capacities are more subtle in affording us with the  
  mental wherewithal to construct and adapt conceptualisations that owe 
  little to dictionary definition and much to accretion of category  
  knowledge around the linkages afforded by our physical and mental 
  make up.  
 
(v)  This work points to the way in which we are able to think and reason 
  by inferences. This capacity, based upon ICMs or MCs (or whatever 
  like construction the individual cognitive linguist proposes), originates 
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  in the ability to interrogate and develop the mental repository at our 
  disposal that is provided by language in all its richness. This latter  
  point is developed further in Chapter 3. 
 
6 THE  PSYCHOLOGY  LENS 
 
 Whereas linguistics deals with the public, shared phenomenon of language, 
psychology, particularly that branch termed ‘cognitive psychology’, is concerned 
primarily with individual mental processes. We have already, in the works of both 
Lakoff and colleagues and Eco, as discussed above, strayed into the realm of individual 
minds. The aspect of cognitive science that is of interest here is one that straddles both 
linguistics and psychology as applied to representation and conceptualisation in general 
and this section is focused upon just three matters. First, is the general aspect of human 
cognitive representation of categories as contributions to efficiency of mental processes. 
Secondly, we deal here with investigations of ‘folksonomies’. These are considered here 
since the main work in this field is that of psychologists and ‘cognitive anthropologists’. 
Thirdly, is a description of the work of developmental psychologists in uncovering and 
investigating a seemingly widespread innate cognitive bias towards essentialism in 
dealing with everyday categories.  
 
6.1 Semantic Networks and Schemas  
  
 On the first question, Miller (1985), neatly summarises the fundamental 
importance of effective categorization thus: ‘All organisms achieve some presentation 
of their environments adequate for their survival as a species….. categorisation is a 
basic process in the construction of any such representation: at the very least, substances 
must be categorised as edible or inedible and organisms must be categorised as friend or 
foe. Insofar as we can discover something about the categories recognised by a species, 
we can come to appreciate something of the world in which it lives.’ (Miller, in 
Aitkenhead & Slack, 1985, p 9). The main means of human representation being 
language, mental models and images. It is Smith & Medin (1981) and  Rumelhart & 
Norman (1985) that take this concern to the level of empirical studies of 
representational systems within humans, largely via examining the semantic features 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
89 
and attributes of historical and artefactual kinds. Their findings tend to show that 
category membership is sorted via both defining features (‘has feathers’) and 
characteristic features (‘can fly’) which help confirm appropriate categorisation, but 
also that what is salient depends upon context. Such work indicates that categories are 
stored hierarchically and to confirm that some categories are judged more typical than 
others. This complements the earlier treatment of the work of Rosch and colleagues on 
prototypes. As Lakoff writes  - seeing involves categorising; to see a ‘tree’ we must 
have an idea of the category ‘tree’ in our vocabulary of things in the world. Whilst the 
philosophers have tended to focus upon what properties are used to classify (i.e. are 
there essences in play ?), the cognitive scientists are equally concerned both with 
classification from known properties and inferring unknown properties from categorical 
information (i.e. a greater focus upon the uses to which categorisation is put). 
 
 Where, however, the cognitive scientists provide some overlap with the 
treatment provided earlier in this chapter, it is in relation to ‘semantic networks’, 
‘schemas’ and the affordance of inference. Psychologists regard schemas as units of 
culturally shared knowledge that employ the neural networks of the individual brain, but 
working to a largely common, culturally acquired, blueprint laid down in socialisation 
and language acquisition. Semantic networks and schemas (Abercrombie, 1960; Harré, 
2002a; Rumelhart & Norman, 1985; Smith & Medin, 1981) provide a means of tracking 
and noting the valences of our individual categories in links to our overall conceptual 
structures. Concepts are seen as nodes of meanings interlinked with other meanings by a 
pattern of relationships that are super-sets or sub-sets in a total network. Schemas are 
data structures for representing generic or prototypical concepts stored in memory.  
 
 It is schemas produced as stereotypes derived from experience, or via 
transmission from others, that erect frameworks around concepts and that enable 
hierarchical structures of  concepts to be interrelated one with another within fairly 
well-defined patterns. Properties are both noted and derived according to processing 
rules reflecting natural brain processes and the cognitive structures provided by the 
schemas. The whole set of neural connections is deployed in achieving a categorisation 
(Eco’s NC), and is then available to make further inferential connections along 
pathways suggested by our schemas. The importance of and connection between the 
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utility of classification schemes and their use for inference, as set out by the 
philosophers, the cognitive scientists and the semioticians, is combined in this 
presentation of the brain’s neural network’s ability to afford connections – to bring into 
play Eco’s full MC or encyclopaedia of knowledge, once the trigger classification is 
made. The schemas provide the equivalent of an encyclopaedia’s entry’s very fullsome 
cross-referencing system. 
 
 As Abercrombie (1960) points out, the schema we employ in the interpretation 
of sensory inputs are crucial to the way in which we each construct our knowledge or 
construe the world of institutional facts. And at aggregate level Searle’s institutional 
constructions depend upon shared schema. Byrnes (1996) attributes four functions to 
schemas:-  (a) They help categorise experiences and make more efficient use of memory 
and knowledge retrieval capacity. Only the significant (new) information has to be 
added to memory storage. (b) They improve the efficiency of memory because one can 
retrieve the whole linked information set of the schema from just one aspect. It is a 
network of linked memories. (c) They help us to understand what is going on by 
bringing rich associations with the schema to the input. (d) They help us to solve 
problems, since after repeated encounters with problems of a like nature we form 
schemas for their solution (heuristics derived from schemas). 
 
 Hence it is possible to regard classification schemes as a particular type of 
schema. A type that provides not just mechanisms for recognition, but also potential 
‘inference machines’; mechanisms that can be appraised in terms of their capacity for 
the affordance of grounded inferences. 
 
6.2 Folksonomies: natural, or naïve, classification schemes. 
 
 The term ‘folksonomy’ has been somewhat captured by internet browser and 
search engine design experts over recent years to refer to a system of classification and 
tagging of data content based, not upon top-down systems, but upon collecting the 
activities of numerous individuals browsing and searching for information content. This 
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provides a public, macro revelation of the private internal connections of individual 
minds. Thus tags and annotation of content can be developed organically, bottom-up. 
However, in the sense used here, a ‘folksonomy’ is any method of naming and sorting 
of phenomena that relies upon natural sortings of entities by similarities, rather than by 
acquired taxonomic or scientific classification systems. The major source being Medin 
& Atran, 1999). There, the authors argue that all cultures have their folksonomies and 
that there is a universal structure where, when dealing with the natural world, there is a 
basic or species level, plus super- and sub-ordinate levels. The book also reports a 
number of case study comparisons between native pre-scientific categorisation of nature 
and their scientific equivalents. Atran finds, for example, that Itzaj Maya natives of the 
rainforests of Guatemala have a thorough understanding of native flora (better than 
trained biology students) and that their knowledge is structured in classification systems 
of  species-like groups and higher and lower orders.  He comments; ‘Like folkbiological 
taxonomies everywhere, it also provides a general inferential framework for category-
based inductions’. The authors speculate upon whether our categories simply reflect 
perceived similarities or some deeper essentialist theory of why / how things are. 
 
 There are two important points in this work. First, is that a number of these 
authors argue that the folksonomies examined are generally of equal, if not greater, 
utility to their users than scientifically based taxonomies. See, for example, Dupré’s 
essay ‘Are whales fish ?’ This is differentiated from a purely scientific systematics in 
biology which seeks to maximise inductive potential, regardless of human interests, as a 
route to understanding nature ‘in itself’. Their contributors take different positions as to 
whether  the scientist is best advised to regard folksonomies in biology as a ladder to be 
discarded after it has been climbed to greater heights of knowledge. The second point is 
a claimed ‘fitness’ in evolutionary terms for such capacities since they are central 
cognitive properties to a determinant of survival (see also Barrett, 2001). This is 
developed further next.  
 
6.3 The naturalisation of classifications ~ ‘Psychological essentialism’. 
 There is a specific interest and relevance in what cognitive science tells us about 
the way in which we interpret the classifications encountered in social learning and 
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enculturation. In particular, Medin and his colleagues (Medin & Ortony, 1989), is 
particularly associated with consolidating the concept of ‘psychological essentialism’. 
This holds that a) people in all cultures intuit that a received, established classification 
entails an essence, and b) they reify the classes into reality irrespective of the lack of 
(personal) evidence or experience. Thus, the classes we have been given in 
enculturation appear to stand for the way the world is ~ they are enacted in our beliefs. 
Spurred by this theory, developmental psychologists, particularly Susan Gelman (2003) 
and her many co-authors, have conducted many practical experiments into the nature of 
categorisation in children, even down to pre-linguistic infants.  This seems to confer a 
pragmatic proof to the concept that we have an instinct to essentialise, albeit many 
different explanations for this attribute have been adduced. There is far too much in this 
work to give adequate coverage in this thesis. But Gelman’s own conclusions, based 
largely upon experimental data, are very briefly outlined below:- 
 
* Belief, not knowledge, is what she is exploring and beliefs can be sustained by 
‘placeholder notions’ of divine design (God’s will), essence, heuristic value, social 
expectation as to ‘correctness’, etc. 
* Children readily infer that category members share hidden properties and that 
given category labels are more important than apparent properties. 
* Categorisation is the inference from properties to category membership and such 
categories carry lots of inductive potential where the entities being categorised 
belong to a kind and the property is relatively enduring. 
* Boundaries tend to be intensified, in that things are seldom partly category 
members. (Less cogent as regards artefacts). 
* Similarity based categorisation is less potent than causal explanations. 
* The nature of innate essentialism varies according to the type of kind involved. It is 
particularly strong for biological kinds and weak for artefacts.  
* Enculturation and language are powerful reinforcers of essentialism, but the 
tendency is there prior to enculturation and acquisition of language. 
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 Barrett’s conjecture (2001), is that such a predisposition to essentialism serves 
an evolutionary fitness function to enable inductive generalisations from nature and, 
subsequently, from culture. Inductions which can prove critical to survival. It is 
preserved through to modern times because it is useful, even if it is a useful fiction. 
Whatever the merits of the argument advanced by Gelman, Barrett and others, there is 
here recognition of an important human propensity to ‘essentialise’ categories that may 
unconsciously underpin approaches in the social sciences to investigations aimed at 
classification schemes. At core it may be that we tacitly assume, when being inducted 
into a new scheme of classification of social phenomena, that there is some hidden 
essence which causes and validates that scheme. This, again, is a point picked up later in 
this work ~ that there is a tendency for putative classification schemes to assume a 
mantle of ‘essence’ when there was no such aspiration or claim in the original 
propagation of the scheme. This reification can, of course lead to an instrumentation and 
research approach that inevitably leads to disappointing results (see case studies). 
 
 Similar observations are contained in Lakoff 1987, who notes that people have a 
tendency to believe that things come naturally in well-defined kinds, characterised by 
shared properties and a single right classification scheme. He refers to this as a folk 
theory of categorisation; a theory of which we are unaware, but is implicit in the way 
we talk and act. And Bowker and Star (1999) write of the ‘naturalisation’ of our 
categories, pointing out that it is often in the interests of those in authority deploying 
some (entirely nominal) classification system to make implicit claims to its 
‘naturalness’. They write ‘The more naturalised an object becomes, the more 
unquestioning the relationship of the community to it; the more invisible the contingent 
and historical circumstances of its birth, the more it sinks into the community’s 
routinely forgotten memory’ (Bowker & Star, 1999, p 229). 
 
6.4 Contribution to understanding of classification schemes. 
 
 This selective drawing upon ideas from the psychology domain contributes the 
following precepts to this work:- 
 
 (i) Our natural classification practices employ schemas that (should)  
  support efficient mental processing and afford grounded inferences. 
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 (ii) Folksonomies, or non-scientific (or pre-secintific) classification  
  schemes fulfil the same task, and can prove equal to or better than  
  formal scientific schemes in contextual use. 
 
 (iii) We have an innate tendency to infer that reasons or essences underpin 
  the categories encountered in our everyday epistemic practices. 
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS – ONTOLOGY REDUX. 
 
A paradigm of the difficulty of category imposition in complex areas has been 
amply, if inadvertently, demonstrated in the above attempt to (a) define our ‘object’ in 
the way that lives up to expectations of a ‘scientific’ approach and (b) to disentangle the 
three ‘lenses’ as between the disciplines: Wittgenstein straddles philosophy and 
linguistics; Rosch is a cognitive psychologist whose work has been very influential in 
linguistics; and Eco is as much philosopher as semiotician. Nevertheless, this has been a 
truly interdisciplinary mix of perspectives upon a subject that warrants such an 
approach. This chapter has attempted to throw light upon the processes involved in 
refining a concept and in examining its nature, not as a definitive statement of belief, 
but as an exposition of the crucial truth that there are many perspectives and none is 
paramount. 
 
7.1 Does all this do away with ‘essences’ ? 
 
In many ways sections 4-6 above have traced a retreat from the traditional 
conception of classification as a question of natural necessity and essential properties to 
a more nominalist construction and psychological projection. Certainly the notion of 
necessary and sufficient conditions determining our categories has suffered much 
critical assault. However, a careful reading of most of these authors leaves a residual 
belief that the world contributes to our categorisations, even where nominalist 
constructions are being described. First, it should be noted that there is, almost 
inevitably, an acknowledgement that some natural kinds are known to us as kinds based 
upon their given essential properties. Even if it is also suggested that as knowledge 
advances we may well revise our notions thereof. The key Lockean departure from 
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classical assumptions is qualified by his own observation that there are inner ‘real 
essences’ ~ the atomic constitution of things. It’s simply that, being unable to see 
anything more than their manifold properties, we don’t (yet) know them. He did 
entertain that science might bring these unobservables to light. Boyd suggests that 
realist constructions best account for the utility we obtain from our classification 
practices. That ‘essence’ can be construed as an observer-independent ontology that 
determines the explanatory and inferential value of our categories. Eco writes of nature 
as being unsegmented, but having a ‘grain’. He holds that our carving of nature is best 
with the grain, or at the joints.  
 
Thus, our sources above do, in various ways, acknowledge the possibility of 
categorisation based upon ontology, especially in the natural sciences. However, to 
extend this to the social sphere would, one suspects, stretch the claim of essentialist 
fundamentals for many of the above authorities cited above. The literature in all three 
disciplines indicates divisions when it comes to social and abstract, conceptual kinds. A 
division that would line up many a natural scientist as against the possibility of social 
kindhood. On the other hand, a critical realist position would be reconcilable with an 
essentialist construal of social phenomena in that the similarities in society are as much 
a prominent feature as the dissimilarities, and these similarities are not the result of 
mere coincidence. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). The fact is that in 
organisational science one low cost airline is pretty similar to another; one corner shop 
pretty much like another; etc., if one chooses to look for the similarities (taken for 
granted in even talking about ‘a low cost airline’; ‘a corner shop’). Thus reasons for 
conformity can be found in the relevant structures, powers and tendencies of the social 
realm ~ what are here termed ‘homologating forces’. See Bhaskar 1979; Danermark et 
al, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010; Harré & Madden, 1975; Lawson, 1997, 2003; Sayer 2000. 
 
7.2 Where next ? 
 
Chapter 3 examines the proposition that much of the heat in these topics would 
be reduced were we to adopt a pluralist approach to the classification of classification 
schemes themselves. Some classification schemes may reflect scientific knowledge of 
underlying causality or regularities of a pretty reliable sort, such that fairly reliable 
inferences are derivable from knowledge of category. Others may reflect not underlying 
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causes or reliable conjunctions of events, but simply observable similarities. Whilst 
others may represent nothing more than useful heuristics, or ‘filing systems’ where we 
can group things for our convenience. Whatever types of classification schemes we 
adopt in the organisational and management sciences it seems sensible to deconstruct 
the notion that they are all of the same nature. An alternative approach, and its 
implications for evaluating the inferential potential of the resulting categorisations, is 
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Chapter THREE  
 
PLURALITY AND  UTILITY. 
 
‘If Marx’s social theories, for instance, have merit, then it should be theoretically 
illuminating… to classify people as proletarians and bourgeois. But of course no one 
believes that all proletarians share a common essence. What they share is what the 
theory says they share, a relation to the means of production. But for other purposes it 
will be more relevant to speak of their nationality, their gender, the precise industry in 
which they work, or many other things’. (Dupré, J. 2002. p95-6). 
 1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
Apart from clarifying business strategy and its classification as the research 
object, previous chapters have described a typology of kinds and summarised the 
relevant thinking regarding kindhood from philosophy, linguistics and psychology. 
Such across-the-board material makes little connection with the literature on business 
strategy that forms the bulk of the empirical material for this thesis. The object of this 
chapter is to provide a bridge between these domains and to introduce and outline some 
of the theoretical constructs that will be deployed in making sense of the business 
strategy classification schemes that are at the heart of this study. In so doing, this 
chapter provides an overall argument for a re-appraisal of classification schemes as 
encountered in management and organisation studies. An argument that, potentially, is 
of interest to any discipline engaged with abstract institutional cross-cutting kinds (see p 
49 above) such as might be found in the social sciences.   
 
In particular, the case will be made here that classification schemes are not all of 
one type and for selecting schemes according to the task in hand. This is with particular 
reference to schemes that categorise business strategies, but, in addition, may be of 
wider relevance. Some such categorisation may be better for some tasks than others. 
The nature of the primary contribution of classification schemes in the abstract social 
realm is cognition and inference, but other uses, such as simple information storage and 
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retrieval, must also be accorded recognition. This chapter will argue for plurality and 
utility as prime features of categorisation in the social realm, but, above all, is claiming 
that how we construe the social ontology of such classification schemes is critical to 
employing them effectively in social epistemology. 
 
1.1 Classification Schemes. 
 
 First, a simple re-cap of the purpose of kind-finding or classification into 
categories: It is of tremendous advantage to cognition to be able to group together the 
separate but numerous and repeated encounters with the various tangible and intangible 
phenomena of the experienced world via our ability to recognise repetitions of the same 
entity or concept type (Braisby, 2005; Millikan, 2000). Otherwise the capacity to make 
sense of the senses would be overwhelmed (Smith & Medin, 1981). Classification is but 
one aspect of this recognition and sense-making process and it involves segmenting or 
dividing up the world into categories such that, through finding commonality, it is far 
easier to deal with. In addition, we arrange our categories in relational structures that 
themselves make cognition more effective. These are termed here ‘classification 
schemes’ and the empirical material of later chapters comprises a number of business 
strategy classification schemes.  
 
This partitioning of stuffs or impressions and / or the groupings together of 
individuals or concepts, via classification schemes, creates an easier task of sense-
making by simplifying repetitive cognitive operations, linking categories in meaningful 
ways and allowing inferences from one member of a class to other members of the class 
and how it / they stand to members of other categories. Inferences, that is, concerning 
the common characteristics and properties of class members and their relations with 
non-class members. Thus, recognition and classification into categories, and the 
arrangement of categories into classification systems, is about finding a commonality 
amongst encounters with the world and their relations one to another that is useful to us. 
Utility, in the sense of practical adequacy in performing its intended task, therefore is 
the cornerstone of the approach adopted here: and, thus, is somewhat distinct from the 
usual discussion of classes or kinds rooted in philosophy. The approach adopted here is 
an epistemic and pragmatic one that recognises, nonetheless, the importance of ontology.  
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Classification schemes can themselves range from, for example, the full, 
publicly recognised and available Linnaean system of botanical naming which can be 
applied to the plants in my garden, or to anyone’s garden anywhere on earth, to the 
partial, private and somewhat idiosyncratic order in which I choose to place my non-
fiction books on the shelving, and which, probably, only I can follow (that is, when I do 
remember what had seemed ‘right’ at the time of shelving). Thus, there are different 
types of classifications and a typology of such schemes is suggested here. Note also that 
there is a distinction to be drawn between the idiosyncratic, personal and private 
categorisation schemes we adopt in daily life (‘urgent’ v ‘pending’ or ‘friends’ v 
‘acquaintances’) and the types of classification schemes being examined here. Our focus 
is upon formal, publicly recognised, or ‘scientific’ schemes that offer a relational 
structure of categories asserted, or assumed, to be relevantly defined and arranged. Such 
schemes exhibit the following general characteristics:- 
 
* Designed – the schemes are crafted with an aim in mind beyond simple 
personal use, even if the conceptual origins were extemporised and / or personal. 
These schemes are associated with an author or originator; a designer. 
 
* Segmented field – the area of interest is conceptualised in terms of a number 
of discrete or discriminable categories with both intension and extension 
established in relation to contiguous and, on occasion, superordinate and 
subordinate, categories and fields. 
 
* Intersubjective – the schemes are intended for collective discursive use in the 
domain in question. This often comprises a particular specialist interest group or 
community of practice or disciplinary matrix. In our specific case, the 
categorisation of business strategy by strategists and all with whom they seek to 
communicate. 
 
* Promulgated – the schemes have been put forward and promoted by their 
originators for public use within the domain in question. There is generally some 
implicit or explicit claim associated with the promulgation which valorises the 
scheme in some way (naturalness, parsimony, internal homogeneity and external 
heterogeneity, etc).  
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* Adopted – the schemes examined here are those that, in one way or another, 
have been, or offer the potential to be, adopted. In some cases this means fairly 
widespread application in discourse and research (entry into the specialist 
language of the profession). In others, it means at least published in a formal 
context of journal article or textbook; i.e. has moved beyond the personal into 
the public arena. 
 
 The discussion found in the philosophical literature and elsewhere (including 
here) tends to polarise the construal of kinds in either an essentialist or nominalist vein. 
But this either / or exposition is under increasing challenge. Braisby (2005) speculates 
that the failure to determine a single successful embracing account of concepts and 
categories may be due to any combination of the following points:- (a) categorisation 
may not prove to be a single cognitive process; (b) categories being differentiated by the 
nature of their properties and theoretical treatments; and (c) groups of people 
categorising according to different goals. And Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’ (Chapter 
2.4.9) is a pluralist position, that argues for co-existence and qualified equality of status 
for variously competing classification schemes in the same field. The pluralist argument 
regarding these formal classification schemes is easily stated:- 1) irrespective of their 
ontological status, all these schemes reflect human construction; 2) the basis of that 
construction can vary; 3) accordingly, there are different types of classification schemes; 
and 4) there are different uses to which they may be put ~ what is suitable to one 
application may be inappropriate in another. Legitimacy can be as much a product of 
epistemology as ontology, and a balanced judgement is required that prioritises the 
utility of the construct. The contribution of Boyd (Chapter 2.4.10) is to emphasise that 
the practical uses of our classification schemes are enhanced by their conformity to any 
underlying causal structures; the bringing together of epistemic practice with ontology. 
 
2 THE  CHAPTER  OUTLINE. 
 
Recognising the discussion in Chapter 1 regarding the variegated nature of 
‘kinds’ themselves, this chapter looks at how we might similarly regard the various 
classification schemes found in the business strategy field as being of various sorts, and 
proposes a typology of four different, but overlapping, types of classification systems, 
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only one of which makes claim to kindhood. This positions classification in a pragmatic 
perspective, asking the question ‘what constitutes a “good” classification scheme ?’ The 
answer is expressed in terms of effectiveness in denoting and sorting and, in particular, 
at utility in providing connotations, or inferences, of value to the language community 
deploying the scheme. There follows an extensive discussion of classifications and their 
inferential potential. In this discussion, the approaches of the philosopher Ruth Millikan 
are combined with Umberto Eco’s semiotics, and Richard Boyd’s accommodation 
thesis. Further reference to the cognitive sciences is provided in terms of the relation 
between schemas and classification schemes, and our tendency to impute causality and 
‘naturalness’ to classifications schemes ~  ‘psychological essentialism’ as described in 
the previous chapter. The arguments are then re-presented as a more inclusive yet 
appraising approach to (abstract social) kinds and their classification schemes, which 
suggests that social science has something to gain by greater attention to the underlying 
nature of its classifications.  Finally, two sections look forward to the subsequent 
empirical work. The first, deals with the suggestion that the more prominent ‘motivated’ 
classification schemes are best regarded as theory made manifest. The second, is a 
trailer ~ It offers a tentative preview of the final conclusions.  
 
2.1 Why all this is important. 
 
 As was explicated in Chapter 2, our ability to categorise and our facility in so 
doing has been a core interest of philosophers and thinkers down the ages. Indeed the 
desire to categorise or segment the whole field of knowledge itself was a preoccupation 
of, amongst others, Aristotle, Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Leibniz, Kant and Peirce, right 
up to Foucault (Burke, 2000). Yet, as described in Chapter 1, it is the particular 
deployment of kinds and categories within a discipline that is identified as being key to 
a progressive ‘science’ of whatever ontological domain. Many writers have remarked 
upon the domain-specificity of classification schemes, but it is particularly Richard 
Boyd who stresses their distinctive role in the particular methods and explanatory 
practices of a ‘disciplinary matrix’. In this chapter, the focus is very much on the role of 
classification schemes in management and organisational science, with particular 
application to the sub-field of business strategy. 
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 It seems that in most fields of learning and practice we devise means of 
grouping phenomena both to ease sense-making within that field and to facilitate fence-
building against rivals. Even though the separate disciplines which we identify (and 
defend) are not natural kinds in the usual sense, they are every bit as real as any other 
component of a socially constructed world of intellectual pursuits (Fish, 1989). Much of 
the demarcation of knowledge domains is conferred as much by a relational structure to 
other domains as to the essential focus of its content. For example, both Bowker & Star 
(1999) and Wenger (1998) stress the importance of what they term ‘boundary objects’ 
between communities of practice. Such barriers are complexes of practices, methods 
and, importantly for our enquiry, the concepts or kinds special to the domain – the way 
in which it identifies and distinguishes entities therein. The latter being intimately 
related to the specialist use of terms. In their characterisation of ‘expertise’ Collins and 
Evans (2007) emphasise the importance of command of language and concepts 
particular to the domain: ‘knowing whereof one speaks’. Thus, this enquiry into abstract 
social classifications, such as business strategy, also touches upon certain aspects of our 
understanding of divisions in society and their causes and consequences. Utility in 
deployment may be more than a question of the practical adequacy of the classification 
and may, inter alia, include personal social advancement within a community of practice. 
The socio-political dynamics of professional practice cannot be ignored when seeking to 
understand the adoption, or neglect, of a classification scheme (O’Keefe, 2009). 
 
3 A  TYPOLOGY  OF  CLASSIFICATION  SYSTEMS. 
 
In Chapter 1 there was an extensive treatment of ‘kinds of kinds’ as employed in 
this thesis. That distinction was an ontological one – the different kinds were held to 
have different existential characteristics. However, the representation and arrangement 
of these kinds in a particular domain as some ‘classification scheme’ is inextricably a 
human act. It is an epistemic distinction. An act which implicates human purposes of 
knowing in the representation: a scheme that serves to help in human understanding by 
identifying similarities and their relations. It is proposed, now, to take another ‘cut’ at 
our material, this time looking at the nature of classification systems within which kinds 
are arranged for our use. They are categorical arrangements that may have underlying 
ontic characteristics – thus the periodic table itself is an artefactual kind giving a 
representation of the set of kinds that qualify as natural elements and of other artefactual 
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kinds representing the trans-Uranic elements that depend upon man’s artifice to create – 
but the scheme itself is epistemic in its characteristics. The periodic table proved highly 
generative, indicating the characteristics of potential, yet at the time, undiscovered 
elements. The question here is, therefore, what human purpose is served by arranging 
abstract institutional phenomena in these classification systems ? and how is it that they 
are of use to us ?  
 
To understand this it will help, first, to examine the nature of the classification 
schemes we actually encounter and how we use them. There are different types of 
classification systems that one is likely to encounter in organisation and management 
science, which are here illustrated in particular with regard to the field of business 
strategy. A classification scheme is an epistemic tool, and reasons for making such 
classifications can be multiple and mixed. For the purposes of this thesis, a distinction is 
made between four notional types of classification system. These are:- ‘motivated 
kinds’, of various sorts; a ‘nomenclature’; a classification ‘heuristic’; and a ‘sorting 
device’. But, note that this is a typology of underlying natures of the classifications ~ 
actual classifications schemes one encounters are seldom unambiguously of one type 
alone. Their natures and purposes are not mutually exclusive. 
 
3.1 Type A:- Motivated Kind. 
 
 In this typology a motivated kind classification system is some structure of 
categories where the distinguishing factors in the classification of entities in the field are 
based upon some postulated determining force(s) that are ‘external’ or superordinate to 
the interests of the classifier, be they supernatural, or powers of nature or society, or 
some mixture thereof. The classes are ‘motivated’ by something that we believe is 
responsible and is additional to a simple current interest in producing some convenient 
groupings. This something causes the kind to be what it is, irrespective of whether we 
can specify the causal mechanism(s) in question. There is, in other words, an imputation 
here that some teleological purpose or ‘essence’ (broadly construed) underlies the 
classification. The principle or distinction concerned applies across the whole field or 
domain being classified. The copious literature on ‘kindhood’, especially that discussing 
natural or historical kinds, largely refers to this type. There are claimed or assumed 
ontological grounds attributed for the designation of the kind, whether or not the 
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motivational device is expressly set out. There are also strong epistemic grounds for 
raising the classification from a mere nomenclature or heuristic (as explicated below), 
by explicit or implicit appeal to those motivational grounds. 
 
To qualify as a motivated kind classification system, as the term is used here, 
there must be some knowledge (and this includes widely held naïve belief, or narrowly 
held but authoritative belief) of grounds for the motivational basis of the classification 
(and this includes ‘the will of God’, entrenched tradition, respected authority, or the 
esoteric mathematical creations of sub-atomic physicists). This is a somewhat different 
take on the philosophy of natural kinds in so far that the distinction there is generally 
ontic, whereas here it is epistemic. It lies in the claim. Whatever the basis of the belief 
in its motivation, this is a ‘natural’ or ‘scientific’ or ‘principled’ or even ‘sanctified’ 
sorting; where the determinants of the distinguishing features are held by us to originate 
in elements exterior to the classification and superior to mere human convenience. Note 
that there is no requirement that the class determining criteria are manifest and, in fact, 
they are frequently only ascertained by means of some sort of instrumentation. 
Scientific instruments such as a microscope or the large hydron collider are obvious; but 
sales data and opinion polls would also qualify as sources of sortals. Such classification 
systems can apply to the full range of kinds ~ natural, historical, artefactual, 
institutional, concrete or abstract, or mixtures thereof. So powerful in the natural 
sciences, the idea that an adopted classification scheme within the conventional wisdom 
of any academic discipline is ‘motivated’ in the sense outlined here has proved an often 
unacknowledged underlying reificative force in the use of many classification schemes. 
This is despite the fact that other types of scheme, as laid out below, more properly 
reflect their nature. Motivated kinds are frequently the default interpretation of all 
classification schemes. We assume motivation, even when none is claimed; 
psychological essentialism at work. 
  
3.1 B Types of motivation ~ ‘alethic scepticism’ 
 
There is a school of thought in the philosophy of truth and logic that is 
associated with ‘alethic pluralism’ (Lynch, 2004, 2008). It rejects a monist view of the 
truth in favour of a pluralist position that holds that there is more than a single way in 
which a proposition about how the world is may be true. That is a position regarding 
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ontology and truth. The argument here, however, is an epistemic one that observes that 
there are a number of ways in which our categorisations of the world can be framed and 
that a motivated kind classification scheme must, in order to qualify as such, be ascribed 
to some non-trivial ontological position. But is itself uncommitted, or agnostic, as to the 
warrantedness of such a belief. It brackets off ontological arguments regarding the 
nature and validity of the correspondence of theory with experience in favour of a 
permissive position termed here ‘alethic scepticism’. It is a pluralism about 
classification as a subjective functional truth that allows for variation of world view.  
But it also holds that there is a real world to be true about. That rules in both positivism 
and critical realism (as regards motivated kinds only). However, the usual construal of 
positivism is of a single, eternal and universal ‘truth’; a belief derived, perhaps, from 
essentialism and, by implication, from positivist methodology. Whilst critical realism 
(see below), especially as regards social realities, is more tolerant of a concurrent set of 
powers, tendencies and structures as being causal in open (social) systems. The 
ontology that critical realism traces is not necessarily eternal and universal. The 
essentialism to which it commits is spatio-temporally determined by the interplay of 
social reality. It is, thus, more amenable to an alethic sceptical position as regards which 
of any such causal factors is paramount in any given context. 
 
Thus, under an alethic sceptical  position where, say, a stratification of society 
into a  caste system is concerned it acknowledges, without value judgement, that it 
exists as a causally efficacious classification scheme in certain societies. Now, to some 
individuals, or groups, caste is a hereditary station acquired as a birthright, whilst to 
others it is an unwarranted social imposition. The rival construals are about whether the 
social phenomenon is ‘motivated’, as outlined here, or not (Bowker & Star, 1999). 
Likewise, both evolution and creationism offer accounts of the origin of species and 
thus any biological classification scheme offered under either of these auspices is 
motivated in the sense employed here. In the first example (caste) we see the reflection 
of the essentialist v nominalist split found in much ‘emancipatory’ studies discourse. In 
the second, (species) we have two rival and deeply incommensurable essentialist 
accounts. The alethic scepticism adopted here seeks not to resolve such differences, 
more to make the claimed motivation behind them overt and, thus, amenable to 
scientific inquiry. The normative position regarding motivated kinds is that, whatever 
the claimed motivation, the basis for such a claim should explicitly accompany any 
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promulgated classification scheme and, potentially, be subject to conceptual and 
empirical investigation.  
 
3.1.C. The range of potential strategy homologating agents. 
 
If any social science, such as organisation and management science, is 
confronted with a claimed motivated kind as the basis of a promulgated classification 
scheme, it faces a dual challenge. One, is to examine the system for utility as a 
practically adequate means of partitioning the domain in question; i.e. as offering a 
satisfactory set of categories as regards identification (denotation), sorting and 
connotation (see Section 4 below). This is generally a scalar evaluation, not a binary 
pass / fail test, and it applies to any and all types of classification schemes. The second 
challenge applies to motivated kind classification schemes only. It is to establish the 
firmness of the ontological grounds for the claimed motivation; i.e. their relation or 
‘accommodation’ to reality, as per Boyd (see Chapter 2.4.10). This second challenge 
confronts a stark and central problem in the social sciences ~ that of multiple competing 
and incommensurable paradigms or explanatory schemes as to why and how the 
categories identified in the promulgated scheme should exist independently of their 
identification by some scheme designer. Below are offered some examples of 
contending explanatory schemes within organisational and management science that 
could account for homogeneities in the phenomena that constitute the objects of our 
research and teaching. But first, it must be emphasised that a closer focus upon ontology 
is a sine qua non of our claims to be a (social) science in the first place. As argued in 
Chapter 1, rigorous exploration of our kinds is almost a paramount duty. A duty that, 
had it been addressed with as much rigour as other conceptual and methodological 
developments, should have resulted in greater progress.  
  
Are there potential exogenous causal forces in the socio-technico-economic 
environment, or endogenous elements within businesses, that could potentially shape 
the natural variegation of companies and their strategies such that commonalities will 
emerge ? Forces that might be termed ‘homologating agents’. This is an enormous 
question, (looked at in more depth in the relevant case studies), that can only be touched 
upon at present. But in effect there are intellectual paradigms within the organisation 
and management sciences from which motivation for similarity emerging from diversity 
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can be drawn. To explicate this, three overall ‘totalising’ paradigms are first outlined 
below – positivism; nominalism; and critical realism. The first and last of these would 
allow for motivated kinds in the social realm. Then, by way of illustration, some 
alternative intellectual frameworks are posited that could provide a more explicit 
account of similarity as being caused by forces outside the interests of the classifier. 
 
A.) The positivist paradigm is a strong mainstream, almost orthodox, belief 
system in organisation and  management science. It would hold that claimed 
homogeneities in structure and strategies reflected in a proposed classification system 
can be detected empirically within populations of organisations ~ a taxonomic approach 
(DeSarbo et al 2005). Any promulgated scheme can then be validated, often in 
probability terms, by means of instrumentation and empirical measurement in other 
populations. Such a paradigm rests upon a methodology modelled on a scientific ideal. 
The two major established business strategy classification schemes included in the case 
studies (Miles & Snow; Porter) have extensively been investigated in this vein. (Often 
to little effect). 
 
B) There are also a number of adherents to alternative nominalist paradigms 
associated within some post-modernism in management science (Boje et al, 1996; 
Gephart, 1996; Gergen & Whitney, 1996; Grandy & Mills, 2004) that would deny the 
presence of anything other than social construction underlying any business strategy 
classification schemes. The question of motivation as described here is seen as mistaken 
and entirely superfluous to our needs. Motivations are entirely superficial and simply 
serve our interests; as such, the schemes may be more or less useful and can be 
evaluated in such terms. This meta-position also underlies the treatment of such 
schemes as being tractable to our various purposes such that they can be altered, 
conflated and applied in a promiscuous way. (Again, such treatment has been meted to 
our two main case study schemes.). There is a tendency for contemporary institutional 
sociology to adopt such approaches, e.g. Hsu et al 2010, (particularly Bogaert et al, 
2010 and Kovács & Hannan, 2010). 
 
C) Critical realism offers a third position (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; 
Danermark et al, 2002; Lawson, 2003; Sayer, 2000: Tsoukas, 2000). This account 
would explicate motivated kinds in the social sphere in terms of the intransitive causal 
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powers, tendencies and generative mechanisms and structures of society that provide 
that motivation and would still be operative as homologating agencies in the absence of 
any classification of the resulting homologies. They are real forces at work that cause 
the similarities and distinctions that are recognised in the categories and their 
arrangement in motivated business strategy classification schemes. Their investigation, 
however, cannot be conducted in the conventional positivist manner described above, 
since more than empirical regularity is at work, and our methods must take account of 
the different conditions of the social realm from that of the natural sciences (Bhaskar, 
1979). The distinction against nominalist constructions is very largely ontological; that 
against positivism is both ontological and methodological.  
 
This enquiry was designed to examine existing business strategy classification 
schemes, not to create new ones. However, this has been a fairly eclectic research quest 
and, in positing, as here, that there can be such a thing as a motivated kind of business 
strategy classification scheme, it is worthwhile briefly speculating from whence such 
claims for motivation might be traced. For either a positivist paradigm or critical realist 
account there are a number of potential frameworks against which a motivation could be 
ascribed i.e. different ways of theorising about causal mechanisms driving 
homologation. This is examined in specific contexts in the individual case studies. For 
the present, a handful of conceptual resources for motivation are sketched below in 
order to simply suggest that there is potential scope for generating a motivated type of 
business strategy scheme via a number of routes (alethic scepticism at work):-  
 
i) The economics paradigm. Here mainstream microeconomics would provide 
an implicit motivation by determining economic forces in competitive markets that 
shape successful strategies such that, whilst there are different ways in which a strategy 
may operate, such variations are limited in scope and range (Besanko et al, 2007; 
Ricketts, 2002, Sawyer, 1979). Under the highly theoretic condition of perfect market 
competition there would be no such thing as strategic choice available to the suppliers 
to that market. As illustrated in this quote from a modern economics textbook:- ‘with 
few firms but easy entry and exit, the market is contestable and can have the properties 
of a competitive market: price equals marginal cost and strategic behaviour is 
irrelevant.’ Carlton & Perloff, 2005, p6. However, markets are seldom perfect, and 
never in the sense implied by theory. It is the normative processes, or stylised facts, 
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termed the ‘laws of demand and supply’ in less than perfect markets that offer a 
potential general framework for strategy classification. Hence an application of 
mainstream economic theory to strategy, such as that expounded by John Kay (1995) or 
John Mathews (2006), discusses strategy in terms of ‘rent seeking behaviour’ by firms 
seeking to exploit potential opportunities arising from departures from the theoretical 
ideal. A rudimentary basis for business strategy categories can be ‘read off’ some of 
Kay’s chapter headings. Of greater salience in this work is the fact that Michael Porter 
can be seen as the author/designer of a business strategy classification scheme that 
stems from conceptualisations formulated within an economics paradigm – that of 
industrial organisation (see Chapter 5). 
 
ii) The social science paradigm. Here the modern mainstream would trace back 
to the seminal paper by DiMaggio & Powell (1983), albeit that they trace the origins of 
their thinking (and the paper’s title) to earlier writers. Whilst acknowledging the 
isomorphic tendencies created by (economic) markets, they account for the similarity of 
organisations with reference to state and professional (social) control and describe three 
isomorphic social processes:- coercive, mimetic and normative at work therein. Further, 
this paper establishes, from theoretical premises, two sets of predictors of the degree of 
isomorphism within a field, drawn from organisational- and field-level indicators. A 
well-known categorisation of strategic responses to institutional processes that emerges 
from this paradigm is Christine Oliver’s 1991 paper, in which she outlines five 
strategies, each with three tactical variants. This, however, hardly qualifies as a scheme 
offering a full approach to business strategy, and is more by way of a heuristic for 
strategic choice than an institutionally motivated kind. A further potential source of 
distinctions amongst organisational or business strategies, where this paradigm is 
foundational, is the sociology of institutional categories literature (Hsu et al, 2010) and 
the school of ‘institutional logics’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008), yet there is no significant 
generalised business strategy classification scheme based on either. (Albeit there is 
much in adjacent fields or discursive treatment of strategy / structure that could provide 
such a formal arrangement had the writers concerned regarded such a task as important.) 
 
iii) The evolutionary analogy has provided three main strands of thought that 
might suggest motivation of foundations for a formal business strategy classification 
scheme:- (a) the work of Bill McKelvey (1975, 1979, 1982) advocating the application 
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of taxonomic methods derived from biological science in organisation and management 
science. McKelvey’s contribution, although widely cited, has not resulted in significant 
business strategy classification schemes based thereon. However, the adoption of 
taxonomic methods and cluster analysis is evident in the work of DeSarbo et al (2005) 
and a discussion of this approach is provided in the Miles and Snow case study. (b) 
Population ecology; work conducted in organisational and management science 
associated with Hannan & Freeman (1977) and their collaborators and followers refers 
to the population ecology of organisations and draws upon an analogy between 
organisational growth and decline and that of organisms competing for environmental 
survival mechanisms or strategies. This is a perspective that sees a competitive social, 
economic and technical setting in which firms compete for resources and survival. It is a 
(market) environmental selection for organisations that best match its requirements. We 
have earlier discussed the parallels between business strategies and generalised 
biological survival strategies such as fleetness, camouflage, stealth, etc. There is here an 
implicit suggestion that organisations, despite their obvious disparities and different 
settings might, nonetheless, find a limited range of survival and growth strategies. 
However, to date, no major classification scheme of business strategies is based upon 
such a premise.  And, finally, (c) the adaptive fit reading of the organisation / 
environment relationship. This is a similar notion to that of the population ecology 
regarding the continued survival and growth only of those firms that meet the needs of 
the environment; here largely the market’s requirements. John Child’s paper on adaptive 
fit (1972) is generally regarded as the starting point for further work on this topic. 
Under the organisational adaptation conceptualisation the emphasis, however, is upon 
the capacity of the organisation to adapt itself to the environment whilst also adapting or 
manipulating the environment to meet its needs. That is to say it recognises the 
significant capacity of organisations to choose and shape their environments, by 
branding, marketing, lobbying, standard setting, etc. Again a plausible basis for 
generalisation across firms and industries as regarding potential strategic groupings. In 
this case, it can be argued that the Miles and Snow typology (Chapter 4) owes 
something to such thinking and, it should be noted, they attribute one of the starting 
points of their own work to that of Child. 
 
iv) The life cycle analogy: Here the growth and development of the firm or the 
market / industry is likened to the stages of growth of an organism. The process of 
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change, from small beginnings to growth and maturity to eventual decline of the 
organisation or the product market place is seen as a natural progression with strategies 
appropriate to each phase. L. Greiner (1972) is associated with depicting the five phases 
of growth of the organisation over time, and the consultancy Arthur D. Little is 
particularly associated with proposing a life cycle portfolio matrix of strategies 
appropriate to stages of industry maturity and the competitive position of the firm. The 
theory here being that there is a valid comparison to be drawn between organism and 
organisational life-cycles. 
 
v) Globalisation rhetoric has carried through into a number of attempts to 
examine strategy. The best known model or structured categorisation being that of 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) regarding the organisation for global operations on a four 
quadrant ‘efficiency’ and ‘responsiveness’ typology that employs idealisations and real 
world exemplars. There are a number of contemporary classification schemes 
promulgated in this area. These schemes would qualify for inclusion in our case studies, 
but have not been examined in detail since it was necessary to limit the scope of this 
study at this time. 
 
There are then a number of plausible framework accounts within the field of 
organisational and management science to which causation of the similarities of 
business strategies highlighted therein might be attributed. An examination which, 
unfortunately, prompts a further question:- given this rich potential, why are so few 
motivated kinds postulated for this domain ? The tentative answer offered here is, that 
to date, ‘kindfinding’ has not been of particular concern to the research community, 
partly, perhaps, because other nomenclative and heuristic schemes offer simpler 
challenges to propose. For if promulgating a purported motivated kind there is an 
implicit obligation to at least state the proximate claimed homologating forces ~ the 
why ? of such kinds. 
 
3 .2 Type B:- Nomenclature. 
 
A nomenclature, as used here, is simply a structured, agreed sorting and 
‘ordinary language’ naming scheme within a field that may be based upon various 
principles or conventions concerning the appropriate classification. There is no explicit 
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claim to external motivation of the categories, no identified homologating forces at 
work; albeit there may well be some overarching ontology relating to how the world or 
society ‘just is’ and the similarities that are being recognised came about. Categorisation 
depends upon superficial similarities as they appear to the classifiers. There are no 
hidden motivational forces or essences directly implicated in the similarities being 
acknowledged in the scheme, yet there is an assumption that these are natural 
phenomena that are being recognised in the scheme. It a scheme that recognises a 
salient similarity, whether of appearance, composition or behaviour and puts a name to 
that reoccurring something. The salience is in usefulness.  
 
This is a nominal classification system that serves some human purpose. The 
class determining criteria are usually easily discerned and intensions and extensions are 
learned as language is acquired from infancy, or through enculturalation , or 
occupational practice and training. It is an unreflective partitioning of environmental 
phenomena in that it divides entities or concepts on the basis of ‘how things are’ rather 
than ‘why things are like that’. (It is, for example, the argument that permits cucumbers 
to be classed as vegetables or gnocchi to be included with the pasta [Harré, 2002a]). 
Whilst it is a pre-scientific or natural classification, such nomenclatures can be robust to 
subsequent knowledge gained through experiment and theorising. They can also be the 
product and property of a practice community such as gardeners or fishermen and be of 
great standing, utility and relevance to that community. (Medin & Atran, 1999). This 
such that the usage becomes that of that language community in general. The point here 
about utility, and to anticipate section 4 below, is perhaps best understood via John 
Dupré’s argument in the paper ‘Are whales fish ?’. As a scientific classification, of 
course not. But, from a practical viewpoint, if the only knowledge we have of what 
class of thing a whale is, is that it is a mammal, the entirely natural assumption is that, 
in all likelihood, a whale is a land animal and has four legs. The scientific classification 
(which Dupré acknowledges is now predominant) is a less helpful cue that only 
indicates how it feeds its young. Although scientific practice seeks and privileges 
motivated kinds, it should also be recognised that sciences will settle for nomenclatures 
in their absence: the classifications of clouds and winds by Luke Howard and Captain 
Francis Beaufort contributed greatly to the science of meteorology, but both are 
nomenclative by nature (Hamblyn, 2001). 
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Sometimes referred to as a ‘folksonomy’, ‘folk sorting’ or ‘folk taxonomy’, the 
role and identity of an author / designer is often obscured by the passage of time 
(Howard and Beaufort mentioned above being rather untypical). Knowing the names 
and arrangements of things is the product of language acquisition at all stages, but for a 
motivated kind we can also learn why such arrangements are appropriate. Nomenclative 
classification schemes may prove the precursor to a motivated kind classification where 
more formal, scientific knowledge subsequently reveals the sorting criteria to have been 
grounded on ontologically firm foundations. However, as mentioned above, Dupré, for 
example, does not regard such nomenclatures in biology as inferior to the scientific 
(motivated) classifications in the same domain (Dupré, 1999). In empirical studies it has 
been shown that the grasp by young children of living kinds and their biological nature 
or the sorting of trees or fish by native societies often proves well-founded for practical 
use, and more appropriate to the language community concerned (Ahn et al, 2001; 
Coley et al, 1999). Likewise, there may be a number of sequential attempts to classify 
natural or social phenomena with seeming ontologically motivated groundings, each 
superseded by the growth of knowledge. As mentioned earlier, there is a tendency to 
impute a motivated kind where a nomenclative classification is, in fact, what we are 
dealing with (Medin & Ortony, 1989). But this is not entirely unjustified, since it is also 
true that many of our contemporary scientific classification schemes of the motivated 
kind were foreshadowed by their nomenclative forerunners. Scientific progress has been 
achieved in establishing the underlying causal forces that produce the evident 
homologies noted by our forefathers. (A position not truly achieved in the business 
strategy classification schemes that form our case studies).  
 
Remaining, however, as a nominal classification system, it is an epistemic, 
social phenomenon, being the relevant community’s way of naming things, or groups of 
things, or of dividing up the variety of entities judged to fall within the relevant domain. 
It distinguishes permanent from temporary characteristics and bases the sorting upon the 
former. It is certainly conventional, and the determinants of the sorting may well lack 
any motivating force(s) within the classified; the determining interests being those of 
the classifier’s community. Unlike a motivated kind based structure, there is seldom a 
single, or even identifiable author / designer of a nomenclature, the origins of the 
scheme of things being lost in the mists of time. But such classification systems survive 
and can thrive when found useful i.e. they are a meaningful sorting of the world of 
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things or thoughts. In the social abstract realm the class determining principle may be 
identified without being specified: as in ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ which is clearly contingent 
upon time, place and context. As is evidenced in discussions of absolute and relative 
poverty and the calibration thereof. The application of such a nominal classification to a 
particular context then being set by application of selected criteria appropriate to that 
context. In other words, the user specifies the terms of the investigation / discussion. 
 
The closest to a nomenclature of strategies was that offered by Henry Mintzberg 
(1988) and explicated here in full in the subsequent case study. Mintzberg had reviewed 
a number of strategy classification schemes and, to some extent, incorporated these in 
his own proposals within a specification of the scope for choice along each of certain 
strategic dimensions. The resulting list of 48 different categories of strategy has 
singularly failed to resonate with the strategy community and has been virtually ignored 
as a framework in strategy research. It is categorised here as a nomenclative scheme in 
the absence of any claim to some such external motivating ‘fitness’ of his scheme. But 
it is also clearly an attempt to provide a widespread community of practice with an 
authoritative, enduring, structured and inclusive framework for analysing strategic 
behaviour. That is to say, it is less than a motivated kind, but aspired to be much more 
than a heuristic or sorting device. 
 
3.3       Type C:- A Heuristic Classification Scheme. 
 
By a heuristic classification scheme is meant a system of sorting entities within a 
field that appeals to our specific cognitive requirements at that time. It is a ‘folk 
sorting’, like a nomenclature, but the purpose rests upon a sorting of things aimed at 
making decisions or judgements concerning them easier to make. Instead of the 
classification being based upon ‘how things are’, it is based on ‘how we can group 
things in order to….’ The usual purpose of classification is recognition first, and any 
inferences follow thereafter. However, in a heuristic the classification is driven by the 
desire to make inferential judgements and the ease of recognition of the appropriate 
category may be compromised by that need to see through the classification to its 
implications. Unlike a nomenclature, there is no need to distinguish permanent from 
temporary features; but like a nomenclature, the firmer the classification’s ontological 
and epistemic grounding the greater its power. This form of heuristic classification is 
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closely allied to decision-making processes, since that is their prime purpose 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999) and may work towards that end by listing schematically all 
the available options / categories and eliminating the least favoured / likely (Berretty et 
al, 1999). The argument here is that of ‘ecological rationality’ ~ that the methods or 
models reflected in the categorisation scheme must fit the purpose, rather than the field 
being restructured to fit the method. But there must be adequate search criteria for 
defining the area or field in question ~ the ‘decision arena’ ~ and rules for starting and 
stopping the categorisation and decision process. We all experience something of the 
advantages and frustrations of heuristic classification when dealing with the ubiquitous 
automated telephone lines of most service organisations these days. (‘If you are an 
existing customer, press one. If you are…..’).  
 
Not all heuristics are classifications, but some classifications are for heuristic 
purposes. They are what Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) termed ‘ecologically rational’ in 
that they are fitted to the task, not driven by some principle or constraining 
methodology. They are helpful where the problem, like many in management, is one of 
uncertainty, rather than risk. In organisation and management science, for example, 
investment appraisal often entails the division of probable future events and outcomes 
as either ‘costs’ or ‘benefits’ and provides mechanisms for quantification and 
comparison ~ the heuristic is a procedure. In a similar vein, the typical ‘SWOT analysis’ 
is a bespoke heuristic classification of the external environment and internal resources 
and capabilities of an organisation. Like a nomenclature, it is spatio-temporally 
contextualised, but here the context is the purpose of the heuristic ~ the determination of 
the affordances and restraints upon possible courses of action. It is indubitably 
subjectively created and bespoke to the current context both of the firm’s position and 
the nature of the question being examined. Yet it does so without limit to the number of 
factors to be considered and without a requirement for some common denominator. (Yet, 
interestingly, this does not stop less enlightened students from downloading a vintage 
SWOT analysis from the internet as being ‘the’ SWOT analysis of the company 
concerned). SWOT is employed in strategic analysis, but is not itself a strategy 
classification scheme.   
 
There are familiar such classification schemes in strategy, often represented via 
a four box matrix such as the Ansoff matrix (Ansoff, 1965). In that this is a well known 
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heuristic classification schemes it illustrates the concept. But, it also contains significant 
nomenclative elements and has become somewhat reified, hence, it is not ideal as an 
exemplar. A more or less ideal strategy classification heuristic type is provided in the 
strategic choices suggested by what has been variously described as the ‘Customer 
Matrix’ (Bowman, 1991; Faulkner & Bowman 1995; Faulkner & Johnson 1992). This 
scheme (described in Appendix 4) simply sets out two dimensions – price and quality –
and a choice of three positions on each – thus providing a set of nine price / quality 
option conceptualisations and associated labels to facilitate discourse and decision-
making. Although its adoption, directly or as the ‘strategy clock’, has fostered 
familiarity of this classification with many undergraduate students, it (like Mintzberg’s 
classification scheme) has little purchase with the academic research community and is, 
perhaps, more familiar to marketing practice. The difference between a heuristic and a 
nomenclative classification system might be found in the way that their use is framed:-  
in the deployment of a heuristic the framing is ‘let’s look at it this way’; whilst for that 
of the nomenclature it is ‘these are type x; whereas those are type y…etc.’ (where no 
explanation is advanced as to why the phenomena in question do segment in that 
manner). 
 
3.4      Type D:- A Sorting Device. 
 
 Finally, a sorting device is how we label a classification system that lacks any 
pretence of motivation or naturalness or heuristic value, but is simply a convenience for 
the storage and retrieval of individual entities, whether of substance or information. It is 
merely a means of the placing and tracing of entities in the general scheme of things. 
The sorting can be personal and the selection criteria can vary arbitrarily from person to 
person; as in the way in which we elect to place non-fiction books upon our 
bookshelves (by author, subject, acquisition date, frequency of reference, size, colour, 
etc). However intersubjective or socially salient sorting classifications usually require 
some public key to the ‘system’ in use. For example the Library of Congress or Dewey 
Decimal Classification system used by many University and public libraries. As will be 
clearer in the light of the discussion in Section 4 below, the emphasis in a classification 
scheme of this type is upon denoting the individual entity and in sorting amongst 
individual categories i.e. determining boundaries. The intension is recall / retrieval and 
the extension is relative to some arbitrary convention(s) defined by, and of value to the 
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users. This is in contrast with the other three classification types where the associated 
connotations are of great interest in determining practical adequacy. A sorting device 
works well if it denotes and sorts well. The main connotations being merely those 
associated with storage and retrieval. 
 
In business and organisational life such systems for data storage, retrieval and 
transfer are ubiquitous, consume considerable effort in design and implementation, yet 
are seldom remarked upon. For example, filing of suppliers’ records in alphabetic order 
is a purely nominal classification that fits the sorting device description, but so too does 
the Dewey Decimal system. Much of the management science literature related to 
classification is associated with ‘knowledge management’ and relates to what, in effect, 
is reducible to sorting devices, but devices with polyvalent tabs enabling data retrieval 
according to many different applications. A sorting device does not rely upon any 
external phenomenon other than the property upon which the sorting is executed. 
Alphabetic order, date order, size, or any other relatively easily discernable feature of 
the entities being classified will suffice as long as it is acknowledged and agreed upon. 
Sometimes the ‘key’ is external, such as the Melvil Dewey’s library index handbook(s) 
with the hierarchical framework of ten main classes and structured sub-divisions 
arranged in a standardised decimal notation. However, there is often an underlying, 
utilitarian folk logic to the arrangement of like with like ~ we don’t look for a book on 
chemical engineering in the history section, but when we spot ‘mechanical engineering’ 
we are inclined to search nearby. (With the implicit brave assumption that any librarian 
will recognise and denote the subject matter of a book in the same unambiguous manner 
as implied by the system and our personal interpretation thereof). Albeit innocent-
seeming, a social sorting device applied to individual persons (e.g. gender, schooling, 
post code) can carry enormous consequences. As Bowker and Star (1999) remark, such 
standardised classification systems provide an infrastructure of organisational or even 
national or international knowledge which is also often an unrecognised source of social, 
political and economic framing of capability or thought. (Where, however, such a 
classification is instrumental for social categorisation, it may be more appropriate to 
consider it as a heuristic device.) 
 
Whilst personal sorting systems for business strategy (often based upon personal 
organisational experience) are undoubtedly salient in strategy discourse, ~ ‘like we did 
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at …..’ ~, this creates a local scheme within a restricted community. There are no 
common place business strategy sorting devices. (Or at least those which might be seen 
as such also make, at the very least implicit, claim to some ‘higher’ type of A-C above). 
This is not surprising, given the abstract collective intentionality that is business 
strategy. There is literally nothing to sort other than the physical filing of the five year 
plan, next year’s budget or the new mission statement or other document within which 
the strategy is reproduced.  
 
3.5      A caution ~ The principle of non-exclusivity. 
 
As stated earlier, these are not mutually exclusive types.  A feature of many 
typologies in the field of abstractions applies with some force here – that few such 
entities fit unambiguously into a single type alone. These are overlapping circles in a 
Venn diagram. There are no sharp dividing lines and most classifications fit more than 
one of the types to varying degrees. The nature of a classification may be such that it 
combines aspects of all four and the terms suggested above are reasonably fuzzy at the 
edges. For example, the periodic table of the elements qualifies as a representation of a 
motivated kind, but, at the outset, it provided a structured nomenclature for epistemic 
communities that did not have understanding of, nor access to means of determining, 
atomic structure. It also provides a guide to the properties of elements in particular 
vertical and horizontal relations to one another in that table, the whole thing acting as a 
heuristic. And, finally, the periodic table is simply a sorting device ordering the 
elements by atomic weight.  
 
The fact that classification schemes may embody more than one type can also be 
explored with regard to the International Classification of Diseases (Bowker and Star, 
1999).  This is the internationally agreed set of accepted causes of mortality and 
associated classification codes used globally in death certificates. The ICD has a host of 
users ~ epidemiologists, public health workers, actuaries, the pharmaceutical industry, 
hospital administrators, etc. and, thus serves as an infrastructure to a wide section of 
society. It also organises on at least four non-exclusive principles:- topographical; 
etiological; operational and ethical-political. It contains etiological elements which 
supply motivated kinds; it provides a structured and standardised nomenclature; it is 
used for heuristic purposes, for example by insurance companies and Governments; 
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and, as a sorting device, it enables the important function of retrospective interrogation 
for emergent diseases. 
 
 3.6 A hierarchy ~ The principle of elevation. 
 
However, it would be a disservice to the import of the periodic table to refer to it 
as anything other than a motivated kind. One instinctively elevates the impartiality and 
durability of a motivated classification over a nomenclature or a heuristic classification 
and all three seem superior to a mere sorting device. The reason(s) for this lie in the uses 
to which we wish to put the classification scheme. The most challenging aspect of 
strategy is that it involves prediction and the categorisation most likely to yield reliable 
inferences about an uncertain future is that founded on a motivated kind. Likewise an 
‘alphabetic order’ sorting device is unlikely to claim high heuristic value, nor to be 
motivated by some higher force. As a first approximation, one can state that the higher 
classification is more likely to serve the purposes of the lower, not vice versa. Thus, 
where it is plausible to claim a classification system as being of a motivated kind that 
would be the appropriate description. A nomenclature is generally derived from some 
salient discernable that may serve for heuristic purposes too. Failing other more 
pressing needs, a heuristic may provide a suitable sorting device. This choice of the 
‘higher’ of the classifications is termed here ‘the principle of elevation’ on the basis, 
explicated further in Sections 4-6 below, that it carries the greater pragmatic potency as 
an inferential mechanism. Dupré, who argues that some folksonomies are of equal value 
to formal scientific classification schemes to some sectors of society, would be 
uncomfortable with the implication of a hierarchy of classification schemes, as would 
this author, provided they are of equal pragmatic value. However, the argument here is 
that – as will be argued in sections 4-6 below – in principle, a motivated kind is likely to 
offer a stronger basis for drawing valuable inferences than is a nomenclature since, in 
terms of Boyd’s accommodation thesis, it is better matched to the real causal 
homologating forces in play. 
 
In business strategy the Customer Matrix / Strategy Clock that emerges from 
Cliff Bowman’s work was described above as a heuristic classification scheme. 
However, Cliff Bowman’s own presentation (see appendix 4) is as if the scheme arises 
from empirical research – a putative motivated kind – and it is offered for pedagogic 
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purposes more as a nomenclature in Exploring Corporate Strategy (Johnson, Scholes & 
Whittington, 2008). Its designation as a heuristic classification scheme is entirely this 
author’s usage. To this writer, the classification on offer here is either as a heuristic; 
setting out the logical permutations of increase – hold – decrease against two 
dimensions of price and quality with accompanying commentary on likely 
consequences. Or it is simply a sorting device. Under the principle of elevation it is 
given as a heuristic classification since the sorting aids decision-making. 
 
3.7 A relation ~ Linguistic embeddedness. 
 
As described earlier, strategising is acting under a description and a business 
strategy classification scheme is a structure of categories or descriptions, with 
associated labels offering a menu of possible strategies as broad generalisations. As 
described there, our classification schemes provide intersubjectively shared meanings 
together with their connotative associations. But the different types of classification 
scheme act differently. 
 
A nomenclature is by definition about what we call things and how we recognise 
them as different from other things (concrete or abstract). But language and its 
comprehension is also inextricably bound up with two of the other three systems. 
Established nomenclatures are irreducibly intersubjective i.e. are collectively owned and 
modified within a language community. Heuristic schemes may be personal, but are 
more generally communally held and learned via enculturation. A motivated kind is 
generally recognised by properties, whether physical or conceptual, that are discernable 
to all. But many natural kinds are, thanks to the progress in scientific instrumentation, 
determined in ways that cannot be naturally determined via the unaugmented senses. 
Furthermore, the nature and modes of operation of some artefacts and social kinds may 
be well beyond the comprehension of all but a minority of experts. We come to 
understand such kinds via third parties; what Putnam (1975) refers to as the ‘division of 
linguistic labour’ and Collins and Evans (2007) refer to as the movement up the ladder 
of expertise to ‘interactional expertise’ where there is sufficient understanding to 
communicate without the practical, often tacit, expertise to contribute. That is most of 
us, other than experts, accept the presence of the determining motivational power(s) in 
the natural kind as a matter of trust. (Not so strange, when one recognises that almost all 
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linguistic acquisition, from childhood to professional education is taken on trust). Thus, 
it is found (see also section 5.2 below) that many classification systems are seen as 
natural and reflecting the way things are, without question. Only when challenged do 
we acknowledge the human origins of such classification practices and terminology. 
(Bowker & Star, 1999). 
 
4 WHAT  CONSTITUTES  A  ‘GOOD’  CLASSIFICATION  SCHEME ? 
 
From the above treatment it is apparent that the value judgement being applied 
here is the usefulness of a classification system to society and the individual. It is not 
focused upon ontological issues, but upon epistemic usefulness. A classification scheme 
by this pragmatic account is a conceptual arrangement of categories as a tool for doing 
some kind of work. So what, then, must such a classification scheme accomplish ?  
 
4.1 A specification. 
 
 In the terms of this thesis, a pragmatic classification (motivated kind, 
nomenclature, heuristic or sorting device) is one that effectively and reliably achieves 
some human purpose in grouping phenomena, and to do this it must provide three 
features:- 
 
A) It must be successful in denoting the phenomena that comprise the class; – 
the class label must attach to something (whether tangible or conceptual) 
recognisable to the language community concerned;  
 
B) One way or another, it must point to recognisable differences in 
distinguishing those phenomena from others that fall outside the class i.e. it 
has effective associated means of sorting, and; 
 
C) It must be useful in connoting, or inference-making; – the connotations or 
wider intensions associated with the class must provide some meaningful 
service to the language community that deploys the label.  
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 The claim here is that the distinction between denotation and connotation drawn 
in the above description is crucial to grasping the usefulness of any classification. While 
effective sorting determines its reliability in that use. This focus upon usefulness is, 
perhaps, somewhat different in emphasis to much that has gone before as regards the 
philosophy of kindhood (Chapter 2). There the key concern of the many different 
contributions has been whether the justification for the classification was indifferent to 
or dependent upon the classifier’s intentionality. The discussion was about the extent to 
which the various kinds are the product of nature or society at large and their claimed 
validity against objective criteria, irrespective of subjective interests. (Note that the 
definition given above carries no explicit or implicit reference to essences, natural kinds 
or nature’s joints). Here, the focus is very much upon utility ~ what meanings does the 
category label carry for us and how relevant are they to our everyday or specialist 
concerns ? Note that the four types of classification given in section 2 above ~ 
motivated kinds, nomenclatures, heuristics and sorting devices ~ all serve human 
interests. The key to that utility is the classification’s use in cognition, and that depends 
upon its successful denotation, effective sorting and the ‘carrier load’ of relevant 
connotation achieved by the classification.  These issues are therefore the first stop in 




 The first task that the classification must achieve is to successfully indicate the 
individuals or concepts to which it applies: denotation. This is the task of attaching 
linguistic labels to phenomena of interest and being able to use that label or word 
correctly. And to do so in such a way that one will recognise the same phenomena on 
further encounter and collate separate encounters into a richer, deeper characterisation.  
 
 One might expect this to be untroubling, because it seems so natural, but a 
moment’s reflection brings to mind the fact that, as adults, we seldom in day to day 
activities encounter entirely new types of phenomena. When we do encounter such 
situations and where there is some personal need to make sense of the novelty, the 
cognitive task is quite appreciable; whether it be grasping the meaning of Bourdieu’s 
‘habitus’, or first coming to grips with a menu in a Vietnamese restaurant, or integrating 
our conception of some newly encountered sub-atomic particle or understanding the 
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risks and returns from a novel financial derivative product. A concept of what is 
entailed in using a word correctly is having a mental structure associated with the word 
and that has to be constructed in such a way that future encounters will call to mind the 
same term. As Millikan declares, ‘the most central job of cognition is the exceedingly 
difficult task of reidentifying individuals, properties, kinds and so forth, through diverse 
media under diverse conditions.’ (Millikan, 2000, p ix). It is taxing. But the effort is 
easily forgotten, except perhaps by those concerned with pedagogy or semiotics. 
 
 The examples of ‘habitus’, the menu, particle or derivative cited above are all 
ones situated within one’s linguistic or epistemic community (or can be translated 
thereto, in the case of the menu); the phenomena or label is there, is supported with 
prior knowledge within that community and simply needs to be attached in one’s 
personal lexicon. As remarked, such encounters are infrequent. Situations in which there 
is no supporting cognitive structures or classification system are even more rare. But, 
one must ask, what if there is not already an existing set of labels or terms to select 
from ? What where there is no supporting structures or linguistic community to help ? 
This is the problem that Eco (2000) tackles through examination of encounters such as 
Aztecs with Spanish cavalry, or the curators of the British Museum with a stuffed 
specimen of a platypus.  
 
 Eco’s (2000) treatment of the distinction between the ‘dictionary’ definition of a 
class noun (the nuclear content or NC) and the ‘encyclopaedia’ entry under that label 
(the Molar Content, or MC) is quite subtle, and first, we have Eco’s Cognitive Type 
(CT); what he terms the private personal semoisis, as contrasted with the NC or public 
communicative consensus. In Eco’s words ‘The NC represents the way in which we try 
intersubjectively to make clear what features go to make up a CT’ (Eco, 2000, p 280). 
This CT is a label or term against which the manifold of the senses registers data 
concerning the phenomena. Whilst Eco refuses to explore the processes of cognition 
and recognition involved here, Millikan sees this as central to her work on substance 
concepts.  
 
 Millikan (2000) proposes a rather unique form of meaning externalism – not one 
in which the referred object, substance, concept or whatever initiates the perception 
prompts the reference, but one where the act of reference is provided as a sense of 
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direction to incoming information. Reference for Millikan, is the routing of sensory 
information – visual, audible, olefactory, etc and including language, all of which enters 
consciousness via different routes yet needs to be combined as all referencing the same 
external or non-embodied source. It means the joining up of incoming information in 
different modes of presentation on different occasions such that the brain represents to 
itself that these all relate to the same thing (object, property, concept )  – reidentification. 
She describes a number of accounts of what this entails, making it clear that there are 
still a range of competing theories. But, whatever the nature of this mental focal point, 
which is termed here a ‘label’ or CT, it, in fact, pre-exists language. It is really what we 
attach the label provided by language to. Thus, whilst his context may have been 
different, Strawson was correct in saying that referring is not something that words do – 
indicate phenomena – but what we do with words   (Eco,  2000, p 280). 
 
 Once we have the label; ~ the CT; the point about which all new information can 
accrete;~ we are on the way to creating the (pre-scientific) dictionary definition, or 
narrow intension, of the class noun – the NC - and, simultaneously, the data file 
containing all that pertinent information ~ the MC ~ or what will become our personal 
encyclopaedia entry for it, the fully networked intension. As Eco points out, the creation 
of the public dictionary definition and public encyclopaedia entry is the next phase and 
is interactive with the language community / epistemic culture at large. But both Eco 
and Millikan are clear that there is no absolute reason why the personal and the public 
definitions / entries should be identical. In fact they are frequently different. The pre-
scientific or ‘folk’ definition of water is of the nature of a colourless, more or less 
tasteless, yet thirst quenching natural liquid that falls as rain or flows as rivers. The 
scientific, and essentialist, definition is that of a natural kind; H2O. 
 
 Whilst the NC and the MC are simultaneously created, and mutually supportive, 
their functions are different. The NC defines the sorting or defining criteria to see if the 
phenomena conforms to the label; can be properly categorised in that class. Whilst the 
MC sets out the associations of that class label with properties wider than the defining 
criteria. The NC of a horse is that it is born of the union of a mare and a stallion – its 
essence is that of a historical kind. The MC tells us that a horse is an animal, a 
vertebrate, a mammal, hay eating, can be domesticated, can be ridden, etc. The 
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veterinary surgeon will have a different MC for a horse from a jockey’s and both their 
MCs will be different from that of a child. 
 
4.3 Sorting  
 
The act of re-identifying incoming information about some phenomena or concept is 
not just about recognising the same individual, substance or concept when re-
encountered, but also, in classification, requires an act of recognition of similar 
individuals, substances or concepts as being of the same sort. It means being denoted 
together as under the same CT or label because they belong together as a group or are 
the same stuff or are the same concept. This also implies the ability to register other 
individuals, substances or concepts to be not of the same sort as those already in our 
current ‘dictionary’ of encountered things or ideas. So we need to both be able to sort 
things into different categories in our mental structures and, where necessary, to create 
new categories and integrate them with existing conceptual structures. In the grounding 
literature, these requirements relate to the ‘extension’ of a category – finding its domain 
of capture – or the question of ‘sortals’ as to how we count individual things as being of 
the same class or not and, furthermore, the basis upon which we divide up and assemble 
the classes within the cognitive world we inhabit.  
 
 Exactly how this is done when sorting things as individuals (recognised as 
‘count nouns’ – things of which we can ask ‘how many ?’ such as tigers or competitors) 
or stuffs (recognised as ‘mass nouns’ – things where the question becomes ‘how 
much ?’ rather than ‘how many ?’ such as water or risk), is neither clear amongst 
philosophers, nor amongst cognitive scientists. So, we can pass over the mechanisms, 
but with the acknowledgement that humans are capable of performing this task far more 
effortlessly than we can understand or explicate exactly what it is we are doing (Grandy, 
2007). In addition, it should be noted that society has proved adept at dividing up and 
recognising the social world and concepts thereof – as the abundance of motivated kinds 
and nomenclative and heuristic classifications in the field remind us. 
 
 However, the literature is less helpful when we move into areas such as concepts 
where ‘similarity’ can be so difficult to pin down. For example Bowker and Star’s book 
(1999), is virtually silent on what, at a philosophical or cognitive level, sorting entails (it 
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being deemed self-evident) and directly tackles the challenging issue of the social 
significance and consequences of created formal classifications of diseases, nursing 
interventions, race, and so on. There the sorting is by means of formal, conscious, 
definitions which, of course, given the variety and plurality of homo sapiens, its 
diseases and its social life, prove procrustean and socially contentious. Thus Bowker 
and Star surface the ‘invisible categories’ that permeate society in the guise of the 
bureaucratic devices that we apply in deciding whether the individual is man or woman, 
black or white, sick or well, etc. They address some of the consequences of their 
‘information infrastructures’ for individuals and society. In so doing they highlight the 
difficulties of classification in the social realm, but do little to ground the processes of 
how categorisations and their architectures arise from our mental processes. 
 
 Other than that, the successful classification system must propose a successful 
means of dividing those items within the domain that qualify for membership of the 
class from those items that do not ~ defining the extension. For this, the recognition 
criteria or the definition should provide some unique distinguishing features or 
ascertainables that can reliably be used to divide the field or segment nature. The easiest 
manner of so doing is to select the surface features of an object or the most easily 
discerned attribute(s) of a concept to apply as a sorting criteria. For physical objects the 
possibility of ostensive reference to an exemplar makes sorting less challenging than as 
for concepts with or without associated discernable physical characters. Some concepts, 
like being a veterinary surgeon, or a member of New Labour or ‘between 50 and 65 
years old’ have some associated token signifying membership of the class – a 
Certificate on the surgery wall, a party membership card, a birth certificate, etc. For 
some, however, the absence of any physical discerning feature is highly problematic. 
This is the case with business strategies. The usual recourse is to some typification by 
example – the ostensive reference is another concept and its associated values – ‘like 
Ryanair or easyJet’ for a low cost airline. The problem, of course, is that typifications 
don’t come with established boundaries; begging the question ‘at what stage does my 
particular no longer fit the template ?’ The problem is not one that this work seeks to 
resolve by means of some over-riding principle, other than the strong recommendation 
that accompanying any proposed classification scheme should be a specification of 
intended boundary conditions between categories. 
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 But there is another feature of a successful classification scheme and that is that 
it successfully segments the whole field in an appropriate manner for a range of 
applications. Obviously a classification of ‘horse’ and ‘not horse’ hardly commends 
itself as a principle for dividing a whole field of large domesticated beasts, since the 
‘not horse’ category contains such a potential miscellany of items – cows, deer, oxen, 
ostriches, large dogs, etc. Thus the extension of the CT to within-group membership 
also applies to the structure of CTs as group-wide definitions. The field of organisations 
can cover a range of sub-fields: the first divide being ‘for profit’ / ‘not for profit’; then, 
for, say, the ‘for profit’ group there is the goods / services distinction and below that the 
industry and below even that the sector therein. We thus can get a hierarchy top down of 
– Commercial (ie for profit); Airline (Service) No frills (sector) European short-haul 
(sub-group). Sorting, on this type of structure is like the pin ball machine in the 
fairground arcade, where the ball drops down through layers of pins to be deflected left 
or right to end up in a particular ‘win’ or ‘lose’ compartment – it is an algorithm that 
sorts our abstract entities into the appropriate category. However, this illustration may 
be an over-simplification, since a strategy is motivational cf. the simplified operational 




 Connotations are associated properties and meanings entailed by the original 
denotation – if it is denoted as ‘horse’ all those things listed above are also connoted. 
The most obvious properties are the physical appearance and other sensory perceptions 
of the animal and its behaviour that cause the original reidentification and denoting as 
horse. The most obvious meanings associated with the denotation are those available 
from our accumulated mental file on horse – that if encountered in a field or wearing 
any tackle it is a domesticated animal; it will (probably) eat an apple offered to it; that it 
can (probably) be ridden. In addition to the connotations directly entailed by the 
denotation itself, it includes all those characteristics that arise from the position of 
‘horse’ in our conceptual structures and knowledge hierarchies. Thus, biological 
knowledge tells one that it is a vertebrate, a mammal, and suckles its young; whilst 
linguistic knowledge tells one that the horse has parts such as ‘hooves’, ‘hocks’, ‘main’, 
‘withers’ etc and the young are denoted ‘foals’; while social knowledge connotes that 
horses can be saddled, trained, raced, etc. In other words the denotation ‘horse’ carries 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
128 
with it a mass of other information relating to ‘horsiness’ – the mass that Eco terms the 
MC - our encyclopaedia entry for ‘horse’.   
 The act of denoting brings into play all the potential knowledge that can be used 
to guide our actions and thoughts in relation to that denoted thing and other things it 
relates to. It is the trigger for the associated schemas and scripts described in Chapter 2. 
The NC calls up the relevant MC, or the wide intension, and its mass of connections to 
other entries in our total cognitive grasp of the world. It is a source now of inferences of 
the sort that say – if this is a domesticated horse, that there will be a house or stable 
nearby; it will have an owner; a name, etc. (These are less properties of horses than 
properties of people in relation to horses.) The list of potential inferences, the mental 
connections one could make are virtually numberless. And therein lies the power of 
classification schemes ~ the ability to draw inferences grounded in our total library of 
knowledge. Thus it is that a ‘good’ classification, as defined, enables us to go from 
dictionary to encyclopaedia to library. It brings all our relevant knowledge to bear. The 
innate human capacity to classify is vital, not simply in recognition, but lies in the 
ability to bring to bear wider cognition through making inferential connections. This is 
explored in the next section. 
 
5 CLASSIFICATION AND INFERENCE. 
 
 At this point we come to see the power of classification in cognition and sense-
making. It is key to living in the world and it is also the motivation for shaping our 
knowledge to meet our intentions of how to live in the world. Learning can be needs 
driven and this frequently means acquiring new concepts and fitting them into our 
mental structures and hierarchies. If my business competitor is a ‘defender’ or my 
strategy is to be a ‘cost leader’, the utility of the denotation comes from its connotations 
~ the inferences about my competitor or about my functional priorities that I can draw 
from the designation.  
 
5.1 Deduction, Induction, Abduction…and just making sense. 
 
Deduction provides, not so much as an inference, as an entailed truth that 
follows from the truth of its premises. In the terms outlined above, provided that the 
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denotation and sorting are correct, (i.e. we have the right dictionary reference, or NC, 
and the acquired encyclopaedia entry, or MC, functions correctly) then the inferences 
that are possible are also reliable. The issue is not whether deductive inferences from 
our classifications are valid, but whether our classifications lend themselves to 
deductions via denotations that recognise motivated properties, sortings that are clear 
cut as to the extension of the category, and category structures and connections that 
facilitate relevant useful connotations. Deduction is the most reliable of all types of 
inference. On the other hand, it can be claimed that deduction merely rearranges our 
knowledge without adding to it. Whilst the ‘natural kinds’ that one might determine in 
the physical sciences may lend themselves to use in deductive inference, the social 
realm seldom provides such solid grounding in a stable motivation since such causal 
powers in society operate in open social systems (Elder-Vass, 2010). The interplay of 
tendencies and structures is in flux. There is, however, some potential to produce semi-
permanent attributes, at least unless and until those causal powers are altered by other 
causal powers and social structures. Hence deductive inference is less potent in social 
classifications. (Ignoring the case of tautology such as being rich and having lots of 
money). 
 
Induction is inferring the conclusion or rule from a series of repeated 
occurrences. But it is conjecture, rather than an entailed truth. For example, there is a 
generally reliable inference that can be drawn from our NC / MC where that inference 
relates to the correct reidentification of an entity (stuff, individual, concept) from a 
partial input of information. This is inductive denotation and is, for example, how we 
recognise any three dimensional object from a particular perspective. However, one is 
dealing with inductive probabilities, not deductive reliabilities. Other properties drawn 
from the MC are probable truths – like those relating to the domesticated horse 
mentioned earlier. They are appealed to by virtue of evidence of prior encounter or 
repute rather than logic and are subject to empirical falsification, but never empirical 
‘proof’ other than statistical confidence. This ‘black swan’ problem (Taleb, 2007) is 
addressed in critical realist texts that discuss ‘tendencies’ rather than ‘laws’ and, 
notwithstanding the conditional nature of all inferences based upon inductions, the 
inferential power of many classifications can be powerful. 
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The third form of inferential thinking, abduction, is frequently the mode of 
reasoning or inferring deployed in social science research (Blaikie, 2000). Social 
scientific accounts can be generated from everyday accounts as a generalisation from 
experience. It is mere conjecture that seeks to explain two or more phenomena with a 
single general rule. But the reality is that we intuitively tend to select for the inferences 
those encyclopaedia entries, or MC properties, that are likely to yield robust conclusions. 
It can be likened to intuitive, rather than deductive or probabilistic reasoning. As, for 
example, when we draw upon generalisations about nature to consider the likely 
outcome of a particular case: As Eco points out the interpretation of signs is inescapably 
abductive – Fire causes smoke. I see smoke. So, there is a fire. – In all probability this 
conclusion is a good guess and a very reasonable inference, but it is not an unassailable 
one ~ or there would be panic at rock concerts whenever the dry ice is used. The clues 
of context add enormously to the nature and reliability of the abductive inferences we 
can draw. 
 
Drawing all this together, we can add ‘sense-making’ to the list. This term, as 
used in management and organisation science, is generally associated with Karl Weick 
(1995), although it has a long history and wide currency in the social sciences. It refers 
to the task of making the occurrence of some phenomena intelligible via some plausible 
explanatory narrative. As regards classification, it embraces the notions of inferences 
from classifications and also the abduction of formal classes from informal ones ~ the 
move from nomenclatures to motivated kinds. Sense-making refers to the fact that our 
thinking processes are a mix of deductions, inductions and abductions based on the fact 
that the phenomena and sensations of life do not come with labels attached. Those 
labels were acquired in enculturation and as a member of an epistemic community. 
Those communities also elaborate and refine the classifications available to the 
community at large. The sense is made in our heads and shared. But it is also shaped by 
these intersubjectively held invisible infrastructural systems of classification. 
 
5.2 Classification systems as inference structures. 
 
 In chapter 1, section 5, a formulation of kinds of kinds was set out which broke 
down kindhood into five ontologically distinct types (excluding the unintended). In this 
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chapter, section 3, the classification schemes found in contemporary organisational life 
were typified in a way which side-stepped the question of essentialism v nominalism 
which dominates contemporary discussion, in favour of a pragmatic view of what 
epistemic values are embedded in them. This typology being non-exclusive, hierarchical, 
and linguistically embedded. In section 4, the chapter also looked at what makes for a 
‘good’ classification system in terms of its utility for denoting, sorting and connoting ~ 
its inferential prowess. In this current section these elements are drawn together in more 
formal terms. It asks the question ‘how effective are such classifications as inference 
machines ?’ 
 
 In the terms used here only one kind – the natural kind as described in Chapter 1 
– is entirely homogeneous at the population level. Therefore an extrapolation based 
upon a single entity is as reliable as the identification is correct. For all other kinds 
populations may be similar and easily identified as such, but the individual entities (say 
tigers, or toasters or tailors) are slightly different one from another and extrapolation is 
less straightforward (Steel, 2008). Thus, the scientific method of closed experiment with 
assumptions of entirely homogeneous natural kinds proves an inappropriate model for 
historical and social kinds, with variability in both the population and interplay of the 
causal forces under enquiry. Yet, this failure of model application should not be taken to 
indicate that all inference and extrapolation in the kinds of the historical or social realm 
is doomed. It merely indicates that inferential validities and reliabilities are of variable 
strength and that care must be taken to explore the exact nature and provenance of the 
‘population’ under study.  
 
  The claim is that a motivated institutional kind, whether concrete or abstract, 
can provide sound inferences; certainly as robust as the weaker forms of historical kinds. 
Thus establishing the further claim that the strict essentialism of the sort traditionally 
associated with natural kinds does not have to be endorsed for substantial cognitive 
gains to result from appropriate treatment of social kinds. This reformulation, it is hoped, 
will enable three changes in perception of social kinds:- 
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A.  That, as well as the acknowledged subjective potency of social kinds and 
their interaction with their human subjects (Bowker & Star, 1999: Hacking, 1999), runs 
an objective capacity to sort social phenomena in such a way as to provide strong 
inductive potentials to the categories so produced. 
 
B.  It follows that the design and promulgation of social kinds merits greater 
attention and respect. To assume that nothing more than a nominal convenience is the 
best that can be achieved is to sell the social sciences short. 
 
 C. That the social sciences may reap benefit from paying closer attention to the 
kinds of kinds that figure in their ontology, epistemology and pedagogy in an attempt to 
build classification schemes that afford strong and useful inferential potential. 
 
  In the next two sections, 5.3 and 5.4, just two of the four classification types are 
examined in terms of their suitability for inferential sense-making. It is argued that these 
two ~ and indeed the others, nomenclatures and heuristic classifications ~ are of 
potential value as inference machines, and that whilst some have greater strengths than 
others, none can be dismissed as being of little utility to the social scientist.  
 
5.3. Motivated kinds as inference machines. 
 
 ‘Motivation’ is used here to indicate the presence of some claimed or implied 
external homologating force(s) or power(s) that result in similarity among phenomena. 
That certain homogeneities are caused, not accidental (Boyd, 1999b, 2010). This means 
that the set of inferences associated with its NC and MC will be universally potent in 
the relevant domain and spatio-temporally resilient. It also means that the necessary and 
sufficient recognition determining character(s) associated with the classification will be 
permanent as long as the motivating powers are unchanged. Thus, the deductions 
resulting from the correct designation (NC) will hold strong. However, as remarked 
upon above, a) such entailed truths add little to the sum of new knowledge (that comes 
mainly from induction and abduction) and b) by insisting that these entailed truths are 
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motivated, and not merely semantic, the search for falsification must involve 
questioning the causal powers or tendencies held to be operating. Whilst this may be 
unproblematic in some natural science, since some laws are enduring, it is entirely valid 
to suspect changes in the collective intentionality of human agents in the abstract 
institutional realm. We can change our minds, our strategies. Thus, the potency of 
deductive inference from motivated kind classifications in the social sciences is never 
guaranteed in a world of unstable motivation. However, some causal forces in the 
economic or social sphere are more enduring (say, the behaviour of competitive markets 
or the desire for status) than others (say, the availability of particular resources at a 
particular point in time or the fashionability of a particular product). Hence, to know 
about the reliability of inferences from motivated kinds in the management and 
organisational field, we need to understand the nature of that motivation. That includes 
its purported spatio-temporal reach. 
 
Inductions and abductions from motivated classes are those that stem from its 
MC; the encyclopaedia entry and the extended network of cross-references associated 
with that category in that given relation to other classes in our mental structures. The 
inferential material drawn upon is that of the schemas associated with the concept and 
our underlying theories as to how the world works. In so far as it is possible to correctly 
identify (denote) and scope (sort) such kinds in the social sphere, the inferences drawn 
should be reasonably strong. The same caveats regarding stability as applied to 
deductions apply with equal, if not greater, force here. 
 
5.4 Sorting Devices as inference machines. 
 
The power and relevance of the pragmatic approach to classification is, perhaps, 
best illustrated with reference to the lowest of our hierarchy of classification systems. 
Many would, presumably, dismiss a sorting device as offering a classification system of 
inferential potential. If the sortal were alphabetic order, this indeed might be warranted. 
But the sorting of competitors by size or nationality might offer a sorting and 
classification approach with considerable inferential potential since these are salient 
points to both the nature and scope of their likely strengths and weaknesses in the 
competitive struggle. Indeed it is nominal features such as these, plus other dimensions 
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such as product range, geographic spread, investment levels in R&D, brand strength, 
and the like that are frequently combined to determine ‘strategic groups’ of considerable 
inferential value in strategic analysis. What has happened is that the NC of the nominal 
classification has drawn upon the full MC and its associated network of properties in 
order to determine the categorisations that permit a rich set of inferences to be drawn. 
That is to say that predictions about strategic behaviour can reasonably be explored by 
means of what appears to be, at first glance, a simple structuring of information ~ where 
that structure grasps some salient causal mechanism(s). 
 
Yet there is one respect in which a sorting device may be superior to a motivated 
kind when classifying in the social domain. The natural sciences generally deal with 
tangible or observable phenomena such that direct ostension is unproblematic. In the 
social sciences such ease of ostension may be absent, especially where an abstract 
concept such as ‘leadership’ or the collective intensionality of a management group 
such as a business strategy is involved. Reverting to an earlier terminology, finding 
‘essences’ upon which to base our classifications of some motivated kind may prove 
elusive. On the other hand, the selection of some simple sorting device, although, 
nominal may prove more effective in denoting and sorting. Thus, classification by level 
of capital investment per unit of sales might prove of greater utility than searching for a 
‘cost leadership’ strategy’s inner motivation. Sorting devices offer firm sortals in the 
face of a fuzzy reality. But note that the researcher’s substitution of a measured ratio for 
interpretations of interview notes, rests upon an implicit theory that such action is 
justified in context, i.e. in this case, that firms with higher levels of capital investment 
per unit of sales than their competitors are more likely to be pursuing a ‘cost leadership’ 
strategy. 
 
Thus, the pragmatic view of classifications in organisation and management 
science is to regard them as structures that afford, to different degrees, inferential 
connotations that serve some purpose. That purpose being largely intersubjective clarity 
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6 CLASSIFICATION  AS  THEORY  (AGAIN). 
  
 As intimated above, and in Chapter 1, there is yet another important overlay to 
the understanding of classifications:- Insofar as a typology or taxonomy is a purposeful 
artefact created from theoretical concepts, it is itself the product of our theories as to 
how things are and how they are best arranged for our purposes. Where that purpose is 
in providing explanation and making inferences, Boyd’s hypothesis is that classification 
systems work best where our classificatory practices are superimposed upon the real 
causal structures of the world and society. 
 
6.1 Innate essentialism and implicit theories. 
 
Our categories, whether acquired from infancy or naïve adult categorisation up 
to domain folksonomies and scientific expert terminology, tend to carve up the world 
according to our implicit or explicit theories regarding the nature of that world. 
Categories are, on this view, metaphysical reflections. This emerges most strongly, but 
indirectly, in Gelman’s work in the ‘theory theory’ view advanced in her 2003 book, 
and in her data regarding people’s perceptions of certain social biological categories. 
For example race and sexual orientation stereotypes that have no biological foundations, 
nonetheless tend markedly among the general population to be ascribed to illusory 
theoretical foundations in genetics. The point being that the theory does not need to be 
well-founded in order for it to command our attention in devising distinctions. Indeed 
the acceptance of the very notion of an ‘essence placeholder’ for some undetectable, 
unspecified and unknown true causal essence is a tribute to the intrinsic belief in some 
yet to be discovered theoretical explanation. This is particularly evident for the 
construal of certain social categories, seen as embedded in explanatory theories that 
may or may not have causal efficacy (Bowker & Star, 1999; Haslam et al, 2000). And it 
can be extended to our social (rather than functional) interactions with certain artefacts 
(Gelman, 2003; Harré, 2002b). It is evident in some of the case studies. 
 
That theory imbues essentialism about categories is illustrated by the work of 
Diesendruck and Haber (2009) on seven and eleven year old Israeli school pupils. When 
divided into two groups – those with a secular education and those with a Jewish 
orthodox education - it was found that essentialism about specific social categories 
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(gender, race and ethnicity; but not social and economic status, nor animal kinds or 
artifacts) is facilitated by the particular cultural belief of creationism. Leading to the 
conclusion that ‘while children might be intuitively disposed to essentialise human kinds, 
the specific kinds in their social environment onto whom they eventually deploy this 
essentialist disposition is determined by cultural input.’ (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009, p 
111).  
 
 That classifications reflect our metaphysical positions in general is also taken up 
in the philosophical literature. First, as Dummett, writing in the 1970s, is paraphrased in 
Thomasson (2009); without some association to a category concept we would be unable 
to single out any objects at all, even to use names or demonstratives in a meaningful 
manner. So, categorical concepts are necessary for us to single out ‘things’ at all and we 
cannot derive ‘things’ without regard to an armoury of categories. Further, this extends 
to abstract institutional kinds (Thomasson, 2003) and to the performative social 
discourse that creates them (Sayer, 1997). Moving beyond experimental psychology and 
the philosophy of kinds to a more general approach, there are many who have looked at 
our classifications and concluded that they are greatly influenced by our theories of the 
world in general.  
 
6.2 Classifications as theories in the social sciences. 
 
The main advocate of seeing classification as theory made manifest is Paul 
Davidson Reynolds. Dealing with theory construction in the natural and social sciences, 
(Reynolds, 1971) recognised that a typology or a taxonomy is a means of organising 
and classifying phenomena that entails some underlying theory as to what will be 
useful. As reported in Chapter 1, Reynolds, further, argues that all substantial, scientific 
knowledge of a theoretical nature is derived from sets of statements organised so as to 
constitute that theory. Whenever we use any classification scheme for the structuring of 
our knowledge-building and sense-making, there is an implicit theory behind its 
deployment ~ a theory that says this is how the world is, or at least should be regarded 
for our current purposes. 
 
Bowker & Star, 1999, under a general description of the ‘Janus face’ of 
classifications, point out that it is important to know not only what is coded by our 
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classifications, but also what is ignored in the coding. What is left out. They discuss this 
under what they term ‘Spinoza’s problem’:- it appears that we could classify things 
(especially in the social world) any way we like; but won’t know which way to do it 
without some theory of what is the important salience. However, we won’t know what 
is important until we have sorted things in some way. We need the theory in order to set 
up the categories in the first place. Perhaps ‘Spinoza’s paradox’ might be more apt. 
Moreover, the central thrust motivating some of the classification systems that they 
examine, particularly that of nursing interventions, is the theory that providing a 
classification surfaces what would otherwise be hidden. They are seen as revelatory in 
the same sense as looking through a microscope is relevatory. 
 
 This general line is picked up in the management and organisational science 
literature in Doty and Glick (1994), who argue that typologies, when properly 
developed, are a theory that can be subject to rigorous empirical test. Those that are not 
falsified can, therefore, be used for prediction. (They also observe that few typologies in 
the field are properly developed and fully specified). On the other hand, McKelvey 
(1975), observes the failure of organisational science to develop a widely accepted and 
usable classification scheme and stresses the importance of such schemes to the 
development of any scientific body of knowledge. In this paper, as in his 1982 book, he 
argues for the use of statistical methods to develop classifications based upon 
taxonomic techniques, keeping the empirical categories free from prior theory or 
classification structures. However, in so doing, he acknowledges how difficult it is to 
gather data so raw as to be free of prior conceptions, and, having critiqued two major 
empirical attempts at so doing, concludes that neither has come close to being theory-
free. Whilst Pinder and Moore (1979), responding in part to McKelvey, observe that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid prior theory. They point to the theory-laden 
content of McKelvey’s own work and to the unavoidable necessity of the researcher to 
provide some conceptual frame for any statistical analysis. 
            
7 THE  ARGUMENT  FORESHADOWED 
 
These ideas are only sketched out here, but (anticipating the results of the 
empirical studies of particular business strategy classifications) it is suggested that this 
pluralistic, pragmatic and epistemic view of classification in the social sciences offers a 
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more promising line of approach to the material than that pursued in the field to date. It 
is a view that values classification in particular as an indispensable ‘inference engine’ in 
management science. One that has been largely passed over in terms of formal 
recognition. Four points in particular stand out:- 
 
 
7.1 Combining and compromising with multifaceted classifications. 
 
 Prompted, perhaps, by the emphasis upon the propriety of a particular 
classification schema as found in the natural sciences (see, for example, the contention 
within biology over the ‘true’ nature of species), there is a tendency to discuss 
classification in the social sciences as an either / or dichotomy. This seems an un-
necessarily procrustean view. The four non-mutually exclusive types of classification 
adumbrated above offer an alternative, fruitful perspective. One where one can look to 
the combination of types and their associated virtues. This does not resile from the view 
that motivated kinds are superior where they can be found (as per 7.2 below). Nor, 
however, does it argue that a theoretically grounded but impractical scheme is superior 
to any other.  
 
Best can be enemy to good. Arguably, even a nominal scheme that lacks even 
the weaker form of motivation found in the social realm, but scores well otherwise, is 
the superior. Trade offs, rather than elusive purity, seem more in accord with the usual 
circumstances of social classifications. Classifications of social phenomena, such as 
business strategy, can be proposed and deployed even where the underpinning theory is 
intuitive, weak or undisclosed. In so doing, some satisfactory outcomes, both cognitive 
and functional, may well result. The equivalence in the discussion above is a 
nomenclature, or folk taxonomy, that enables us, and our organisations, to function in 
that sphere and it need no more concern us why the classification happens to serve our 
purposes any more than it does a child to be concerned with why a tiger is a cat.   
 
7.2 Keep looking for motivated kinds in management science. 
 
 From what is said above, however, it is also clear that the concepts and 
categories we deal with in management and organisational science are ‘better’, i.e. more 
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useful in making inferences, when and where they are grounded in some ‘motivation’. 
In the social sciences, this epistemic essentialism largely concerns the motivational 
effects of social structures and causal powers upon individuals and organisations (which 
both represent historical kinds, individual agency and collective intentionality). This 
observation rests upon a broadly social constructivist and critical realist framework as 
regards to the ontological status of social phenomena. See for example the works of, 
Danermark, 2002; Elder-Vasss, 2010; Hacking, 1999; Lawson, 2003; Sayer 2000; and 
Searle, 1999. As described above re Porter’s generic strategy, motivation for strategy 
kinds may be found in such exogenous economic forces within society. Whilst another 
well-known strategy classification, the Miles and Snow typology (1978), is claimed to 
arise from the interplay of endogenous organisational forces in their little-researched 
‘adaptive cycle’. These two business strategy classifications are explored in depth later 
in this work. Other possible exogenous or endogenous motivation or homolgating 
mechanisms were described above in Section 3.1 C (i.e. economics, sociology, 
evolution, globalisation). 
 
So, as the pragmatic criteria moves from use-in-practice to theory-in-practice, it 
changes from ‘does it work ?’ to ‘do I/we understand it and its causation ?’ which, of 
course, leads on to the questions, ‘can we rely upon it ?’ and ‘what else does potentially 
it do ?’. Any serious academic research on such classifications must focus upon those 
motivations that cause the manifestation(s) which had been the basis of an initial 
nomenaclative classification. In other words it must progress from a folk taxonomy to a 
scientific taxonomy. It is those sciences which have achieved robustly grounded 
concepts and classes that have made the most progress. It is particularly in those natural 
sciences where the domain’s natural kinds are well-characterised and understood that 
progress has been most marked. Those social scientists that have sought to emulate the 
hypothetico-deductive methods of the natural sciences have generally done so without, 
perhaps, full recognition of the prerequisite requirement of well-founded kinds (as well 
as many other prerequisites of successful nomological research, such as the 
abandonment of a Humean account of causality and laws).  
 
7.3 Instructions for use. 
 
In using a motivated kind in the natural sciences one may draw the appropriate 
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inferences for the category more or less on faith (albeit noting any anomalies). Once 
soundly established, the associated laws and inferences are relatively stable over time 
and universal in their application under the existing normal research paradigm (until a 
new revolution therein). However, in the social realm the provenance and stability of 
any motivation underlying the classification scheme is of immediate pertinence in 
considering the reliability of any application to a new context. Yet the qualified 
contextuality of such classification schemes is seldom foregrounded by their 
promulgators and, as remarked above, there is a known propensity for third parties to 
assume motivation (whether claimed or not) and to reify received classification systems. 
A pragmatic view must acknowledge the ingenuity shown by strategists in adapting 
their tools to the case in hand. But far better if this was a conscious, deliberative act than 
an unreflective instinct. Assuming that some purported strategy classification scheme is 
to be promoted to the business community, it is important that some indication of the 
spatio-temporal domain in which it is claimed that it has some purchase is also 
provided. As with all tools there must be instructions for use (and, possibly, a ‘use 
before’ date).  
 
7.4 The lacuna in strategy classification research – look in the right direction. 
 
 Consequential upon the argument for recognition of the contribution of good 
classification to progress in our field, is the recognition of the absence of research 
designs predicated upon such belief. Instead we see what Medin and colleagues (Ahn et 
al, 2001; Coley et al, 1999; Medin & Ortony, 1989) remarked upon as ‘psychological 
essentialism’ as regards biological and artefactual kinds. The observation is that, no 
matter what its original status, people act as if a received class or concept has some 
essential properties that are both criterial for category membership and responsible for 
the observable characteristics of the class members. This is compounded by the natural 
tendency for reification of received taxa into unconsciously assumed ‘real’ phenomena. 
Research is then framed to ask the question how ‘real’ or ‘essential’ it truly is. There 
follows the construction of some research instrument to gather data on alleged 
properties that can then be challenged by empirical studies that quantify the assumed 
properties of the suggested categories and, deploying statistical techniques, find them 
warranted or not. Review of the treatment of strategy classifications in the research 
literature reveals this to be the predominant case in our field. 
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Given the simple fact that these are socially constructed categories of abstract 
institutional kinds and that the most common way of positing their existence is via 
ostention to existing organisations, it is impossible to prove their existence or non-
existence since they stand as descriptions attached to abstractions. As long as some 
initial plausibility is achieved, validity, to some extent, stands in the eye of the beholder. 
No wonder then that the empirical results reek of ambiguity. Somewhat perversely, the 
upshot of much of this activity is the desuetude of the ambiguous categorisation scheme 
in question as ‘invalid’, when abandonment may well justified, not by being not proven, 
but because it is not useful. No matter, the research is done, the results enter the copious 
and self-contradictory literature and the academy continues to worry about its 
‘relevance’, but not its methodology. A methodology that has not attended to the crucial 
first task of finding and refining its motivated kinds.  
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Chapter  FOUR 
 
  THE  MILES  AND  SNOW  TYPOLOGY. 
 
 ‘I always thought that the adaptive cycle was underutilised – in fact, it was 
hardly used at all by subsequent researchers’.  C. Snow, quoted in Ketchen, 2003, p99. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  AND  BACKGROUND. 
 
 The first case study is of a purported motivated kind. The ‘Miles and Snow 
typology’, first widely promulgated in the book Organisational Strategy, Structure, and 
Process, (Miles & Snow 1978, re-issued as a Stanford Classic, 2003) is an attempt to 
identify and characterise the ways in which a range of USA organisations adapted to the 
nature of, and changes in, their environment. The full work, including the performance 
and organisational implications, theoretical and other aspects of this major contribution 
to strategic thought (Hambrick, 2003) is not analysed in detail here. The focus in this 
research is upon only the context and content of their business strategy typology and its 
associated argument concerning the ‘adaptive cycle’ as a purported motivating 
mechanism. Since1978 their Defender, Analyser, Prospector, Reactor typology has 
become one of the most familiar tools in the business strategists’ vocabulary for 
providing, in the broadest terms possible, a descriptive label to a particular type of 
strategy choice. This, despite origins certainly remote from modern USA and British 
business and, perhaps, even further from the Korean or Finnish companies, or Israeli 
kibbutzim to which it has been applied (Kim & Lim, 1988; Segev, 1987; Woodside et al, 
1999). From an original study of American college textbook publishers in the early 
1970s, the typology has been applied to firms in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy or electronic 
commerce, to British electricity generators or to SMEs in Brazil, even to local 
authorities in Wales (Andrews et al, 2009; Evans & Green, 2000;  Kearns, 2005; 
Ghobadian et al, 1998; Gimenez, 2000).  It is the intention of this chapter to both outline 
the origins and nature of the Miles and Snow organisational typology – henceforward 
the typology – and to question and critique its application in our contemporary study of 
strategy. 
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 This chapter divides into parts. The first, Sections 2-3 below, provides a detailed 
longitudinal view of the origins of the typology up to and including the definitive 
version of 1978. The following section examines the ontological plausibility of the 
typology as a classification scheme per se. The next two sections, 5 and 6, examine the 
ways in which the typology has been instrumented by the research community and the 
associated uses and abuses. It is argued that, in the main, the strategy research 
community has been asking the wrong questions and deploying the typology 
inappropriately in research. Finally, suggestions are made as to potentially more 
productive uses of Miles and Snow’s work and further avenues of enquiry.  
 
2 ORIGINS OF THE TYPOLOGY. 
 
 It should, first, be emphasised that the Miles and Snow typology was the most 
enduring and promulgated aspect of what was a much larger and, perhaps even more 
ambitious project – that of exploring and explaining the relationship between an 
organisation’s priorities and internal resource configuration and its external 
environment. Albeit that other aspects of this work are discussed, in particular the 
‘adaptive cycle’ held to underpin the types, it must be emphasised that this chapter is 
focussed upon the typology construct. It is not an attempt to critique the larger study in 
the round. 
   
The typology, first outlined in a 1974 paper (Miles et al, 1974), was based upon 
Snow’s study of the behaviour of some 16 US college textbook publishers in 1972. 
(Snow, 1976). It was the authors’ way of distilling the essence of a highly elusive 
concept – that of business strategy. Strategy, to Miles, Snow and colleagues, was the 
way in which the resources and capabilities of the organisation were harnessed to 
achieving organisational goals. Witness the book’s opening sentence ‘An organisation 
is both an articulated purpose and an established mechanism for achieving it.’ (Miles & 
Snow 1978, p 3). It was recognised that organisations had a wide variety of purposes 
and many different means for their achievement. Yet, within this variety there must be 
some reoccurring patterns. The goal was to understand, and generalise from case studies, 
the similarities of how organisations set about the task of bringing strategy, structure 
and process together in such a way as to optimise success in the relevant environment. 
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This, they postulated, was the outcome of an ‘adaptive cycle’ (op cit p 21- 28) of 
managerial decision-making by the ‘dominant coalition’ in the light of their perception 
of the ‘enacted’ environment.  (Child, 1972; Weick, 1979). 
  
2.1 The 1974 Version  
 
 The conception of the typology is, like most conceptions should be, decently 
shrouded from view in an unpublished working paper. However, the theoretical 
underpinnings and much of the field work was carried in the early 1970s, and evidence 
that it was a few years in gestation comes particularly from two important published 
earlier papers. The first was co-authored by R.E. Miles and J. Pfeffer of Berkeley and 
C.C. Snow of Pennsylvania State University (Miles et al, 1974).  
 
 The title ‘Organisation-Environment: Concepts and Issues’, and the opening 
paragraph;  
 ‘To what extent are organisations shaped by their environments, that is, by the 
network of individuals, groups, agencies, and organisations with whom they interact ? 
Are there organisational characteristics – strategies, technologies, structures, processes 
– which are appropriate for one environment but which may lead to failure in another ? 
More  pointedly, are there linkages across these characteristics which determine 
organisational success – are there, for example, particular structures and processes 
which fit certain technologies or strategies but not others ?’ (Miles et al 1974, p 244) 
 
 …..both give a very clear indication of the focus and basis of this work as being 
the accommodation between an organisation and its environment. The principal 
literature cited ~ Alchian, Burns & Stalker, Child, Emery & Trist, Gouldner, Starbuck 
and Weick ~ confirms this orientation to managerial choices of how to respond to their 
organisation’s environment. Miles et al discuss the issue in terms of top management 
‘decision points’ regarding four elements they term ‘domain’, ‘technology’, ‘structure’ 
and ‘continuity’ and how a ‘feasible set’ of compatible choices in each leads to an 
‘adjustment process’ of the organisation to its environment.  
 
 It was in this context, and that of the empirical studies of college textbook 
publishing firms, that a first version of the typology was presented as an attempt ‘to 
categorise  managerial perceptions of the environment and to describe how these 
perceptions are transformed into organisational responses’; and four ‘relatively distinct 
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types of environmental enactment’ were proposed (op cit p 256). All four strategy types 
were given two word labels – they are ‘Domain Defenders’, ‘Reluctant Reactors’, 
‘Anxious Analysers’ and ‘Enthusiastic Prospectors’. The full descriptions are given in 
Appendix 1.1. They were framed in relation to Karl Weick’s notion of the self-
definition of the environment through management’s selective attention to aspects 
thereof – ‘enactment’ (Weick, 1969). The types were conceptually defined in relation to 
essentially just two dimensions:- The degree of environmental change and uncertainty 
perceived by the dominant coalition at the top of the organisation and their 
responsiveness or resistance to (changing) environmental conditions. Taking just one of 
the four types, it is possible to trace the development of the typology and reveal more of 
the conceptual basis of their work. Thus the Domain Defender is described:- 
 
 ‘Domain Defenders, organisations whose top managers perceive little or no 
change and uncertainty in the environment and who have little inclination to make 
anything other than minor adjustments in organisational structure and processes.’ ( p 
256 ).  
  
 Taking the key words from their descriptions (Appendix 1.1.A) it is possible to 
characterise the four types as given in Table 1, below;- 
 
TABLE  4.1 THE  TWO  DIMENSIONAL  TYPES 
 
Type   Perception of Environment Organisational Responsiveness 
 
Domain Defender No change or uncertainty  Minor adjustments only 
Reluctant Reactor Some change or uncertainty Substantial change only when forced 
Anxious Analyser Much change and uncertainty Wait and watch others. Rapidly adopt. 
Enthusiastic Prospector See (even foster ) much change  Trial proactive responses to anticipated 
       change. 
 
Source: Author, based upon Miles et al 1974. 
 
 These two dimensions and their accompanying definitions are such that this 
original description of the types is an implicit gradient-like construct in which top 
management’s perception of environmental change and characteristic organisational 
responsiveness increase in tandem – as has been represented in the bottom left to top 
right positioning of the four types in Figure 4.1, overleaf. 
 
 Thus, the 1974 four types are essentially defined by their positioning along a 
single continuum or vector as a diagonal in which there is an implicit causal or  
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FIGURE  4.1 THE  1974  TYPOLOGY  AS  A  GRADIENT. 
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   Certain Domain   
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     Resist change  Embrace change 
 
            Organisational Responsiveness. 
 
Source: Author, based upon Miles et al, 1974. 
 
associative relationship between top management’s perception of the environment and 
the willingness or ability of the organisation to respond to this perceived environmental 
instability or change. The four types are positioned from ‘conservative’ to ‘radical’ 
along this gradient. The gradient-like nature of this organisation-environment 
interaction is an interpretation and is not expressly given in the original paper (and the 
textual grounds of this interpretation was to disappear from later versions). It should be 
noted also that their construct description includes the caveat ‘Although the typology is 
crude, subsuming a number of variables in addition to managerial perceptions….’ (op 
cit  p 256-7). However, there is sufficient contextual content to support such a 
presentation, and this gradient-like construal of the typology appears in the writings of 
Miles and Snow and in subsequent academic writing about their work. It is, for example, 
used to justify the exclusion of the Analyser type as a mere intermediary in some 
treatments. 
 
 It is evident that the authors accepted, as established by others and their own 
observations, that the same ‘objective’ environmental context could elicit different, yet 
viable, organisational responses. For example, in relation to the suggestion that future 
research should look at the constraints upon managerial choice, they comment ‘Such a 
focus would permit us to account for the frequent observation that organisations adopt 
a variety of forms in response to apparently similar environmental demands.’ (op cit p 
256) and, in relation to adjustment costs and benefits; ‘We have suggested, based on our 
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research, that within the same “objective” environment both Domain Defenders and 
Enthusiastic Prospectors can apparently survive and even flourish, at least in the short 
run.’ (op cit p 262).  (See section 2.2. ‘Fit and Equifinality’).  
 
 In their conclusions Miles et al stress three points regarding the organisation- 
environment relationship:- (i) current theories are inadequate in explaining how 
environmental conditions place constraints on the adjustment alternatives; (ii) that 
managers have considerable decision-making discretion, meaning that managerial 
judgements and perceptions are important in determining choices and outcomes; and (iii) 
‘To provide information on the total adjustment process, researchers will most likely be 
forced out of their current mode of cross-sectional survey studies and toward 
longitudinal analyses’. (op cit p 264). 
 
 Thus, by as early as 1974, the basic framework and key concepts later to become 
known as  ‘the Miles and Snow typology’ were established, and some of the issues of 
subsequent ambiguity and controversy were established. 
 
2.2 The 1976 version. 
 
 This paper was sole authored by Charles Snow and published in the Academy of 
Management Proceedings. Again, the title:~ ‘The role of managerial perceptions in 
organisational adaptation: an exploratory study’ ~ clearly locates the typology within 
the context of adaptation and how attention focuses action. The typopolgy itself shows 
just one modification to the wording of the descriptor for the Domain Defender, viz;- 
 
 ‘Domain Defenders, organisations whose top managers perceive little or no 
change and uncertainty in the organisation’s narrowly-defined domain and who have 
little inclination to make anything other than minor adjustments in organisational 
structure and processes.’  (op cit p 250 – emphasis added).  
 
 The descriptors for all the other three remain, mutatis mutandis, as before (See 
Appendix 1.1.B). There is also an indicative confirmation of an underlying ‘gradient-
like’ conceptualisation given in the earlier presentation of the four 1974 types, as in 
Figure 4.1 above, in that Snow suggests positioning along a single gradient in the 
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phrasing ‘ Using only the two extreme cases on the continuum of enactment’ (op cit p 
251 – emphasis added) and ‘In order to highly [sic, presumably ‘highlight’] major 
similarities and differences, only the two polar types of organisations, Domain 
Defenders and Enthusiastic Prospectors are shown.’ (op cit p 253 – emphasis added). 
But note that the gadient conception used in Figure 4.1 here employs two dimensions 
(environmental change and organisational responsiveness), whilst  Snow expresses it as 
a single attribute that calls to mind a straight line and opposite poles. This latter 
construct is Snow’s own descriptive representation of a single organisational attribute of 
‘environmental enactment’, presumably measurable along some ill-defined continuum. 
Albeit that this is, probably, close to the gradient described above, the distinction is 
important and akin to that between a lay concept of ‘speed’ and a more scientific 
conceptualisation of ‘velocity’ ~ a gradient line showing distance travelled against time. 
As mentioned earlier, this ambiguity surfaces frequently when the typology is applied in 
research. 
 
  Also of significance, is the additional wording in the definition of the Domain 
Defender, as underlined in the definition above. This has introduced a third dimension 
into the conceptual framework – that of domain scope. There is no doubt that this 
potential refinement was foreshadowed in the 1974 paper – viz ‘Domain Defenders 
survive by working more intensively in a narrow segment of the environment, perhaps 
offsetting the loss of some potential gains in new areas by servicing their known area 
with increasing cost efficiency.’ (1974 op cit p 262). The significance, however, is that 
the 1976 type specification is more complex and (at least potentially) versatile. No 
longer can organisations be positioned on just two dimensions, (or 4 cells maximum on 
binary positioning). There are now three dimensions which generates 8 possible cells, 
only four of which have been characterised. We have a Domain Defender with narrow 
scope, but none with broad scope, and, similarly, no narrow scope versions of the other 
three types. There is no explicit textual justification for these exclusions from the 
property zones defined by the three conceptual dimensions. It just appears that examples 
of such strategies are not….. Not what ? :- Encountered in the case studies to date ? Or 
to be found in the ‘real world’ of organisational strategies in general ? Or simply not 
viable configurations due to some powerful constraints or countervailing structures and 
mechanisms in the business environment ?  
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 But, greater significance attaches to the characterisation that Snow provides for 
the types in the 1976 paper. This provides a far richer descriptive palette for 
characterising the types. For example in Figure 1 of that paper Snow gives ‘Some Key 
Aspects of the Adaptive Process’ for both Domain Defender and Enthusiastic 
Prospector – his ‘polar opposites’. He specified some 7 distinct behavioural or 
organisational attributes and the characteristics of each of the two types on these 
features. Thus, for two of the types, we have a multidimensional characterisation over 7 
distinct  aspects as represented  in Table 4.2,  below:- 
 
TABLE  4.2 RICHER  CHARACTERISATION  OF  TWO  TYPES 
 
Type of Environ- Domain Defender  Enthusiastic Prospector 
      mental Enactment. 
 
Strategy  Narrow and relatively fixed Changing product-market domain 
   product-market domain;  as opportunities appear; primary  
   primary focus on market focus on product and market 
   penetration.   development. 
 
Uncertainty about Low perceived uncertainty High perceived uncertainty 
future. 
 
Organisational  High perceived competence, High perceived competence, mostly 
competence.  mostly in the area of techno- in the area of market identification  
   logical efficiency.  and rapid product innovation. 
 
Payoff from  Risk averter; must have solid Risk taker; quick to develop initial 
Experimentation. evidence concerning shifts in capability on limited information  
   the environment.  about potential environmental trends 
 
Subunit Power  Centralised; derived from eff- Decentralised; derived from effect - 
   iciency oriented activities iveness-oriented activities such as 
   such as production and  marketing and product development
     finance.     
 
Distinctive  Create and distribute a   Rapid response to environmental 
competence  limited range of products trends; custom design products  
   cheaply and efficiently;  for specialised markets. 
   respond rapidly to changes   
   within but not outside 
   domain  
 
Performance  High     High. 
 
Source: Author, based upon Snow 1976. 
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The significance of this development lies in the gradual transition from a 
theoretical and essentially simple construct to categorise managerial perceptions of the 
environment and organisational responses, with illustrative exemplars, which is a 
reasonable reading of the 1974 text, towards the much more rounded polythetic 
characterisations of the types in the 1976 version, leading eventually to the fully fledged 
typology based upon ‘idealisations from nature’ that the Miles and Snow typology was 
to become by 1978. Or, using Bailey’s 1994 distinction; a transition from a theoretical, 
deductive typology to a more ‘scientific’, case study observation-based, empirical, 
inductive taxonomy.  
 
First assessment of the typology. 
 
As the sub-title ‘an exploratory study’ intimates, the 1976 paper was a report of 
a test of the typology. To explore validity, Snow, in 1975, submitted the descriptions 
(developed jointly with Miles) of the four types to 13 top level executives in four of his 
original college textbook publishers. The four firms were selected as being 
representative of the four types, - ‘one firm which he believed fit [sic] each of the four 
descriptions’ (op cit p 250) - and many of the 13 respondents were still in post from his 
1972 study. They were using the typology to classify their own organisation and those 
of three of their competitors. ‘Agreement was almost unanimous regarding the 
placement of three of the firms into their respective categories; only with respect to the 
Enthusiastic Prospector was there any significant variety of opinion, with four of the 
thirteen respondents suggesting that the firm be labelled an Anxious Analyser.’  (op cit 
p 250). Since Snow had selected the four most representative exemplars from his 
sample of 16, and that the respondents were merely asked to place four firms against 
four descriptions, this can only be judged as; i)  a tentative confirmation of the viability 
of the single paragraph self-typing by senior executives approach that figures later in the 
development of the typology, (see below) and; ii) at best a partial confirmation that 
college textbook publishers could be found that conform to his typology. It was not a 
demonstration that all 16 of his USA college textbook publishers could be so classified, 
let alone any further extensions or generalisations from the typology to other contexts. 
 
‘Fit’ and ‘Equifinality’ 
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 The 1976 paper endorsed the 1974 view that no one type was superior in 
performance than another ‘provided that it is properly designed to pursue its chosen 
strategy.’ (op cit p 249). Indeed it went further; the contingency theorists had postulated 
that each industry environment called forth an optimum organisational ‘fit’, but Snow 
asserted that ‘several different “fits” were equally feasible….The recent heavy reliance 
on contingency models of organisation and environment, which suggest that 
organisations in similar environments are “forced” to employ similar structures and 
processes, seems to ignore the principle of equifinality – that managers may choose 
among several routes to effective performance.’ (op cit p 253). Their concept of ‘fit’ is 
reinterpreted here, and in later work, in terms of:- a) rejection of ‘environmental 
determinism’ (as associated particularly with Hannan & Freeman, 1977) in favour of a 
managerial choice perspective (Child, 1972); b) employment of the concept of 
managerial environmental enactment (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1969); and c) their 
own description of the coalignment process linking strategy to environment (Miles et 
al,1974). The concept of ‘equifinality’ originates in the earlier work of von Bertalanffy 
and has been applied to other strategy classification schemes such as Porter’s generic 
strategies (Porter, 1980). This is generally seen as an alternative conception to the 
ecological determinists who argued that only one strategic posture will prove 
sustainable per industry or sector context. The term ‘equifinality’ is not expressly used 
in the later 1978 text. The principle is, however, clearly expressed in other terms therein, 
and the word has become a shorthand way of referring to the concept in subsequent 
discussion of the Miles and Snow model (e.g. Doty et al, 1993). There is no hint in the 
1976 (or 1974) version of the typology regarding reservations as to the performance of 
one of the four that later emerges in respect of the Reactor type as given in 1978. 
 
Adaptation and conclusions. 
 
 The ‘discussion’ section of Snow’s paper is primarily about the complexity of 
the relationship between perceived environment and organisational strategy and 
structure, listing a number of reasons why the adaptive process itself is resistant to 
simple enquiries. He also comments, regarding research that: ‘Most of the empirical 
research on organisations and environment has been cross-sectional. This research has 
identified numerous relationships between organisations and their environments, but, of 
course cross-sectional studies do not explore the dynamics of these relationships as 
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organisations evolve….Hopefully, this study has suggested some guidelines for a richer 
conceptualisation of managerial perceptions in future research.’ (op cit p 254). In other 
words the typology was being presented as a means of investigation of perception / 
enactment and adaptation;~ as a conceptual heuristic. 
 
3 1978  THE  DEFINITIVE  VERSION 
 
 The 1978 book arose from the collaboration of Raymond Miles and Charles 
Snow with two of their colleagues Alan Meyer and Henry J Coleman Jr, then doctoral 
students at Berkeley. It represented a coming together of three separate strands of 
empirical research – Snow on 16 firms in the college textbook publishing industry (as 
described in the 1976 paper); Meyer on 19 voluntary hospitals (as described in the book 
and his 1982 paper on how ideologies shape responses to environmental shocks) and 
Coleman on 27 food-processing and 22 electronics (mainly semiconductor) companies 
– and the conceptual framework of the firm / environment relationship provided, in the 
main, by Miles and Snow.  
 
The Adaptive Cycle. 
 
 The principal question that this work addressed was that of the co-ordination of 
strategy, structure and process within a business unit as a response and fit to the 
(changing) business environment and how the adjustment is achieved or enacted. This 
required top managers to make decisions concerning their organisation that addressed 
what was characterised in the book as three generic top level problems facing all 
management:- the Entrepreneurial problem (or the choice of what product-market 
domain to operate within); the Engineering problem (or what technologies or means to 
employ to deliver the solution); and the Administrative problem (the process that both 
defined the organisation’s structures and processes and directed the search for 
innovation). This, in a chapter titled ‘The Process of Organisational Adaptation’, they 
described and labelled, in their Figure 2.1, as the ‘adaptive cycle’ which ‘helped to 
explain the emergence and stability of our strategic types’ (Miles & Snow, 1978 p xv). 
The adaptive cycle is, thus, held to be the underlying mechanism, or causal process, that 
brings the internal strategy, structure and processes of the organisation into concert with 
its environment. This they termed ‘fit’. This was the first time the term adaptive cycle 
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was formalised and illustrated as a model. Given its significance as the proximate causal 
mechanism (albeit presumably consequential to deeper lying structures and mechanisms) 
of the organisational strategy, structure and process that is the focus of their work, Miles 
and Snow provided relatively little characterisation of the available solutions to the 
three generic problems or of the typical operation(s) of the cycle. 
 
 Yet the adaptive cycle defines the task and process of strategic management and 
goes to the heart of business strategy. Through management’s articulation of purpose 
and incremental or decisive actions, the adaptive cycle is held to work, like an invisible 
hand in an internal market, to bring the three domains – the entrepreneurial, the 
technical and the administrative – into harmony with one another in certain 
configurations that are consistent with success in meeting the requirements of the 
environment i.e.‘fit’ arises from the implementation of management decisions based 
upon their perception of the organisation’s environment and their room for action. The 
adaptive cycle is a postulated internal mechanism that, if functioning correctly, brings 
about the alignment of structure, strategy and process with the requirements of the 
organisation’s environment as ‘enacted’ by top management. Since the detail of how it 
brought about these effects was not explicated, one has to regard this as a ‘placeholder 
notion’ that supported a set of motivated kinds. The types, therefore, emerge from these 
adjustments:~ ‘In the organisations we have observed, patterns of adjustment emerge 
which tend to constrain management’s choices during the next cycle of adaptation. 
Four of these adjustment patterns are briefly described in the next section’ (op cit p 28 




 The typology  is first described towards the end of Chapter 2 under the sub-
heading ‘Types of Organisational Adaptation’. It answered their second objective:- ‘to 
provide an explanation of the alternative forms of adaptive behaviour which exist in the 
industries we have studied and which are probably present in most other industries.’ 
(op cit p 11-12, emphasis added). The resultant typology was recognisably that put 
forward in their earlier works and consisted of three effective types of organisational 
configuration, now with single word labels: the Defender, the Prospector and the 
Analyser. However, the fourth type, the Reactor, was held to be unable to respond 
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effectively to a changing environment. This is a clear departure from the ‘vectoral 
conceptualisation’ of the Reluctant Reactor as given in the 1974 and 1976 versions and 
is a significant disjunction, the causes of which are not revealed from this textual 
analysis. It was these four archetypes that seem to have caught on and they had a far 
more enduring influence than the accompanying adaptive cycle. Indeed, as Hambrick  
(2003) observed, they have become part of the canon of strategic analysis. As outlined 
earlier, associated with the typology was a notion of ‘equifinality’ – the view that there 
is more than one way to succeed in an industry and that, the Reactor category aside, no 
one configuration is superior to any other.  
 
 The method of presentation is one of illustration of types in relation to vignettes 
of a few of the organisations encountered in their field work. The generalised salient 
characteristics are described at some length and, all but the Reactor, have a table setting 
these out as the distinctive approaches of each type to the three ‘problems’ that 
organisational design, structure and strategy must address. In subsequent work, (Snow 
& Hrebriniak 1980), the prototypical, generic characteristics are set out in one 
paragraph rich descriptions for self-classification by top managements of organisations 
co-operating in their research.  The authors’ Introduction to the 2003 re-issue of their 
book comments, in relation to the second of their 1978 objectives ‘Although this claim 
was probably presumptuous given our limited samples of industries, the strategy 
proposition nevertheless provided us with a parsimonious means of describing 
alternative, complex and successful adaptation behaviours within widely different 
industry environments. We continue to find the concept of firms trying to follow a 
consistent pattern of decision-making and behaviour to be valuable… ’ (op cit p xvi - 
emphasis in original). The claim is, thus, that these prototypical specimens provide a 
classification template of possible configurations and strategic stances taken by the 
sample firms in the range of industries investigated and that they, probably, encompass 
the possible types found in most industries.  
 
 By the 1978 book the typologies had been extensively described in a richer, 
multidimensional manner – more as gestalts than simple labelled dimensions. The 
single sentence type descriptors have become paragraphs. All four descriptions are 
given in Appendix 1.1.C, but the general characteristics for the ‘Defender’ are as given 
below, with comments; 
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 ‘Defenders are organisations which have narrow product-market domains. Top 
managers in this type of organisation are highly expert in their organisation’s limited 
area of operation but do not tend to search outside of their domains for new 
opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organisations seldom need to make 
major adjustments in their technology, structure or methods of operation. Instead, they 
devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations.’ (op cit 
p 29 ). 
 
 The main change to note is that whilst we have richer descriptions of the 
archetypes (for example, 74 words for the 1978 descriptive paragraph compared with 
the 34 word 1976 equivalent) the relative position of the Defender on the environmental 
enactment axis of the typology (as given in Figure 1, above) is not specified in the 1978 
version. The same is true for the Prospector type. The Analyser could be construed as 
containing an implied dual focus environmental enactment, whereas the Reactor’s 




 Using these paragraph descriptors, we now have a multidimensional construct, 
that has not only developed, but changed, from that postulated in 1974 / 6 to a far more 
characterised scheme of many projectable properties appropriate to each type: 
polymorphic categories. Appendix 2 sets out the dimensions and characteristics of all 
four types. That for the Defender is reproduced below:-  
 
TABLE  4.3 THE  TYPOLOGY  AS  A  MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONSTUCT  
 
    Defender’s characteristics   Same/similar in… 
Dimension    as at 1978   1974 ? 1976 ? 
 
Environmental perception               Enactment not specified ( as an   No No  
    attribute of the type. ) 
 
Environmental Scrutiny  Limited search by top management. No Yes 
 
Organisational responsiveness Minor only. Major adjustments are  Yes Yes  
relatively infrequent.  
 
Product-Market Domain  Narrow.     No  Yes 
 
Management focus  Operational efficiency.   No No. 
 
Operational effectiveness.  ( High -implied )    ( No )  ( No ) 
 
Source: Author, based upon Miles & Snow 1978 (p29) and Miles et al, 1974, & Snow, 1976. 
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 These single paragraph descriptions provide a characterisation of each type on 
up to six dimensions or properties, but afford only some tenuous similarities with the 
earlier characterisation of the Domain Defender and Enthusiastic Prospector given in 
Table 4.2 above. In theory, and assuming a simple binary specification on each property 
( high/low, broad/narrow, stable/unstable, etc) some 64 potential property spaces have 
been created, of which just three are occupied with specified archetypes. Furthermore, 
the 1978 typology was further described, as regards the three successful types, by means 
of detailed tables which set out the characteristic ways in which each conceptualised 
and solved the three elements of the adaptive cycle and the associated costs and benefits. 
These are summarised in Appendix 1.3.A-C. The fourth type, the Reactor, was not set 
out in such a manner, being now expressly regarded as a failure to coordinate the 
various components of the adaptive cycle and, thus, resembling a mix or hybrid of the 
three successful types. Space forbids more extensive exegesis of the 1978 text – there is 
a chapter devoted to each of the four types, complete with selected case examples. 
However, the types have now been delineated over at least 16 different property 
‘dimensions’:- see Appendix 1.2 and 1.3A-C. Such a characterisation, were it to be 
applied simply in the binary form to all possible permutations would result in a potential 
of over 65,000 other archetypes:- Is it around 65,000 short of descriptions ? or are there 
a host of substructed (i.e. unoccupied) categories that in practice have no exemplars ? 
 
 Thus, by 1978 the outline and detail of the Miles and Snow typology were 
definitively expressed and available as an idealised typification via richly characterised 
archetypes for third parties to employ when examining business strategies. As a 
proposed practical classification system, however, the 1978 typology faces three 
fundamental problems compared to the 1974 / 1976 precursors. First, to become 
sufficiently parsimonious it must rely upon either some simplifying assumptions as to 
the principal dimensions for categorisation of an organisation and / or employ a 
majority rule or similar heuristic to reduce the number of archetypes. Secondly, far from 
being the simple binary positions (present/absent) on the property dimensions referred 
to above, actual observations will relate to nominal, ordinal and interval measures of 
organisational features that are seldom straightforward to ascertain (even with a willing 
and well-informed respondent) and frequently involve a subjective assessment (whether 
by an internal informant, or external expert or researcher) if used as a measure for 
categorisation of strategy. Finally, it should be noted that not all of the dimensions are 
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specified within the 1978 text for all three well-characterised types, such that even 
where it is possible to make an observation consistent with the dimensional construct, 
the position of the archetype on that construct may itself be unknown. 
 
 The 1978 version of the typology has a richer depth of characterisation of the 
types, but at some cost of greater ambiguity about categorisation. It added to the 
verisimilitude of the typology as rooted in field studies, but at a cost of its projectability 
to other sets of organisations, and unpredictability in inter-rater classification. A tension 
that resurfaces in later discussion; not least the next three sections. 
  
4 THE  PROJECTABLE  CLASSIFICATORY  SYSTEM  -  TYPOLOGY  OR  
TAXONOMY  ? 
 
 The 1974 or 1976 version of the typology, as simple conceptualisations, were 
potentially projectable in Nelson Goodman’s (1983) terms, in that the types could be 
predicated as dispositional properties of business strategies. However, as Goodman also 
describes, more is required for projectability to be achieved, and that is that the terms 
concerned are, in his word, ‘entrenched’ in language. For the terms analyser, defender, 
prospector and reactor to be actually projectable they must acquire a certain familiarity 
and credence within the language community concerned i.e. strategists of all types. 
Only then can the terms be used meaningfully and intersubjectively to impute properties 
and characteristics of their designations such that they convey inferential utility. The 
typology appealed to a need for simple, generalisable and catchy terminology to 
describe business strategies, plausibly based on real business behaviour and that could 
replace vague analogies to other domains such as military strategy. It was the 1978 
book’s publication from well-regarded researchers from prestigious universities and 
drawing upon years of research across a number of different fields, that propelled the 
typology into the consciousness of the language community and achieved this 
authentication:- the Miles and Snow typology had entered the strategists’ lexicon and a 
business strategy classification scheme was born. 
 
 Considering the original classification system as proposed, (Miles et al 1974, 
Snow 1976) its description as a ‘typology’ (using Bailey’s 1994 nomenclature) is 
correct. Albeit the presentation in Miles and Snow (1978) is such that the empirical base 
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for the proposed categories was emphasised, the original derivation was essentially 
conceptual and the typology has, to a considerable extent been synthesised with 
empirical observations to become an operational classification system. The conceptual 
framework was under construction as the empirical investigations were underway and it 
is entirely conventional for a typology to be constructed in this manner. Furthermore, 
whilst a taxonomy would require decision rules for categorisation, a typology can 
accept recognition against archetype or discernment against rich paragraph descriptions 
as offered here. The typology as promulgated in the 1978 book is a step beyond a 
straightforward typology towards a synthetic classification in that multiple dimensions 
are specified to assist the operationalisation of the scheme. Although an ideal 
descriptive pro forma would employ a restricted number of identical scale dimensions, 
there are, at least, no major inconsistencies or incommensurables in the descriptors they 
set out in their Tables 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1 and the general description offered for the 
‘reactor’ type.  
 
 The key question as regards projectability is the degree to which, in further 
characterising the attributes of their types, Miles and Snow’s 1978 version was less 
projectable than the earlier, purer, typology. Had the richer descriptions of the types 
become overdetermined ? That they had managed to achieve entrenchment is not 
questioned, but whether the result was to strengthen or somehow weaken the underlying 
product is debateable. The parsimonious four types are at a high level of generality 
(more like cross-cutting kinds than species), and the danger lies in the over-specification 
of second-order attributes by examining functional and structural aspects that may not 
conform to their generalisations in each exemplification of actual strategies. In other 
words, the simple single paragraph descriptors offered in the 1978 book were probably 
more potent than the further characterisation offered in the detailed chapters dealing 
with each type where specific attributes are extracted and illustrated via their field work 
exemplars. In a similar manner it may be more effective to describe another abstract 
kind ~ art genres ~ by means of short descriptions and reference to particular artists, 
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5 INTENSION AND DENOTATION. 
 
 The intension of the types is easily grasped by reference to their labels. Miles 
and Snow have succeeded in attaching labels to their types that capture in a single word 
the essence of the organisational strategy concerned. Strategic intention and conceptual 
intension are happily coincident. Defenders defend; prospectors prospect; analysers 
analyse; and reactors react. This linguistic felicity in labelling strikes one as a 
significant contribution to the enduring success of the typology. Whether the subsequent 
further characterisation of the types in the full detail set out in the 1978 book has 
clarified and disambiguated their types, or not, is a moot point. Arguably, the main 
contribution of the detailed descriptions has been to authenticate the typology’s 
credentials in terms of research in real organisational settings.  
 
6 EXTENSION - WARRANTS  AND  QUALIFIERS. 
 
 It is recommended (Doty et al, 1993) that theories are identified with their 
boundary conditions. There are no terms that explicitly warrant that the Miles and Snow 
(1978) typology extends to the categorisation of all possible organisations in the world 
at any time. In fact we find, (op cit, p 30), the observation ‘Any typology, of course, is 
unlikely to encompass every form of organisational behaviour – the world of 
organisations is much too changeable and complex to permit such a claim’. However, 
‘not everything’ is an inadequate definition of the population of organisations to which 
the typology does relate. There are no qualifiers that limit the boundary conditions to 
USA, (the source of their empirical investigations) or any part of the world, nor as to 
time. Since the text to the 2003 Introduction lacks qualification as to the effects of time, 
economic systems and structures, cultures and the like, the default assumption is that the 
authors are at least making no retrodictive qualifiers. Given that, (Snow & Hrebiniak, 
1980), the original typology was conceived principally by Snow in relation to his 
emerging theoretical framework and his 1972 studies with just 16 college textbook 
publishers, (Snow, 1976) this may be viewed as justifiably termed ‘presumptuous’ 
above. Although, there is nothing unusual in practice in this lack of warrant and 
qualification, the lacunae in floating a very highly specified set of ‘types’ without 
specifying also the population of ‘organisations’  to which it applies, is regrettable. 
Instructions for intended use are appropriate with a new analytical proposition. 
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 Seeking the implicit warrant as to application, we can examine the text and its 
research base. Before publication the typology was ‘road tested’ against a number of 
organisations - both profit and non-profit; high technology and low; manufacturing and 
service; and geographically dispersed within USA. The major omissions are, therefore, 
Governmental and non-USA organisations. This would point to a reasonable claim that, 
at least as regards that economy, at that time, the classification system should prove 
reasonably exhaustive. However, four considerations should have weighed in the 
promulgation of the typology as regards extension:-  
 
 First, it is evident that the within study test of the typology proved satisfactory 
for Snow’s reasonably homogeneous group of textbook publishers (Levitt & Ness, 1989) 
and Meyer’s ‘small tightly knit’ (Miles & Snow 1978, p 11) sample of 19 voluntary 
general hospitals in a single region of California. But it was less satisfactory for 
Coleman’s more geographically dispersed and variegated sample of 49 food processing 
or electronics companies, where ‘executives were not always able to describe or 
evaluate other companies in their respective industries, and while the typology was 
generally supported, it could not be definitively concluded that it was a valid means of 
classifying organisations’ (op cit p 10). Here is a sensible, very early, caution as to the 
generalisability of their typology that received little focus in their presentation thereof. 
There is in both the college textbook publishing industry and the hospital sector a strong 
coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) created by the higher education 
institutional or health funding and regulation context within which they operate. It is 
possible to construe the differing environmental perceptions and responsiveness for 
such firms as being a necessary and deliberate (or emergent) enactment of strategic 
distinctiveness in the face of a uniform common environment. A fine grain supply 
heterogeneity in response to a coarse grain demand homogeneity. This suggests that the 
Miles and Snow typology would be a useful tool for the exploration of within-group 
differences in strategy amongst firms in the same industry group.  
 
  Whereas Coleman’s inconclusive study of 22 electronics firms and 27 food-
processing companies was, in part, an attempt to explore the generalisability of the 
theoretical framework with a more diverse set of environments and organisations. As 
regards the typing of these organisations he reported (op cit Chapter 12) difficulties in 
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using researcher-designated or CEO-designated typing. For example, of the 27 (from 49) 
organisations for which at least two CEOs provided third party typing, he reported; ‘The 
ratings reflected a modest level of agreement concerning the strategic type of these 
firms; overall, 39 percent of the ratings for the 27 organisations fell in the modal type of 
each firm.’  (Miles & Snow, 1978, p 211). Thus the expectation that the typology will 
provide internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity across a wide spectrum of 
organisations is not robustly supported in the original case studies of classification 
according to evidence from the scheme’s proponents. A qualification as to application 
in diverse industries and across industries was amply justified, but not provided. 
 
 Second, the authors were well aware that in the late 1970s, in response to the 
growth and internationalisation of many American firms, a new ‘matrix’ form of 
organisation was rapidly emerging and that, alongside the rapid changes in industrial 
structure on the wave of the ‘information technology’ revolution, would imply a need to 
qualify the application to contemporary conditions. This, appropriate qualification is 
explicitly acknowledged in the text (Chapter 9, ‘Mixed strategies and structures.’). 
There is also a more general theme that emerges in the book, that of unfinished business 
~ that this was an early exposition of interim findings that would be amplified and 
modified in the light of further research. For example the concluding sentences of 
Chapter 13 ‘Management and strategy’ read as follows:- 
 
 ‘In no sense do we consider or offer these studies as “proof” of the validity of 
our conceptual framework. It is our hope that the utility of this approach for 
understanding intra-industry variations in environmental enactment and internal 
organisational characteristics will be examined in a variety of other settings. We 
believe this approach  will prove useful and that it should, at least, provide the raw 
material for more advanced  conceptualisations.’ (Miles & Snow, 1978, p 245.) 
 
  Thirdly, of course, the intimate links between their whole conception of 
corporate and business strategy and a capitalist market economy should have caused 
some qualification as to application outside of such context. None is provided. All 
research was carried out in USA in the first half of the 1970s and is intimately bound 
into the socio-politico-economic society of that time and place. Whether the resultant 
categories would apply outside this temporal, spatial or societal context is a matter for 
serious deliberation, particularly from the vantage point of an early 21st century 
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globalised economy when the Foreword and Introduction to the 2003 classic edition 
were written. 
 
 Fourthly, and finally, where a typology departs from the desirable classification 
criterion of being exhaustive of the population in that it fails to provide an archetype for 
property space(s) created by its own conceptualisation, then a final category of ‘Other’ 
or ‘Not elsewhere specified’ should be supplied. The ‘broad scope defender’ is an 
example of a discounted property space under the Miles and Snow typology, in that 
there is no description of the fifth archetype for such an organisation, nor some catch all 
category to cover all such discounted property spaces. There are two possible 
constructions of this fact. Either the somewhat ill-specified or hybrid type, the Reactor, 
could have been intended as a catch all for those organisations failing to conform to the 
more clearly specified types. (At times the text allows for such an interpretation and 
some later commentators / researchers have taken this line.). Or, alternatively, the 
authors did envisage that the typology would encompass the entire population. 
Although to impute this latter alternative might appear somewhat far fetched, it must be 
recognised that the typology as originally set out in 1974 could sensibly be applied to all 
organisations. All organisations must sense their environment in terms of stability and 
certainty and all organisations must determine in what manner they will respond to that 
environment. The simple two dimensional classification typology of 1974 could 
plausibly make a claim to universality. The more complex and highly specified 1978 
version could not. There is no explicit acknowledgement of this limitation.  
 
7 ONTOLOGICAL  PLAUSIBILITY 
 
 The previous section has reviewed the typology as a question of practical 
adequacy. In functional terms, Miles and Snow had succeeded in proffering an 
intersubjective strategy classification scheme to practitioners, researchers and teachers 
alike. That review examined the (implicit) warrants as to generalisability and, in so 
doing, has critiqued the presentation as inadequately qualified in respect of i) the limited 
success in original application to diverse industries; ii) possibly, being particular to 
USA, or North American or Anglo Saxon capitalist economies of the 1970s and 1980s; 
iii) creating property spaces that are conceptually available but are not characterised 
with archetypes in the reduced typology put forward, and (iv) lack of an ‘other’ type. 
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 The next section, 8 below, will examine the plausibility of the claim to a 
grounding of the typology in the outcome of the adaptive cycle’s operations in 
achieving ‘fit’. In this section the question of whether (as a simple nomenclature or 
heuristic classification scheme) the typology ‘rings true’ of its domain’s contents. That 
is to say that it is critiqued as a classification system from the points of view of its 
ontological plausibility, irrespective of any claims to some known motivation. 
 
 It is not easy to tease apart ‘practical adequacy’ as evaluated above, from the 
question of ‘ontological plausibility’ addressed here. First, it is assumed that it is 
possible to predicate a property, or set of properties, of an organisation that purports to 
capture its strategy. Second, if it is possible to point to a fair example of same, it is 
incontrovertible that such an individual instance of the strategy “exists”. The issue, 
therefore, is not an existential one, but about the projectability from one case to others. 
Thus, we can describe a strategy of opening a hardware store in Nuneaton, or of 
launching a new soft drink range, or defending market share at all costs, or any number 
of other potential strategies, and we can hold that such a strategy is an archetype 
projectable to other instances. Ontological plausibility is about the credibility of that 
projection. Nelson Goodman (1978,1983), in examining how we make social worlds 
that constitute the viewpoints from which our projections are made, explored in some 
depth the problems of induction and prediction. In his terms, we are here postulating a 
‘presumptive kind’~ a disposition to execute some strategy. The evaluation of same 
requires that, as a first step, it is compared with the whole panoply of competing, 
complementary, and overriding kinds and entrenched hypotheses about the relevant 
field and its kinds. The presumptive kind is evaluated against the framework that 
constitutes the worldview of the strategist. Hence, it is not some extra-linguistic 
“reality” that is being examined when dealing with abstract social kinds; ‘In a sense, not 
the word itself but the class it selects is what becomes entrenched, and to speak of the 
entrenchment of a predicate is to speak elliptically of the entrenchment of the extension 
of that predicate. On the other hand, the class becomes entrenched only through the 
projection of the predicates selecting it: entrenchment derives from the use of language.’ 
(Goodman, 1983, p 95). Indeed, the whole arena of social kinds depends upon the 
constituitive uses of language (Searle 1995, 1999). 
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 To critique the Miles and Snow typology from an ontological standpoint is to 
raise the issue of whether, in the light of the wider body of projectable properties 
entrenched in the strategists’ world, it is plausible that;- i) a significant number of 
organisations that conform to the proffered descriptions or archetypes can be identified 
in a variety of contexts such that they are generalisable under that denotation; and ii) 
whether there exist a significant number of organisations in the same population that 
cannot sensibly and reliably be so categorised, such that either the typology should be 
abandoned, or a superior classification can be devised by extending the categories, or 
revising the descriptions. Further, it also asks whether;- iii) the detailed characterisation 
of the archetypes provides a consistent set of properties for the envisaged contexts; and 
iv) whether the types of organisations so delineated would plausibly thrive across a 
range of industries and contexts. For example, one may raise five such issues in relation 
to the ontological plausibility of the Defender type:-  
 
 1  Implicit in the typology as set out is the notion that the narrow product-market 
domain provides a more stable niche. Our contemporary interpretation would be that a 
segment of a market may or may not be more stable than the whole; in grocery retailing, 
staples such as milk and bread are less volatile than luxuries such as shakes and cakes. 
Stability is a property of segment content, not segment size. However, the whole is 
always more stable than the parts that aggregate to it and a greater number of segments 
will be less, rather than more, stable than the whole. The Defender is described as both a 
stability-seeker and a niche-seeker. There is no necessary connection between the two 
and some potential conflict - i.e. there are logical inconsistencies in the argument. 
 
 2  If the authors had intended the characteristics of the Defender to be so 
designated, it must have been sensible and logical for them to have ruled out the 
existence (or at least in the format specified in their characterisation) of Defenders in 
certain volatile industries, such as high fashion or technology, or in highly differentiated 
product markets, etc. That is to say, the features of the Defender are inconsistent with 
profitable performance in certain industries, but complementary to other (stable or basic 
commodity) types of industry. The authors have, however, embraced the equifinality 
principle at the expense of denying the contingent nature of some aspects of their 
typology - i.e. there are logical consequences which have not been acknowledged. 
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 3  In a similar vein, the characteristics of the Defender as set out by them, such 
as focus upon a core technology, vertical integration, continuous improvement and 
cautious and incremental growth primarily through market penetration might be 
descriptive of a differentiator in a mature industry characterised by a stable technology 
(Porter, 1980).Yet other features of the Defender’s characteristics, such as emphasis 
upon production efficiency, price competitiveness, functional structures and centralised 
control, are all typical of a cost leadership posture and appear to disqualify a Defender 
from adopting a differentiation strategy - i.e. potential internal inconsistencies or 
contradictions might be detected in their detailed characterisation. 
 
 4  Consigning the Defender type to narrow product-market domains effectively 
rules out the possibility of dominant firms within an industry conforming to a Defender 
role. Yet many such firms protecting their dominance, particularly in commodity-like 
industries, appear to adopt Defender-like characteristics - i.e. there are incompatibilities 
between observed organisational behaviour and the permitted typing.  
 
  5  There are path dependent firm-specific features such as size and age that, 
whilst compatible with the industry as a whole, would be incompatible with successful 
performance in certain type roles. For example a start up company can hardly be a 
‘Defender’- i.e. the typology is silent regarding certain organisational properties that 
lead to consequential exclusions from generalisable types. 
 
 In summary, there appear to be some inconsistencies between the specification 
of the Defender archetype and the range of Defender-like organisations depicted in 
practice. A set of substantive problematic issues could similarly be raised in relation to 
the three other types. Whilst substantive problems concerning the establishment of 
boundaries as regards application across diverse industries, socio-politico-economic 
systems and geographies have already been discussed. To summarise, one may 
conclude that:- 
 
 i) There are organisations (as cited in the 1978 work) that conform to all 
four types. 
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 ii) There are clearly organisations that fall outside the types. The 
partitioning of the population upon the specified characteristics (and the non-provision 
of alternative appropriate categories) creates additional unclassified types. The typology 
is not exhaustive of the population. 
 
 iii) Inconsistencies can be detected in the detailed characterisation of the 
types, particularly when a range of environmental contexts are considered. 
 
 iv) There are reasonable grounds for doubt as to whether certain types are 
likely to be compatible with success in particular organisational histories and settings. 
 
8 A  MOTIVATED  KIND ? – THE  ADAPTIVE  CYCLE. 
 
 The above discussion considers the ontological plausibility of the Miles and 
Snow classification scheme as originally proposed. It does not, however, encompass a 
key question being raised in this thesis as to the central role of ‘motivation’ to any 
promulgated classification scheme. To what extent is the typology the product of an 
accommodation between epistemic practices and real causal structures and mechanisms ? 
That question arises especially with regard to the adaptive cycle as a placeholder for just 
such a mechanism. As argued in this thesis, the possible motivation of kinds is an 
important consideration in evaluating their scientific utility. It is the inferential qualities 
of a category that contribute most to its value in cognition, and motivated kinds are 
more potent in that respect. Those considerations were encouraged by examination of 
the philosophical and cognitive basis of classification schemes applied to abstract 
institutional social kinds in general, and which do not, in the main, figure significantly 
in the management and organisational science literature concerning classification. For 
example, apart from a reference to Tiryakian (1968), on social science classification, the 
1978 book’s impressive bibliography contains no indication of considerations beyond a 
general field firmly centred around management and organisational science, with minor 
excursions into social psychology, decision sciences and industrial economics. There is 
little evidence of any engagement with the issues discussed in Chapters 1-3 above that 
underpin this critique. In other words, the question now being addressed did not occupy 
Miles, Snow or their collaborators. These issues will be touched upon below in this 
chapter, but will be considered further later under the ‘Conclusions’ chapter of the thesis. 
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 Miles and Snow’s work suggested to the research community of the 1980s and 
1990s, particularly in the USA, two distinct areas for empirical research; - the validity 
of their parsimonious classification system of four types and the equifinality of three of 
these; and the workings of their postulated mechanism of causality – the adaptive cycle. 
On the latter there is little evidence of substantive development, albeit that work with 
the typology often drew upon the notion of the cycle as described in 1978. Miles and 
Snow returned (1984) to the associated concept of ‘fit’ without further development of 
the adaptive cycle, which seems, therein, to have been subsumed without mention. The 
general concept of ‘fit’ between an organisation and its environment is longstanding and 
ubiquitous within the strategy literature, but Miles and Snow had a more contextually 
specific meaning in 1978 since they referred to the adaptive cycle as a set of internal 
mechanisms that brought about the alignment.  (A principal exception is Chakravarthy 
(1982), who proposed his own and somewhat independent development of the adaptive 
cycle. That conceptualisation has not commanded the attention of the mainstream 
research community.) 
 
 We are, thus, largely left with the mechanism of the adaptive cycle only in so far 
as it was articulated in the 1978 book, with its three interacting elements: the 
entrepreneurial, the administrative and the engineering. It is clear that, in the terms of 
this thesis, the homogeneity of strategic behaviour recognised in the Miles and Snow 
typology was postulated as a consequence of some underlying causal forces; it is a 
purported motivated kind. However, whilst the three elements and the adaptive cycle 
itself are described, the manner in which it gives rise to the types is not. A mechanism is 
intimated, but how the mechanism works is not. The book explicates the relationship as 
follows:- 
 
‘Because management is relatively free to choose among [many] alternative 
forms of each of these major organisational features [the three elements of the 
adaptive cycle], the range of strategy-structure relationships is potentially vast. 
When competing organisations within a single industry are observed, however, 
patterns of behaviour begin to emerge which suggest that these various 
organisational forms can be reduced to several archetypes. So far from our 
research and our interpretation of the literature, we have identified four such 
organisation types. Each of these types has its own strategy for responding to 
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the environment, and each has a particular configuration of technology, 
structure and process that is consistent with its strategy. These organisation 
types, which we have named the Defender,……’ (Miles & Snow 1978, p 29, 
[with additions]). 
 
 However, it should be noted that their conception of the three components does 
not overlay comfortably with the conventional functional divisions or departments of a 
commercial organisation (finance, production, marketing and sales, etc). Exactly how 
this trio of problems that management must continually solve relate, not to their 
perceptions of the external environment and the problems that it may set, but to the 
levers of action within the organisation itself that must be brought into play in order to 
answer those questions is just not explicated. Furthermore, the actual operation of the 
adaptive cycle is not described in any coherent way in the text, despite numerous 
references thereto. Indeed it is not clear how one would recognise the cycle in motion. It 
is an intriguing overarching notion, since there must be ways in which an organisation 
changes in the light of changing circumstances, but it is one that is difficult to pin down. 
Note that the adaptive cycle has not provided a framework for subsequent research of 
any note. It does not figure strongly in the voluminous ‘change management’ literature. 
 
 From a contemporary perspective, and adopting a broadly weak social 
constructivist or a critical realist stance, one might view purported social institutional 
abstract kinds as potentially the product of causal mechanisms within both the 
organisation and its environment and, accordingly, expect some explication of same. 
(Danermark et al, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010; Sayer, 2000; Searle, 1995, 1999). In 1978 
the expectations of readers would, in all likelihood, be entirely different, allowing for 
the functioning of the cycle and the mechanism(s) by which the types result to be 
intimated and labelled, but left unexplored. That, it could be reasonably anticipated, 
would be the task of further research. Miles and Snow suggested as much in their 
concluding chapter. Yet the literature that followed the 1978 publication did not adopt 
Miles and Snow’s adaptive cycle (contra their typology) as a central component.   
 
That the internal mechanisms of adaptive change pointed to by Miles and Snow 
was not explored by others raises the possibility of two explanations beyond the simple 
attribution to the fact that it was too sketchy and inconvenient in its outline. The first is 
that the Miles and Snow claim was not taken too seriously at the time. Miles and Snow 
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had produced a plausible deus ex machina to account for the emergence of their types, 
but this was a somewhat inchoate metaphorical device rather than a concrete 
observation of causality at work. Indeed all would understand that any such mechanisms, 
or causal structures in the social realm, could only be detected from salient cues in their 
observations, rather than be directly observable. (The predisposition termed 
‘psychological essentialism’ allowed for a placeholder notion of mechanism to provide 
a satisfactory account, despite its flimsy outline). Thus, the first explanation can be 
reduced to polite disbelief or lack of interest. The second, is simply pragmatic. Messrs 
Miles, Snow, Meyer and Coleman had assembled and reported upon the generalised 
findings of a large number of case studies conducted over many years. Replication 
would be impossible and even an imitation fraught with cost and risk. Far easier and 
safer to investigate the reported typology and, perhaps, thereby throw greater light upon 
the causal forces at work thereon. As explicitly recognised in both the 1974 and 1976 
papers, research had tended (and still does today) to focus upon cross-sectional 
quantitative studies, rather than longitudinal qualitative studies which would be required 
in any work that sought to investigate and expand upon the adaptive cycle. Whatever 
the reasons, the fact remains that the strategy community was not too interested in 
following up what, from a scientific viewpoint, was the most intriguing aspect of the 
1978 book. 
 
So, although presented as a motivated kind classification scheme, the Miles and 
Snow typology was treated, in general, as if it were a nomenclative scheme. That is, it 
was seen as a structured, agreed sorting and ordinary language naming scheme for the 
strategy community ~ a nominal system that recognises how things are in the world of 
organisational structure and strategy. Yet to become a set of reasonably well-understood 
and reasonably determinable archetypes, adopted as a familiar component of strategy 
discourse and a means of exploring performance implications, it requires something 
more accessible than a 274 page book. It called for some simpler instrumentation of the 
complex descriptions that had been provided by Miles and Snow in 1978. 
 
9 SUBSEQUENT  SYNTHESIS – THE OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION 
 
There is no desire here to attempt to summarise and synthesise all the research 
material content of papers citing the Miles and Snow typology. This is not a meta study 
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of the Miles and Snow typology, but a case study in categorisations of organisational 
strategy. Thus, another way of examining the promulgation and application of the 
typology is to examine, not the results of these studies, but the basis upon which the 
results were sought. The job being to reveal the implicit understanding of the typology 
as a phenomena being investigated. It is the latter which reveals the way in which the 
Miles and Snow typology was construed by strategists and academics interested in 
strategy research. 
 
The instrumented kinds – recognition heuristics. 
 
 In contrast to the lack of interest in investigating the adaptive cycle, there has 
been very substantial development of research on the typology in two directions. First, 
the design and implementation of operational classification constructs to enable 
empirical investigation of the typology; either by rich one paragraph descriptions of the 
conceptual types (Conant et al 1990; James & Hatten, 1995; McDaniel & Kolari, 1987; 
Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980); or by devising a research instrument to measure the variables 
considered characteristic of the archetypes under investigation, using the attributes 
contained in Miles and Snow’s work. (Segev,1987; Shortell & Zajac, 1990). In other 
words, very shortly after its first promulgation in 1978, the typology had been 
developed into a synthetic (operational) classification scheme for use as a research 
instrument. In so doing the Defender, Analyser, Prospector and Reactor constructs had 
become reified - they had been endowed with substance and reality by virtue of being 
authoritatively deployed in this manner. The research question was increasingly being 
framed not as ‘do you recognise the organisation’s strategy as being like one of the 
following….’, but as  ‘to which of the following four types of strategy does your 
organisation conform…. ?’ - what we now would call an ‘anthropic bias’(Bostrom 
2002). 
 
 The second, of course, was the exploration of the validity and generalisability of 
the typology as contained in a large number of empirical studies. These studies 
generally used the research instruments outlined above, via respondent surveys, or, 
alternatively, used a public data base such as PIMS (Hambrick, 1983), or combinations 
thereof (Conant et al, 1990). The number of quantitative studies grew apace, with Zahra 
& Pearce (1990) summarising some 17 reported empirical studies of the typology in the 
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decade 1980-89. Thus the original typology was extensively operationalised and 
quantified with synthetic measurement instruments. The empirical studies either 
converted these measurements into means of assessing hypotheses against the resulting 
regression and analysis of variance test statistics, or using cluster analysis (Ketchen & 
Shook, 1996) to suggest configurations that conformed to the types detected. Other, 
more qualitative studies probed the typology with direct research within organisations 
and the management team (Hambrick 1981). And yet others combined both qualitative 
and quantitative approaches.  The overall results of these empirical investigations are, 
disappointingly, too ambiguous to attempt a summary. However, as explicated below, 
the net effect of this research activity was to reify the types, much as the development of 
IQ tests had reified notions of intelligence. 
 
Instrumentation via self-typing paragraphs. 
 
 An example of a self-typing paragraph (for the Defender type), as provided by 
one of the original proposers thereof, (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980), is given below;- 
 
‘Which one of the following descriptions most closely fits your organization 
compared to other firms in the industry ? 
 
Type 1: This type of organisation attempts to locate and maintain a 
secure niche in a relatively stable product or service area. The organisation 
tends to offer a more limited range of products or services than its competitors, 
and it tries to protect its domain by offering higher quality, superior service, 
lower prices, and so forth. Often this type of organisation is not at the forefront 
of developments in the industry – it tends to ignore industry changes that have 
no direct influence on current areas of operation and concentrates instead on 
doing the best job possible in a limited area.’ (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980, p 336) 
 
A number of observations immediately follow. The first, is that the type has 
become even more separated from the environmental enactment conceptualisation of the 
original work; there is here no direct mention of the top management team’s 
responsiveness to a changing environment. Second, the type has been characterised or 
re-defined with marked resemblance to, but using quite different terms from, the 1978 
original and its precursors. Arguably, a comparison with the paragraph descriptor given 
on p 29 of the 1978 book (see Appendix 1.1.C) and that printed directly above leads one 
to speculate that the two could plausibly be offered as alternative types of narrow scope 
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organisations (same genus, different species). Third, and most significantly, the whole 
nature of the exercise is self-confirmatory. This is explored further below. 
 
The clear implication of this format is that there are reasons for believing / 
knowing that these types exist and the task is simply one of recognition and appropriate 
categorisation. Given the choice of just four types and their seemingly authoritative 
source it would take a strong sense of total inapplicability for the respondents to reject 
the types as simply unrecognised or invalid. The absence of  ‘not applicable’ or ‘none of 
the above’ response creates the classic salesman’s closed question situation (‘would you 
rather buy our deluxe, or the standard version ?’). The innate ‘psychological 
essentialism’ described by Gelman (2003) and others is here compounded by the 
psychological tendency for people to trust statements that come from and are delivered 
by an authoritative source (Nisbitt & Wilson, 1977). The tendency will be to ‘force fit’ a 
fuzzy reality into the most plausible match; but this is far from an affirmation that the 
typology stands confirmed. Above all, the anthropic bias of this technique is reinforced 
by the closed segmentation of the strategy continuum in the absence of that fifth choice 
of ‘not applicable’. The respondents have replied, but there is no telling how willingly 
or unwillingly they accepted the limited set of options available to them. Nor can one 
tell the degree of conformity with which the categorical boxes fit their perceptions of 
reality. Whether a non-respondent in a self-typing survey had not complied with the 
exercise on grounds of its perceived irrelevance is not known. But it should be noted 
that where data for inter-rater or inter-method correlations from those who complied 
with such surveys is cited, it is unimpressive. This latter point is explored further below. 
 
The 1978 book describes how difficult it was for Henry Coleman (who 
employed the self-typing approach) to obtain confirmation of the typology when using 
executives to provide third party typing. This is confirmed in Snow & Hambrick 1980. 
Donald Hambrick had taken his Ph D at Pennsylvania State University with Charles 
Snow, and their joint paper discussed four different approaches to measurement of 
organisational strategy, including self-typing. They observe that Coleman’s study of 27 
food-processing companies and 22 electronics firms (1978 book, chapter 12) 
encountered resistance in classifying their own organisations and sometimes lacked 
sufficient information to classify other firms in a different segment of their industry. In 
the light of this, Alan Meyer’s study of hospital administrators (1978 book, chapter 13) 
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had deliberately confined itself to ‘hospitals that were geographically proximal and 
generally homogeneous in services’ and had found that many were ‘reluctant to classify 
their own hospitals because of their perceived uniqueness’. (Snow & Hambrick, 1980  
p533). Conant et al, 1990, used two approaches to classifying strategy to the Miles and 
Snow typology in a single industry – Health Maintenance Organisations in USA (again, 
a fairly homogeneous segment) – and found that the two methods (self-typing 
paragraphs and multi-item scales) gave different categorisations for 67 out of 150 of the 
organisations that responded to the survey. 
 
Given, as was discussed in Section 3.3 and Section 4, that the typology is not 
exhaustive, and was acknowledged by the authors as incomplete, the fact that 
conformity and consistency are somewhat compromised is not unexpected. However, 
the broad generality and simplicity of the approach was such that, the principles and 
practice of self-typing having been established, subsequent researchers were able to 
develop self-typing paragraph wordings bespoke to their studies. (e.g James & Hatten, 
1995; McDaniel & Kolari, 1987; Zajac & Shortell, 1989.). 
 
Instrumentation via multidimensional attributes. 
 
 The alternative to ‘gestalt recognition’, as in the self-typing paragraph, is 
recognition via ‘attribute configurations’. This is an explosive decomposition of the 
types into distinctive positions or values along a number of attribute dimensions 
assembled into a particular form that is deemed representative of each of the types. This 
categorisation is, thus, achieved via a research instrument that measures a number of 
organisational attributes (priorities, resource allocations, structures, processes), taking 
the typology as being polythetic. Here, the form of analysis can be twofold. Both 
require that the various properties or attributes along which the types can be identified 
and listed on some enquiry instrument. This is usually a questionnaire with 
measurements provided by a Likert scale, although some quantification is possible, 
especially as regards the performance data normally associated with such research. 
Then:- 
 
(A) Either the investigator predetermines the appropriate measure for each type 
on each attribute, with justification thereof based upon some exegesis of the 1978 text 
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and/or its subsequent treatment in the literature (e.g. Conant et al, 1990; Hambrick, 
1983; Snow & Hambrick, 1980). Again the problem of the reliability of such data is 
evident. For example, in the Conant et al 1990 study referred to above, an 11 item scale 
was employed following extensive trialling of questions. On a test-retest with 47 of 
their sample they found that the reliability of these 11 questions being answered the 
same way by the same respondents on each occasion ranged from 0.56 to 0.82, with a 
mean reliability of 0.69. 
 
(B) Or, it can be that, having determined the attributes to be measured via some 
1978 textual justification, the selection of the co-variants is provided by a statistical 
package creating ‘clusters’ of compatible measures which, with, generally, some off-
line adjustments approximates to the types (e.g. Hambrick, 1984(a) and (b); Desarbo et 
al, 2005, 2006). In fact the latter study is interesting in that, by using what the authors 
describe as a ‘constrained finite-mixture structural-equation methodology’ the claim is 
that strategic types can be derived empirically, i.e. entirely by taxonomic methods, in a 
manner that provides better fit to the sample firms than provided by the Miles and Snow 
typology. This work is discussed further in Section 7.2 below. The use of cluster 
analysis in strategic management research was examined by Ketchen & Shook (1996). 
Their conclusion was that the technique was more dependent upon researcher 
judgement than was commonly recognised (i.e. was less ‘objective’ than claimed) and 
that it should not be used in isolation. 
 
Consequences of Instrumentation. 
 
 If one construes ‘the Miles and Snow typology’ as a typology rather than a 
taxonomy, then a self-typing paragraph is more meaningful in terms of utility. (A 
‘good’ classification is one that enables useful inferences to be drawn about the entities 
identified to the classes concerned). This is perhaps best illustrated by consideration of 
intentionality in classification. One can characterise the distinction between 
classification via self-typing paragraphs or via attributes as similar to the distinction 
drawn by Searle (1999) regarding the ‘direction of fit’ of intentional states and as 
reflected in his development of  G E M Anscombe’s shopping list analogy. The 
proffered self-typing paragraphs act as items on a shopping list and place the obligation 
on the respondent to make the messy world fit its simplified and ordered representation. 
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It is a world-to-list direction of fit. With attribute measurement classification, however, 
the direction of fit is that of (attributes) list-to-world; the parallel being the check out 
cashier who simply records the items as they appear on the conveyor. The resulting list 
of shopping is an accurate representation of the particular shopping basket’s contents, 
and hence DeSarbo et al’s justified claim that their taxonomic approach is more 
accurate than the typology. However, from a utility perspective such accuracy is 
immaterial, if no extension beyond the sample population is possible. Accuracy has 
been gained at the cost of utility. (See 7.2 below). 
 
Instrumentation, as described above, has had its consequences for the research 
community. The net effect of employing self-typing paragraphs or attribute 
measurement instruments was as follows:- 
 
(i) The opening up of the types and their attributes to interpretation and 
possible modification by the individual researcher. They had become 
public property. 
 
(ii) A parallel reification of the types as concrete and existential reality rather 
than as abstract idealisations of that reality. Concepts had become 
percepts defined by tick boxes or measures, themselves more concrete 
than the abstractions they represented. They became tractable in 
quantitative research in the strategy field. 
 
(iii) Closure of the typology at four maximum, as exhaustive of available 
business strategy types (whereas Miles and Snow had implied this was 
an interim finding of the most obvious results from their investigations to 
date and allowing for modification in the light of development in 
economic and organisational settings). 
 
(iv) Yet a permissive, at times dismissive, approach to the typology’s origins 
(and the adaptive cycle), allowing individual researchers to drop one or 
two of the types (usually the Reactor and / or the Analyser) if it suited 
their perceptions, or research objectives. The typology became what 
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others made it to be, whilst calling in aid the authority of Miles and 
Snow and their research. 
 
(v) Inappropriate usage verging on abuse (as explicated below in Section 10). 
 
The Missing Algorithm. 
 
 It is of interest to note that a third method of type recognition ~ that of the 
algorithm, or decision tree ~ was not found in the literature. There is a possible 
underlying algorithmic interpretation to the presentation given, for example, in figure 
4.1. above, in the sense that the ‘dimensions’ could be substituted by decisions – 
Environment:- Stable or Unstable ? and Response:- Proactive or Reactive ? This could 
be further extended to the richer characterisation  provided in the 1978 book, as in – 
Scope:- Narrow or Broad ? Innovation:- Leading or lagging ? etc, etc. Thus a 
dendogram or decision tree could be produced that is based thereon and providing a 
handy recognition guide to the types (and maybe revealing additional types).  The 
consequences would be that the types would appear fairly clear cut and mutually 
exclusive. This is broadly the method employed in the biological sciences. The great 
problem in the social sciences is that homogeneity is not the product of the relatively 
stable forces found in the natural world. The boundaries between social abstract kinds 
are not clear cut, and types are seldom entirely mutually exclusive. They are what Smith 
and Medin (1981) refer to as probabilistic categories. Any attempt to apply algorithms 
would simply transfer the problem of identification to the branching points, and the holy 
grail of reliable intersubjective classification is still unobtainable. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that there is no Miles and Snow recognition chart, decision tree or similar 
device (albeit the subsequent treatment of the reified types might lead one to suppose 
that a simple decision tree was possible to construct). 
 
The problematic outcome. 
 
It is difficult to see exactly what contribution these studies of the typology are 
providing in return for the brain power absorbed therein. In nearly all of these studies 
the question of the ‘validity’ of the Miles and Snow typology and its predictions is 
central. This gives rise to the further question of exactly what it is that these studies are 
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attempting to demonstrate ? If it is that there are just four recognisable and generalisable 
archetypes that can be used to categorise business strategies, then the questions of 
coverage, ease of categorisation and inferential utility in decision-making would be core, 
rather than peripheral observations:-  ‘Do any of these four…?’ (rather than ‘Which of 
these four….?’). Or, ‘Would you add to these four…?’ ‘Do you find it useful to discuss 
strategy in the light of characterisation using these four ….?’, ‘Can you recognise your 
competitors against these four….?’, ‘Does knowing that one of your competitors is one 
of these four types help you to…?’ etc. Secondly, the studies have tended to be driven 
by the search for ‘success’ in strategising and, thus, concern themselves, not with 
recognition and use of the typology in strategising, but with the relative performance of 
the different types. This resolves into the investigation of ‘equifinality’. Neither 
direction proves particularly convincing when the questions are couched in the wrong 
terms.  
 
The kinds of the natural sciences are investigated as pure (i.e. refined) samples 
in closed systems. One sample of copper sulphate is pretty much like all other samples 
of copper sulphate. But this does not apply here, and the use of the sort of mathematical 
‘proof’ used in the natural sciences is incommensurable with the very nature of the 
social kind (organisation and its strategy) being classified. However, IF, on the other 
hand, a social kind IS being recognised in the Miles and Snow typology, then it is the 
motivating ‘adaptive cycle’ that is scientifically interesting. It may be that in positing 
this device Miles and Snow are reflecting actual mechanisms and causal structures that 
give rise to similarities of essence, despite immense variety of forms, that is the genuine 
heart of the adaptive fit between an organisation’s structure and strategy and its 
environment. If this is so, then an accommodation between our epistemic practices and 
the ontology of our subject is achieved such that the types are proper kinds. It is only 
when we have identified a proper kind that we can even contemplate employing the 
aggregative, quantitative methods employed in the natural sciences. 
 
 The overall problem that besets this treatment of the typology by the academy, 
and here one must include Miles, Snow and their fellow authors, is that the construal of 
the typology appears to have been as if there were a claim to an established and tacitly 
proven motivated kind observed in ‘nature’, or, here, ‘society’. Here the relevant social 
context is the apparently highly heterogeneous ecology of organisational strategies, 
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wherein Miles and Snow had discovered or ‘revealed’ the existence of underlying 
homogeneous kinds. Kinds that exist ‘out there in nature / society’. Instead of probing 
the postulated homologating forces that gave rise to these homogeneous characteristics, 
it is the claim itself that is examined. It is no more possible to ‘prove’ the Miles and 
Snow typology in this manner, than it is to prove ‘abstract impressionism’ or 
‘cumulonimbus’ or ‘socialism’ or, for that matter, the merits of this thesis (Taylor, 
2003). Consider the following :- business strategy can be likened to a game and can be 
described in terms that apply equally to a game. Board room discourse or case study 
text can refer to competitors, tactics, moves, stakes, positions, winners and losers, etc. 
Yet, as Wittgenstein pointed out, a ‘game’ is easier to recognise than to define. If the 
true value of the typology is to provide an intersubjective set of terms for discussion of 
business strategy, this entire conceptualisation of quantitative empirical research is 
simply misguided. The construal is a misconstrual, and the effort irrelevant to what 
matters.  
 
10 THE  MISUSES  OF  THE  TYPOLOGY.   
 
 In addition to the underlying misconstrual of the Miles and Snow typology 
referred to above, the review of the extensive literature revealed instances of what can 
only be regarded as, at best, poor practice and, at worst, an abuse of the typology. This 
seems to arise even in some peer reviewed journals that are well regarded within 
academe. To illustrate the nature of these misuses of the typology two particular (and 
somewhat egregious) illustrations will be used; one from the UK and one from USA. 
The first is simply misuse, the second combines misconstrual with paradoxical claims 
for a ‘superior’ classification. 
 
10.1 Misuse – Andrews et al. 
 
This is a fairly recent paper by four UK academics based in Wales ~ Andrews et 
al, 2009, with the title ‘Strategy,  Structure and Process in the Public Sector: a test of the 
Miles &Snow model’ published in a refereed journal, ‘Public Administration’. The 
Miles and Snow typology is central to this research, but, as shown in Table 6 below, 
their version of Miles and Snow’s work and the application of the typology they are 
purporting to test is unrecognisable when compared to the original:- 
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TABLE 4.4 ANDREWS ET AL, 2009  cf  MILES & SNOW 1978. 
 
Andrews et al 2009.     Miles & Snow, 1978. 
 
Organisations: 17 Welsh local authorities, 2003-4. Various USA private enterprises, 
       1972-6. 
 
Respondents:Heads of Service & middle managers Investigatory team and CEOs of  
Via questionnaires.     businesses, via interviews.  
 
Strategies:Departmental; in context set largely by Unconstrained organisation-wide  
Welsh Assembly Government.   strategies within market contexts. 
 
Typology: 3 types (excludes ‘analyser’)  All 4 types. 
 
Strategic Goals:Solution to 2 managerial problems   Solution to all 3 problems of the  
~ the ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘administrative’;  ‘adaptive cycle’ (with relative  
(within policy-constrained choices).   freedom of choice). 
 
Investigating: Departmental strategy; centralisation Whole organisational configurat- 
 v decentralisation; planning processes. ions of strategy, structure and 
processes. 
  
Emphasis: Implementation of strategy.  Formulation of strategy and  
       structure. 
 
Source Author based upon Andrews et al 2009 and Miles & Snow 1978. 
 
 In fairness, it is accepted that there is an absence of a strategy typology of 
equivalent status in the public sector, but this hardly justifies the application of the 
‘Miles and Snow typology’ to such an entirely different context in order to investigate 
an entirely different set of considerations. Nor to label it a ‘test’ of the typology. The 
table above indicates that almost all aspects of this work demonstrate differences of 
substance between Miles and Snow and Andrews et al. Their conclusion states;- ‘Our 
evidence shows that public organisations can have consistent strategies which fit the 
Miles and Snow categories. However, the fact that the processes of formulation and 
implementation are only loosely coupled to strategy content contradicts one of the 
central elements of the Miles and Snow model. Thus, while our analysis implies that the 
model can furnish valuable insights into strategy in the public sector, it appears to be 
unable to account for potential linkages with important internal characteristics.’ (op cit 
p 746). This amounts to a claim that the labels ‘defender’, ‘prospector’ and ‘reactor’ can 
be associated with analogical strategic behaviours exhibited by local authorities in 
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Wales, but that they lack associations with the characteristic strategy formulation 
processes and the organisational properties described by Miles and Snow, i.e. there are 
resemblances, but these can only be superficial. It is a metaphorical relationship that is 
being reported, and such is our human capacity for analogy and metaphor that almost 
any classification scheme can be projected in such a manner. For example to describe 
strategy formulation as ‘calm’ or ‘stormy’ is hardly an application of the Beaufort scale. 
Andrews et al have simply carried bricolage too far to yield a useful conclusion as 
regards Miles and Snow’s typology to describe their work as ‘a test’ thereof. 
 
  This article also illustrates the circularity or self-referentiality of conclusions that 
is found in other work. Here, for example, respondents’ replies were coded such that 
‘Reactors’ were classified by a strong positive response to three questions on the 
research instrument:- 
 
a) There is no internal pressure to create or develop strategy. 
b) There is no discernable strategy process. 
c) There is no discernable approach to implementing strategies in our area. 
 
They present results with the observation that; ‘Our findings on the strategy 
formulation processes of reactors are given further weight by the results of the strategy 
absence variable. This is associated positively with reactors and negatively with both 
defenders and prospectors’, (op cit p744), in a context which makes no 
acknowledgement of the fact that the results are a consequence of their method of 
category determination. The anthropic bias of such methods is unrecognised. Yet the 
results are subject to the use of tests for;- non-response bias; common methods bias; 
priming effects; interclass correlation coefficients; t-tests; Cronbach’s Alpha; variance 
analysis, etc. In fact the paper devotes about three times as much to data methods and 
results as it does to the model and concepts, including six hypotheses. There is little 
clarity about the nature of the phenomena of interest or concepts employed in this work. 
There is very little exposition of the differences shown in Table 6 above. Anyone not 
well versed in the Miles and Snow work, its background and its nature, is likely to take 
the authors’ heavily adapted version at face value. 
 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
181 
Like much public property, the Miles and Snow typology can be abused in the 
absence of some effective policing (a job usually assigned to the peer review process). 
If this work tells us anything, it tells us that there is a woeful dearth of generalised 
classification schemes suitable for research into strategy within not-for-profit and public 
organisations. It also tells us that no amount of statistical method can compensate for an 
inadequate characterisation of the phenomena being investigated and an inappropriate 
frame of reference for that analysis. It might also suggest a weakness in the peer review 
process where, for example, the domain of origination of a conceptualisation, with its 
associated classification scheme, and the domain of its application, are significantly 
different.  
 
10.2 Misconstrual and paradoxical claims – De Sarbo et al, 2005 & 2006. 
 
 This work, reported in two major journal articles ~ DeSarbo et al (2005), 
Strategic Management Journal; and DeSarbo et al (2006), Management Science ~ is an 
attempt to apply statistical methods to strategy classification such that empirical clusters 
can be identified that outperform the application of the Miles and Snow typology to the 
same data set. The claim is that DeSarbo et al have achieved this. It is taxonomy versus 
typology. It is, in some respects, profoundly misconceived and miscommunicated. 
 
 The taxonomic approach, in particular with regard to biological classification, 
was strongly advocated in the 1960s and 1970s (see, especially, Sneath & Sokal, 1973) 
with the advent of economic large scale data analysis via computers. This approach was 
termed ‘systematicist’. The prime statistical method being multivatiate cluster analysis 
of a large number of attributes of biological specimens and establishment of 
consequential polythetic groups at all levels down to species and even varieties…  
“Organisms are placed together that have the greatest number of shared character 
states, and no single state is either essential to group membership or is sufficient to 
make an organism a member of  the group.” (Sneath & Sokal, 1973, p21). In 
management science it was Bill McKelvey who, drawing upon biological sciences, did 
most to advocate the adoption of systematics in organisational classification (seen as 
complementary to the population ecology work associated with Hannan & Freeman, 
1977). McKelvey  presented systematics as a prerequisite for a scientific approach in the 
field of organisations (see, particularly, McKelvey, 1975, 1978, 1982), whilst conceding 
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that a priori classifications such as simple typologies have higher predictive validity 
and ‘are very useful but only when the particular attribute they include is of interest’ 
(McKelvey, 1978, p 1429). 
 
 There is an apparent resemblance between DeSarbo et al’s cluster analysis 
approach and Boyd’s homeostatic property clusters (as described in Chapter 2 above), 
and it is the intention of this critique to tease the two apart. This is an important task, 
since Boyd seems to offer a productive approach to understanding organisational or 
strategy classification and yet DeSarbo’s work is arguably a cul-de-sac. The problem is 
as follows:- 
  
 First, the DeSarbo et al claim in the 2005 paper ;- ‘We compare the Miles and 
Snow typology to the classification empirically derived utilizing this combinatorial 
optimization clustering procedure. With respect to both variable battery associations 
and objective statistical criteria, we show that the empirically derived solution clearly 
dominates the traditional P-A-D-R typology of Miles and Snow.’ (2005, Abstract 
extract). And, in the DeSarbo et al 2006 paper;- ‘We devised a constrained finite-
mixture structural-equation methodology and empirically derived a four-group, 
“mixed-type” strategic typology. We find that our typology improves on the M&S 
typology in terms of statistical fit’ ( 2006, p922). Neither claim should in any way 
discomfort Miles or Snow. It is always possible to produce a bespoke a posteriori taxon 
that more closely fits a small sample than a generalisable a priori category. My ‘five 
metal-legged, soft seated, curved, green hessian-like covered’ fits the chair I’m sitting 
on like a glove, and a lot better than the Concise OED definition ‘separate seat for one, 
of various forms.’ But so what ? It is a sine qua non of any postulated category that it be 
projectable. That one can sensibly predicate a category as covering some sets of 
(concrete or abstract) entities in an abstract and generalised sense is how classification 
serves human purposes. Thus, ‘a £2 coin, plus two 50p coins, plus one 20p, three 10ps, 
and two 2p pieces’ is a very precise description on the contents of my pocket. But that is 
not a projectable classification. Whilst ‘loose change’ is. DeSarbo make no 
generalisable claims for the taxa they generate other than the fact of more closely fitting 
a collection of firms in their sample than do the Miles and Snow types (as instrumented 
by them). 
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 Secondly, let’s look at the taxa that DeSarbo et al produce. The 2005 paper 
analysed extensive data from 709 manufacturing firms; 248 from Japan, 216 from USA 
and 245 from China. They looked at the correspondence between their four statistically-
derived clusters and those derived from their operationalisation of the Miles and Snow 
typology. Their 4 ‘derived strategic types’ are given as follows:-  
 
Group 1 – 230 firms:- composed 52% of  Prospectors, 32 % Analysers and 16% 
Defenders; but, significantly, Group 1 comprises almost entirely Asian firms ~ 
110 Japanese and 108 Chinese firms, with just 12 Americans. 
 
Group 2 – 185 firms:- composed entirely of Defenders (55% ) and Reactors 
(45%) and spread fairly evenly between all three countries. 
 
Group 3  - 104 firms:- composed of a mix of Prospectors ( 26%), Analysers 
(43%), Defenders ( 27%) and some Reactors (4%): but, very significantly, 
Group 3 is comprised 100% of American firms.  
 
Group 4 – 190 firms:- composed of 45% Prospectors, 54% Analysers and 1 firm 
typed as a Defender. Again this group is very evenly spread over the three 
countries. 
 
Further, as well as DeSarbo et al’s focus upon strategy types, they also examined 
strategic business unit capabilities and perceived environmental uncertainty and how all 
these factors interrelate with firm performance. First, some comments on their (clunky) 
labels and the associated descriptions of firm characteristics and relative strengths and 
weaknesses are offered below (observations on performance follow):- 
 
Group 1. ‘Asian-based prospecting firms with technology strengths’. Note that, despite 
the label, this group is almost half (48%) composed of non-prospectors. But as 
‘prospectors’ the description of their capabilities is also somewhat unexpected; viz; 
‘They possess relative weaknesses in marketing, market linking and management, which 
would seem to limit their ability to respond quickly to market changes; however, they 
operate in relatively uncertain markets [see on], competitive and technological 
environments, which may mitigate the need for strength in market linking.’(op cit, p 62). 
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First, it should be noted that the ‘uncertain’ environment facing this group is shown in 
their Table 4 as the most certain, ~ this group operates in the most stable market and 
competitive environment and the second most stable technological environment 
according to Table 4 of DeSarbo et al 2005. It is assumed that a typo has crept in here 
and, on this assumption, the assignment of ‘prospector’ rather than ‘defender’ is 
squarely at odds with the Miles and Snow conceptualisation of responses to 
environmental uncertainty as shown in Table 2 of this chapter. The observation that 
these firms lack strength in marketing and are unresponsive to market changes is also 
totally contrary to the conventional interpretation of ‘prospectors’ in both Miles and 
Snow 1978 and in other writers e.g. ‘Prospectors continually search for market 
opportunities’ (McDaniel & Kolari, 1987, p 20).  
 
Group 2. ‘Defensive firms with marketing skills’. Note the somewhat contradictory 
tensions in that title and the contrast between DeSarbo et al and Miles and Snow and the 
majority of other writers in applying the terms ‘defender’ and ‘prospector’ as noted 
above re marketing capabilities. DeSarbo et al write ‘These firms stay competitive by 
defending their established positions through superior marketing, market linking and 
management capabilities.’ (op cit p 62) This is equivalent to a reversal of the expected 
capabilities of defenders and prospectors as given in the Miles and Snow account. 
DeSarbo et al find this group operates in the most uncertain environment; again a 
contrast to conventional expectations based upon the Miles and Snow’s treatment. Thus, 
the use of ‘prospector’ and ‘defender’ in two of DeSarbo et al’s four taxa is arguably a 
reversal of how Miles and Snow intended these terms to convey meanings. 
 
Group 3 ‘US-based firms with market linking and management strengths’. A group that 
lacks a Miles and Snow equivalent, since all three of the functional types are well 
represented in this group. It is, however, entirely composed of American firms and 
nearly half of all US firms in the sample are allocated to this group. In contrast to the 
strengths associated with the group’s descriptive label, these firms are held to be 
‘among the weakest in marketing, technology and IT. These weaknesses contribute to 
the uniformly low performance of this group on all performance measures’ (op cit p 62). 
Perhaps a simpler description would be ‘poor performing US companies’. (Although the 
date of the data gathering is not declared, the first draft of this paper was received by 
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SMJ in July 2002, suggesting that much of the field data refers to a period in which the 
USA economy was suffering in the aftermath of the bursting of the ‘tech bubble’.) 
 
Group 4 ‘Balanced prospecting firms’.  The ‘balance’ refers to the fact that these firms 
are relatively strong in all capabilities; but they also comprise a mix of national origins 
and are split more or less evenly between prospectors and analysers. 
 
 As regards performance;- the DeSarbo sample breaks down very clearly into two 
high performing groups, ~ 2 and 4 ~, and two groups that perform very poorly, ~ 1 and 
3. This confounds the Miles and Snow equifinality claim. But, more significantly, the 
fact that Group 2 is ‘among the leaders on almost all performance measures’ is strongly 
at odds with Miles and Snow in that 83 of the 87 Reactors (i.e. theoretically poor 
performers) in the total sample are allocated to this group and they constitute 45% of 
Group 2 itself. But note also that DeSarbo et al’s notion of performance is comprised of 
11 measures, 9 of which are subjective ratings by the respondent relative to their 
competitors in their principal markets against a decile scale of 0-10; e.g. ‘if you believe 
your sales growth is greater than that of approximately 45% of all competitors in your 
principal served market segment, rate yourself a 5 for the sales growth’. These 9 have 
been averaged in the exhibit below, together with the maximum and minimum average 
scores against the 9 criteria. As can be seen, the four groups are quite clearly in two 
reasonably tight patterns of subjective ratings. (These results may be saying as much 
about the psychology ~ glass half-full / empty ~ of the respondents, as providing a 
reliable guide to firm performance.) The other two performance measures depend upon 
quantitative data provided by the firms / SBUs. The first is gross margin (i.e. total 
revenue – total variable costs) / total revenue. This measure does not meaningfully 
transfer across contexts in that it reflects capital intensity as much as, or rather than, 
performance differences. It should not have been used as indicative of performance 
across a diverse range of industries and countries. The other objective measure is 
average ROI over past three years, and just look at these results:- 
 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Overall 
 
Self-ratings   1.84    6.14    1.98    5.51      4.13       
(Range) (1.19-2.27) (5.38-6.90) (1.69-2.63) (5.55-7.91) (3.68-4.55) 
 
3 yr ROI -1.66% 19.52% 0.06%  16.80% 9.07% 
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 Now one possible contributory source of these incredible differences is variation 
in industry performance. But this is an unlikely candidate, since Table 7 of DeSarbo et 
al shows the derived groups to be pretty evenly spread across all industries. We are left 
with the conclusion that if this is a reliably measured finding, and if DeSarbo et al’s 
groups are matters of managerial choice of strategy and resource emphasis, then the 
secrets of commercial success in strategising are revealed for all to see and emulate. 
This would count as one of the most significant empirical research papers of all time in 
the field of strategy, and rapid promulgation and exploitation by consultants and 
practitioners would / should have followed. It did not. It may be that, despite the 
reported strength of these findings and the prestigious publication in which they were 
promulgated, there was a lack of plausibility in this empirical mathematisation of 
strategy and the lack of any instrumentality in these methods. That, ultimately, a 
posteriori taxonomic methods alone were no substitute for deep understanding and 
immersive longitudinal studies leading to grounded typologies a la Miles and Snow. 
 
 The important things to register in this lengthy description are as follows:- 
 
1 That it is possible to devise a better a posteriori ‘fit’ to a particular set of 
phenomena, than the a priori projection of some intensional typing. However, since the 
resulting categories are not projectable or generalisable to any extent, the accuracy 
gained is at the cost of utility. 
 
2 The utility of any typology as suggesting projectables of inferential value, 
particularly in relation to identification and prediction, is of prime interest to both 
academic and practitioner audiences. There is little to recommend the DeSarbo types as 
regards strategic choice; one cannot select nationality as is seemingly woven into the 
DeSarbo classifications.  Nationality is, of course, a property and one that may carry a 
host of associated attributes and, probably, performance implications, but it is not 
normally a strategic variable. 
 
3 The Miles and Snow typology conceptualised the strategic responses of firms in 
broadly similar settings (academic textbook publication, voluntary hospitals, etc) as 
reflecting different perceptions of broadly the same environment i.e. as subjective 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
187 
interpretations. The DeSarbo approach has slipped into a description of environments as 
objective settings (‘these firms operate in a…’) in which strategies are played out. The 
perceptual and sensemaking construal of Miles and Snow’s types have been replaced by 
an unwarranted confidence in ‘objective’ measures of some environmental ‘reality’. 
 
4  Nationality was not an issue within the Miles and Snow research and 
performance was a background consideration. At face value, DeSarbo et al had reported 
upon two very significant findings from a major study of over 700 firms in three nations, 
either of which might have prompted excitement among strategy researchers:- 
 
 * That nationality was very significant as regards strategy, competence and 
 performance. 
 
 * Very marked differences were detected in the performance of their four 
 groups. 
 
 Whilst, ‘forms of capitalism’ and routes to highly profitable results were not the 
prime purpose of this work, the fact that these results were not highlighted in their 
presentation suggests a certain myopia in the research team and, possibly, the 
agnosticism or inertia of the referees involved in bringing the paper to publication. To 
make progress in any science requires that creative and observant scientists spot the 
significant from the trivial in their results and focus thereon, even if it means a diversion 
from the original course. The mathematisation of conceptual social phenomena may ape 
the natural sciences, but the ability to question and probe results and causation is a mark 
of true progressive science. If these results are meaningful, it is a shame that, despite 
their accidental discovery, that their significance was unexplored in any depth. 
 
5  DeSarbo et al would be entitled to respond that their intention was not to 
promote a specific set of groups, but to promulgate a particular taxonomic 
methodology:- ‘The research objective of this manuscript is to introduce a new 
quantitative methodology to derive strategic typologies empirically… Our goal is not to 
uncover generic strategic types that could be necessarily generalised across all time 
periods, industries, data samples, etc., as we believe this would be impossible to do. 
Rather, we propose a quantitative methodology to be utilized across any scenario in 
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order to derive strategic types for a given empirical application (e.g. for a given time 
period, industry).’ (op cit p 48). So, it was all about methodology. If so, it appears, as 
argued above, that the methodology stands between the researcher and discovery. But 
there is a second argument here: one would be equally entitled to claim that this critique 
demonstrates the futility of such an exercise ~ if a classification scheme is not 
projectable in any generalised and abstract sense of intension, it is immaterial that the 
extension is better defined. DeSarbo et al are simply mistaken that their methodology 
will produce more meaningful groups than any other sorting device. They have, 
however, produced an (unnecessarily) elaborate mechanism for producing a bespoke 
sorting device, even if the ‘bespokeness’ appears to be driven more by a statistical 
model rather than a human purpose. But a sorting device has many uses, amongst which 
would be as a possible precursor to a more detailed within-group investigation of causes, 
both of similarity and of performance. 
 
 In discussions of classification and kinds (natural or social) it is common to 
encounter a fairly dismissive treatment of ‘artificial kinds’ ~ simple, arbitrary groupings 
on attributes such as ‘green things’. That is to say, categories with relatively easily 
discerned extensions, but devoid of common intensions (or ‘essences’ in much of the 
literature). The taxonomic approach adopted by DeSarbo et al is by way of producing a 
more characterised artificial kind, one that embraces many (superficial) attributes in 
creating the groupings or taxa. Possibly, just possibly, a posteriori taxonomic methods, 
or organisational systematics, such as proposed by McKelvey, or as practiced by 
DeSarbo and colleagues, may provide organisational researchers clues to the presence 
of underlying mechanisms or causal powers which in turn give rise to the evident 
homologies encountered in management studies. A sort of divining rod for types. 
Possibly, just possibly, these types may yield projectable a priori categories of value to 
researchers. But mathematical manipulation alone, without concomitant observational 
and theoretical foundations is a cul de sac as regards organisational and management 
science. This work to date is a long way from producing the projectable homeostatic 
property clusters described by Boyd (1991, 1999b, 2010) and extendable to social kinds 
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11 CONCLUSION  ON  THE  MILES  AND  SNOW  TYPOLOGY 
 
 It is possible to view the epistemic development of the Miles and Snow 1978 
typology in two ways. Under the first, it developed from a simple two dimensional  
typology of 1974 / 6, to become a far richer depiction of the ‘ideal’ type against what 
are in the main a realistic and recognisable set of organisational features. In this it has 
become ‘entrenched’ within the strategy field and gained potential as an operational 
classification scheme for other researchers. However, this research has not been fully 
realised in the manner in which the original proponents had shaped and promulgated the 
typology and so, on the other hand, it is a less than ideal, overdetermined, scheme for a 
third party to absorb and apply in classifying, or characterising, an observable 
organisation’s strategy. This is for three principal reasons; first, there is the ambiguity of 
making the assessment of where the organisation stands in relation to any of these 
dimensions - the problem of measurement and scaling. Second, is the (un)likelihood of 
conformity to type; since it would be extraordinarily unusual for an organisation to 
conform to the ‘ideal’ on all of the dimensional measures - the problem of identification. 
Lastly, the boundary conditions ~ the extension ~ for appropriate populations of 
organisations to be submitted to typing are imprecisely set. 
 
 Notwithstanding these observations, the Miles and Snow typology of 
organisational strategies has proved robust, versatile and enduring and has been used in 
a significant number of academic research projects requiring some strategy construct as 
a dimension. Somewhat perversely, it appears that the looser the characterisation and 
dimensioning the greater the utility of the typology. The reification of the typology into 
a synthetic (operational) research instrument and the achievements and problems 
associated with its use for research purposes have only been touched upon in this 
investigation. However, it should be noted, that this would repay further investigation 
since the ‘uses and abuses’ encountered in the literature invite more detailed studies and 
suggest a fundamental re-examination of methodologies in the social science field of 
strategy.  It should also be noted that, albeit the typology’s use in European research 
was never greatly significant and may be waning, there is indication in contemporary 
literature and citations that it is still very much a strategy classification system deployed 
in North American business research. 
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 One motivation behind this examination of the origination, development, 
presentation and adoption (in research) of the Miles and Snow typology was to suggest 
a better way of presenting and promulgating any proposed conceptual system of 
strategy classification. One that recognises the importance of exploring and making 
explicit the conceptualisations or theories or empirical evidence upon which any such 
typology is based and is clear about the data, backing, warrants, qualifiers and 
exemptions (Toulmin, 1958) associated with the claimed application. This treatment of 
the typology was intended to also provide an illustration of a strategy classification 
scheme presentation. Miles and Snow’s 1978 contribution has proven itself to be 
enduring because, presumably, it has appealed to an intuitive characterisation of what is 
‘out there’. In the associated literature research, however, the way in which the original 
typology was presented and the subsequent treatment of the concepts and the causal 
mechanism outlined over 30 years ago, prompts a further topic. This is a questioning of 
whether the desire for empiricism, the rush to derive quantitative scales and subject 
them to multivariate or cluster analysis, has by-passed the normal or parallel process of 
knowledge development which is equally important. If these types really are out there, 
why so ? The mode of follow-up research has, in this case, seemingly been dominated 
by refinement and reification of the types, rather than investigation of their causality.   
 
 The engine for creating recognisable types, as suggested by Miles and Snow, is 
their adaptive cycle. Yet this is far less researched in the strategic management literature. 
(See, for example, Charles Snow’s quote at the Chapter heading). Yet this subtle and 
intriguing, not to say magical or mythical, putative causal mechanism has been 
neglected in the rush to build measurement scales for conversion of a conceptual 
typology into a classification instrument deployed in empirical studies. Research 
appears to have focused on turning concepts into constructs, whilst ignoring empirical 
work to investigate within-organisation mechanisms and structures. If social 
organisations exhibit marked similarities there may / must be some isomorphic forces in 
play (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) or, as argued in this thesis, some motivation behind 
the proper kinds we discern and denote in our linguistic practices. As treated within the 
literature reviewed here, however, this is like Marx’s class system, without its dialectic. 
Or, it is as if the result of Darwin’s work was refinement of the means of measurement 
of the beaks of birds to be found in the Galapagos Islands and elsewhere, whilst his 
concept of evolution fell into desuetude.  
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 A science that critically scrutinises and selects its kinds for those where 
motivation can be traced makes better progress. It is possible to discount the Miles and 
Snow typology as an epistemic phenomenon ~ a convenient nomenclature. Yet, for all 
their distant roots in 1970s California, the archetypes of Defender, Analyser, Prospector 
and Reactor are often recognisable to students, researchers and practitioners today. 
Would that they were equally familiar with the mechanisms of the adaptive cycle that 
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Chapter  FIVE   
 
PORTER’S  GENERIC STRATEGIES. 
 
 ‘I see my basic discipline as economics and I see myself as an economist. There 
are certain economic fundamentals that influence everything else and my principle 
initial contribution was taking some knowledge of industrial economics and for the first 
time bringing that perspective into the business strategy field.’ Michael Porter, quoted 
in Stonehouse & Snowdon, 2007 p 262.  
 
 
I INTRODUCTION  –  ON  GENERICS 
 
 The object of this case study is Michael Porter’s ‘generic strategies’; an attempt 
to provide an intersubjectively acknowledged business strategy classification scheme. 
Whilst the elusive nature of ‘strategy’ has been elucidated earlier in this work, there is 
in this Introduction an examination of the polyvalent nature of the term ‘generic’. It 
derives (indirectly) from the Greek ‘genos’ and the same word is often translated into 
English as the word ‘kind’. The two words maintain similar meanings, as well as the 
same primordial root. Porter does not explicitly define, explain or embellish his use of 
‘generic’ over plausible alternatives such as type / typology, yet it is clear that he 
regards that adjective as the mot juste. It was selected for salient reason. He uses it in 
the sense of providing a highly generalised high level category. For example, he refers 
to ‘generic concepts for [market] entry’ (Porter, 1980, p 349) and also applies ‘generic’ 
to the description of the variety of operational or functional strategies that could be 
applied to the nine activities individuated in his value chain schemata: - ‘The labels may 
differ based on industry convention, but every firm performs these basic categories of 
activities in some way or another.’ (Porter, 1986, p 13).  But where, elsewhere, he uses 
the phrase ‘generic products’, in the particular context of non-branded cigarettes, he 
does provide an interpretation (Porter, 1985, p 7). One might, therefore, construe his use 
of generic strategy or generic product as identifying more than typicality; it indicates in 
addition some core, inner, or ‘essential’ property (like tobacco); distinct from the 
accidental properties of a particular set of strategic intentions or branded cigarettes or 
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proprietary pharmaceuticals. A generic to Porter is one that embraces all in its very 
broad class through possession of some underlying property thereof, whilst allowing for 
superficial variation in form. He elucidates the nature of that core essential, but leaves 
the user of the categorical scheme to adapt the terms to the relevant context of 
application. 
 
 But the word ‘generic’ has come into the English language via the Latin 
‘genus/generis’, and there is a further hint at the standing of Porter’s generic strategies 
in that more proximate derivation. For just as the term ‘generic’ indicates belonging to 
or designating a genus, as opposed to a species, so the term here indicates a hierarchical 
structure ~ generic strategy is a strategy designation at a somewhat elevated level, 
where the identifying attribute commonality is broad; one that permits a significant 
amount of variation of attributes at a lower, basic level. The generic terms, or 
hyperonyms, ‘tree’, ‘furniture’ or ‘officers’, which operate at one level, can respectively 
encompass a range of quite differentiated natural kinds, or artefacts, or social 
constructions of roles and positions respectively at a lower level e.g. the linguistic 
generic ‘officers’ can refer to colonels, majors or captains or all at once. Fine for the 
initiated, with an established nomenclature, folksonomy or definitive guide (a 
systematised lexicography) to the object class of things being identified. But, otherwise, 
leaving much to be decided by the exercise of background knowledge and judgement. A 
desk is clearly accepted as an item of furniture, but what of the reading lamp, or 
computer upon its surface? Generics, like Wittgenstein’s famous case of ‘game’, can 
have ill-defined extensions. Porter covers the five chapters of Part II of his 1980 book, 
under a heading ‘Generic Industry Environments’ ~ covering fragmented, emerging, 
mature, declining and global industries. Thus, his ‘generic strategy’ is one that stands 
for all in its designation, whilst allowing for a significant variation among individual 
realisations thereof. Porter’s ‘cost leadership’ generic strategy can embrace what may 
variously be termed ‘mass producer’ in manufacturing, ‘no frills’ in airlines, or 
‘discount store’ in retailing. It is a hyperonym. So, Michael Porter’s ‘generic strategies’ 
are seen here as superordinate (Lakoff, 1987) kinds of strategy classifications whereof 
there is some intimated core meaning, yet lacking precise and specified determining 
surface features or sortals.  
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 Before leaving discussion of the meaning of ‘generic’, mention should also be 
made of the semiotician’s generic phrase or sentence, sometimes termed ‘generic mood’. 
The simple example is the generic ‘he’ where, in context, it is to be interpreted as 
standing for ‘he’ or ‘she’, or a generalised statement such as ‘swans are white’, where 
an appropriate qualifier (‘nearly all’ or ‘most’) is missing, yet normally proves 
acceptable. The more intriguing extension is the paradoxical generic sentence such as 
‘birds lay eggs’. This is conventionally accepted as being true, whilst a claim that ‘birds 
do not lay eggs’ would be challenged. Yet proper consideration acknowledges that only 
adult, fertilised, female birds lay eggs – ‘birds don’t lay eggs’ is nearer to the truth. 
There are even generic phrases where the property in question is untrue for the vast 
majority of individuals in the salient domain, yet the phrase would conventionally be 
unchallenged e.g. ‘Watch out ! Sharks attack bathers’. Generic phrases are, thus, 
phrases that tolerate exceptions and such exceptions can be quantitatively significant. 
(For a thorough exploration of the psychological and semiotic properties of generic 
mood phrases see Cheng, 2010; Cimpian et al 2010; Cohen, 2004; and Leslie, 2008.)  
  
 Thus, we commence an examination of the ontological and epistemological 
nature of Michael Porter’s generic strategies from a stance that recognises:- a) that 
strategies are abstractions that prove elusive to pin down in terms of sharp definitions 
and, consequently, are problematic to generalise and categorise; b) that Porter, in 
conceptualising strategies, almost certainly selected the term ‘generic’ to indicate that 
he intended a broad, superordinate level of generalisation; but, c) may also have had in 
mind the connotations of essential nature, but variable instantiation, and tolerance of 
exceptions, that also associate with the adjectival term. In what follows, the origins and 
nature of Porter’s generics will be explicated first largely in his own terms. It will be 
further argued below, that, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit claim to that 
effect in Porter’s own writings, that they can be construed as motivated abstract 
institutional kinds. In effect, that the ubiquity of interest in, and seeming empirical 
plausibility of, Porter’s generic strategies might be ascribed to a mild or weak form of 
essentialism. This is, further, elucidated in realist terms, drawing upon simple 
tendencies and robust heuristics encountered in the microeconomic realm of markets. 
Finally, the subsequent construal of Porter’s work within subsequent research will be 
critiqued in the light of this analysis.  
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 Michael Porter is held by many to be the most influential strategist of his 
generation (Argyres & McGahan, 2002; Barney, 2002; Huggins & Izushi, 2011; Nicoli, 
2004; Sheehan & Foss, 2007;  Stonehouse & Snowdon, 2007), having contributed many 
of the key foundational concepts in particular to what is now termed the ‘positioning 
school’ (Mintzberg et al, 1998). The full extent of his contribution is such that it is well 
beyond the scope of this case study to encompass. The focus in this section (2) is on his 
generic strategies, but also, given the interest in explication of origins and promulgation 
of strategy classification conceptualisations, the work is contextualised in the broader 
aspects of Porter’s approach. As far as possible (commensurate with length), this first 
part of the case study is presented in terms that Porter himself would (it is claimed) 
recognise and concur. The following section (3) deals with Porter’s scheme as being a 
cross-cutting kind that can be derived from basic economic reasoning. Then, following 
a re-cap, it is evaluated against the typology of classification schemes (Section 5), 
where it can be construed as a heuristic, as a nomenclature and also claimed as a 
motivated kind grounded in basic economic reasoning. The implications of this 
interpretation for academic research are then explored in a final section. 
 
 However, one must acknowledge that the frame of reference adopted here ~ the 
examination of Porter’s generic strategies as a strategy classification scheme ~ is NOT 
the way in which Porter himself presented and promulgated his generics. This was not a 
typology expressly based upon some theoretical framework and much empirical study 
(a la Miles and Snow typology). Instead, it is presented in an authoritative and 
normative mode. He introduces the generic strategies as simply the way it is, or has to 
be, if you wish to succeed. E.g. ‘In coping with the five competitive forces, there are 
three potentially successful generic strategic approaches to outperforming other firms 
in an industry’ (Porter 1980, p35). Or ‘Though a firm can have a myriad of strengths 
and weaknesses vis-à-vis its competitors, there are two basic types of competitive 
advantage a firm can possess: low cost or differentiation…. The two basic types of 
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competitive advantage combined with the scope of activities for which the firm seeks to 
achieve them lead to three generic strategies for achieving above-average performance 
in an industry…’ (Porter, 1985, p 11). There is in Porter’s style a lack of linguistic 
‘hedges’ ~ equivocation and qualification to statements ~ that contrasts with the style of 
many of his academic peers and which can, to some extent, account for his greater 
appeal to the practitioner audience. Porter’s work reached a far greater audience in the 
business community than his academic contemporaries in the field. We have to look to 
surrounding literature and interviews to trace much of  the origins and thinking that 
gave rise (and justification) to his nostrums cited above. 
 
2.2 The basic scheme. 
 
 Since the Cost Leadership, Differentiation, Cost Focus and Differentiation Focus 
generic strategies set out by Michael Porter (1980, 1985) as quadrants or ‘boxes’ are so 
well known, the finished product, as shown in Appendix 2.1, is described only briefly 
here. Doty and Glick (1994) point out that a typology is a form of theory building or 
expression. This treatment deals primarily with describing the implicit theoretical 
underpinning to Porter’s proposition of his generic strategies; the origins or the 
‘intellectual provenance’ of the strategy classification scheme he proposed. 
Understanding the theoretical underpinning to Porter’s conceptualisation and 
presentation is important to evaluating the claims and warrants that are (mainly 
implicitly) associated with putting up his scheme as a basis on which strategic managers 
might formulate their plans and predictions. These cognitive tools do not craft the 
strategy, but that crafting can be improved by better understanding the provenance of 
the tools used and the ends to which they were designed (Pidd, 1996). 
 
 Porter contextualised a firm’s competitive business strategy as being directed at 
achieving above-average profit for its industry / sector. He positioned strategic choices 
here as being located in two dimensions:- a) the basis upon which it seeks to compete, 
whether that is achieving lower costs or higher prices (differentiation) than equivalent 
contenders; and b) the scope of the marketplace contention, whether that is broad or 
narrow (focus). He argued that these choices should be wholehearted, and that failing to 
concentrate strategy upon one or other of his positions would result in the firm 
becoming ‘stuck in the middle’ and earning sub-optimal profits. There is a logic to 
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Porter’s claims that is part overt in his work and partly drawn from unstated 
presuppositions about the nature of competition drawn from economics. It is this 
underlying motivation towards homogeneity despite hetrerogeneous markets, firms and 
business environments that provides the ontological base for Porter’s generic strategies. 
This is explored next. 
 
2.3 Porter’s theoretical background and understanding. 
 
 Porter studied first as an aeronautic and mechanical engineer (Princeton 
University, 1969). He took an MBA at Harvard Business School (1971) and then 
entered Harvard University’s economics department to take his PhD in Business 
Economics, eventually returning to the Business School to take the MBA class in 
Industry and Competitor Analysis.  Whilst at the economics department Porter had 
collaborated with Richard Caves on a number of papers dealing with industry structure 
and entry barriers (Caves & Porter, 1977, 1978). Thus, Porter, seen by many in HBS as 
an economist (Argyres & McGahan, 2002), carried into that arena a logical, positivist 
and quantitative approach associated more with conventional econometrics than 
organisational and management science. In particular, he acknowledges the intellectual 
foundations of ‘Competitive Strategy - Techniques for Analyzing industries and 
competitors’ (1980) as being in that branch of economics termed industrial organisation 
(IO) and particularly the works of Edward Mason and Jo Bain (Foss, 1996). This is 
often referred to as the Structure  Conduct (strategy)  Performance model; where 
industry structure constrains the choices and behaviour of the firm and, thus dictates 
performance in terms of market shares and profitability. Porter (1981, 1983), sought to 
integrate these theoretical constructs from economics with the case study material 
familiar to his classes at Harvard Business School and to re-cast this material in a new 
way with new models and frameworks.  
 
This was not all one way traffic. For example in his 1998 Introduction to the re-
issue of his 1980 work, Porter suggested that his work had served to signal ‘a new 
direction and provide an impetus for economic thinking…[and]…identified a range of 
phenomena that economists, armed with game-theoretic techniques, have begun to 
explore mathematically for the first time.’ (ibid, p xi). In particular, Porter reoriented the 
approach of economists to IO. He offered a new, alternative viewpoint. A perspective 
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that moved away from the top down public policy issue of promotion of competition 
and removal of ‘excess’ profits, where firms were seen as homogenous entities 
comprising the ‘competitive forces’ to be promoted and encouraged by policymakers. A 
perspective that recognised instead that an industry may contain distinct sets of firms 
that competed in similar ways to one another, but differently to other sets within the 
same industry; these ‘strategic groups’ (Porter, 1979) followed different strategies 
(Hawes & Crittenden, 1984). This newer viewpoint was that of strategic management. It 
was that from the bottom up: managers in heterogeneous firms facing competition and 
striving to achieve distinctive ingredients of success, higher profits and to prevail over 
competitors. ‘In my theory, managers had important latitude to influence industry 
structure and to position the company relative to others’. (Introduction to 1998 edition 
of ‘Competitive Strategy’ p xi). So, in his own contribution to the economics literature 
Robert Caves was influenced by his protégée, as much as by economists such Edith 
Penrose, Oliver Williamson or Joan Woodward (see, for example, Caves 1980; Caves, 
1984; and Caves & Williamson, 1985).  
 
But, Porter’s own thinking about strategy as a whole had been profoundly 
influenced by the economic framing provided by his earlier industry and structure 
studies. Both his 1980 and 1985 books represented a somewhat novel style. Drier, less 
personal and more generalised (despite the numerous organisations he draws upon to 
illustrate his points) than the ‘how to’ books for practitioners. Yet lacking the usual 
qualifications, reservations and credentialising found in conventional academic 
textbooks. Porter’s presentational style avoids hedging sentences. This is how it is, or 
has to be. Nor does he present his work as a hybrid of economics with business strategy, 
yet, with only a few changes of style (and more mathematics), the content of both books 
could equally have been presented as contributions to the field of IO. This is illustrated 
by examination of his 1980 book’s chapter titles ~ ‘The structural analysis of 
industries’; ‘a framework for competitor analysis’; ‘structural analysis within 
industries’; ‘industry evolution’; and his associated descriptions of strategies in 
particular industries described over five chapters as ‘Generic Industry Environments’ in 
Part II. These can all be attributed to the conventional understanding of markets and 
microeconomics that permeated the IO literature and his own writings for academic 
journals. A heritage that Porter was very willing to acknowledge. (See Porter 1981, 
1983, 1980/1998 Introduction, plus Argyres & McGahan, 2002; Stonehouse & 
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Snowdon, 2007).  
 
However, the particular theoretical underpinning to his generic strategies is less 
overtly in this foregrounded IO work, and can be traced to more basic economic 
principles, heuristics, or stylised facts, to do with the output of the firm in a competitive 
market. This will be explicated in section 3 below. However, there are three other 
important aspects of Porter’s presentation of his generic strategies that should be 
outlined here first; those of ‘scope’, ‘stuck in the middle’ and ‘equifinality’. 
 
2.4 Scope & Focus. 
 
The horizontal axis of Porter’s box diagrams is the framing of decision-making 
by those that set strategy for a firm as regards the basis upon which it will seek strategic 
(1980) or competitive (1985) advantage ~ low cost or differentiation 
The second frame of his presentation, the vertical axis, is the consideration of ‘scope’ - 
the range of markets served. The dichotomy of the vertical axis in the 1985 text is 
expressed as ‘broad target’(‘industrywide’, 1980); - that is to say, serving all potential 
customers of the industry concerned; - or ‘narrow target’ (‘particular segment only’, 
1980) - that is to say, selecting and serving an identifiable segment of customer demand 
only. Segmentation can be by geography, or customer type, or product range. Porter 
gave the latter strategic decision the label ‘focus strategy’ and describes it throughout 
both texts as the generic strategy of focus. ‘By optimising its strategy for the target 
segments, the focuser seeks to achieve a competitive advantage in its target segments 
even though it does not possess a competitive advantage overall.’ (1985, p 15). Note 
that Porter describes focus as one of the three generic strategies. This in 
contradistinction to those subsequent researchers who interpret the ‘focus strategy’ as 
being immediately sub-divided into two, giving four generic strategies in all. The 
decision is that of scope; the strategy is that of focus and, the emphasis is upon the 
bringing to bear concentrated attention and resource to the targeted market. Albeit 
recognising that this third strategy came with a choice of focus upon reducing costs or 
focus upon increasing customer willingness to pay a price premium.  
 
 The underlying theories regarding the causal processes involved ~ to be 
explored further in section 3 below ~ are respectively; a) scale economies of various 
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sorts; b) recognition of the propensity of more affluent customers to pay a price 
premium for an augmented product or service; and c) the enhanced effectiveness of 
resource and competencies when brought to bear on a particular customer’s needs. A 
contributory rationale for introducing this second dimension of scope may also lie in the 
empirical results of studies of the relationship between market share and profitability. 
This will be explored further in the next section. 
 
2.5 ‘Stuck in the Middle’ 
 
According to Porter a firm that compromises its choices between the three 
generic strategies and fails to achieve any of them is ‘stuck in the middle’. He 
comments; ‘The firm stuck in the middle is almost guaranteed low profitability. It either 
loses the high-volume customers who demand low prices or must bid away its profits to 
get this business away from low-cost firms. Yet it also loses high margin businesses – 
the cream – to the firms who are focused on high-margin targets or have achieved 
differentiation overall.’ (1980, p 41-2). He argues that this suggests a U-shaped 
relationship between profitability and market share, where the largest and smaller 
(focused or differentiated) firms achieve higher return on investment than their 
middling-sized competitors. The treatment being extended further in the 1985 book, 
with discussion of specific examples of firms both failing to avoid being stuck in the 
middle and of large and small firms achieving success where their competitors are stuck 
in the middle. 
 
At the time these books were being written, the results of the on-going PIMS 
(Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies) programme and other empirical studies that 
were coming into the public domain, seemed to show that companies with both high and 
low shares of the total market could out-perform middle ranking firms. This practical 
finding, confirmed, at one end, the predictions of economic theory concerning imperfect 
or monopolistic competition, but, at the other, required further explanation. Porter’s 
generic focus strategy, plus the stuck in the middle phenomena provided a model and 
accompanying explanation that recognises that smaller firms can take a relatively large 
share of their served segment or niche, and combines this with his view that success 
required clarity and wholehearted emphasis upon the selected basis of competition 
position (low cost or differentiation).  
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Porter’s treatment of the ‘stuck in the middle’ position has attracted much debate 
between Porter and his followers who argue that firms should avoid mixed or hybrid 
strategies, and those who believe that a ‘best-cost provider’ (embracing both low cost 
and differentiation) is a viable (even optimal) strategy. (Cronshaw et al, 1994; Dess & 
Davis, 1984; Hill, 1988; Miller, 1992; Murray, 1988). The influential American strategy 
textbook ‘Strategic Management; Concepts and Cases’ (Thompson & Strickland, 10th 
edition, 1998) for example, describes ‘The five generic competitive strategies’. They 
describe a fifth generic strategy of ‘Being a Best-Cost Provider’ yet claiming that ‘the 
classification scheme is an adaptation of one presented in [Porter, 1980]’ (op cit p 135 
and 152-4). The strategy community divides over the issue of whether such ‘best-cost 
provider’ strategy is viable, and one can find subsequent quotations from Porter’s work 
that indicate some equivocation regarding the degree to which the middling position is 
untenable. However, by the time of his 1998 Introduction to the re-issue of the 1980 
book, Porter had not recanted from his earlier position:- ‘Successful strategies require 
choice or they can be easily imitated. Becoming “stuck in the middle” – the phrase I 
introduced – is a recipe for disaster.’ (1998, Introduction, p xiv). There is here (as 
elsewhere in exegesis of Porter’s ouvre) a topic for further discussion, but that would be 




The performance implications of Porter’s generics were bound to exercise those 
concerned with formulating and assessing business strategies. It must be recognised that, 
(apart from his interdiction of hybrid, middling, strategies), Porter made no claims that 
any of his three generic strategies was inherently superior in performance terms. Where 
performance relates to returns on investment or margins, rather than absolute profit. 
This notion of parity of outcomes, or ‘equifinality’, was a feature of this and other 
contemporary strategy classification schemes (e.g. Miles & Snow 1978). It also 
prompted debate in that the contingency school of strategists held that good fit between 
strategy and structure with the industry environment led to superior performance. There 
is a plethora of academic literature on both the middle position and equifinality 
associated with Porter’s generics that has, in effect, largely substituted for discussion on 
the ontological basis of the claimed fundamental common strategic behaviour across 
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heterogeneous firms and industries. The question of whether he was offering a 
‘motivated kind’ of some sort is examined next. 
  
3 A CROSS-CUTTING  KIND GROUNDED IN ECONOMICS. 
 
3.1 Porter’s economic grounding. 
 
Porter’s writings are deeply influenced by his grounding in microeconomics, 
particularly his contributions to the IO branch thereof. Thus, for example, concepts 
underlying his influential ‘five forces driving industry competition’ are those derived 
from structural analysis of industries, replete with concepts familiar to industrial 
economists such as entry and exit barriers, switching costs, economies of scale, product 
substitution, the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, forward and backward 
integration, and the like. (The concepts of switching costs and exit barriers were 
themselves developed substantially by Porter with Richard Caves in the 1970s - Argyres 
& McGahan, 2002). Moreover, he relates his generic strategies to stages of industry 
evolution and to strategic groups within industries. It is, perhaps, this orientation to 
forces external to the firm that accounts for the attribution to Porter of a school of 
thought that became widely known under the label of ‘the positioning school’ 
(Mintzberg et al, 1998). This is not to suggest that Porter was silent as to the importance 
of endogenous capabilities and strategies of management, leadership, resources and 
structure. Indeed, Chapter 2 of the 1985 book ‘The Value Chain and Competitive 
Advantage’ was a major contribution to formalising analysis of the internal activities of 
the firm, including deeper exploration of ‘scope’ decisions and organisational structure. 
 
When Porter was interviewed in 2002 regarding the motivation behind his 1980 
book (Argyres & McGahan, 2002), he acknowledges that most of the content came out 
of his earlier IO work. But he also indicated that his generic strategies were less 
foreshadowed in prior theorising:- 
 
‘At the eleventh hour, I tried to get at the question of how to think about 
positioning in a way that was fundamental and connected to competitive 
advantage…. The chapter on generic strategies was the last chapter to be 
written Again, it involved uncomfortable territory. Business School colleagues 
were saying, “Too abstract” and “We can’t generalise”, while the economists 
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were saying “Where are the statistical tests ? What is the model ?” It was a very 
uncomfortable leap.’ (Argyres & McGahan, 2002, p 44). 
 
Porter’s own aspirations for this presentation was not that of the case study 
approach as favoured by the Business School, nor the modelling and large scale 
statistical approach typical of economic analysis. ‘My main body of work is what I call 
frameworks. A framework tries to capture the full richness of a phenomenon with the 
most limited number of dimensions.’ (Argyres & McGahan, 2002 p 46). But, if the 
grounding of other aspects of the 1980 and 1985 books was to be traced to Porter’s 
work on IO economics, that for his generics is not overt in these texts, albeit it comes 
through in the 1988 teaching video discussed in Section 3.3. below. It can, however, be 
set out here as being compatible with and complementary to an economic understanding 
of how producers cope with competitive market forces. That is to say that there are 
grounds for arguing that there are underlying economic tendencies at play in 
competitive markets that would influence the contending firms’ strategy-making such 
that they tend to conform to the generic strategies (and avoid the middle position). 
 
3.2 Some theoretical grounding for the generic strategies. 
 
 The underpinning theory in which Porter’s generic strategies are rooted is that of 
a firm facing competition in a market economy. Remember that Porter is writing about 
‘competitive strategy’ and ‘competitive advantage’~ that is to say his firms are always 
considering their strategic options subject to the forces of competition in their industry. 
These forces will be outlined here in terms of what may be considered simple A-level 
economic theory, or what Bruce Caldwell terms ‘basic economic reasoning’, as opposed 
to ‘formal microeconomic theory’, (see Caldwell, 2002 and the Caldwell / Lawson 
exchange in Fullbrook, 2009). That is to say a set of stylised facts of fairly robust 
heuristic value in understanding economic aspects of social and institutional life. The 
argument being that, although not explicated in his presentation, something like these 
presuppositions of the ‘facts of economic life’ underpinned Porter’s thought processes 
when ‘at the eleventh hour’ he formulated his generic strategies. There are four main 
general elements of basic economic reasoning to consider here. 
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First, a firm faces market prices for its output determined in the main by the 
prices of competitive offerings. This is evidently true for fungible products, but it is also 
roughly true for a whole range of industrial and consumer goods and services; from 
hammers, to hamburgers, to houses, to haircuts. Anywhere that the notion of the ‘going 
rate’ is a recognisable and effective constraint upon the firm’s freedom to price at will, 
is the product of conceptual forces that we seek to describe in economics by such 
abstract terms and notions as ‘price taking’, ‘like–for-like substitution’, ‘price elasticity 
of demand’, etc. This is not to argue that a single exact price level is specifiable; simply 
that suppliers face a world that works in such a way that if they overprice their goods or 
services, they will sell very little and total revenues will fall. If, on the other hand, they 
underprice they will forgo potential profit. Whichever way one construes the origins of 
the subset of considerations at work, the fact remains that the prevailing level of prices 
is a highly germane factor or constraint in deciding upon a firm’s pricing strategy. 
 
Secondly, comes the recognition that the demand for a product or service 
represents an aggregation of the purchasing decisions of many customers and these 
customers are different in their affluence, tastes, functional and psychological needs, etc. 
This is reinforced by the everyday evidence that some customers are prepared to pay a 
price premium for goods or services that, beyond functional performance, convey 
features of convenience, quality, prestige, uniqueness, etc. Thus competition for 
customers in many markets is by no means based solely on price. Firms able to secure a 
price premium for their products / services that exceed the costs of adding these 
augmented features will earn above average profits. 
 
Third, consider the rather prosaic fact that we tend to regard the goal of business 
enterprise as being to maximise long-term profits, and that profits are defined as total 
revenues minus total costs and that total costs comprise fixed and variable elements of 
various types. If a company seeks to maximise its profit margins (sustainable 
competitive advantage), it can logically only achieve this either i) by having lower costs 
than its competitors, or ii) by achieving a price premium over its competitors that 
exceeds the costs incurred in achieving that premium (by investment in branding, 
product features, service quality, etc). The former Porter labels the ‘cost leadership’, the 
latter he labelled ‘differentiation’ (perhaps, because the more obvious label of ‘price 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
205 
leadership’ had already been utilised in IO to mean something different – Pearson 1999 
p 142). 
 
Lastly, it is a matter of principle and observation from experience that any firm 
must decide, not only how to compete, but also where to compete. This, the notion of 
strategy as selecting the firm’s ‘mission’ (Ansoff, 1968), or the solution to the 
‘entrepreneurial problem’ (Miles & Snow, 1978), involves choices as to which 
segments of the market to address. A decision dimension that Porter labels ‘scope’. The 
default position is that a firm will compete across the board; that it will define its scope 
as the same set of products and services, geography, demographics, etc as provided by 
the industry of which it is a constitutive supplier. Where, however, the firm seeks to 
redress certain weaknesses (generally of scale) by concentration of its resources and 
capabilities on serving a particular niche or sub-set of the full market, then it may, by 
virtue of that concentration, achieve competitive advantage of ‘focus’ compared to its 
more generalist competitors. 
 
Combine the four and we end with a fairly robust argument, couched as an 
economic explanation, of Porter’s generics that provides a plausible explanation of why 
such characteristic strategic behaviour may be found in different industries, emerging 
from the heterogeneity of firms and the multiplicity of their choices. This is to assert 
that had Porter associated an overt claim to this underlying motivation to the categories 
resulting from his conceptualisation as set out in 1980 and 1985, he would have been 
able to provide a plausible case. The generic kinds, on this account, are not simply 
matters of convenience in grouping phenomena, as in a nomenclature, but are plausibly 
based upon and consistent with basic economic reasoning. Reasoning that is itself 
cogently formulated in the light of empirical regularities of observed firm behaviour in a 
(broadly) competitive market ~ see 3.5 below. And, significantly, this is how Porter 
represented the generic strategies in his pedagogy: as is revealed next. 
 
3.3 A diagrammatic representation. 
 
The above stylised argument can be represented in a simple schematic diagram, 
Figure 1.This is drawn from the diagram that Porter uses in his own 1988 teaching 
video (Porter & Ong, 1988) and is similar to that given in the TV broadcast in the UK 
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where Porter explicated his concept and that figured in a discussion between himself 
and David Sainsbury regarding the ‘stuck in the middle’ position (Cronshaw et al, 
1994). It is also similar to that given in Gordon Pearson’s book ‘Strategy in action’  
(1999, p141) and the 2011 edition of Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, Exploring 
(Corporate) Strategy (This, however, owes something to my own contribution as a 
member of the Advisory Board to that publication.)  
 
FIGURE 5.1. A SCHEMATIC  REPRESENTATION OF THE  GENERIC  BASIS  

























Drawn from Porter & Ong, 1988 (Teaching video). 
 
 
This diagram examines the profitability of three competitors in an industry on 
the basis that profits = revenues minus costs for each. In the case of the ‘average firm’ 
(A), it incurs average cost per unit, obtains average revenues and earns average profits 
per unit. A ‘low cost competitor’ (B), ‘needs a good product’ and ‘prices at or near 
industry average’ but, by concentrating its strategy on cost reduction, incurs lower costs 
per unit whilst reaping the same revenues per unit and, hence, earns a higher level of 
profit. On the other hand, the competitor with a strategy that has invested in imbuing its 
Prevailing 
market  price 
Typical cost 
levels 
A B C 
Costs 
Profits 
A = Average firm 
B = Lower costs 
C = Higher prices 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
207 
products and services with superior ability to meet particular customer needs and values 
can command higher prices than average. This is what Porter terms the ‘differentiation 
strategy’ (C). It is likely to involve some additional cost to achieve this market 
positioning, but Porter stresses both that the additional price premium it can command 
more than compensates for the additional cost, and that where the buyer is unprepared 
to pay extra the differentiator must cut costs to the bone.  
 
Note the highly abstract or stylised representation of what is empirically an 
exceedingly fuzzy phenomenon of ‘prevailing market price’ or ‘typical cost level’. This 
is quite common in conceptualisations within conventional mainstream microeconomics. 
This representation does not show the dimension of ‘scope’ a possible third dimension 
of depth. The low cost competitor can address the entire market as a ‘cost leader’, or 
segment(s) thereof as a ‘cost focuser’. Similarly, the high price competitor can address 
the whole market as a ‘differentiator’, or part(s) thereof as a ‘focused differentiator’. 
 
3.4 Porter’s generics as a cross-cutting kind. 
 
Economics is conventionally sub-divided into macroeconomics ~ dealing with 
economy-wide phenomena such as trade or fiscal balances, interest rates, inflation, etc ~ 
and microeconomics ~ dealing with individual markets, industry structure, competition, 
etc. Porter’s generics have been situated above (Sections 3.2 and 3.3) as microeconomic 
generalisations rooted in basic economic reasoning.  
 
The fact that firms in the same national / regional economy tend to conform to a 
very broadly similar set of norms is reflected in the fact that it is possible to contemplate 
and produce what is termed the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature. But, over and beyond 
this, there are sound reasons consistent with the implicit ontology of IO argumentation 
for anticipating that firms within the same industry will resemble one another. There are 
strong isomorphic or homologating pressures to be found in:- the industry’s technology 
(capital investment, r & d expenditures, IPR requirements); its production and 
distribution requirements (plant and process engineering, value chain logistics); the 
coercive forces in the business / industry environment (customer requirements and 
expectations); or institutional setting (professional standards, regulations, legislative 
requirements); and ‘mimetic isomorphism’ (emulation of successful firms and their 
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strategies). Normative expectations are carried by personnel as they move between 
organisations within the same industry. So, similarities of structures and strategies of 
firms in the same industry is a pretty natural expectation. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Lounsbury, 2007; Lounsbury & Rao, 2004; Oliver, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio 2008; 
Spender, 1989).  
 
Furthermore, there are causal mechanisms embedded in the variety of these 
isomorphic forces that may cause the industry to sub-divide into ‘strategic groups’ ~ 
firms with similar structures and strategies to others in their group, but distinctive from 
other firms in the same industry but in different groups. For example:-  specialist steel 
or chemical producers v bulk producers; ethical v OTC pharmaceuticals; supermarkets v 
convenience stores; low cost v full service airlines; prestige v budget hotels, and so on. 
Thus, competitive strategies at the industry level will manifest in characteristic ways 
and can be described in terms of the generic labels exemplified above or form the basis 
of the much-researched ‘strategic groups’ as empirical entities or theoretical constructs 
(see e.g. Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Bogner et al 1996; DeSarbo & Grewal, 2008; 
Hawes & Crittenden, 1984; Miller & Friesen, 1986; Short et al, 2007; Thomas & 
Pollock, 1999). It is tempting to see these intra-industry divisions as supportive 
evidence of Porter’s low cost or differentiation distinction at the pan-industry level. It is 
certainly possible to divide many industries into groups of firms that emphasise price 
and functionality and those that emphasise service and quality. Indeed, Porter even 
briefly outlines a three-level picture of competition ~ industry against industry; strategic 
group v strategic group within an industry, and firms against each other within strategic 
groups, in a paper published just a year before he launched the generic strategies (Porter, 
1979). 
 
However, Porter’s generics describe strategies that originate within individual  
competitive markets, but are macro-industry in that (reasonably) competitive markets 
are (reasonably) widespread in Western economies. They are at a level of abstraction 
and generalisation above the level of the strategic group or the industry and apply at a 
pan-industry level, much as many other microeconomic-type phenomena incorporated 
into his work apply across the board. For example; threat of entry or substitutes, 
bargaining power of suppliers or customers, value chain are all concepts that operate at 
macro-industry levels. In the language of the philosophy of natural kinds, (Ali Khalidi, 
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1998), Porter’s generics are cross-cutting kinds; or in the language used here ~ abstract, 
institutional, cross-cutting motivated kinds. At an epistemological level there is little to 
challenge about cross-cutting (institutional) kinds:- they are either useful 
conceptualisations or not (Thomasson, 2003), but there is a potential contribution from 
the ontological level to that utility (Boyd, 1999; 2010). 
  
4 A BRIEF RE-CAP 
 
4.1 The fundamental question being assessed here is that of what kind of 
classification scheme is Michael Porter’s generic strategies ? So far we have established 
the following three points:- 
 
4.1.1 As an abstract institutional cross-cutting kind dealing with motivation 
and behaviour there are unlikely to be simple, procrustean, determining and 
determinable class properties that distinguish and sort categories (Chapter 1). 
Such classification schemes are likely to be thematic in nature, with fuzzy 
extensions and, probably, citing some prototypical exemplar as the only 
ostension possible. Extension is not either / or; there are degrees of centrality / 
typicality on a number of salient properties. With salience determined by the 
author / authority’s  descriptive treatment. Connotations, or inferential uses, may 
be derived from probabilities, as much as analytical usages and connections. 
These limitations are inherent in the ontology of the individuals (i.e. firms’ 
strategies) being categorised (Chapters 1-3). 
 
4.1.2 The homologies in strategic behaviour that Porter postulates are at a 
superordinate, cross-cutting, ‘generic’ level. They, thus, invite and require more 
contextualised construal of both intension and extension on the part of the 
classifier / user, and can tolerate exemptions on manifest properties. 
Nevertheless, Porter’s formulation includes a normative element in equifinality 
of three / four types and the admonition to avoid being ‘stuck in the middle’ 
(Sections 1and 2 above). 
 
4.1.3 The implicit theoretical underpinning to the classification scheme can be 
derived from basic economic reasoning regarding the strategy formulation and 
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decision-making options available to firms operating under competitive 
conditions. This is somewhat under-described, particularly in the two main texts 
associated with its original promulgation. Porter’s written style is authoritative 
rather than explanatory. The explication offered here exceeds that provided by 
Porter to some degree, yet is consistent with the more discursive presentation 
provided in his pedagogy. It is eminently plausible that it underpinned his 
thinking (Section 3 above). 
 
5 WHAT TYPE(S) OF CLASSIFICATION SCHEME WOULD PORTER’S 
GENERICS FALL UNDER ? 
 
5.1 From this position, we now examine the nature of Porter’s generic strategies as a 
business strategy classification scheme with regard to the typology offered in Chapter 3: 
First, it is evident that the scheme does not qualify as an effective sorting device, since 
the types are not easily determined by superficial features. Had Porter’s intention been 
to propose a sorting device he made a poor job of it. Sorting firms to Porter’s categories 
is a matter of deliberation and judgement, and intersubjective agreement is by no means 
guaranteed.  
 
5.2 On the other hand, it certainly works as a nomenclature. But there is little in 
Porter’s presentation, either in text or pedagogy, that indicates he was proposing a 
nomenclature. Had that been the case, one would expect:- observations to precede 
theory; far more by way of neutral description of manifest properties ~ as a guide to 
recognition and observable behavioural characteristics; accounts of empirical 
observations based upon practical experience; greater richness in the detail of his 
examples; some sort of ‘recognition key’. In fact, the scheme is presented in a 
normative, rather than descriptive manner. There is plentiful ostension to particular 
companies (in both texts and teaching video), but these are ideal instances, more as 
exemplification of principles than as the source or evidence of his relational schematic. 
He does not dwell upon borderline cases, contradictory attributes and recognition 
criteria as might be the case if he was setting out a nomenclative scheme. In Bailey’s 
terms, (1984, 1994), this is an a priori typology based upon a conceptualisation of 
options against two dimensions, rather than an a posteriori taxonomy derived from the 
rationalising of empirical observations. Yet, perversely, and not withstanding these 
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comments, Porter’s generics do rank as an effective de facto nomenclature ~ it has 
caught on. Despite their rather indeterminate extensions, those labels and associated 
terms such as ‘stuck in the middle’ have surely been assimilated, or entrenched, into the 
strategy vocabulary.  
 
5.3 So, the fact that Porter’s generics have been taken up as a nomenclature, might 
point to its appeal and effectiveness as a heuristic classification scheme adopted by, and 
spread within, the strategy community. This is discussed next, in 5.4. But it could also 
point to an a priori conceptualisation ~ that its appeal lies in the fact that it is consistent 
with and draws upon some theory. That theory being postulated as basic economic 
reasoning about firm behaviour in competitive markets. This leads to a more 
challenging question: can Porter’s scheme qualify as a claimed motivated kind ? This 
question, drawing from prior chapters, section 3 and point 4.1.3 above, is examined 
thereafter.  
 
5.4 Porter’s scheme certainly qualifies as a proffered heuristic classification scheme. 
It is not only framed in terms of decision-making options as regards scope and basis of 
competition, it is also promulgated in a normative manner, urging clear-cut decisions as 
to which of the prototype strategies to follow, and warning against failure to be decisive 
in that choice. Plausibly too, one could maintain that the generic strategies rest upon the 
heuristic nature of ‘basic economic reasoning’ i.e. construe the latter as no more than a 
structured set of folk-wisdom or common sense maxims. This is also a tenable position 
as regards Porter’s presentation in the 1980 and 1985 texts, which rests more on 
assertion from a leading authority, than detailed logical argument. (Although it is more 
difficult to reconcile this construal in the light of his presentation in his pedagogy, 
which is more explicit about conceptual reasoning). One might, therefore, suggest that 
the generic strategies are most consistent with a viewpoint that accepts Porter’s work as 
presenting a potential heuristic business strategy classification scheme. It is, possibly, 
the interpretation most consistent with the ‘strategy tools’ literature that views the 
contribution of strategic management education and training to be the provision of a 
toolkit for use in company strategising or case analysis (e.g. Jarzabkowski et al, 2007). 
The generics seem to have provided a reasonably successful heuristic as witnessed by 
their longevity and ubiquity within the literature. But can it be more than this ? ~ a 
classification that reflects some natural homeostatic force(s); a motivated kind ? 
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5.5 Remember that it was suggested in Chapter 3 that there is a hierarchy in the 
different types of business strategy classification schemes. The motivated kind is placed 
at the top since it allows for the greatest utility in inferential use and is more 
nomological or ‘scientific’; the homologies are not accidental, being the product of 
some claimed underlying causal force(s). If Porter’s generics are postulated as a 
motivated social kind, then that is the most significant claim to explore and critique. 
However, before doing so, it would help to register in greater depth the significance of 
the distinction between the physical and social sciences and what this means in relation 
to our question. 
 
5.6 In the physical sciences the causal forces in operation are enduring and 
indifferent to our knowledge. Once promulgated, a motivated kind in science can be 
investigated and the source(s) of motivation identified, isolated and, if warranted, be 
given nomological status. That is the status accorded to what are termed ‘natural kinds’; 
they behave according to the laws of nature. Furthermore, the scientific exploration of a 
nomenclative categorisation scheme can result in a posteriori elevation of a scientific 
nomenclature into a motivated or natural kind as the causal forces or laws governing the 
categories become understood (Beebee & Sabbarton-Leary, 2010). 
 
5.7 The similarities recognised in a motivated social kind are created 
by something claimed as causal. A religious account, an evolutionary account, a 
historical dialectic account, and other reasoning as to causation could be the something 
put forward, and, in each case, the resulting categorisation is a putative motivated social 
kind. The account here considered is the socio-economic account: that a concert of 
forces within the particular social realm that are present and operative, irrespective of 
any formal recognition thereof, are (or were) responsible for the clustering of strategic 
behaviours such that the generic strategies provide useful categorisation. Here the case 
is somewhat different from one’s presuppositions regarding science in respect of 
enduring, universal and mind-independent causation, since we are dealing with a social 
science and a social kind. Firstly, we are not able to experiment in closed systems and, 
thus, isolating or controlling causal forces and structures is not possible. Since many 
such forces and systems are operative, the changing balances therein provides a source 
of heterogeneity in outcomes. Hence, for example, the  extrapolation of results from 
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case studies into generalisable conclusions and the use of replication studies in social 
science has proved highly problematic. Results will show variation over space and time. 
What may have been generative of the outcomes that Porter painted in the market 
economy of 1980s USA may not have been observable in the China of that time, nor be 
usefully applicable in the USA, or China, in 2012. Competitive forces can wax as 
markets are opened up to foreign competition, or wane as a result of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
5.8 Secondly, social kinds can exhibit ‘looping effects’ and these are certainly in 
play as regards choices of strategy. Firms in the USA in 1980’s may have exhibited the 
clustering of behaviour patterns in their strategies that Porter has formalised in his 
scheme, but it may well be that, his scheme, being well-known and normatively 
propagated, subsequently became a further homologating force within the business 
community. Porter was not merely describing his types, he was recommending them. 
Since Porter supplied the concepts, the terminology and the authority that acted to 
reinforce what had been previously been indifferent to his ‘revelation’ of the types, he 
had in effect created a probable self-reinforcing institutional kind.  
 
5.9 In section 3, and in 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 above, it was suggested that Porter’s generic 
classification can be interpreted as a cross-cutting kind grounded in economics. It was 
presented as the product of an implicit grasp of the underlying forces at play in 
competitive markets in terms of basic economic reasoning. It was only later, in the 1988 
teaching video, that Porter explicated the generics in terms that are more closely related 
to such economic reasoning and associated terminology such as ‘prevailing price level’ 
or ‘average costs’. He, however, left the presupposition of firms acting in a competitive 
market largely unexplored. In these terms it is, therefore, possible to portray Porter’s 
generic strategies as constituting a claimed motivated kind, albeit that claim comes as 
much from this exploration of Porter’s work, as from Porter himself; except, perhaps 
from his less well-known pedagogic treatment. 
 
5.10 Chapter 3 set out the characteristics of a motivated kind as:- ‘some structure of 
categories where the distinguishing factors in the classification of entities in the field are 
based upon some postulated determining force(s) that are ‘external’ or superordinate to 
the interests of the classifier, be they supernatural, or powers of nature or society, or 
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some mixture thereof. The classes are ‘motivated’ by something that we believe is 
responsible and is additional to a simple current interest in producing some convenient 
groupings. This something causes the kind to be what it is, irrespective of whether we 
can specify the causal mechanism(s) in question.’ The claim here now is that Porter’s 
generics can be accurately described as a postulated motivated kind in these terms. The 
external determining forces being those of competition between firms as explicated in 
basic economic reasoning. It is, however, important to bound that claim such that it is 
not confused with similar-seeming alternative construals.  
 
5.11 The important point is that the typology in Chapter 3 is concerned with 
epistemic, rather than ontic, claims. The motivated kind, in order to qualify as such, 
must show some claimed non-trivial ontological position, regarding causation on the 
part of the proposer / user of the scheme or category. But to identify a motivated kind is 
not to commit to the veracity or warrantedness of any particular ontic position. It is 
agnostic, or permissive, about such claims. For example, in Chapter 3 a number of 
possible socio-economic frameworks for understanding the genesis of similarity in 
firms’ strategies were outlined:- the economics paradigm; the social sciences paradigm; 
the analogy to evolution; and the descriptive rhetoric of globalisation. The economics 
paradigm provides a close fit to Porter’s work. Nevertheless, the claim here is NOT:- 
 
(a) That Porter’s generics are (or are not) ‘natural kinds’ of which one may 
predicate a necessary and sufficient determinable essence. 
 
(b) That Porter originally promulgated his generics in a way that was overtly a 
claim to be a motivated kind as here described. 
 
5.12 The claim IS that: 
 
(a) It is possible to construe Porter’s generics as a motivated kind, where the 
motivation results from the causal relationships described by basic economic 
reasoning about the way competitive markets and management’s capacity will 
constrain a firm’s strategic choices and discipline outcomes.  
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(b) That such an account is consistent with Porter’s own intellectual provenance 
in economics and the manner in which he explicated the generic strategies in his 
pedagogy. That is to say that it is a plausible interpretation in the light of what 
the far more generalised account of classification in the social sciences 
contributes to our understanding. 
 
6 SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THIS CONSTRUAL. 
 
6.1 To summarise the foregoing:- In chapter 1 it was established that there is a 
substantial body of thought that claims that a discipline that understands and refines its 
kinds will enjoy greater progress than one that neglects intersubjective definition and 
agreement concerning its raw material or concepts. In this chapter, it is argued that 
Porter was promulgating a classification system that is a cross-cutting abstract 
institutional kind. Its purpose was either to provide (a) a heuristic classification scheme 
grounded in basic economic reasoning about the choices available to a firm seeking to 
out-perform its rivals when facing a competitive market place, or (b) a motivated kind. 
A number of implications flow from this conceptualisation as explored below. Points 
6.2.–5. deal with the epistemic implications of either construal. The two alternatives are 
then explored in 6.6 and 6.7. However, it must first be acknowledged that this thesis is 
about the nature of business strategy classification schemes, and it is not by way of a 
detailed literature review of the enormous outpourings of research papers that followed 
Porter’s work. Observations below about the way in which academe conducted such 
research are based upon a substantial reading of the more well known papers, including 
Campbell-Hunt’s (2000) metastudy, Parnell’s (2006) summary and Huggins & Izushi’s 
book (2011), but does not claim to be exhaustive.   
 
6.2 Competition as an “independent variable.” 
 
Appropriate empirical work following up this formulation would concentrate 
upon either (i) seeking to validate the claims to some effective causal mechanisms 
creating the homology that Porter was describing; or (ii) following up the utility of the 
heuristic for strategic decision-making. Either way, the boundaries of such reasoning 
apply to competitive markets and, thus an important dimension to any empirical study 
would be the degree of competition pertaining to the case study(ies) or sample of firms. 
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In principle, if the reasoning put forward here is pertinent, one would expect greater 
conformity to Porter’s typology, i.e. greater ease of discrimination in categorisation, in 
more competitive markets. At least as pertaining to USA firms in the 1970s and 
1980s.Yet studies of Porter’s generic categories appear not to have adopted a measure 
of competition as an independent variable. 
 
This formulation prompts a further thought:- The IO literature, described in 2.3 
above, is framed around an SCP model of Structure (of industry i.e. degree of 
competition therein) -> Conduct (i.e. firm’s strategies) -> Performance (i.e. profitability 
and survival). The development described here could be represented as an alternative 
PSC model where Performance of firms determines those that are long-term survivors. 
Therefore, the industry’s current Structure reflects a selection of firms whose strategic 
Conduct has been successful. Those firms that fail to achieve successful strategies drop 
out of the population leaving behind those whose strategies follow successful patterns. 
Porter’s generics simply recognise and label this phenomena by picking out as cross-




The second issue is the development of a tool for research purposes that 
instruments Porter’s conceptualisation. Porter did not develop one, nor propose suitable 
diagnostic devices for sorting firms into his categories. Although individual academics 
have produced bespoke questionnaires (whether self-administered or researcher-
administered) for such categorisation, each seems to have developed independently and 
none has ‘caught on’ as the conventional means of sample division amongst Porter’s 
categories. There is no equivalent of the standard research tools found in other equally 
abstract fields of organisational science such as Blake and Mouton’s leadership styles or 
Belbin’s team roles, both of which concern the identification of behavioural attributes 
every bit as generic as Porter’s strategies. It is unknown whether this was for want of 
trying or lack of success in the task in devising a suitable standardised research tool. In 
fact, one of the features of a limited review of the more prominent relevant research 
papers, is the idiosyncratic interpretation and instrumentation of individual authors. 
 
6.4 Performance implications. 
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Given the normative nature of Porter’s promulgation of his generic strategies 
and the very large constituency of interest in achieving sustainable competitive 
advantage, it is entirely natural and predictable that a large measure of empirical 
research effort would concentrate upon the relationship between generic strategy and 
firm performance. Thus, many early and prominent papers examined questions of 
performance both as regards Porter’s equifinality claim for the three / four generic 
strategies and the under-performance of firms whose strategies are ‘stuck-in-the –
middle’. That this effort has been largely inconclusive, with many contradictory cross-
claims, has led to much debate and some equivocation in academic circles regarding 
Porter’s generics (Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Dess & Davis, 1984; Parnell, 2006). There is 
no aspiration here to resolve the issue. However, it is noted that performance can be 
measured in a number of ways and is generally accepted to be a product of national 
economy, industry, firm strategy, firm resources and capabilities and management 
competence in implementation, such that identifying any single variable as a 
determinant of performance is near impossible. This is to say, that the absence of 
conclusive empirical evidence supporting Porter’s categorisation is not sufficient to 
throw doubt on its veracity, any more than lack of conclusive evidence the other way is 
grounds for greater confidence therein. 
 
Nevertheless, performance implications are of paramount importance. The most 
probable source of evidence thereon would, given this conceptualisation of Porter’s 
work, be within-industry studies, over sustained periods, using multiple measures of 
performance and some standardised and instrumented measure of conformity of 
strategic variables and Porter’s idealised categories. The industry concerned being low 
concentration, high competition. Again, such research seems not to be typical of the 
studies of Porter’s generics. (See, however, section 7 below). 
 
6.5 ‘Not elsewhere specified’ category. 
 
A good classification scheme  has an extension that covers all relevant 
instantiations, i.e. it is ‘exhaustive’. That is to say that it provides a set of categories that 
is adequate to cover all entities / phenomena in the domain in question. It is advisable 
that any scheme dealing with social science phenomena allows for the unusual or rare 
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instantiation by allowing for an additional category of ‘other’ or ‘not elsewhere 
specified’ as a catch all for these non-conforming outliers. Porter lays out a 
conceptualisation or framework that makes no such allowance. This is a weakness, for 
there are presumptions surrounding his framework that can be challenged:- 
 
(a) It is built upon an assumption of profit–seeking objectives as paramount. Not 
an unwarranted presumption in the main. However, at the time Porter was 
writing American industry was facing intense competitive rivalry with Japanese 
exporters seeking US market share growth (and export earnings for a natural 
resource-starved Japan) to some extent at the expense of near-term profits. It 
was not unusual to find, in industries such as motor vehicles or consumer 
electronics, that the ‘failing’ American contenders were earning significantly 
higher margins and returns on capital employed (ROCE) than their more 
‘successful’ Japanese counterparts who were focused on growing market share, 
but earning thinner margins and lower aggregate profits. Each was operating 
under a different set of strategic objectives. 
 
(b) Another important set of strategic behaviours that fall outside Porter’s 
framework are those that seek to lessen the degree of competition facing the firm. 
Cartels, alliances, joint ventures, mergers and the like are framework-breaking 
strategies that again rose to prominence in the decades that followed Porter’s 
first book (1980). ‘Competition avoidance’ joins ‘competitive advantage’ as a 
goal of strategy. To some degree John Kay (a British economics-trained 
strategist) has explored and described such behaviour under the heading of ‘rent-
seeking’ strategies (Kay, 1995).  
 
Notwithstanding the illustration above of two potential strategic behaviours that 
lie outside Porter’s scheme; even were they to be accommodated as additional 
categories, it remains advisable to provide for some ‘NES’ category as a catch-all for 
other non-conforming instantiations. It is, of course, possible that subsequent 
examination of the contents of this NES category will suggest new categories in their 
own right. This, it seems, is an inevitable consequence of the reflexive, malleable and 
transient nature of social phenomenon.  
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Note that the point above is separate from the case of those firms that fall within 
his framework, but choose not to emphasise one of the four strategies for achieving 
sustainable competitive advantage. Such firms would be categorised as being in a 
hybrid, middling position – a position Porter describes as being ‘stuck-in-the-middle’. 
However, others have described this as a perfectly tenable position of ‘best value’ or 
similar. Their approach detaches Porter’s generics from an economics-based causal 
underpinning to either a motivated kind classification scheme or a heuristic argument 
that only a strategy clearly prioritised to one or other of his categories will succeed. By 
separating Porter’s scheme from putative causation and consequences, those suggesting 
a five position scheme are offering a nomenclature. It may borrow from Porter’s 
diagram and labels, but is not commensurable with his conceptualisation ~ such 
schemes do not ‘build upon’ or ‘draw from’ Porter, but offer a substitute. Under the 
principle of elevation (Chapter 3) such motivated schemes are ersatz. 
 
6.6 Porter’s generics as a heuristic classification scheme. 
 
If Porter’s work is seen as providing a heuristic with a normative intent then the 
prime focus in researching it would be its utility to strategic management in strategy 
analysis and formulation both as regards ease of use, or ‘purchase’, and in terms of the 
results of implementing strategies formulated thereon, or ‘purpose’. Ease of use is best 
explored in terms of familiarity and adoption ~ usually the product of enquiries from 
respondent strategists and tool penetration studies and also citation studies as found in 
the fashion and fads literature. In this regard Porter’s work undoubtedly registers well as 
a whole, albeit the fact that his promulgation of the generics was mostly contained in 
books where (a) citation data is less available and (b) a wide range of analytical tools 
are deployed and it is, thus, not possible to distinguish the reference as being to Porter’s 
generics or to any other prominent conceptualisations of his, such as the Five Forces or 
Value Chain.  A key indicator of ease of use would be intersubjective agreement in 
categorisation, or inter-rater agreement in empirical studies. Such data was not 
encountered in this restricted survey. However, the literature, even when critical, does 
not dwell upon the unreliability, inapplicability, or difficulty and expense of application 
of Porter’s generics, even though, as remarked earlier, there is no standardised and 
broadly accepted instrumentation thereof. Furthermore, the frequent use of the 
conceptualisation in case study analysis and its persistence in general strategy textbooks 
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over the decades indicates a certain utility and endurance. Thus, it is not unreasonable to 
claim that Porter’s generics appears to be a tool with purchase, at least as a way of 
thinking about strategy. 
 
However, the more taxing question for researchers is ‘purpose’ ~ is it a 
prescription that can be used to good effect ? Utility as regards the generics as a guide to 
strategic management for sustainably achieving above average performance is very 
difficult to determine by large scale industry studies, despite the extraordinary interest 
such evidence would arouse. To assess conformity to type would require some 
satisfactory instrumentation that measured the properties of the individual firm’s 
strategy against some idealised prototype of the category. Such instrumentation appears 
elusive. Performance is the dependent variable and, as remarked earlier, is also difficult 
to measure satisfactorily. Where, however, there is some established measure of 
‘industry average’ performance (say, margin on sales, ROCE) there is the possibility of 
using the same criteria in any study. Alternatively, case studies can be used to explore 
this matter, but, as with all ideographic research there are problems with generalisations 
based thereon. One additional suggestion is that of taking past cases and claims for 
successful (or unsuccessful) adoption of generic-conforming or non-conforming 
strategies (such as ‘stuck-in-the-middle’) and reviewing performance over an extended 
period. 
 
So far, the nature of the scheme’s heuristic value has not been empirically 
evaluated in terms of how and why it is useful in guiding strategy formulation and 
choice. This might involve questions of functional utility in decision-making as regards, 
for example;- provision of concepts and terminology that facilitate group discussion; the 
setting out of options for consideration; reference to Porter’s normative admonitions; etc. 
It might also raise questions of the reliability of the set of categories in relation to 
performance and prediction. Taken as an empirical matter this is about regularities and 
probabilities, but taken as a matter of theory, it also raises questions about why, where, 
when and how such may arise i.e. causality. If, however, it is claimed that we 
understand and can articulate causality, then the heuristic has shifted to being more than 
a decision-aiding tool, to one that rests upon some motivation ~ it is a claimed 
motivated kind (as well as a heuristic tool) and, given the greater utility of such for 
inferential use, the hierarchical principle set out in Chapter 3 would apply.  
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6.7 Porter’s generics as a motivated kind.  
 
Thus, if, on the other hand, we construe Porter’s generics to be a postulated 
motivated kind, the implications for research thereon are important and are different. 
First, it would be implicit that there are causal forces at work that give rise to the noted 
homologies of successful strategies. As explicated above, whilst Porter did not 
formulate and present his generic strategies in quite this manner, it is consistent with his 
background and pedagogic presentation. The putative salient homolgating forces being 
the operation of competition between private enterprises as described in Sections 3 and 
4.1.3 above. Examination of same would not differ to any great extent from that set out 
above for empirical investigation of the generics as a heuristic classification scheme as 
regards basic methodology. There is the same importance attached to empirical research 
within a single industry and/or consideration of the competitive nature of the industries 
concerned in any cross-industry research panel. There is the same need for some 
standardised research instrumentation of Porter’s categories. And the same need for at 
least one additional category of non-conforming strategies. Likewise, the use of industry 
panel data to determine ‘average performance’ and greater use of longitudinal studies as 
suggested for investigation of a heuristic scheme. However, the investigation of a 
motivated kind can be more ‘scientific’, and differences in research design or emphasis 
are also important:- 
 
(a) As it is a claim to there being general homologating forces in operation to 
cause the homogeneity being recognised in the categories, the conduct of 
replication studies confirming or disconfirming Porter’s (implicit) claim is far 
more important. The suggestion above of standardisation of research instruments 
has added cogency in the context of facilitating such replication. 
 
(b) It is the action of what is here termed ‘basic economic reasoning’ in a 
competitive market that is the postulated homolgating and performance-
determining causation. But a number of determining powers, mechanisms or 
structures are in concurrent play in any market place. Empirical outcomes will 
be the result of a myriad of interactions between the underlying structures and 
mechanisms. Accordingly, it is, now, more appropriate to investigate these as 
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mediating components of our understanding. Instead of a single measure of 
‘industry competition’ this would need to be decomposed into individual 
elements (supply conditions, demand conditions, market structure, price and 
income elasticities, and the like).  
 
(c ) Although there are higher thresholds for statistical significance associated 
with claims arising from empirical investigations in the natural sciences than are 
likely to be achievable in the social sciences, the claim that Porter’s generics are 
a cross-cutting abstract institutional motivated kind is one which, in principle, 
might be amenable to a hypothetico-deductive study method, or, more likely, to 
the type of contrastive studies favoured by Lawson ( 1997, 2003). This is not to 
suggest that the claim is likely to be upheld or discounted as a consequence of a 
single well-formulated study. But, a number and variety of such academic 
studies should serve to increase understanding and greater confidence in our 
knowledge. 
 
(d) Finally, any research design must take account of the reflexivity of open 
social systems. The causal mechanisms can themselves be manipulated by the 
agency of the strategists under scrutiny. Hence, the importance of supporting 
quantitative research with longitudinal case studies that engage both with the 
strategy formulation and implementation activities within companies. 
 
It should be recognised that this is a suggestion for further academic study of 
Porter’s generics as a business strategy classification on the grounds that the exercise, 
whatever the outcome, is worthwhile. If Porter’s generics do not serve, what will ?   
 
7 A  CASE  OF  PORTER’S  GENERICS  IN  CONTEMPORARY USE. 
 
7.1  Introduction – Nandakumar et al, 2010. 
 
 However, there is a sense in which what is (generally) taken to serve as Porter’s 
generic strategy classification scheme does not serve the advancement of strategic 
knowledge as a scientific enterprise that knows the status of its kinds. There appears to 
be no published study of Porter’s generics that construes his work as offering an 
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intersubjective means of classifying business strategies as a motivated cross-cutting 
kind in the manner explicated here. It is  clear that (a) no such study has been revealed 
in this (perforce limited) literature search and (b) that this search has included some 
metastudies and reviews that, adopting a critical approach, would reasonably be 
expected to have brought such novel interpretations to light  (Huggins & Izushi, 2011). 
Since one cannot prove a negative, a positive example of the problem is explicated 
below. 
 
 Typical of contemporary academic research deploying Porter’s generics as the 
strategy variable is Nandakumar et al, 2010 ‘Business-level strategy and performance: 
the moderating effects of environment and structure.’ in Management Decision. This 
study was selected because it is recent and concerns a fairly heterogeneous group of 
firms in a fairly homogenous common engineering manufacturing setting with relatively 
low concentration and relatively strong competition. That is to say, a setting in which 
microeconomic theory might suggest that the forces of competition would be felt in 
such a way as to reinforce the purported general homologising tendencies that underpin 
Porter’s generic strategies. (Section 6.4 above). The study also exemplifies the highly 
quantified orientation to much contemporary strategy research and its attendant 
limitations. 
 
 The study was designed to explore the ways in which the constructs of business 
strategy, as dichotomised between cost-leadership and differentiation, and external 
environment, as dichotomised between two components of dynamism and hostility,  and 
organisational structure, as dichotomised between mechanistic or organic, affected 
organisational performance as measured by two subjectively assessed criteria, objective 
fulfilment and relative competitive performance, and by two objective accounting 
measures; return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). The overall 
conceptualisation is that strategy affects performance and this affect is moderated by 
external environment and organisational structure. The study data was drawn from 
questionnaires returned by the CEOs from 124 UK manufacturing organisations in 
certain SIC (2003) codes, representing electrical and mechanical engineering.  
 
 Albeit the focus here is on the use of Porter’s generics, it should be commented 
that these study aims are highly ambitious and involve a set of constructs – environment, 
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structure and performance – which in themselves would prove as challenging to 
instrument and disentangle as the strategy construct. As remarked below, the fact that 
little sense can be made of the results over and above the relationships that a 
commonsense understanding might have predicted without the study is both 
disappointing and expected. 
 
7.2 The strategy construct. 
 
 Albeit employing the labels provided by Porter, there is a disconnect between 
Nandakumar et al’s ‘generic strategies’ and Porter’s presentation thereof. The strategy 
construct is by now entirely reified; strategies are either cost-leadership or 
differentiation i.e. a single dimension of the basis of seeking competitive advantage is 
used and there is no consideration of the scope / focus dimension. Further, there is no 
NES, partially compliant, hybrid, or other option. But more significant is the complete 
absence of discussion of this (reduced) interpretation, or even an offered description of 
the two strategies beyond their labels. It is assumed the reader is familiar with the 
construct and it requires no further exploration. This is despite the fact that the academic 
literature is replete with contradictory claims as to the justification for and utility of 
Porter’s conceptualisation. Furthermore,  the categorisation is achieved by a self-
completion questionnaire assigning on a Likert scale of 1-7 ‘the extent to which your 
company focuses on the following in comparison to your major competitors’ followed 
by a set of questions such as:- ‘Emphasis on production capacity utilisation’ or 
‘Intensity of your advertising and marketing’. There are 12 such questions (6 each for 
cost-leadership and differentiation), but no explicit rationale is provided for the 
instrumentation in this particular manner, other than the circular logic of the fact that it 
was used in another study. It may be possible to critique each and every question, but 
here the comments are confined to:- (i) the observation that ‘focus upon’ is not the same 
as achievement ~ an intended strategy v realised strategy distinction; (ii) none of the 
questions refer to scope – say, volume of output or breadth of markets served cf 
competitors; (iii) no justification is offered for why theses particular attributes are 
selected and why all 6/12 questions carry equal weight in categorisation; and (iv) the 
mean scores for cost-leadership (4.83, SD 1.0) and differentiation (4.59, SD 0.98) are 
very little different from the mid-point of a 1-7 scale (4.67). This giving rise to the 
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observation that (probably) many firms are what Porter would describe as stuck-in-the-
middle.  
 
  In the light of the presentation given here, particularly section 3.3 above, the 
categorisation of the sample firms’ strategies could equally, and less ambiguously, have 
been based upon just two key questions:- 
 
 ‘Are you trying to’ (for intended strategy) or ‘Do you (for realised strategy) 




 ‘Are you trying to’ (for intended strategy) or ‘Do you (for realised strategy) 
 ‘achieve a price premium for your products ?’   
 
 One might also mention the contrast between the absence of any explication 
regarding the meaning of the terms ‘cost-leadership’ or ‘differentiation’ (which 
comment could be extended, albeit with less force, to all the constructs here deployed), 
with that of certain statistical methods questions – 2 pages on common method variance, 
non-response bias and internal consistency. The 14 tables of results contrasts with the 
sparse explication of the phenomenon they seek to represent and the absence of 
justification for the quantification constructs employed in their manipulation. One 
cannot apply scientific method to poorly characterised phenomena. Definitional clarity 
of concepts must precede their representation in epistemology. 
 
 It should, finally, be remarked that the lack of a characterisation of what 
constitutes a cost-leadership or differentiation strategy in terms of intension and 
extension, amounts to a glossing of whatever construal the authors have of the nature of 
their strategy constructs – we are not able to answer the question of what type of 
typology they believe they are dealing with. That is to say that, some 30 years after first 
promulgation, the constructs appear to have been taken as a recognition of a real world 
dichotomy and deliberate choice. A very striking example of how such terms can be 
reified in (and by) our epistemic practices. 
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7.3 Performance constructs. 
 
 Of course, one possible interpretation of the generic strategies is that they do 
represent a real world dichotomous choice (to be taken alongside choice of scope, if we 
accept Porter’s fuller version) and the sortal is economic performance ~ only those 
firms that succeed in conforming to the categories’ imperatives survive (the PSC 
interpretation described in 6.2 above). This, makes performance the independent 
variable and strategy the dependent variable ~ a reversal of the common assumptions 
and one which posits performance as the determinant of strategy focus. It is in tune with 
a motivated kind construal and is an approach that can be theorised in a population 
ecology construct to explain the emergence of characteristic strategy types such as not 
seen in the literature to date. 
 
 That ‘moderating effect of performance and environment on strategy formation’ 
construal postulated above is emphatically not Nandakumar et al’s  approach. But it 
does lead in to the consideration of their performance measures. These are twofold. First, 
there is a pair of subjective measurement scales (Likert, 1-7) for ‘Objective fulfilment’ 
and  ‘Relative competitive performance’. The former asking ‘the extent to which you 
have been successful in achieving each of the following objectives in the last five years’ 
and giving six questions of the ilk ‘Improvement in long-term performance’ or 
‘Avoiding problem areas’. The latter asks the CEO to ‘compare the performance of your 
organisation in the last five years with that of your main competitors’ and gives nine 
items such as ‘sales growth’ and market share change’. In addition are two ‘objective’ 
measures from a commercial database ROA and ROS, available for 88 out of the 124 
participating firms. 
 
 Nandakumar et al’s reported results for performance indicate that, whilst the 
objective fulfilment results correlate strongly with strategy and the dynamism of the 
environment, no such significant correlation exists with their accounting measures. 
Further, their more detailed exploration of the mediation effects of environment and 
structure upon the strategy-performance relationship do show some significant results 
for the subjective assessments of the CEOs of their ‘objective fulfilment’ and their 
‘relative competitive performance’ (but they would say that, wouldn’t they ?), but none 
with regard to the accounting data. When, however, a three-way assessment of strategy, 
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structure and environment is carried out the results are more open to an interpretation 
that accords significance to structure + strategy yielding success in ROA and ROS terms. 
 
7.4 Their conclusions. 
 
 The overall aim of the study was, as described earlier, to examine the 
moderating effects of the external environment and organisational structure in the 
relationship between business-level strategy and organisational performance. Also, as 
remarked above, this a highly ambitious study objective. It results in a series of possible 
permutations of strategy, environment, structure and performance that become 
somewhat unmanageable and inexpressible. 
  
 The results are summarised as follows:- 
 
‘For improving a firm’s performance in comparison to its competitors both cost-
leadership and differentiation are effective in environments with a high level of 
dynamism. In low-hostility environments a cost-leadership strategy and in high-
hostility environments a differentiation strategy lead to better performance in 
comparison to competitors. A cost-leadership strategy is more favourable for 
improving financial performance in highly dynamic  environments. However, in 
environments with low levels of dynamism a  differentiation strategy is more 
helpful in improving financial performance….. The results indicated that a 
mechanistic structure was more helpful in improving the financial performance 
of organisations adopting both cost-leadership and differentiation strategies. 
This could be because of the effectiveness of a mechanistic structure in 
controlling the cost and improving coordination within organisations’. 
(Nandakumar et al, 2010, p 929). 
 
 The problems in employing the results of such a study are manifest in the 
above:- (i) can they be interpreted in the sense of being extended to other situations ? (ii) 
are the constructs useful to anyone concerned with the charting of strategy in a real 
organisation ?  (iii) do they contribute to greater understanding of generalities by other 
strategists ? and, above all, (iv) are they convincing ? It is hard to answer in the 
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8 CONCLUDING  REMARKS. 
 
 It is evident that there are problems with the employment of Porter’s generics as 
regards its construal in the research articles reviewed when preparing this chapter. The 
approaches simply cannot be characterised in relation to the considerations of kinds and 
categorisation elucidated in this thesis for the reason that such considerations appear not 
to be articulated by Porter or those who employ (or critique) his generic strategies in 
research. The fact that many studies are directed to finding whether the stuck-in-the-
middle position is viable has been mentioned earlier and it should be repeated here 
simply that such studies tend to contradict each other, but largely, in the opinion of this 
author, because of the difficulty of isolating strategy as a determinant of firm 
performance given the diversity of the constructs and influences involved and the 
diversity of firm resource endowments and market positioning. In fact, a kind construal 
of those categories that accommodate the exigencies of the competitive business 
environment reverses the direction of causality ~ those strategies that survive to be 
noticed and generalised are accommodated to the causal forces in play. Those strategies 
that fail to achieve accommodation are eliminated by the competitive characteristics of 
the economic environment. 
 
 But two other comments regarding these problems should be registered. On the 
one hand is the ‘problem of non-problematisation’ ~ the generics are simply accepted in 
the reified manner described in the above discussion of Nandakumar et al’s work. It is a 
sort of unthinking essentialist position that might be attributed to a form of 
psychological essentialism employing Porter’s authority, and the use by others of his 
generics, as a placeholder notion for the ‘naturalness’ of the categories. On the other 
hand, are the writings that challenge the validity of Porter’s construct as representing a 
meaningful segmentation of strategies into generalised categories ~ a nominalist 
challenge to find, or not find, his generics in the data from an enquiry designed to trap 
cost-focusers, cost-leaders, differentiators or focused-differentiators in their 
instrumentation. Yet this prompts the observation that it is idle to investigate whether 
any postulated institutional category conception ‘exists’ or not. From philosophy, Amie 
Thomasson shows that an institutional kind concept is established by a constitutive 
consensus and at a fundamental level is epistemically privileged. If the label has 
currency within a linguistic community it exists ~ be it ‘democracy’, ‘cost-leader’ or 
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‘ghost’. Whilst at the pragmatic level, an exposure to cognitive psychology (e.g. 
Gelman, 2003) has the interesting side-effect of demonstrating how easily a conceptual 
category can be brought into existence ~ a ‘blinxy’ is a small blue furry triangle ~ and 
deployed in our research. It appears that the important question, ducked so far by the 
strategy research community, is how useful are Porter’s generics as inference machines? 




Chapter  SIX  
 
 
MINTZBERG’S  COMPREHENSIVE  FRAMEWORK 
 
 
‘In this paper, we seek to delineate in an orderly fashion the “families” of 
strategies widely represented in organizations in general. In other words we wish to 
develop a comprehensive typology, a single logical framework, of generic strategies. 
We wish to draw on all the lists, where appropriate, but only for possible candidates 
which we wish to incorporate into one comprehensive framework.’ 




1 INTRODUCTION:  THE  MAN  AND  HIS  WORKS. 
 
 Given its comprehensive scope and his outstanding reputation as a strategist and 
academic, it might have been expected that Henry Mintzberg’s contribution of an all-
embracing system for the classification of both business and corporate strategies, 
launched in 1988, would have proved a serious rival to those offered by Michael Porter 
and Miles & Snow. That the 67 page article ‘Generic Strategies: toward a 
comprehensive framework’ (Advances in Strategic Management, 1988), instead, sank 
into near oblivion is an anomaly that this case study seeks to explore. First, the outline 
of Mintzberg’s scheme is explicated (as briefly as possible, given its ambitious scope). 
Then its intrinsic problems and truth claims are explored, largely in epistemic terms, 
before looking at the possible exogenous and contingent causes of its surprisingly near 
complete neglect. It is to the latter aspects, rather than ontological concerns, that the 
reasons why the framework was not adopted by the management and organisational 
science community is attributed i.e. it is concluded that social and contextual factors 
were paramount in explaining a fairly comprehensive failure on Mintzberg’s part. 
 
1.1 Henry Mintzberg, strategist and academic. 
 
 One of the grounds for expecting Mintzberg’s systematic and broadly based 
generic strategies to establish a strong position within the field is the fact that he was in 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
231 
1988 amongst the most well-known of his generation of organisational scientists, and 
one with a record of stimulating writings on strategy based upon first hand studies of 
top management and their decision-making processes. In fact, in 1988 he was president 
of the Strategic Management Association, as well as being twice winner of the HBR 
award for best article for the years 1975 (‘The manager’s job: folklore and fact’) and 
1987 (‘Crafting strategy’). His ground-breaking doctoral study of how senior managers 
actually went about their jobs was published as a book in 1973 ~ ‘The Nature of 
Managerial Work’, and he became Professor of Management at McGill University in 
1978 at 39 years of age.  
 
 Mintzberg is something of an iconoclast and has always been prepared to 
challenge academic orthodoxy regarding strategy with his own field observations (‘The 
rise and fall of strategic planning’, 2000) and to challenge the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of management education (‘Managers, not MBAs: a hard look at the soft 
practice of managing and management development’, 2004.) Two other very well-
known studies with James Waters, ‘Tracking Strategy in an Entrepreneurial Firm’ 
(Academy of Management Journal, 1982) which provided an inside view of strategy 
formulation within a Canadian retail chain, Steinberg Inc., 1917-1975; and their 1985 
paper ‘Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent’ (Strategic Management Journal), both 
controversially challenged the prevailing ‘design school’ view of the strategy process.  
Mintzberg became synonymous with a view of the strategy process that emphasised 
chance, intuition, opportunism and creativity, and that came to be known as the 
‘emergent school’. In other words, Mintzberg was very much at the height of his 
considerable fame or notoriety when he launched his generic strategies. If reputation 
and academic credentials are part of the determining factors in, at least, the initial 
interest in the first promulgation of a strategy classification scheme, then Mintzberg’s 
had a lot of positives going for it. 
 
1.2 The Publication. 
 
However, there was a significant countervailing negative in Mintzberg’s choice 
of where this contribution was published. The publication in question, ‘Advances in 
Strategic Management’, is an annual book series of multi-authored academic articles 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
232 
and, albeit well respected, appears to have a fairly restricted circulation compared to 
other leading strategy journals. It is not published on-line and the electronic versions of 
earlier volumes reach back only to 1996. Books are not normally included in the Social 
Sciences Citation Index, but, unusually, ASM’s status as a hybrid book series composed 
of journal-type academic articles meant that it was accepted and indexed, but not until 
1993. Thus, citations of Mintzberg’s 1988 article are not available from the SSCI. 
References to the article can be found on Google Scholar, and one can review the 
citations given there as a rough guide to the prominence of the contribution to academia. 
To provide a base comparison, the citations to the books and journal papers listed in 
paragraph 1.1. above are also given:- 
 
TABLE 6.1. CITATIONS OF SOME OF MINTZBERG’S BETTER-KNOWN  
  WORKS. 
 
The nature of managerial work (1973) (Book)    5,490 
The rise and fall of strategic planning (2000) (Book)   3,483 
Of strategies deliberate and emergent (1985) (SMJ)    2,081 
The manager’s job: folklore and fact (1975) (HBR)    1,473 
Crafting strategy (1987) (HBR)      1,291 
Managers, not MBAs (2004) (Book)        648 
Tracking strategy in an entrepreneurial firm (1982) (AMJ)     543 
Generic strategies: toward a comprehensive framework (1988) (ASM)   269 
 
Source: Google Scholar, 21 July 2011. 
 
 
1.3 The Reception. 
 
  A further notable feature, however, is that the literature search does not reveal 
the same explosion of interest and empirical work that followed the publication of 
generic strategy classification schemes by Miles and Snow or Michael Porter a decade 
or so earlier. (The same Google Scholar search gave 5,281 and 9,784/10,099 
respectively as the citations of these two authors’ books as sources {Porter having 
extensively described his generics in both 1980 and 1985}). More significantly, a quick, 
but complete, trawl of the 269 papers (title / abstract) citing the 1988 article as noted 
above revealed only a single paper that sought to replicate or validate Mintzberg’s 
scheme. This, Kotha & Vadlamani, 1995, compared a limited component of 
Mintzberg’s framework with Porter’s generics. It is discussed briefly in section 5 below. 
There are papers that have sought to apply the framework, but these tend to reflect an 
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interest specifically in relation to his treatment of the subset of strategies labelled 
‘differentiation’ and in particular to manufacturing strategies. No papers appeared to 
address and critique the whole framework as a strategy classification scheme per se. 
There is no equivalent of the Campbell-Hunt (2000) metastudy of Porter’s work, nor of 
the implementation of research instruments equivalent to the self-typing paragraph or 
multi-item questionnaires developed for the Miles and Snow typology.  
 
 All in all, therefore, it seems justified to describe Mintzberg’s entry as somewhat 
of a non-event. A scheme of classification which, albeit using familiar terminology, 
failed to be effectively promulgated to and adopted by the strategy (research) 
community. In Goodman’s terms the Mintzberg-specific proposed relational structuring 
of strategy terminology was not absorbed into the general lexicon of strategists ~ it did 
not become ‘entrenched’ as an intrinsic component of conceptualising or discussing 
strategy. The plan of this case study, therefore, is to, first, lay out a summary of the 
content of Mintzberg’s 1988 paper whilst describing some of the associated and 
inherent difficulties with this work as a strategy classification scheme. It then looks at 
whether it was the absence of practical serviceability or other more exogenous features 
that led to the near obscurity in which it languishes today. 
 
2 THE  CLASSIFICATION  FRAMEWORK. 
 
2.1 The overall scope and ambition. 
 
Albeit that both the Miles and Snow and Porter business strategy classification 
schemes were introduced in (conventional) books, the total text therein devoted 
specifically to their descriptions is no greater than the 67 page article devoted expressly 
to the comprehensive framework (less in the case of Porter’s generics).  Mintzberg 
clearly had ambitions to challenge the others by producing an all-embracing scheme that 
drew upon this earlier work, particularly that of Porter. But he also widened the scope to 
include many other contributions, especially the Boston Consulting Group’s ‘growth 
share matrix’; the Ansoff matrix; and A D Little’s list of 24 strategic options. The paper 
is laced with references to the work of other luminaries in the field of strategy and the 
framework is a synthesis of Mintzberg’s thinking and the contributions of others, 
particularly Porter. (Miles and Snow’s work is merely mentioned in passing).  
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Most importantly, Mintzberg, noting that Porter’s generics relate only to 
business strategy, set out to cover the whole of strategy, including those elements 
conventionally described as corporate strategy i.e. organisation scope, business control 
and integration, acquisition and diversification strategies. The upshot being that 
potentially any commercial firm’s strategy would be covered by his ‘comprehensive 
framework’. This is a scope ambition that has the advantage of extensive coverage, but 
at a cost of complexity and iterative distinctions between what results as some 48 
different generic strategies at base level, 16 at mid-level and 5 superordinate levels of 
‘the content of strategy’. In this Mintzberg’s scheme might be seen as Aristotelian or 
Linnaean in underlying hierarchical structure. However, this is not foregrounded in his 
work. He does not set it out in the vertical branching (‘Tree of Porphory’) structure 
conventionally associated with hierarchical classification schemes and, arguably, has 
not fully exploited the cognitive simplification that such a presentation might have 
offered his readers. This is somewhat surprising in the light of Mintzberg’s preference 
and aptitude for diagrams. The representation of his overall scheme is given on the last 
two pages of his text and as a listing, and left-right indentation, plus a bullet point 
system to indicate what in the presentation in Appendix 3.1. is given as 4 levels.  
 
However, the reader’s difficulties are somewhat mitigated by the fact that 
Mintzberg has devised two recurring elements that hold the framework together. The 
first is the use of little pictograms to illustrate his strategies by means principally of 
circles, cylinders and arrows. There are some 40 or so of these mini-diagrams scattered 
throughout the text, in addition to 11 full Figures. And, whilst they are not brought 
together in a coherent overall diagram, and are perhaps less meaningful to the reader 
than to the author, they do help distinguish some of Mintzberg’s conceptualisations of 
strategies. Secondly, Mintzberg employs the recurring example of a hypothetical canoe 
manufacturing company and its strategies in relation to differentiation and its relation to 
upstream and downstream industries and activities as a means of illustration of 
alternative (corporate) strategic moves that such a company might make. He also uses 
actual canoe companies in some exemplars. This also serves to make the somewhat dry 




On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
235 
2.2 The Framework. 
 
There is rather too much material here to enable one to detail all the 48 main 
strategies that Mintzberg incorporates into his comprehensive framework. Instead, the 
main headings and some illustrations are described. In so doing, note that the concept of 
a ‘framework’ explicit in his title and implicit in the descriptions provided by him is not 
one that Mintzberg has represented in the text. The nearest is a lateral ‘dendogram’ with 
individual categories provided in Table 3 The Framework of Generic Strategies in the 
final two pages of his text, with the branching framework reading left to right via 
indentation and bullet points. This has been represented in Appendix 3.1. which, 
drawing upon the lead provided by Mintzberg’s phrase ‘families of strategies’, employs 
the terminology of a Linnaean (biological) hierarchy of Family, Genus, Species and 
Variety to indicate four levels of hierarchy. 
 
The scheme allows for five main ‘families’ of strategy; A-E. Here Mintzberg 
differs with those who separate corporate from business strategy. He presents his own 
sub-divisions by arguing that identification of the core business and if and how it is to 
be elaborated and extended are two aspects of the same activity, and that there is a need 
for a category of strategies ‘that seeks to reconceive the organisation’s business or 
portfolio of businesses (in effect, perceiving a corporate strategy in business strategy 
terms).’ (ibid, p3). The resultant list is explicated below. 
 
2.2.1 A. Locating the Core Business. Here Mintzberg draws upon Galbraith’s 
1983 version of an industry supply chain, but introduces his own  
interpretation where the picture of a single dominant supply chain is replaced by a 
network of inputs and outputs and the industry becomes a junction in that network – a 
‘node’ in a matrix. The core business is, thus, seen as the centre of gravity in a matrix of 
overlapping industries comprising the overall chain or sequence involved in the 
satisfaction of some final demand. The ‘core’ is that production stage which is regarded 
as the firm’s core competence (using today’s terminology) or in Mintzberg’s terms ‘the 
stage at which it focuses its attention, in a sense where its collective mind lies.’ (ibid, p 
6). This lends itself to the three possible strategies of stage of operations, 
i.e.concentration upon the upstream, downstream or midstream positions in the chain; as 
1a) – 1c) in Appendix 3. Thus, Mintzberg is suggesting that a key strategy determinant 
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– maybe a ‘genus’ level - is that of positioning within the particular industry; the three 
‘species’ being upstream (e.g. extractive and raw materials industries); or midstream 
(e.g. fabrication and assembly); or downstream (e.g. wholesale or retail distribution and 
service industries). 
  
A second genus level strategy is simply labelled the ‘Strategies of Industry’ and 
here Mintzberg’s meaning is rather ambiguous since, on some readings, it is very close 
to the first genus strategies of stage of operations. Under such a reading it refers to the 
selection of ‘industry’ in its macro-sense (e.g. ‘motor manufacturing industry’) in which 
to position the preceding stage of operations choice. However, this is not the 
interpretation of his meaning that Mintzberg’s treatment mostly invites. His use of the 
word ‘industry’ is far more consistent with a micro-sense (e.g. carburettor  manufacture). 
This is not inappropriate when the strategic sense of ‘the industry’ is conventionally a 
group of firms employing the same production means to satisfy the same customer need. 
He adds another layer of meaning(s) by referring to the complexity of this choice of 
industry. It could mean the markets served (demand being addressed); or the products or 
services being provided (the supply side); or how the need is being satisfied (a 
technological dimension); ‘the list seems endless, as do the criteria for definition’ (ibid, 
p 11); and the boundaries between industries are arbitrary and subject to constant 
change ~ ‘Perhaps the basic problem reflects the fact that the analysts are trying to fix 
what the strategists are trying to change: competitive advantage often comes from 
reconceiving the definition of an industry’ (ibid, p 12). Had Mintzberg simply referred 
to his (narrow) use of ‘industry’ as the choice of business ‘Mission’, as described by 
Ansoff (1965), and meaning the set of customers or markets and products or production 
technologies it decides to maintain in its core portfolio, this would have avoided 
ambiguity with the first (broad) interpretation. It would make the strategic choice here 
subsidiary and consequential upon the positioning choice, and would make more sense 
of his final sentence of section A Locating the Core Business, viz; ‘We therefore close 
with the conclusion that the first step in the identification of an organisation’s strategy 
can be conceived simply as to locate the core business on a two –dimensional matrix, 
the state of the operating process (as categorised earlier) and the basic product-market 
configuration.’ (ibid, p 12). 
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 Whilst one might conclude that Mintzberg has found himself somewhat lost in 
the recognised difficulties of providing a definitive depiction of both ‘strategy’ and 
‘industry’, (as described in Chapter 1 above), it should be noted that neither Porter, nor 
Miles and Snow, engaged with that problem to any significant extent. Notwithstanding 
the subtitle of his 1980 book ~  ‘Techniques for analysing industries and competitors’ ~ 
Porter seems to take for granted that the business and its strategy are simply defined in 
terms of the competitive arena:- ‘Let us adopt the working definition of an industry as 
the group of firms producing products that are close substitutes for each other.’ (Porter, 
1980, p 5). Miles and Snow, although conducting research in four industries, do not 
dwell on how their industries are delineated, and  take them as more or less extraneous 
to their typology of how environments are enacted and responses are formulated by the 
organisations themselves. That is to say the issue is not ‘problematised’ in their work as 
it is in Mintzberg’s. 
 
2.2.2. B. Distinguishing the Core Business. Here the objective is to define the 
distinguishing characteristics that will enable the organisation to achieve competitive 
advantage in its chosen sphere i.e. the core. It is the choice of distinctive competitive 
posture or business strategy adopted within the selected business mission as defined 
under A earlier. It is the specific manner of how the business will strive for success in 
the future, assuming that future is to be grounded in the current definition of the core. 
Mintzberg identifies three mid-level, or genus-level, sub-divisions of how this might be 
approached;- functional strategies; differentiation strategies; and scope strategies. And 
each of these has a number of basic, or species-level, discrete strategies – 5 functional 
strategies; 6 differentiation strategies; and 4 scope strategies, two of the latter sharing 5 
different varieties. There are, thus, some 18 basic level strategies for distinguishing the 
core business. Mintzberg provides no indication of whether these individual basic-level 
strategies are mutually exclusive or, as is most likely, are to be combined in the sense of 
taking one option from each genus-level list. 
 
 It is when we examine these individual basic-level strategies that the main 
problems emerge; problems of specification and distinction of the strategic ‘content’. 
This is most apparent as regards the ‘functional or business strategy areas’. Here 
Mintzberg observes ‘This second level of strategy can encompass a whole host of 
strategies in the various functional areas.’ ( ibid, p12). He acknowledges the conception 
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of organisations under systems theory as being a flow model of inputs, transformation 
and outputs and he contrasts his own diagrammatic (Figure 3 Functional Strategy Areas, 
in System Terms) version of  Porter’s generic value chain (1985) with the original 
(Figure 4 Porter’s “Generic Value Chain” {Porter, 1985: p 37}). Mintzberg’s version 
consists of 5 sets of strategies as listed in Table 3.2. above, ‘genus’ column B.3., 
‘species’ column a)-e) ~ sourcing; processing; designing; delivery; and supporting 
strategies. He also provides indicative labels for each ‘variant’ of the species, but makes 
no attempt to describe the variants. Thus Sourcing Strategies cover procurement, people 
and finance, etc. The upshot of all of this is that the end result is a seemingly 
purposeless tautology – It is ‘generic’ in the sense that all organisations have to have 
such a strategy, but it is content-less. He makes no attempt to describe or contrast, for 
example, the different procurement strategies (for stock, bulk, JIT,) or  alternative 
approaches to recruitment (core / periphery) and retention of staff, (hire and fire, 
internal development) etc. He comments ‘An initial effort by us to delineate generic 
strategies for each of these functional areas was abandoned as overwhelming: there 
would simply be too many possible strategies, a great number of them industry-
specific…..Accordingly, rather than focusing on functional strategies, we shall describe 
ones of a broader nature at the business level, noting however that these not only drive 
functional strategies, but, as we shall see, are also driven by them.’ (ibid,  p 14). 
 
 Thus, Mintzberg has set up a dimension of functional strategy which, ultimately, 
takes no effective part in his framework. This raises the question of how he would 
distinguish strategies from tactics, since an escape route from the cul de sac he seems to 
have encountered as regards functional strategies, is to say that overall organisational 
strategies give the parameters that shape functional tactics i.e. to situate them as at a 
more trivial level in the hierarchy or to simply state that they are contingent and 
bespoke to the organisation and its strategy. Thus, altering the treatment above to a 
statement that, albeit that common themes will be encountered across organisations and 
contexts, the listing of available generic functional tactics is not attempted here ~ the 
reader must look elsewhere, probably in the literature dealing with specific functions. 
So, having effectively abandoned functional strategies, we are left with the two (Porter) 
dimensions ~ that of ‘scope’, and that of ‘basis’, but here given as ‘differentiation’. 
Mintzberg admits to taking his lead here from Porter’s duothetic generics, but only as 
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regards ‘scope’ is he content with Porter’s framing. He states ‘In describing the 
strategies that distinguish the core business, we take our lead from Porter’s “generic 
strategies”. But in so doing, we once again take issue with some major aspects of his 
classification scheme, seeking to develop a tighter typology.’ (ibid, p 14). 
 
There follows a section which sets out an argument for replacing Porter’s cost 
leadership strategy with one of ‘price differentiation’ ~ pricing below the competition. 
He concludes that whilst Porter’s scope dimension is appropriate for adoption in his 
own framework, he rejects Porter’s ‘basis’ dimension of cost or differentiation, for one 
that simply refers to means of differentiation. There are a number of issues raised in this 
treatment of Porter’s work.:- 
 
(i)  First, is the question of whether the resulting product is coherent as between 
the two authors in their use of language. It is clear that Porter does not use the term 
‘differentiation’ (higher price premium obtained for offering something different and 
valued by customers) in the same sense as Mintzberg (offering is simply distinct from 
that of competitors in some way). It is inadvisable to combine two similar, but different, 
conceptualisations under the same term. 
 
(ii)  Secondly, Mintzberg appears (at times) to misunderstand Porter’s start point 
as regards the nature of the goal of strategy. Porter’s concern was with sustainable 
competitive advantage and obtaining above average profitability, whilst Mintzberg 
places emphasis upon outselling the competition. ‘If, as Porter argues, the intention of a 
generic strategy is to seize competitive advantage, then cost leadership per se does not 
do this. Rather, its natural consequence does: to use cost leadership to underprice the 
competition and thereby attract buyers’ (ibid, p 14). 
 
(iii) Yet, at other times, there is recognition that Porter had a distinctive and 
different conceptions from his own:- ‘A “cost leadership” strategy could, of course, be 
pursued to increase margins while simply meeting the prices of competitors. That would 
justify the label Porter gives to it.’ (ibid, p 15). But he then disparages such a strategy as 
a negative compared to his version of ‘price differentiation’, which he couches in 
positive terms. Surely the strategy to achieve maximum profitability, might arguably be 
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matched by, but cannot be trumped by, one of seeking maximum sales, even where the 
two are clearly complementary. (This difference between those who see the object of 
competitive strategy as being to increase profits or to increase sales surfaces later in 
Bowman’s work and the Strategy Clock – Appendix 4). 
 
The section ‘Strategies of Differentiation’ details some 6 means of seeking 
competitive advantage focused upon:- price; image; support; quality; design; and 
‘undifferentiated products’. The accompanying text describes these strategies in simple 
terms, exemplified by frequent reference to examples such as IKEA, Smirnoff, Maytag, 
Toyota, Marks and Spencer, Burger King and the like. The following section notes that 
each of these strategies of differentiation will emphasise different functional areas (e.g. 
price differentiation would promote processing operations; image differentiation would 
place emphasis upon delivery strategies, etc). This section of 6 differentiation strategies 
and the associated functional emphasis for each is the nub of a potential typology of 
business strategies, but is less than 6 pages. As presented here, and treated as a stand 
alone business strategy typology, it compares unfavourably with either the Miles and 
Snow or Porter typologies in terms of definition and clarity (and, hence, plausibility). 
 
The scope strategies, defining the extents of the markets in which the firm sells 
its products, are given by Mintzberg as broadly accepting Porter’s identification of this 
as an independent dimension of business strategy. However, his presentation here (with 
additional reference to the authority of Wendell Smith; S G Smith et al; and Dickson & 
Ginter, plus discussion of Porter’s 1980 and 1985 versions of focus strategies) is of 
‘scope’ as being of four ‘species’, two of which are further sub-divided, giving seven 
‘varieties’ of strategy in all. They are listed as; a) unsegmented; b) segmentation – either 
b.i.) comprehensive, or b.ii.) selective; c) niche; or d) customised – from d.i.) pure, or 
d.ii.) standardised, or d.iii) tailored. Each is briefly described and exemplified both with 
real world examples and by reference to the hypothetical canoe company.  
 
It should be noted that the two characterised sets of strategies ~ differentiation 
and scope ~ are referred to by Mintzberg as the ‘Two Basic Dimensions of Business 
Strategy’. The first dimension is differentiation and is represented in a diagram of a 
segmented circle. The second is scope and is represented as segments along the length 
of a cylinder. This suggests that Mintzberg was possibly contemplating a three 
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dimensional representation (that, possibly, proved unsatisfactory). Had he, however, 
presented these ideas as a simple matrix of the six differentiation strategies on the 
vertical and seven scope strategies on the horizontal, he would have ended with some 42 
cells, each describing a specific potential strategy e.g. image differentiation on a 
comprehensively segmented scope, or price differentiation in unsegmented markets. 
Arguably, such a presentation as a stand alone (and more extensively characterised) 
comprehensive framework of business strategy, might have proved more accessible than 
the comprehensive strategy framework presented here. 
 
However, these musings raise a second question to which the text provides no 
clear cut answers. This is the degree to which Mintzberg regarded the ‘dimensions’ as 
independent of one another; i.e. opening up the full 42 ‘degrees of freedom’ suggested 
above. He is clear that organisations can pursue ‘mixed strategies’ as regards scope, 
meaning that in some product markets it operates comprehensively (say the home 
market), but in others it is more selective (say export markets). But that still leaves all 
cells in the matrix theoretically available. On the other hand he comments ‘a strategy is 
characterised as much by what it excludes as by what it includes. No organisation can 
be all things to all people (though some try), just as no biological species can live off 
the environment in general. The all-encompassing strategy is no strategy at all. Thus, to 
facilitate survival, every real strategy deposits the organisation that pursues it into a 
particular segment of the overall environment – in ecological terms, into its own niche.’ 
(p30). How Mintzberg might have reconciled these two possible constructions of his 
work is unresolved by the text itself. 
 
2.2.3. C. Elaborating the Core Business. This is the third of Mintzberg’s 
‘families’ of strategy. The first is the identification of the core business; the second is 
the development of a posture from which to compete. This, the third, concerns decisions 
about how to extend the size and depth of the core business. Later families of strategic 
decisions concern ‘extension’ or branching out beyond the core; and ‘reconceiving’, the 
readjustment and re-conceptualising of the core. By using the phrase ‘elaborating the 
core business’ Mintzberg is implying some degree of strategic change, but also one that 
stays within the same broad definition of the core business. There are, however, no clear 
dividing lines drawn between ‘elaboration’, ‘extension’ and ‘reconceiving’ and the 
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distinctions being made are fuzzy ones. Leaving one with distinctions that prove 
difficult for a third party to articulate or apply with confidence. 
 
 If the business strategy components discussed in 2.2.2 above owe a debt to 
Porter, this, and the next section (D. Extending the Core Mission), is largely based upon 
the Ansoff  (1965) four cell product/mission conceptual framework. The first three of 
Ansoff’s quadrants ~ Penetration; Market Development; and Product Development are 
adopted here, at ‘genus’ level; with 3, 2 and 3 ‘species’ respectively in each. In addition, 
Mintzberg has split out a new section ‘Geographic Expansion’ from Market 
Development and added it as a genus-species in its own right. Thus providing 9 strategy 
species in all. (Ansoff’s fourth quadrant ‘Diversification’ is the core of Mintzberg’s 
fourth family ~ Extending the Core Mission.). Mintzberg’s treatment is reasonably brief, 
straightforward and perceptive, with the added virtue that he also considers the negative 
or reverse strategy as an alternative to growth  – ‘harvesting market share’; 
‘consolidation of markets’; and ‘rationalising product lines’ are three of his nine 
strategies here. There is little to be gained by a detailed exposition of Mintzberg’s 
discussion of these strategies. Except it is worth noting that he refers to the problem of 
boundaries or sortals when discussing product development strategies, in particular 
product extension: ‘There is no formula to tell where the product extension strategy 
ends and the industry diversification begins. We shall return to the issue later to make 
the point that pinning down an industry can be like pinning down the wind.’ (ibid, p37).  
 
2.2.4. D. Extending the Core Mission. These are a family of strategies where 
the goal is to take the organisation beyond the core business and extend the mission. He 
identifies four genus level strategies; chain integration; diversification; combined 
integration-diversification; and withdrawal. There are respectively 3, 4, 3, 3 species-
level strategies in each, giving 13 strategies in all. One of these strategies ‘Acquisition’ 
has six varieties, such as majority or minority ownership, franchising, long-term 
contracting. As with the section on elaborating the core, Mintzberg also considers the 
negative strategies of withdrawal; – shrinkage, liquidation and divestment. 
 
 As one might expect, this is a well informed and stimulating treatment and 
Mintzberg adds a lot of his own conceptualisation to the discussion of the general topic 
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of diversification; disagreeing here and there with other academics and offering his own 
structures and diagrams. But it would require a major exposition to sensibly discuss 
these points and that would represent a digression from the treatment here as focussed 
on Mintzberg’s contribution as a strategy classification scheme. As regards the scheme 
itself, again, Mintzberg’s treatment suffers from the problems of definition or boundary-
setting within the framework and between his strategies. It can depend, he notes, ‘on 
what goes on in the heads of the managers who make the decision. Diversification or 
integration, it sometimes turns out, exists fundamentally in the mind of the beholder.’ 
(ibid, p 46). Again, his treatment is an interesting mix of real world examples (Alcoa, 
Canadian Pacific Railroad, Philip Morris, Carborundum Company, etc), his canoe 
company and the real company case study of a well-known Canadian supermarket chain, 
Steinberg’s, that had been the subject of his 1982 paper with Waters. Two further points 
of passing interest relate to the transient nature of how terminology and packaging of 
notions varies over time:- a) much of what Mintzberg sets out here as corporate strategy 
is today largely covered under the topic of ‘internationalisation strategy’, and, b) he uses 
the term ‘impartition strategy’ (attributed to Barreyre, 1984) to describe what is more 
familiar to us as ‘outsourcing’. 
 
2.2.5. E. Reconceiving the Business. ‘After the core business has been 
identified, distinguished, elaborated and extended, there often follows the need not just 
to consolidate it but also to redefine it and to reconfigure it – in essence to reconceive 
it.’ (ibid, p 54). Under the family heading Mintzberg identifies three genus - species 
level strategy groupings;- Business Redefinition; Business Recombination; and Core 
Relocation strategies. The first two having no sub-divisions, but the third having five 
distinct strategies. (i.e. there are 7 reconceiving strategies in all). 
 
 It is clear that Mintzberg recognises the problems inherent in describing a 
strategy of ‘reconceiving a business’ in such a manner. He points out that a business can 
itself be defined in different ways, by function, market, products, etc and comments ‘All 
of these, no matter how tangible, are ultimately concepts that exist only in the minds of 
actors and observers.’ (ibid, p 55) and, regarding his own delineation of three strategy 
headings (genus-level), that ‘the distinctions among them, as we shall note, appear fuzzy 
at the margins.’ (ibid, p 55). The comments made above regarding the treatment of 
these concepts by Mintzberg vis a vis other academics apply equally here. 
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2.3 The Conclusion (or lack thereof). 
  
The paper (which has no abstract) seems to end somewhat abruptly without a 
section headed ‘conclusion’ or similar. This means that the end of the final strategy 
description ~ the strategy of relocation around a core theme ~ is not marked by any sub-
headings; merely a new paragraph which starts ‘This brings us to the end of our 
discussion of generic strategies..’ (p 61). The  final three paragraphs (just 21 lines of 
text) achieving the following:- 1) reference to the concluding table which summarises 
all the generic strategies somewhat in the manner given here in Appendix 3.1., a second 
paragraph that comments upon the uneven nature of empirical investigations of the 
different strategies he has identified and the requirement for more research on the 
consequences of following the various options he describes. 3) A warning against using 
his framework as a ‘pat list’. 
 
 This ending is sufficiently at odds with the extensive and structured 
introductions and main sections for one to speculate that some factor other than the 
original ambitions of the paper intruded upon Mintzberg’s writing. Maybe he was 
restricted by time or word count; maybe he ran out of energy and enthusiasm for the 
endeavour; maybe he recognised some of the intrinsic difficulties inadequately resolved 
in this work. (It might, for example, be noted that there are increasing references to the 
definitional problems and fuzziness of his material as the text proceeds). This is 
explored next, in Section 3. However, one might also note that it is possible that 
Mintzberg recognised the possibility of this work not proving successful in 
commanding the attention and adoption of the framework within the strategy 
community – whether of practice or research. That possibility, ‘the extrinsic difficulties’, 
is explored in Section 4 below. 
 
3 THE  INTRINSIC  DIFFICULTIES. 
 
It will be argued that there are four principle intrinsic reasons why Mintzberg’s 
classification scheme contained within it the seeds of its own failure. One is the inherent 
difficulties of the task he was taking on ~ the classification problems,and there are many, 
as discussed in 3.2 below. Secondly, it is argued, in section 3.3 below, that his scheme 
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was a nomenclative one which, in a sense, was competing with prior schemes of a more 
motivated kind, and, thus, at a disadvantage. Third, the fact that the scheme implicitly 
addresses a ‘reader’ rather than a ‘user’, i.e. was not designed as a heuristic device, is 
described in section 3.4. But a fourth, intrinsic reason, is the conclusion that the whole 
endeavour was somehow antithetical to Mintzberg’s overall set of beliefs as regards 
strategy. It is that his heart just was not in it. Section 2, above, was rounded off with the 
tentative suggestion that Mintzberg had somehow lost conviction as the 1988 article 
progressed, this point is dealt with first in section 3.1 below. 
 
3.1 Lack of Conviction  
 
It is significant that Mintzberg himself failed to promote this offering of generic 
strategies in some of his other key works on strategy. Had he been convinced that his 
1988 framework did a good job he would undoubtedly have pushed it further. His 1994 
book The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning references some 19 of his own works, but 
not the 1988 article. The perceived significance lies in the fact that the whole thrust of 
Mintzberg’s argument in the 1994 book is against the notion of formal analysis and 
planning that is detached from doing that he associates with the works of, in particular, 
Michael Porter, including his formulation of generic strategies. His argument is perhaps 
captured best in the quotation below, bearing in mind that the whole book is an 
extensive polemic against formal strategic planning:- 
 
‘Generic means well-defined, belonging to a class, which implies that the 
categories of change have already been worked out, perhaps by some other 
organisation that did the innovating…. This seems to be more compatible with 
formalised planning. In fact we suspect that the proliferation of “mainline”, or 
generic, strategies in American business in recent years (and of the concept of 
“generic strategies” itself in the literature, dating primarily from Porter, 1980) 
corresponds to the rise to popularity of formal procedures of planning.’  
(Mintzberg, 1994, p 181). 
 
 This text must be seen also in the light of the whole corpus of Mintzberg’s work 
from the 1973 studies of practicing managers to the present day. If there is an overriding 
theme, it is of the contingency and creativity of the tasks demanded of top management 
and the stultifying effects of prescriptive solutions and pre-packaged conceptualisations. 
One, somehow, feels that the 1988 framework was an aberration in his broad corpus of 
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thinking on strategy and that as the inherent difficulties of his material bore in on him 
he lost any conviction that the endeavour to crystallise and define the full range of 
strategies available to any manager was worthwhile. Had the ‘framework’ been the 
work of another, it would have been quite plausible to envisage Mintzberg greeting it in 
terms of Procrustes’ bedframe. 
 
 This point is also born home by his treatment of the ‘positioning school’ in the 
book he co-authored with Bruce Ahlstrand and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari, 1998. 
They described some 10 schools of thought about strategy; the first three of which came 
under a general heading of the ‘prescriptive’ approaches, and one of these three was the 
‘positioning school’ in which they located Porter’s overall works, including his generic 
strategies. Importantly, they distinguished this school from the other two prescriptive 
approaches, (the design and planning schools) which tended to see strategy as a blank 
sheet offering unconstrained choice. Whilst, by contrast, the positioning school argued 
that only a limited number of key generic strategies are desirable in any given industry 
and the task of the strategist was to analyse the external conditions for the appropriate 
strategy choice. In a footnote they remark:- 
 
‘One of us recalls a conversation with one of the best-known early proponents of 
this school. He was incredulous at our “exaggerated” comment that there could 
be an infinite number of possible strategies. He could not appreciate the idea of 
strategy as invention, as playing Lego instead of putting together a jigsaw 
puzzle.’    (Mintzberg et al, 1998, p 84, footnote). 
 
Indeed, much of their critique of the positioning school is about the restrictive 
nature of generic strategies, as the following extracts make clear:- 
 
‘The design school promoted strategy as perspective and encouraged its 
creative design. By focussing on strategies as generic, the effect of the 
positioning school may have been exactly the opposite.’  (op cit p 116) 
 
‘The same problem [that of myopic vision] seems to occur in the academic 
research, when it favours boxing strategies into particular categories rather 
than studying their nuanced differences.’ ( op cit p 117 [with addition]) 
 
‘The positioning school focuses its attention on strategies that are generic, on 
industries that are established, on groups that have formed, and on data that has 
hardened. Studying the established categories discourages the creation of new 
ones….. It is another interesting irony that the positioning school, so proactive 
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in tone, is in fact among the most deterministic of all the schools of thought on 
strategy formation. While proclaiming managerial choice, it delineates boxes 
into which organisations should fit if they are to survive…. All of these 
prescriptions are presented in the belief that there is a best generic strategy for 
a given set of conditions: ignore these at your peril.’ (op cit p 118) 
 
‘Porter continues to see strategy as necessarily deductive and deliberate, as if 
strategic learning and emergent strategy do not exist.’ (op cit p119). 
 
In the face of these comments, the comparative failure of Mintzberg to promote 
his own version of generic strategies is quite understandable. In fact, it would be 
reasonable to ask why he set out on the endeavour in the first place. But that would be 
too simple in the light of the fact that these quotes are from his later writings and, more 
significant perhaps, that when producing a general strategy textbook, Mintzberg et al 
2003 (2nd edition), he did promote his 1988 version of generic strategies. The reading 
that he reproduces there is a 12 page truncation of the original material that stays pretty 
faithful to the original, and includes reproductions of Porter’s diagram of his generic 
strategies and Ansoff’s product / mission matrix. The only difference of note is in the 
treatment of diversification and acquisition.  
 
Thus, it is not possible to say that Mintzberg completely suppressed his 1988 
work in subsequent publications. However, it is clear that he did not foreground this 
work, only including it when compiling a general textbook on strategy. Again one can 
only speculate that it is possible that it would be seen (possibly by his co-authors) as a 
lacuna to produce such a textbook without covering the topic at all. It is reasonable to 
suppose that, faced with such a requirement, Mintzberg considered it preferable to 
include his own version (which subsumes Porter’s version and the works of others such 
as Ansoff). 
 
Finally, and perhaps, trivially, (but, perhaps, not), the 1988 article is rather 
poorly edited and contains obvious typing errors. Evidence, at least, of some lack of 
care somewhere in the system. 
 
3.2 The difficulty of accomplishing the task of classifying strategy. 
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 The elusiveness of the strategy concept itself and the inherent problems 
associated with its classification has been elucidated earlier. It is, therefore, not repeated 
here. Suffice it to say that Mintzberg was taking on a very taxing, but much needed task. 
This section looks in more detail at the affordances and limitations of Mintzberg’s 
scheme as a proposed means of providing an intersubjective strategy classification 
framework for the conduct of discourse, research and pedagogy. Notwithstanding the 
nomenclative nature of Mintzberg’s scheme, (see 3.3 below), there is nothing in that 
status which, per se, diminishes it as a projectable set of terms of valuable epistemic 
utility. We can carve social kinds at man-made joints, especially faute de mieux. What 
distinguishes nomenclative social kinds from motivated ones is the lack of 
accommodation (Boyd, 1999, 2010) between the categories and their relations 
postulated in the classification scheme to the relevant causal social structures and 
mechanisms. But we do not have a rival motivated kind that embraces all aspects of 
strategy and trumps Mintzberg’s epistemic utility by its ontological plausibility. The 
scope of Mintzberg’s ambition is certainly enough, without insisting that it be 
accompanied by an explication of socio-economic motivation(s) giving rise to the 
behavioural property clusters ostended to in his categories of strategic action and their 
interrelationships. 
 
 The first, and most important, positive for Mintzberg’s scheme was that it 
attempted to draw together business and corporate strategy into a single comprehensive 
framework.  Had he successfully pulled off the attempt, the framework would have 
established a central place in the field (even helping to define the field itself). Secondly, 
in so doing, he drew upon the works of others of solid repute in the field and employed 
many familiar concepts in his own conceptualisation. To some degree, therefore, it was 
an inspired and creative contribution that, nonetheless, stood upon familiar foundations, 
particularly Ansoff and Porter. Third, Mintzberg has a deep grounding in empirical 
research on strategic management, writes engagingly and uses illustrations to good 
effect. Few authorities on strategy could have been better-positioned to make such a 
contribution. 
 
 That the contribution has been largely passed over can here be ascribed to the 
fact that the intrinsic challenges of the task proved more daunting than the affordances. 
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There were a number of possible factors which singly, or in combination (the more 
probable), worked against widespread adoption. These are listed below :- 
 
3.2.1 Was the framework too intricate to illustrate ? The scheme’s ambitious 
scope was both an attractor and a detractor. The resultant framework is never presented 
as a blueprint of an ‘overall supporting structure’ for strategic decision-making. This, it 
would appear, is because the different aspects of corporate and business strategy did not 
lend themselves to a single integrated structure, more to a set of bolt-on mini-structures. 
The various bases of his ‘families’ of strategies are incommensurable and, hence, do not 
fit easily together. That Mintzberg, one of the most visual writers on strategy, was 
unable to offer an engaging illustration of the overall scheme, and, instead, produced a 
rather unimaginative overall listing of its parts, although capable of providing effective 
sub-unit illustrative diagrams, surely says something about the insuperability of the task. 
The reader is somewhat frustrated by the fact that the overall ‘framework’ lacks any 
pictorial clarification of Mintzberg’s own mental structuring of his layered material. (It 
is analogous to the situation as if a set of instructions for self-assembly furniture came 
with a list of parts and some illustrations of sub-assemblies, but no overall picture of the 
finished product).  
 
3.2.2. An unorthodox conceptualisation of strategy ?  It is surprising to note that 
Mintzberg’s discussion of functional strategies (B.3.a)-e) in Appendix 3.) proceeds 
without allusion to the fact that most strategists regard the purpose (or at least a purpose) 
of business and corporate strategy is to give an overarching sense of direction, priority 
and focus to the various functions. Strategy is not the sum of the parts, but the end to 
which the parts are directed. This is, of course, most noticeable with regard to functional 
strategies, but it is a recurrent observation in trying to grasp his framework that 
guidance is absent as to whether these strategies are mutually exclusive, or are mutually 
reinforcing, or come in compatible (and/or incompatible) permutations. Mintzberg does 
not tell us how these individual descriptive items relate to items elsewhere in the overall 
framework. If the strategic manager’s task is to integrate the aims of parts of the 
organisation such that they complement each other, then Mintzberg is silent on this 
process (surprising, since his writings in general emphasise process over product). 
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It is possible to construe this problem as a manifestation of Mintzberg’s 
unconventional conceptualisation of strategy itself. He sees it as a pattern of 
organisational behaviour, rather than planned action; and that pattern is best seen in 
retrospect (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Weick, 1995). This, to some extent reflects the 
earlier discussion (Section 3.1.) regarding Mintzberg’s lack of conviction about generics. 
He is highly critical of formal strategic planning and the projective use of generics in 
setting a forward strategy, and, maybe, sees generics more as a retroactive descriptive 
glossary. If the start point for conceiving what constitutes a strategy is that it is a pattern 
of past and current organisational behaviour, there is always an available ostensive point 
of conceptual reference. Concern for forward choices means a need for clarity about the 
range and characteristics of the available, but abstract, options. Strategy terms provide 
clear (one hopes) intent in a fuzzy, guessed-at future. It requires generics that provide 
definitions of possible decisions and plans, not a lexicon of descriptions of past events. 
Hence the frustration of the proactive strategist at Mintzberg’s lack of guidance; 
regarding the interrelationships between his strategies, as raised here, but also as to 
success criteria, definitions and sortals as raised below (Sections 3.2.3 – 5. below). 
 
3.2.3. Ill-defined and dimensionless terms ? At a number of points Mintzberg 
fails to define his terms, or is employing one sense of a term, rather than another, 
without making his choice clear. This, for example, is true of his use of the word 
‘industry’ at a key point in drawing out distinctions within the family of strategies he is 
partitioning at genus-level. But the same kind of difficulty appears at a number of points 
in the paper. The classification scheme, especially with regard to his last two ‘families’ 
of strategy – Extending the Core Business and Reconceiving the Business – is one 
where the terminology ~ such as ‘diversification’ and ‘integration’ and ‘core’ ~ is 
already notorious for different usages. This is a field in which many authors offer their 
own specific definitions and relational structures, but none can command universal 
usage. There was a clear opportunity to offer a structured and principled version of 
these terms within a generalised scheme for the strategy community, and in an 
authoritative, single source. Had Mintzberg risen to this challenge in this paper, his 
structures might have commanded more attention and use, not, maybe, as an overall 
generic scheme, where he faced entrenched rivals, but as, say, the strategies of 
extension or reconceptualising the firm, where the competition was weaker. 
 
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
251 
As part of the preamble to discussion of his families of strategy, Mintzberg 
distinguishes between the ‘content of strategies’ (by which he means their direction or 
fundamental approach) and the ‘generic characteristics of strategies’ (ibid, Table 1. p 4-
5) The latter are the dimensions along which a particular strategy can be pursued and 
described or measured – amount, speed, riskiness, overtness, comprehensiveness, etc. 
This list of characteristics, itself over a page long, is attributed to various places in the 
strategy literature. Mintzberg comments thereon; ‘We believe this only confuses an 
already confusing subject, and so have tried to be careful not to mix characteristics and 
content of strategies (although, as it will be clear, some of the content strategies are 
inextricably linked with particular characteristics).’ (ibid, p 6). This is a laudable intent, 
but carries some consequences for clarity of exposition of the distinctions he wishes us 
to draw. When puzzling over the appropriate ‘content’ label (i.e. selecting one of the 48 
strategies) to apply to certain strategic actions it is precisely the quantitative / qualitative 
dimensions that are pertinent. For example when does ‘market development’ become 
‘geographic expansion’ ? ‘Niche’ become ‘Tailored customising’ ?  ‘Linked integration’ 
become ‘Core relocation – Upstream’ ? etc. The self-imposed absence of terms like 
‘frequent’, ‘strong’, ‘extensive’ or ‘large’ means that Mintzberg’s palette of descriptive 
language regarding relative significance of an organisation’s action is not readily 
apparent to another party. Intersubjectivity of his lexicon is thereby compromised. 
 
3.2.4. Underdefined sortals and boundaries ? A recurrent problem, akin to that 
with his use of terminology as discussed above, is with understanding the structural 
divisions that Mintzberg is seeking to impose upon the protean world of strategic 
behaviour. Whilst he generally succeeds in presenting an idealisation of his concepts, he 
is weaker in defining the limits to one strategy in contrast to another. The watershed 
between one strategy and another, adjacent one is unclear in his style of description and 
discussion. In effect, Mintzberg, increasingly as the paper progresses, acknowledges 
this problem as being unsolved in this work, parking it as a comment upon the fuzzy 
nature of his material. Yes, it is fuzzy, and it is not easy to get intersubjective agreement 
on any set of terms or glossary of strategy ~ but Mintzberg does not provide a minimal, 
clear personal definition as a starting point for subsequent challenge. We are left with a 
fuzzy focus upon fuzzy material.  
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3.2.5. Standing on the feet of giants ?  Finally, it should be noted that one reason 
for rejecting Mintzberg’s treatment of strategy classification, is the fact that he borrows 
from the works of others on a ‘pick and mix’ basis. This involves, for example, the 
rejection of key elements of Porter’s generics and a partial de-construction of Ansoff’s 
product / market matrix. The resultant hybrids of incommensurable concepts are not 
vigorous. In both cases the conceptual structures, and associated claims, as presented by 
the original authors, are coherent and have stood for some time as significant 
contributions. By reducing the intellectual constructions of Porter, Ansoff and others to 
their components, Mintzberg is reducing their capacity to support his own work. 
 
3.3. A Nomenclature versus Motivated Kinds.  
 
As previously described, Mintzberg, throughout his writings, is a descriptive 
empiricist and, if anything, ‘antitheoretical’ is sometimes a better characterisation of his 
approach in general than ‘atheoretical’. The components of his generic scheme are 
based upon a fairly robust logic, the core descriptions are reasonably delineated and the 
exemplars or idealisations supportive. Despite the limitations indicated above, this is a 
projectable scheme, or, perhaps, the first step towards one, that embraces all aspects of 
(for profit) strategy. It has no rivals of note. However, Mintzberg adduces no reasons for 
the claimed homogeneity of the cluster of behavioural properties he is describing i.e. 
commonalities of underlying strategic intensions across a multitude of different 
organisations in different industries and different markets. In other words he is 
providing a nomenclature for common strategic behaviours, not a causal explanation 
thereof. He describes no causal structures or mechanisms equivalent to those provided 
for the more limited contexts of Miles and Snow’s explicit ‘adaptive cycle’, nor Porter’s 
implicit ‘competitive forces’. His scheme of generics rest upon his considerable 
authority, his extensive knowledge of business practice and research and his prowess as 
a writer. It is as if Mintzberg is saying ‘this is how it is ~ believe me I know.’ It is a 
nomenclative system, or a folksonomy, that offers a glossary covering the entire domain, 
based upon the experience and expertise of an acknowledged authority. However, a 
nomenclative classification, as such, is at a disadvantage compared to the motivated 
kinds of Porter and Miles and Snow; as explicated below.  
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The fact that a motivated classification scheme, based upon plausible claims to 
underlying causal structures, is superior to a nomenclature as regards inferential use and 
explanation has been described in principle in Chapter 3. We are generally content to 
allow the expert ~ and Mintzberg is certainly an expert ~ to provide us with the names 
of things. I am happy to take my green-fingered neighbour’s word for it that this fern is 
a ‘Pellaea rotundifolia’. Putnam (1975) refers to this as the ‘linguistic division of 
labour’. Where, however, as is the case here, the scheme is challenging two alternative 
and motivated kind classification schemes, it is at a severe disadvantage. Categorisation 
schemes that are based upon some putative essences or causal mechanisms and 
structures (Danermark et al, 2002; Elder-Vass, 2010; Harré & Madden, 1975; Sayer, 
2000) will always trump an unmotivated scheme, unless the latter has some 
overwhelming compensatory advantage. Such might be found for a ‘first mover’ 
proposed scheme, since established, or ‘entrenched’ (Goodman, 1983), schemes that 
provide practical uses are difficult to dislodge, even if we subsequently ‘know better’ 
thanks to modern science (Dupré, 2002). This is also supported by ‘psychological 
essentialism’. This is the innate bias toward believing that there are reasons why 
homogeneity can be found in the natural and social world (Gellman, 2003; Keil, 1991; 
Medin & Atran, 1999). This assumption that our categories reflect causality, whether or 
not the cause is articulated or understood, means that successful nomenclative 
classification schemes can catch on within a knowledge community, or find common 
use by the general public, provided that the absence of known cause is unchallenged. 
Where, as in this case, the scheme is competing with already established motivated kind 
schemes, the challenge may be insuperable. 
 
3.4 A Nomenclature versus a Heuristic Device. 
 
 A nomenclature of a natural (physical) kind generally provides little by way of 
decision-making guidance or utility beyond that of type identification. Recognition of 
an oak tree or of lead ore has certain utility in human purposes, but we can do little to 
turn an oak into an elm or lead into gold. The entities being identified are more or less 
immutable. On the other hand, to some extent we can select participation in social kinds, 
particularly those of an institutional nature. The categories themselves offer a menu of 
possible choice and prior choice might be intentionally modified by human agency. 
(This often falls under the description of ‘change management’). Thus, it is possible that 
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what is primarily a nomenclative classification has less potency in the social sciences 
than its potential in the natural sciences. Its accommodation to the expectations of the 
disciplinary matrix is weaker than a classification that contains normative connotations 
~ in the case of strategy, the performance implications of such choice are likely to be 
highly salient. 
 
 A ‘generic’ strategy is, elsewhere, taken to mean an option which if properly 
understood and implemented will lead to organisational success, or at least avoidance of 
failure. Much of the interest in generic strategies is due to the fact that firms wish to 
improve their financial results and those that have promulgated such schemes tend to 
argue for ‘equifinality’ of results i.e. there is not one generic strategy that trumps all 
others. The Miles & Snow typology and Porter’s generics, and other similar attempted 
schemes, generally argue that the successful implementation of any of their strategies, 
with the exception of the ‘failure’ route, (‘Reactor’ for Miles & Snow; ‘stuck in the 
middle’ for Porter), will lead to above average performance. In so doing, these generic 
strategies stimulate interest and engagement by practitioners and consultants (does my 
strategy match up to the requirements of the successful type ? will we improve 
profitability if we faithfully pursue one of the described strategies ?) and among 
academic researchers (do the strategies characteristic of the firms in my study match 
those as suggested ? does the performance data support the {equifinality}contention ?).  
 
So the reception of a proposed business strategy classification scheme will 
reflect the instrumentalism of its users. However, none of this is apparent in 
Mintzberg’s presentation of his framework (or, in the main, in the subsequent academic 
literature drawing upon this source – albeit, see Kotha & Vadlamani, 1995). In fact 
there is no overt discussion of success and failure in the 67 page paper; no claim that 
certain strategies are more suitable or successful than others; no admonition to adhere 
strictly to a single ‘pure’ version, nor invitation to hybridise at will. Hence there is little 
in Mintzberg’s framework, other than the fact that he is exhaustive in listing potential 
strategies, to attract its use by those engaged with consideration of strategic choice ~ it 
provides a rather poor heuristic device. In fact the text seems to consider a ‘reading’ or 
‘reader’, rather than direct consideration of some ‘use’ or ‘user’ of his framework. For 
example, the initial justification for the paper is not a need to improve strategic 
performance, but one of needing to sort out and reconcile a proliferation of conflicting 
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lists of strategies. A discursive concern rather that a performance issue. One might 
conclude that a strategic manager would have little incentive to read the paper if all it 
does is describe his or her options. This lack of normative content to Mintzberg’s 
presentation of the strategy typology illustrates an aspect of his work in general – the 
privileging of description, often rich and insightful description, over prescription. (See 
Gosling 1994; Mintzberg, 1977). It being quite possible that Mintzberg would resist 
drawing generalised, normative conclusions from his work, leaving it to the reader to re-
contextualise and apply the lessons, if any, from reports of his research. 
 
3.5. Rounding-up the intrinsic problems. 
 
It may be that this reading of Mintzberg is imposing a set of expectations upon 
the paper that were not part of his intentions. It is after all but one of Mintzberg’s many, 
many papers in the field of management and organisation science. However, there is, in 
the paper itself, nothing to the effect that his ambitions were small-scale, tentative, or 
partial. Indeed, as the quotation from his text, at the Chapter’s heading, makes clear, his 
intention was to provide a new, alternative and all-embracing set of generic strategies 
that covered the whole domain of strategy. He was aiming at a new glossary for 
intersubjective use by strategists. In this he failed to achieve the necessary entrenchment. 
 
That the intrinsic weaknesses of Mintzberg’s scheme outweigh its intrinsic 
strengths has been argued here. To summarise, the main weaknesses are:- 
 
A Some equivocation in Mintzberg’s own presentation and promulgation of 
his creation, and the fact that this is not the expected sort of product from that 
source. 
 
B The ambitious scope and complexity of the framework, the absence of an 
overall representation of the framework, and the lack of precision in its 
presentation and delineation of the terminology / concepts involved, results in 
diminished accessibility and intelligibility to potential users. 
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C Mintzberg does not adduce any causal mechanisims that would generate 
the claimed underlying homogeneity of strategic action that he implicates in his 
segmentation of the field of organisational behaviour into generic strategies. 
 
D The absence of claimed normative performance implications of direct 
interest to strategic decision-makers and researchers. 
 
If Porter and Miles and Snow have over-simplified the complexity of business 
strategy options, Mintzberg’s all-embracing alternative has not caught on. However, 
there are examples of, sometimes very complex, nomenclative classifications based 
upon intelligent and careful observation that have caught on (think of Linnaeus, 
Mendeleyev, or Luke Howard within their respective communities of practice). 
Mintzberg is right in observing the proliferation of partial lists of generic strategies and 
in detecting the potential utility of a single comprehensive framework. There is a 
potential constituency out there. Lack of easy intelligibility of their output has done 
certain philosophers no harm. Diffidence in promoting their output can be seen as 
confidence in its content. It does not seem, therefore, that the intrinsic weaknesses 
outlined above were sufficient to mean failure to thrive was inevitable. This brings us to 
consideration of the extrinsic factors that might have acted in conjunction with the 
above intrinsic factors to the detriment of acceptance and use. 
 
4 THE  EXTRINSIC  FACTORS. 
 
Here the fact that Mintzberg’s framework was in a sense in competition with 
other generic classification schemes is the paramount consideration – as described in 4.1. 
below. In addition there were a number of lesser, but not trivial considerations – the fact 
that Mintzberg is a Canadian (Section 4.2) and the relative obscurity of the source 
publication (Section 4.3) are also covered below. Finally, there is a general factor 
affecting all classification schemes in this field – the absence of an international and 
impartial validation authority, that might work more against an anti-establishment (and 
non-American) proposer. (Section 4.4). 
 
4.1 Pre-emption by other classification schemes ? 
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Earlier, it was argued that Mintzberg’s scheme is primarily a nomenclative one 
and was, thus, less likely to appeal to our innate psychological essentialism than a prior 
motivated one. It was also described as somewhat limited as a heuristic device. This 
was a partial exploration of an intrinsic weakness. More significant extrinsic issues bear 
upon the question of Mintzberg’s scheme versus Miles and Snow and  / or Porter. These 
fall under two headings as explored below; – the inferential power of the schemes; and 
the question of timing.   
 
4.1.1. Practical adequacy.  First, is the fact that (as explained in Chapter 3) in 
terms of utility, for inferential classification purposes, a motivated kind will hold greater 
practical adequacy for inferential and explanatory uses. Given that, as explained in 
Chapters 4 and 5, both Miles and Snow’s typology and Porter’s generics qualify as 
possible motivated kinds, this might seem to be conclusive against the comprehensive 
framework. But it is not that simple. As explicated in Chapter 3, there is a hierarchy of 
classification schemes in which a principle of elevation applies. A nomenclature may be 
lower than a motivated kind system, but, given a sound nomenclative system, one has 
also a heuristic system, plus a sorting device. But, as reported above, Mintzberg’s 
framework was somewhat limited as a performance heuristic too. So the question of 
scope is also relevant. The greater scope of Mintzberg’s scheme makes it far superior to 
the other two schemes that focus upon business strategy alone. Put another way, 
Porter’s generics have nothing to offer for denoting, sorting or connoting in the domain 
of corporate strategy. (That is in terms of a structured classification scheme ~ Porter has 
much to say about corporate strategy elsewhere in his work). Miles and Snow have no 
type of strategy that deals with different varieties of ‘acquisition’, do not discuss 
‘withdrawal via divestment’, have little to say on ‘integration’, etc. Mintzberg’s 
classification scheme enables one to identify and consider these as available strategic 
options. There are, of course, generic classifications in corporate strategy, particularly 
the Ansoff framework upon which Mintzberg draws. But this time the inadequacy of the 
Ansoff scheme as regards business strategy applies. For all the intrinsic flaws described 
above, there is compensatory reward in the width of Mintzberg’s scheme. Remember 
too, that there are qualifications aplenty about the alternative more-limited schemes, 
whether motivated or not. Despite all the qualifications, there are insufficient grounds 
here alone for dismissing Mintzberg’s comprehensive framework. 
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4.1.2. Timing. This, an entirely contingent factor, has a large impact upon the 
story. The fact that Miles and Snow (1978) and Porter (1980, 1985) pre-dated 
Mintzberg’s work, and were already well known throughout the academy when he 
launched his own scheme, meant that his offering had to co-exist with or usurp these 
earlier, simpler and motivated schemes. Had Mintzberg published his scheme before the 
others this narrative would, in all probability, have been quite different. But there is no 
way to test the counterfactual conjectures.  
 
But, remember that both the Miles and Snow typology and Porter’s generics had, 
by 1988, an ambiguous status in academic circles. Various empirical studies and 
theoretical critiques had somewhat fractured any simple consensus about their adequacy 
(see Chapters 4 and 5). It was by no means inevitable that a 1988 proposed scheme of 
sufficient stature and functionality could not challenge, or even replace, these 
established schemes. What is asserted, however, is that Mintzberg’s comprehensive 
classification of generic strategies was not such a scheme. It had insufficient intrinsic 
strength and extrinsic affordances to pull off the task of replacing the schemes upon 
which it drew. 
 
 Compared to the above, the next three putative extrinsic factors will only have 
possible contributory roles in the narrative of Mintzberg’s relative failure. 
 
4.2. Canadians command less attention ? 
 
 Hard to prove, though no doubt believed by many to be true, is that the USA 
dominates the practice and research of strategy to the detriment of other English and 
(particularly) non-English language sources. It may be, therefore, that Mintzberg’s 
status as a Canadian working at the Business School at McGill University in Toronto 
could be adduced as a reason for his work receiving less attention. This, however, is 
very hard to support in the light of Mintzberg’s colossal status and renown in the field 
of strategy and organisation science. The truth is that he has comfortably transcended 
any disadvantages due to his national origins and domicile, and others of his 
publications are extremely well-known to strategists the world over. 
 
4.3 Recondite source ? 
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 This is the simplistic ‘low road’ explanation of why Mintzberg’s scheme was 
largely overlooked. It is certainly true that the annual book / journal ‘Advances in 
Strategic Management’ is not as well known, is cited less often and is harder to obtain 
than many other strategy journals of that time. On the other hand, and in some 
mitigation, the textbook ‘Minztberg and Quinn’ in its various guises is well known and 
the truncated version of the framework is replicated there for many students of the 
subject. 
 
4.4 Absence of impartial validating authority ? 
  
There is no widely-acknowledged professional body or validating authority in 
the strategy field of practice.  No imprimatur. No formal national, or international, body 
to appeal to, or to whom to submit a glossary for ‘adoption’; as might be the case with 
the functional professions in organisational science such as marketing, personnel or 
finance. There is no formal qualification in ‘strategy’ and, hence, no agreed set of 
definitions to learn or work to. (This is not to argue for such a professionalisation of the 
domain, merely to report a fact). There are the conventional academic circles, such as 
the leading journals and their editorial boards, and the USA Academy of Management is 
a strong network of international reach, particularly within the strategy field. The (USA-
dominated) Strategic Management Association at the time of Mintzberg’s publication 
had little authority over practice, and it is to be doubted whether Mintzberg’s position as 
its president at the time carried much clout as regards the validation of his framework. 
The fact that cannot be ignored is that Mintzberg’s identification as an anti-
establishment figure (i.e. a vocal critic of the dominant ‘positioning school’) was 
already becoming clear by 1988. He has done little to endear himself to the Business 
Schools since. 
 
Whether or not this was a factor in the extrinsic reasons for the failure of 
Mintzberg’s framework to take hold cannot be determined. There are certainly lots of 
other factors that could claim priority in explanatory terms. However, the point being 
made here is that the absence of formal systems for authenticating terminology (as 
found in some scientific nomenclatures – see for example McOuat, 2009 on biological 
classification, or Hamblyn, 2001 for meteorology) left a more amorphous and subtle 
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system of tacit approval / disapproval in its stead. In such circumstances Mintzberg’s 
ability to attract attention, by stimulating controversy with his peers, is likely to have 
worked against him. (The extent of antipathy to his works is most notable in Igor 
Ansoff’s surprisingly sharp response to Mintzberg’s 1990 paper on the ‘design school’ 
of strategy ~ Ansoff, 1991). 
 
5 VALIDATION – KOTHA & VADLAMANI (1995) ~ A  CRITIQUE 
 
 The limited literature search conducted via Google Scholar identified an 
academic paper that sought to validate (parts of) the Mintzberg scheme. This was that 
produced by Suresh Kotha and Bhatt Vadlamani, 1995 ‘Assessing generic strategies: an 
empirical investigation of two competing typologies in discrete manufacturing 
industries’, Strategic Management Journal. Since this study compares only the six 
‘differentiation’ core business strategies (i.e. Appendix 3.1., items B4 a)-f)) it is not a 
study of the Mintzberg framework as a whole ~ as such, this might be indicative of 
problems in instrumenting and investigating what is, after all, an attempt at a complete 
nomenclature of different strategies. It does, however, contain the observation that 
‘Beyond anecdotal evidence, there are no empirical studies that [seek to] validate 
Mintzberg’s typology.’ (op cit p76, [with addition]). That is to say their study is a 
somewhat unique, serious academic study reported in a leading strategy journal. 
 
 The study comprised questionnaires, comprising 22 Likert-scale (5 point) 
questions, from 160 ‘discrete parts manufacturing firms’ i.e. component suppliers in 
business-to-business markets in USA mechanical and electrical manufacturing. They 
reported ‘Our, findings,… provide support for Mintzberg’s typology and fail to support 
Porter’s typology’. There are, however, a number of issues (items a-d below) and two 
very pertinent questions of principle raised by this article and its conclusion:- 
 
 a) It strips out one element of Mintzberg’s classification scheme without any 
 acknowledgement that it is nested in a broader framework. Even accepting that 
 the business strategy component might be taken as a stand alone from the 
 choice of mission (‘locating the core business’) and corporate strategy 
 (‘elaboration’; ‘extension’ and ‘reconception’) components of Mintzberg’s 
 total scheme, and, further, accepting that Mintzberg himself abstained from 
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 characterising his ‘functional areas’ of business strategy; one is left with no 
 consideration of Mintzberg’s characterisation of the ‘scope’ over which the 
 ‘differentiation’ strategy is operationalised. Put another way, the strategies 
 being examined here are one-dimensional and somewhat remote from being 
 implemented / implementable without a (strategic) decision on the scope 
 dimension.  
 
 b) The 22 ‘underlying dimensions of strategy’ are those previously identified 
 and instrumented by Dess & Davis 1984 in relation to Porter’s generics. This 
 study ‘provides empirical support for the presence of strategic groups based 
 upon Porter’s (1980) generic strategies. Variations in intraindustry 
 profitability and growth are found to be related to strategic group  membership. 
 Firms identified with at least one generic strategy  outperformed firms 
 identified as “stuck in the middle”’. ( op cit, p 467 {abstract}). Thus, it seems 
 odd to claim that Porter’s generics are not confirmed by their own study 
 without some discussion of the contradictory findings of Dess & Davis using the 
 same instrument. 
 
 c) They seem to share with Mintzberg what was described earlier (2.2.2. (ii) 
 and (iii) above) as a misconception about Porter’s basis of competition on  lower 
 costs as being valueless as a competitive advantage unless converted into lower 
 prices. 
 
 d) There is no measurement or consideration of the relative performance of 
 firms that conform to different degrees to one or other of their six strategies. 
 There is, thus, an internal focus upon research method ~ ‘Taken together,  these 
 results provide strong evidence of a good fit between the model representing 
 Mintzberg’s six generic strategies and our sample data.’ (op cit p 79) ~ rather 
 than on the fit between these strategies and the causal structures and 
 mechanisms of the socio-economic environment. Surely it is the latter that 
 provides the justification for their work on ‘competing typologies’.  
 
5.1 Validation of what ? (and why ?) 
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 At a deeper level, one is prompted to ask what conceptions of these labels Kotha 
and Vadlamani are attempting to ‘assess’ and ‘validate’ in the first place ? They are 
assessing the generic strategies of Mintzberg and contrasting his classification scheme 
with that of Porter. But Porter identifies ‘differentiation’ at a level that encompasses 
five of Mintzberg’s labelled differentiation strategies (with the sixth, ‘price’, the subject 
of a conceptual contention). Let us take the generic ‘furniture’ ~ would one claim that a 
division into ‘bedroom furniture’, ‘dining room furniture’, ‘living room furniture’, etc is 
‘better’ than the higher level term ? It, surely, is a question of utility; fitness of purpose 
to our projects. Prompting the next question of why seek to ‘validate’ a classification 
scheme before establishing its utility ? There are many potential ways of segmenting 
organisational behaviour, the primary question to be addressed is which of the 
promulgated schemes is best suited to which tasks for which users ? (In particular, 
which scheme is better accommodated to the underlying causal mechanisms ?  Boyd, 
2010). Had that been Kotha and Vadlamani’s purpose, the investigation would look 
very different from that which they report. 
 
5.2 A circular argument is not a validation of anything outside the loop. 
 
 Furthermore, one is driven to enquire is not this research (and, ceteris paribus, 
that of Dess & Davis as regards Porter’s generics) fundamentally based upon a 
tautology ? It seems to involve taking Mintzberg’s brief ‘gestalt’ descriptions of his six 
differentiation strategies, envisaging how these would be reflected in differences in 
priorities on 22 ‘dimensions’ (‘new product development’; ‘operating efficiency’ ‘build 
reputation’; etc); using a panel of six experts to judge which would be prioritised under 
each of the six descriptions. The dimensions are then put to executives responsible for 
strategy in their companies and they are asked to rate their priorities on the same set of 
dimensions. But the firms are then categorised according to the conformity between 
their selection of priorities and that of the composition provided by ‘experts’ – all one is 
doing is confirming that the two groups make broadly similar judgements as to the 
consistency of prioritising one cluster of variables over other potential clusters. Only a 
perverse choice of inconsistent priorities on the part of the experts or CEOs would 
disconfirm the findings. In effect this is the logical fallacy of begging the question 
dressed up in a positivistic presentation of structural equation modelling. (LISREL VI). 
It is an enclosed loop validating itself via circular reasoning. 
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 There is no other substantive empirical investigation of Mintzberg’s framework 
per se that came to light in the (perforce somewhat limited) literature search thereon. 
And, as indicated above, that which was examined proves less than convincing as 
regards suggesting any ontological foundations to the classification scheme. The 
accommodation to the investigatory, explanatory and inferential practices of the strategy 
community is partially attempted, and arguably achieved, in Kotha & Vadlamani 1995. 
But not accommodation to the causal structures of the world. However, this study fails 
to convince and reflects also the lack of putative motivation to kindhood, or 
homogeneity, in the original work. No study appears to have examined it as a useful 
nomenclative scheme, nor as an exhaustive (48 category) strategy heuristic. To 
investigate the latter, research would instead focus upon the usage by strategic managers 
in their discourse and enquire as to their inferential and predictive powers as assessed by 




6.1  It is highly challenging to come up with a classification system for business 
strategies and, maybe, we are too ready to discard that which is found lacking in some 
regard before we have a proven replacement able to withstand equivalent scrutiny. As 
Weick (1999) points out, it is unlikely we will ever achieve a framework that is 
simultaneously simple, accurate and generalisable. In so far as Mintzberg has provided 
an entry into this challenging task, it has to be judged that his scheme is certainly not 
simple. Nor, taking accuracy to reflect precision in aim, (whether ontic or espitemic) is 
it unambiguous as regards intension or extension. As regards the ability to generalise 
from Mintzberg’s generic strategies, then its scope is wider than the others considered 
here, in that it includes both business and corporate strategy. Limitations as to 
generalisability has more to do with complexity and obscurity than with scope. It is 
clear that Mintzberg hoped to provide a conceptualisation and set of terminology that 
could have provided at least the basis of an acceptable nomenclative classification 
system. In this he is judged to have failed for a host of intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. 
These have been sketched out above. 
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6.2 However, the more significant overarching point here is that none of the 
discussion above related to failures based on ontological grounds, or truth values, in 
Mintzberg’s work. The nearest this treatment has come to establishing pertinent 
ontological factors relates to the discussion of motivated kinds versus nomenclatures in 
section 3.3 above. More pertinent, by far, have seemed to be the epistemological 
questions of presentation, complexity, definition and the like, plus the relevance of 
social context within a community of practice. The practical adequacy of Mintzberg’s 
contribution to the field, his proposed lexicon, is (it seems to me) at least sound enough 
to warrant further development and discussion. (But not of the sort undertaken by Kotha 
& Vadlamani). Beyond business strategy lies the greater conceptual complexity of 
corporate strategy, a challenge that has not, so far, come up with any structured 
terminology that commands widespread acceptance. Such issues, and their implications 
for strategy research extension and replication, are not currently resolved within the 
broad strategy academy.  
 
6.3  No simple, widely accepted, and purportedly motivated kind, embracing 
business and corporate strategy classification currently exists. There is no reason to 
assume that our discipline, albeit dealing with abstract social institutional kinds, would 
not benefit from a truly intersubjective set of descriptive terms. Linnnaeus’ 
nomenclative scheme served the field of biology well long before Charles Darwin and 
Gregor Mendel made their theoretical contributions. Of the nomenclatures on offer, 
most are confined to the particular author or textbook glossary and none have the 
ambition and scope of Mintzberg’s vision. Perhaps it is appropriate to review his 1988 
scheme in the light of subsequent business activity and theoretical and empirical 
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Chapter  SEVEN 
 
 
THESIS,  FINDINGS  AND  CONSEQUENCES. 
 
‘….some degree of essentialism is simply unavoidable. The disputes are usually over 
which essence we should accept as important, not whether essences can be dispensed 
with.’  McLennan, 1996, p 67. – Cited in Sayer, 2000, p 89. 
 
PART  A THE  THESIS  (BRIEFLY)  OUTLINED. 
 
 Underpinning the thesis advanced here are a number of steps or propositions that 
are outlined briefly below: 
 
1 The world contains many things and experiences that are alike; whether natural 
things such as rivers, rabbits and rainbows or social things like railways, retailers and 
revolutions. Some of these similarities are the outcome of the causal structures of the 
natural and social world. The capacity to recognise repetitions of encounters with the 
same or similar thing or experience is crucial to the mental capacity to form concepts 
and categories ~ a key fitness characteristic. 
 
2 Categorisation is allocation to standardised or generalised representations. For 
humans, to employ words like rabbit or revolution which attach labels to these 
categorical phenomena provides the ability to intersubjectively share these as meanings, 
via language, and to act in concert under a description. This is a particularly human trait 
and advantage. 
 
3 The association of repetitions with being the same type of thing or experience carries 
the implication that such things or experiences have some common central nature or 
characteristic property. They are alike in some meaningful way. Such entities are termed a 
‘kind of….’. Furthermore, we humans display the capacity to distinguish between superficial 
similarities (labels beginning with the ‘r’ sound) and characteristics of greater significance in 
determining our kinds. Indeed it has been recognised that there is an innate bias when 
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acquiring language labels to assume that there is particular significance and justification in 
the selected determining characteristic(s): that the appropriate partitioning of phenomena is 
donated by the inner natures, or essences, of the phenomena themselves. 
 
4 The notion that this partitioning and aggregating of the phenomena of the natural 
and social world into categories is done in some meaningful way, in this context, 
indicates that it provides us with utility in fulfilling our projects. It is the best way for 
dividing things up in order to accomplish our goals. There are, thus, those who interpret 
the selection of the partitioning criteria as being imposed upon the phenomena by 
ourselves. Our categories are simply nominal arrangements that suit our purposes. 
 
5 A reconciliation of the two conceptualisations of categorisation is achieved 
when it is concluded that human purposes in classification are usually best served when 
the categories themselves reflect, or are accommodated to, the underlying intransitive 
nature of the world, and its causal structures and mechanisms, whether natural or social. 
The categories that most reflect the nature of the world are the most likely to be of value 
to us in our dealings with that world. 
 
6 Of particular interest here are the kinds deployed within a particular branch of 
knowledge. The notion of a ‘science’ encompasses a communal lexicon of kind terms, 
i.e. predicables, without which generalisations are not possible. It also encompasses 
common methods of knowledge acquisition. A community of practice will have a 
specific set of kind terms and associated epistemic practices. Since all science (physical 
or social) seeks generalisations and reliable inference, a successful science must 
determine with care the kinds of phenomena within its domain. Good categories are 
necessary for good science. 
 
7 All actions, all workings, all research, is under a description current within the 
community of practice under which it is undertaken, and that description is held in 
common among its members. Meanings are collectively held. Social scientists construct 
‘tools’ for organising social facts into research objects, and (although seldom discussed 
in terms of kinds) classification schemes are one such tool. 
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8 A science which establishes clear identity of its kinds and their meanings 
(intensions) and their boundaries (extensions) makes greater progress in theorisation 
and explanation than one where intersubjectivly stable terms are not established. 
Imprecision is detrimental to shared meanings and a progressive science. 
 
9 Any established scientific lexicon of kind terms connects with other terms in an 
expanding network of knowledge that provides access to a set of mental inferences 
which embellish our thinking and enhance our decision-making and forecasting capacity. 
New terms, specifically categories in a proposed classification scheme, must achieve 
linkage between the internal conceptualisation of the proposer(s) and the interpretation 
thereof by the wider community. Terms achieving intersubjective currency within a 
disciplinary practice become ‘dictionary entries’ and each such entry connects to a host 
of ‘encyclopaedic entries’, in an endless network of cross-referenced interconnections 
becoming, thus, a rich source of inferential potential. An ‘inference machine’ that 
underpins our thinking and our projections. 
 
10 There are different domains of reality which contain different types of kinds. 
The characteristic kinds associated with the social sphere and the collective human 
activity that is organisational behaviour are abstract institutional kinds. 
 
11 Any and all classification systems are artefacts of human thought. The fact that 
abstract institutional kinds are irreducibly human and contingent, does not mean that it 
is impossible for such kinds to be intransitive objects of study.  
 
12 However, the science of abstract institutional kinds is distinctively different 
from that of natural kinds. In particular, being grounded in social practices, they are 
transient and local and, thus, unlike the paradigmatic notion of universal and eternal 
scientific kinds. Furthermore, being abstract means that simple ostention to physical 
kind members is not possible. Reference must be to shared descriptions, typifications or 
exemplars providing intersubjective meanings. Finally, social kinds are reflexive ~ the 
entities being categorised potentially interacting with the categorisations (descriptions) 
available to them. 
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13 It follows that the treatment of abstract institutional kinds in our scientific 
practices will, perforce, be distinctively different from those practices associated with 
natural kinds. 
 
14 Our particular research object is business strategy classification systems; these 
are a relational set of kind terms, or categories, which can be predicated of certain 
collective strategic intentionalities on the part of commercial organisations in 
competition with one another (and which, ideally, encompasses all such activities as 
defined below). 
 
15 The intension of business strategy being defined as the collective sense of 
overriding purpose that provides the touchstone of prioritisation in the disposition of 
organisational resources and functional goals. It is a local, intersubjectively agreed 
means by which a business unit achieves coherence and coordination of future activities 
in seeking fulfilment of its overall objectives in the face of its interpretation of the 
salient market environment. 
 
16 The intensions of individual business strategies must be delineated with care and 
contextualised as contingent to a particular spatio-temporal societal / economic / 
institutional setting. Each organisation is sui generis and ‘strategy’ is the product of the 
interplay of individual agents acting more or less in concert to a more or less common 
goal in the light of a more or less agreed interpretation of the salient business 
environment. The scope for heterogeneity in both attributes and outcomes is enormous. 
 
17 Yet it is a matter of observation that, commonalities can be detected across 
strategic behaviours across a number of different business environments and, 
accordingly, certain general schemes of business strategy classification have been 
proposed and accepted as meaningful. These are at a high level of generalisation, 
conventionally termed ‘cross-cutting kinds’, in that they are found in different 
competitive industrial and market settings. As defined earlier, a business strategy 
classification scheme is a relational structure of different conceptual and generalised 
business strategy intensions arranged as categories, or types, asserted, or assumed, to be 
relevantly defined and arranged for intersubjective use, pertinent to the efficient sorting 
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and consideration of alternative choices of business strategy and the communication 
thereof. 
 
18 Given the nature of business strategy as an abstract institutional kind shaped by 
the spatio-temporal setting of its social, economic, political and technological 
environment, and the heterogeneous nature of the personal and collective goals of its 
protagonists, there is little scope for enduring and precise definitions of particular 
business strategies as might be encountered in the physical sciences. 
 
19 Instead of the enduring and precise necessary and sufficient conditions, or 
recognition criteria and sortals, established in certain paradigmatic natural kinds, the 
kinds of an organisational and management science will, perforce, be of the type called 
‘fuzzy kinds’ or ‘family relation kinds’, with somewhat indistinct boundaries both as 
regards intension and extension. To complicate matters, as social kinds the entities 
being categorised interact with their categorisations: the objective of the researcher may 
be to categorise appropriately, the objective of the firm may be to avoid such 
categorisation, or to blur the distinctions. 
 
20 The extension of a business strategy classification scheme can only be delimited 
as those organisations which can properly be said to directly possess a business strategy 
as outlined in chapter 2 above. (That others have extended application via analogy to 
contexts other than profit-seeking behaviour in competitive markets is more a 
recognition of the paucity of more suitable schemes than a reflection of the permeability 
of boundaries.)  
 
21 The polyvalent and heterogeneous nature of business strategy is such that there 
is no ‘right’ way to segment it. Accordingly the field tolerates a plurality of alternative 
perspectives, according to the ostended behaviours registered therein or the cognitive 
purposes sought by such segmentation. If a scientific enquiry seeks to explore the nature 
and implications of ‘business strategy’ across the board i.e. as a universal, generalisable 
concept, only the broadest cross-cutting kinds are likely to be suitable for that purpose.  
 
22 Insofar as it is seldom possible to assign all varieties of business strategies to 
one or other of a broad classification scheme’s prefigured categories, such schemes may 
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not be exhaustive. It is unnecessary to assume that such schemes must be exhaustive. Or 
it is necessary (or at least advisable) to add a ‘not elsewhere specified’ or ‘other’ 
category to aspiring exhaustive schemes. 
 
23 Although the nature of ‘kinds’ is such that some motivation to the ostended 
similarity can be traced to underlying homologating forces causing the resemblance in 
question, this ~ the motivated kind ~ is not the sole type of business strategy 
classification scheme one may encounter. As stated earlier, all classification schemes 
are artefacts designed with some cognitive purpose in mind and this is not always 
scientific. A scheme may therefore equally be purely nomenclative ~ the attachment of 
a label to some reoccurring phenomena without imputing causality; or heuristic ~ an 
arrangement that sorts entities for decision-making; or even simply some sorting device 
~ a means of grouping phenomena for ease of subsequent processing. 
 
24 Notwithstanding the above, good scientific practice would privilege the 
motivated kind for research into the understanding of the causal factors giving rise to 
the ability to generalise and predict based upon categorisation. By and large, the 
inferential potential of such kinds is greater than that of others. 
 
PART  B THE  (GENERALISED) CASE  STUDY  FINDINGS.   
 
 Despite the difficulties of conceptualising and articulating categories in a 
scientific manner where the phenomena of interest is an abstract institutional kind, there 
have been a number of attempts to provide a generalised classification scheme for 
business strategies. Three of the more notable (and venerable) schemes have been 
examined in a series of detailed case studies ~ the Miles and Snow typology; Porter’s 
generic strategies; and Mintzberg’s attempt to provide a comprehensive framework. 
This section attempts to pull together some overall findings. 
 
1 There is a general lacuna in the way that business strategy classifications are 
promulgated and projected in research practice ~ they are seldom explicit about the 
nature of classificatory claims being made and, when these are intimated, they are more 
likely to concern intension rather than extension. Many of the concerns articulated in 
this study are simply not overtly addressed in terms that propose or speculate upon 
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some connection(s) between the postulated categories and the causal structures of the 
world. Nor, when no such claims are made, is it clear exactly what utility is proposed in 
connection with the use(s) of promulgated schemes ~ what are they good for ? Nor do 
appropriate ‘instructions for use’ accompany the initial promulgation. 
 
2 Nothing comes from nothing. All the case studies indicated that the original 
promulgators of such schemes had conceptual precursors that underpinned the proposed 
categorisations. In the case of the Miles and Snow typology this can be traced through 
various published papers. Porter’s generics were situated in his understanding of the 
mechanisms and theoretical structures of profit maximisation in competitive markets, as 
made evident in his teaching rather than his main texts. Mintzberg’s precursors were the 
conceptual structures provided by Ansoff, Porter and others. (As regards Appendix 4:- 
Bowman sought to encapsulate and frame the pricing / quality change options available 
to any competitive firm as a heuristic for strategic choice. And the Strategy Clock built 
upon conceptual foundations provided by Bowman and Porter.) 
 
3 All three selected case studies were conceptual typologies or heuristic schemes 
and can be judged as producing projectable categories of differing degrees of utility. 
The potential of both the Miles and Snow typology and Porter’s generics as putative 
motivated kinds was intimated in the respective chapters, but Mintzberg’s 
comprehensive framework offered only a nomenclative system. All provided some 
potential utility as heuristics or sorting devices depending upon context of the user’s 
interests. 
 
4 Notwithstanding the projectability found above, none of the business 
classification schemes examined here have made explicit claims to exhaustivity (i.e. that 
all potential, current and future, members of the population had been assigned); yet 
none had explicitly designated a category functioning as ‘not elsewhere specified’. 
(Albeit the Miles and Snow ‘Reactor’ category has been used by some researchers to act 
as a catch all for non-conforming types). Subsequent research employing such schemes 
tended instead to either retain just the designated categories, or to reduce them by 
suppressing one or more of the categories. This meant that such enquiries also tended to 
structure the enquiry instrument such as to ‘force fit’ the empirical instantiations to the 
classifications and to close the typology / heuristic to further additions or development. 
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5 The only truly empirical taxonomy examined in this thesis was that produced by 
DeSarbo and proved to have achieved accuracy at the expense of projectability. It was 
not a generalisable classification scheme, let alone some cross-cutting kind, but offered 
a mechanism for sorting a specific population into taxa (clusters) for subsequent 
analysis (albeit the value of such analysis would be compromised in the absence of 
some generalisability). 
 
6 Given the instrumental importance of performance outcomes, it is unsurprising 
that claims to superior/inferior status or equifinality among categories tended to 
predominate in research follow-up to initial promulgation. However, such research does 
not focus upon understanding and explication of any putative causal mechanisms 
whereby conformity to category is associated with enhanced (or diminished) 
performance. Whilst the search for causal understanding is highly challenging, the 
absence of same diminishes the utility of strategy research practice and progressive 
knowledge accumulation. 
 
7 The various case studies included some examination of certain follow-up studies 
of the business strategy classification schemes (albeit this thesis makes no claims to 
exhaustive study thereof). These revealed a general tendency on the part of the 
epistemic community that is organisational and management science to:- 
 
 (a) Privilege instrumentation and empiricism in exploration of the 
classification schemes as nomenclatures over further conceptual development and 
search for putative causality of the non-accidental similarity being postulated, and / or 
for utility in the application of categorisation for generalised heuristic purposes. 
 
 (b) Epistemic practices that freely adapt and re-contextualise the original 
schemes that, on occasion, pay scant regard to the origination of the scheme and 
privilege bespoke heuristic application over generalised causal understanding. 
 
 (c) Privilege discussion of statistical confidence and significance 
measurement over exploration of conceptual meanings (intensions) and delineation of 
boundaries (extension) when employing the categories in research projects. When 
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reporting results this works to the detriment of their interpretation and utility. The much 
reported ‘relevance gap’ can be traced to the neglect of ontology and utility in such 
practices. 
 
 (d) Failure to convincingly either establish or refute the reality of the 
grounding in ontology of any of these schemes. Failure to directly and empirically seek 
out any underlying causal mechanisms and structures. And failure to establish the utility 
of the schemes in use by strategists.  
 
 Much of the capacity for progressive knowledge development in the field of 
strategy is, thus, squandered in misconceived research effort resulting from a faulty 
conceptualisation of the ontology of the research object itself. The task is hard enough 
without such nugatory projects. 
 
PART  C CONSEQUENCES. 
 
 Without motivated kinds or entrenched  nomenclatures there is little 
intersubjectivity of the collective abstract institutional phenomena that is business 
strategy. Without intersubjectivity generalisations are less soundly grounded for 
communication and application in our epistemic practices ~ there is no science. Without 
science business strategy (and organisational and management science) becomes closer 
to the arts and humanities. This is not intended as a derogatory observation, but a 
comment on epistemic practices; Dickens, Shakespeare, and the whole literary canon 
provides beautiful, illuminating and emancipatory works that immeasurably increase 
our capacity for understanding the human condition. Our strategy case studies can 
aspire to similar goals of illumination and understanding, but they are not ‘science’ as 
customarily understood, and our epistemic practices are currently ill-suited to our 
material. The attempt to reify and quantify such cross-cutting abstract institutional kinds 
that form the basis of business strategy classification schemes such that they are 
tractable to a version of probability- and correlation-based scientific method is 
delusional unless the ontological basis of any putative kindhood is established. If we 
wish to aspire to science, far greater attention must be paid to not just the similarities 
that we witness, but to the underlying causal mechanisms and structures that brought 
them about. To that end, certain findings from this work should be foregrounded. 
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1 It appears that the achievement of a truly intersubjectivly established and 
causally understood kind of business strategy has eluded the science of organisation and 
management. Although both the Miles and Snow typology and Porter’s generics are 
sufficiently ‘entrenched’ to offer potential in this regard, there are no substantive studies 
of the causal mechanisms that might lie behind their occurrences. Thus, there are no 
studies of the relationship between Miles and Snow’s types and the detailed mechanics 
of the ‘adaptive cycle’ that (might) give rise thereto. Likewise there are no prominent 
studies of, say, the intensity of competition and the degree of conformity (or otherwise) 
of firms to Porter’s generic alternatives and, should these be shown to be important 
determinants of conformity, how the homologating mechanisms themselves might work. 
 
2 Classification is important to theory development and hypothesis testing and the 
science of strategy is all the weaker for a lack of established and characterised kinds 
enabling generalisations to be founded in the ontology of business behaviour of a 
strategic nature. The much reported lack of progress in our field and suspected 
irrelevance of our epistemic practices to the behaviour of those who practice strategy 
may be ascribed to lack of soundly delineated, understood and communicated concepts 
and categories. We lack the ‘inference engines’ that good kinds provide. 
 
 And, now, some more mechanistic observations:- Any promulgated 
classification scheme in the organisational and management disciplines should be clear 
as to:- 
 
3 The claimed status of the scheme against the four types of classification 
described here ~ motivated kind; nomenclature; heuristic; or sorting device. Accepting 
that elements of each might potentially figure in the same scheme.   
 
4 The intension of the abstract institutional kind being classified and the intensions 
of the individual categories therein must be described as clearly as possible. 
 
5 The extension of the entities being categorised at both genus (the scheme) and 
species (its strategy categories) level, and the appropriate sortals must be made evident. 
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6 The design of any business strategy classification scheme should:- 
 
 (a) come with appropriate ‘instructions for use’ (possibly, even, an 
 originator’s research instrument as public property) 
 
 (b)  allow for a ‘not elsewhere specified’ catch all category, 
 
 (c) specify any hierarchical relations between categories, 
 
 (d) recognise the contribution of good labels to entrenchment. 
 
7 There is a possibility, only hinted at in this work, that other cross-cutting kinds 
of business strategy classification schemes might offer potential appeal and utility 
equivalent to that offered by Miles and Snow or Porter. For, let it not be forgotten, that 
these two currently dominate research that categorises business strategy. Such 
alternative motivational sources might be found in domains such as organisational 
sociology, the population ecology of organisations, rent-seeking behaviour repertoires,  
geo-political forces and ‘varieties of capitalism’, etc.  
 
8 Above all, it should be acknowledged that, unless one subscribes to a view that 
perceived similarity of organisational strategies is only and always an accidental effect 
of our desires, any postulated and promulgated systematic classification may reflect the 
real results of an intransitive causality. Research to explore and expand our knowledge 
of how and why those causal mechanisms gives rise to the kinds is of importance. It 
must take at least equal precedence to the research that seeks to employ the 
classification scheme as a nomenclative artefact. 
 
 There is a common underlying theme to the manner in which the business 
strategy research community has adopted and explored these classification schemes. 
That is a desire to convert descriptions into instruments and then to explore the relations 
between the organisations so categorised and their performance vis a vis one another. 
The priority is to see whether there are meaningful differences between categories and, 
if there are, which category of strategic behaviour works best in which context. Whilst 
the putative causality, of why they might work best, seems to have been passed over. 
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Yet only that understanding can provide guidance to strategic managers. Only with the 
recognition that we don’t, as yet, have well-founded and causally understood business 
strategy kinds, will our epistemic practices start to address the weaknesses therein. 
 












APPENDIX  ONE  
 
 
THE  MILES  AND  SNOW  TYPOLOGY. 
 
 
Additional exhibit materials derived from Miles & Snow’s  texts.







APPENDIX 1.1. DEFINITIONS  OF  THE  FOUR  TYPES  AS  PER  VARIOUS  




A  1974 – Miles, Snow & Pfeffer version 
 
1 Domain Defenders, organisations whose top managers perceive little or no 
change and uncertainty in the environment and who have little inclination to make 
anything other than minor adjustments in organisational structure and processes. 
 
2 Reluctant Reactors, organisations where top managers perceive some change 
and uncertainty in the environment but who are not likely to make any substantial 
organisational adjustments until forced to do so by environmental pressures. 
 
3 Anxious Analysers, organisations where top managers perceive a good deal of 
change and uncertainty in the environment but who wait until competing organisations 
develop a viable response and then quickly adopt it. 
 
4 Enthusiastic Prospectors, organisations whose top managers continually 
perceive (almost create) change and uncertainty in the environment and who regularly 
experiment with potential responses to new environmental trends.  
 
 
B  1976 – C. Snow version. 
 
1 Domain Defenders, organisations whose top managers perceive little or no 
change and uncertainty in the organisation’s narrowly-defined domain and who have 
little inclination to make anything other than minor adjustments in organisational 
structure and processes. 
 
2 Reluctant Reactors, organisations whose top managers….as 1974 version above. 
 
3 Anxious Analysers, organisations whose top managers…..as 1974 version above. 
 
4 Enthusiastic Prospectors, organisations whose top managers continually 
perceive, and may even create, change and uncertainty …..as 1974 version above. 
 
 
C 1978 – Miles & Snow version ( The typology ) 
 
1 Defenders are organisations which have narrow product-market domains. Top 
managers of this type of organisation are highly expert in their organisation’s limited 
area of operation but do not tend to search outside of their domains for new 
opportunities. As a result of this narrow focus, these organisations seldom need to make  
On the classification of business strategy       December 2011 
279 
major adjustments in their technology, structure or methods of operation. Instead, they 
devote primary attention to improving the efficiency of their existing operations. 
 
2 Prospectors are organisations which almost continually search for market 
opportunities, and they regularly experiment with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends. Thus, these organisations often are the creators of change and 
uncertainty to which their competitors must respond. However, because of their strong 
concern for product and market innovation, these organisations usually are not 
completely efficient. 
 
3 Analysers are organisations which operate in two types of product-market 
domains, one relatively stable, the other changing. In their stable areas, these 
organisations operate routinely and efficiently through use of formalised structures and 
processes. In their more turbulent areas, top managers watch their competitors closely 
for new ideas, and then rapidly adopt those which appear the most promising. 
 
4 Reactors are organisations in which top managers frequently perceive change 
and uncertainty occurring in their organisational environments but are unable to respond 
effectively. Because this type of organisation lacks a consistent strategy-structure 
relationship it seldom makes adjustment of any sort until forced to do so by 
environmental pressures. 
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APPENDIX  TWO 
 
PORTER’S  GENERIC  STRATEGIES 
 
 



































FIGURE  2.1  A REPRESENTATION OF PORTER’S GENERIC STRATEGIES 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
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MINTZBERG’S  COMPREHENSIVE  FRAMEWORK 
 
 









THE  COMPREHENSIVE  FRAMEWORK OF GENERIC  STRATEGIES 
 
‘Family’  ‘Genus’  ‘Species’  ‘Variety’ 
 
 
A Locating the Core 1 Stage Strategies:-  a) Upstream strategies 
 Business    b) Midstream strategies 
      c) Downstream strategies 
 
2 Industry Strategies. 
 
 
B Distinguishing the 3    Functional, or a) Sourcing strategies 
   Core Business business strategy b) Processing strategies 
   areas.   c) Delivery strategies 
      d) Design strategies 
      e) Supporting strategies 
 
   4 Differentiation a) On price 
      b) On image 
      c) On support 
      d) On quality 
      e) On design 
      f) Undifferentiated 
 
  5 Scope  a) Unsegmented 
     b) Segmented  i) Comprehsive 
        ii) Selective 
     c) Niche 
     d) Customising i) Pure 
        ii) Standardised 
        iii) Tailored 
 
 
C Elaborating the 6 Penetration  a) Expansion 
   Core Business    b) Takeover 
      c) Harvesting 
  
   7 Market Devpt a) Elaboration 
      b) Consolidation 
    
   8 Geographic Expansion 
 
   9 Product Devpt a) Product extension 
      b) Line proliferation 
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TABLE 3.1. (Cont)   
 
THE  COMPREHENSIVE  FRAMEWORK  OF  GENERIC  STRATEGIES. 
 
‘Family’  ‘Genus’  ‘Species’  ‘Variety’ 
 
 
D. Extending the 10 Chain Integration a) Upstream / downstream integration 
  core business     b) Tapered integration 
      c) Impartition 
 
   11 Diversification a) Related 
      b) Unrelated 
      c) Internal development 
      d) Acquisition  i) Majority owned  
         ii) Minority own’d 
         iii) JV / turnkey 
         iv) Franchising 
         v) Licensing 
         vi) Long-term 
          contracting 
   12 Combined  a) By-product 
   Integration -   b) Linked 
     Diversification c) Crystalline 
 
   13 Withdrawal a) Shrinkage 
      b) Liquidation 
      c) Divestment 
 
 
E. Reconceiving 14 Redefinition 
the business  15 Recombination    i) Conceptual /  
tangible. 
         ii) Bundling / 
          unbundling 
   16 Core relocation a) Upstream / downstream 
      b) Functional focus 
      c) New business 
      d) Core theme 
      e) No focus. 
 
 










BOWMAN AND THE STRATEGY CLOCK  
 
 
NOTE: This appendix contains a case study of a heuristic for business, or more properly, 
marketing, strategy choice and its subsequent presentation in a general strategy textbook. 
There is little of direct interest here concerning the metaphysics of the classification 








 Cliff Bowman’s ‘customer matrix’ is a fairly recondite conceptualisation, known 
to relatively few in the UK, and to even fewer outside these shores. It is, however, 
familiar to many in the UK through its adoption, in the ‘strategy clock’ as presented in 
Europe’s best selling general strategy textbook, ‘Exploring Corporate Strategy’ 
(Johnson et al, 1993 -2011.) The strategy clock is a composite; it combines elements of 
Porter’s generic strategies with a presentation and structure drawing very largely on that 
suggested by Bowman. In fact the customer matrix is a handy business (or marketing) 
strategy heuristic that is worthy of examination in its own right. So, the first part of case 
study looks at the origins and nature of Bowman’s contribution to strategy classification. 
It is also, of course, a necessary preamble to the discussion in the second part of the 
strategy clock as presented in Exploring Corporate Strategy. 
 
 The customer matrix was developed by Cliff Bowman whilst at Cranfield 
School of Management. As joint author of an early British general strategy textbook 
‘Strategic Management’ (Bowman & Asch 1987) he was well versed in the canon of 
strategy, including the works of Michael Porter and the Miles and Snow typology. The 
latter is presented as ‘a typology of organisations’ in a very short, but relatively faithful, 
summary of both the adaptive cycle and the four types (ibid, p 302-5). The treatment of 
Porter’s generics, however, is somewhat perfunctory. The cost leadership and 
differentiation strategies are very briefly mentioned in that 1987 text (p 110-113 & 270-
275), but as components of other frameworks. Bowman’s own classification scheme for 
generic strategies is not included in the 1987 text. Its origins are found later and 
elsewhere:- The first is a working paper (Bowman, 1991) and then in contributions to a 
textbook that incorporated this thinking: - ‘The Challenge of Strategic Management’ by 
Faulkner & Johnson 1992 - Chapters 4  ‘Interpreting Competitive Strategy’, and 5 
‘Charting Competitive Strategy’. Subsequent papers and textbooks have re-represented 
and developed the concepts; particularly in the books ‘The Essence of Competitive 
Strategy’, 1995 which Bowman jointly authored with David Faulkner, and their 1997 
collaboration ‘Competitive and Corporate Strategy’ and in Bowman’s contribution to 
the ‘Oxford Handbook of Strategy’ (2003), Chapter 14 ‘Formulating Strategy’. 
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2  BOWMAN’S  “CHARTS”. 
 
 The 1991 version of Bowman’s framework is contained in a Cranfield 
University working paper titled ‘Charting Competitive Strategy’ and posits the answers 
to the question ‘How can firm A improve market share?’ as a series of options on ‘The 
Competitive Strategy Chart’ with relatively little by way of explication. The seven 
options, five of which are charted, plus ‘cost efficiency’ and (by implication) ‘stay put’ 
are carried into the two chapters that Bowman contributed to the Faulkner & Johnson 
1992 book, ‘The Challenge of Strategic Management’. There the framework is 
introduced via a chapter describing Porter’s generics and his own investigations of 
managements’ perceptions thereof. He attributes his framework to developments arising 
from this coming together of theory and practice. Thus, he starts Chapter 4, 
‘Interpreting Competitive Strategy’ in Faulkner & Johnson 1992 with:- 
 
 ‘This chapter explores Porter’s generic strategies using the perceptions 
 practicing managers have of their firm’s strategic priorities. The following 
 chapter builds on the empirical findings presented here, and develops a 
 conceptual framework for exploring issues and options in competitive 
 strategy. This framework emerges from the insights into competitive strategy 
 derived from managers perceptions.’ (op cit p 64.) 
 
 The discussion in this chapter covers, first, a very brief statement about Porter’s 
generics, without explication of the underlying concepts, and the treatment of his work 
(largely) by other academics and points (not too surprisingly) to variations and 
inconsistencies therein. In all, a somewhat negative review. The second part describes a 
study undertaken with 1,716 (presumably British) top or second tier managers from 168 
different SBUs over the period 1989-1991. The SBUs covered manufacturing and 
services and ranged in size from small partnerships to multinationals. Most importantly, 
the study investigated just two of Porter’s generic types - cost leadership or 
differentiation. The outcome of the resulting factor analysis study using 16 questions 
and a 5 point Likert scale (modelled on the methodology adopted by Dess & Davis, 
1984) was a set of ‘four strategic thrusts’ (op cit p 77) as follows:- 
 Competing on price 
 Offering unique products/services 
 Cost control 
 Product/service development. 
 
 Since some mileage is claimed for this empirical base, it is worth pointing out 
that; a) the four groups were determined by statistical criteria which explain only about 
half of the variation in the data; and b) it is remarkably difficult to discern, from the 
descriptions provided, the distinctions in organisational behaviour between the first and 
third and between the second and fourth groups which could, therefore, be regarded as 
perceptually nuanced variants of Porter’s cost leadership and differentiation; perhaps 
different ‘conduct’ arising from different ‘structure’ in the various managers’ differing 
envisioning of their competitive environments. 
 
 Alongside this empirical engagement, Bowman’s own conceptualisation of types 
of strategic direction, or ‘thrust’, is given in Chapter 5 of Faulkner & Johnson (1992) 
‘Charting Competitive Strategy’. The presentation there is as was provided in his 1991 
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working paper, with much greater richness in exposition. Albeit the whole chapter is 
only 13 pages, including 9 charts. He writes:- 
 
 ‘In this chapter the results of the empirical study of managers’ perceptions of 
 competitive strategy is used as the basis for the development of a conceptual 
 framework for discussing and exploring issues in competitive strategy.’ (op cit 





 Each of these charts has a vertical axis labelled ‘Perceived use-value’ (PUV), 
which is explained as ‘what buyers perceive as valuable, not what management think is 
valuable. Perceived use value refers to the feelings of satisfaction experienced by the 
buyer in purchasing and using the product /service.’(op cit p 84). This definition seems 
indistinguishable from what economists would call ‘customer satisfaction’ or ‘utility’; 
or what a market researcher would explore via attribute analysis. The horizontal axis is 
‘relative perceived price’, simply labelled ‘price’. To explain his concept of strategic 
thrust, Bowman takes a firm, nested in a cluster of similarly placed firms in the middle 
(average PUV, average price) of this chart and considers the consequences of moving in 
various directions, such as ‘left’ which means same PUV, lower price. He then 
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considers two aspects of this pricing strategy; the likely competitor response (to lower 
prices) and the requirements upon the firm to carry off this strategy successfully (cost 
leadership). Given below, as Figure 4.1, is a representation of Bowman’s charts that 
combines the presentations in his 1991 working paper and that given as directional 
arrows against a background cluster of competitors in the 1992 versions of the charts. 
 
 The strategies are variously described by Bowman and set out as follows:- 
 
 i)‘cheaper’ i.e. left or west;  
 ii) ‘better’ i.e. move north, (higher PUV for same price) which contains three 
 forms - ‘innovator’; ‘first imitator’ and ‘protector’ and three means of 
 attaining higher PUV - better on all dimensions that users value; better on only 
 some; and worse on some, but excellent on others; 
  iii) ‘stay put’; No change to price or PUV strategies. 
 iv) ‘cost efficiency’ - no position suggested since this is a general  underpinning 
to success for any strategy, but also can become an end in itself,  an option some 
firms select as strategy and particularly those inward looking  firms that stay put. 
(Suggestive of a third dimension of cost orientation, where  the firm moves “downward” 
into a lower cost base ?) 
 v) ‘upmarket’ or ‘north-east’ i.e. higher PUV, higher price 
 vi) ‘escape the pack’ or ‘north-west hook’ i.e. increase PUV and reduce price 
 (an aggressive move against competitors’ market shares) 
 vii) ‘downmarket’ or south-west i.e. reduce both PUV and price. 
  
 We, thus, have six strategies which are essentially market positioning strategies 
(the only reference for this chapter is a marketing text - Kotler, 1988), as shown in 
Figure 4.1, plus a seventh which is described as giving priority to cost efficiency - a 
production strategy that he describes as ‘on its own, it is not a competitive strategy. It 
plays a role in sustaining either the better’ or the ‘cheaper’ options.’ (op cit p 92, 
emphasis in original).  Thus, the orientation to marketing strategy and its prioritisation 
over production / cost considerations is clearly a component of the whole 
conceptualisation. An orientation that becomes even more evident in the next outing as 
the ‘customer matrix’.  
  
3 BOWMAN’S  “CUSTOMER  MATRIX”. 
 
 The next representation of Bowman’s thinking is that given in the 1995 textbook 
in the Prentice Hall Essence of Management Series ‘The Essence of Competitive 
Strategy’ (Faulkner & Bowman, 1995). This represents a development from the charts. 
His new version is reproduced in Figure 4.2. overleaf. This is drawn from Bowman’s 
own figure 2.4. titled ‘Competitive strategy options’. That title implies a rounded 
conceptualisation of strategy. However, the fundamental market- positioning nature of 
his model is reflected in the fact that it is given within a chapter titled ‘The Customer 
Matrix’ and that the option descriptions focus upon price / utility type choices as with 
his charts. This is the first time that Bowman refers to his framework as a ‘matrix’, but 
it is not represented as a conventional matrix. Rather, his strategies are referred to as 
eight directional ‘routes’ and the representation, together with his own occasional 
description of moving north-east or west fits the metaphor of a compass rather better.  
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 The axes of the matrix are as in the charts, with the addition of ‘perceived’ to 
‘price’. The labels such as ‘cheaper’ or ‘upmarket’ have been replaced by neutral 
numbers. Five of the original 1992 options remain. However the ‘stay put’ option from 
the 1992 text is not given, and the ‘cost efficiency’ dimension is subsumed as a 
subsidiary consideration to the viability of the option choice. That is to say that the 
firm’s cost position vis a vis its competitors is seen, not as an option for strategic 
positioning, but as a determinant of the likely success of the strategic choice. Another 
change of note is the abandonment of an implied equifinality of the various positions, in 
the privileging of the ‘escape the competition’, or north-west ‘hook’ option, now simply 
labelled Route 8. It is described here as ‘The only route that can be guaranteed to 
deliver an increased market share is route 8, increased PUV coupled with reduced price. 
However, to make this move and retain profitability, the firm must be the lowest cost 
producer.’ (op cit p 16). Three new positions are identified ~ Routes 3 (east), 4 (south-
east) and 5 (south). Whilst these are not described with great enthusiasm, they are not 




 Despite the fact that Bowman contextualises his scheme in relation to certain 
empirical studies, it is not really descriptive of a kind in the sense that Miles and Snow, 
Porter or even Mintzberg are categorising business strategies as motivated kinds or 
nomenclatures. This by virtue of the fact that there is in Bowman’s work no explicit or 
implicit claim that firms will be found that conform to, or accommodate, a set of 
homolgating forces in the socio-economic environment of capitalistic competition that 
Source:  Adapted by author from Faulkner & Bowman 1995, p 14, Figure 2.4. 
 
FIGURE 4.2   A  REPRESENTATION  OF  BOWMAN’S  ‘CUSTOMER  MATRIX’ 
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give rise to his categories. We don’t ‘recognise’ firms by Bowman’s categories, or 
positions / routes, so much as set out their actual or potential actions against his 
framework. It is a heuristic for (marketing) strategy-making. It is a transitive subject, 
rather than an intransitive object.  
 
4 BOWMAN’S  HEURISTIC  v  PORTER’S  GENERIC.  
 
4.1 Strategic objectives. 
 
 Porter envisages the objective of competitive strategy as earning above average 
profits on a sustainable basis; his ‘competitive advantage’. Albeit Bowman uses similar 
terminology and acknowledges the influence of Porter’s earlier work, he is positioned 
far more towards seeing competitive advantage in terms of beating the competition in 
market share. Although, in many respects, the two concepts can be complementary, as 
where economies of scale are significant, at other times, the two are contradictory, as 
where market share is being ‘bought’ through the under-pricing of tenders. Maximising 
profit and maximising market share are not identical and much epistemological 
confusion can result from failing to appropriately discriminate between the two, 
especially in considering alternative classes or types of strategy. Since the identification 
of generic strategy is so challenging, clarity as to the grounding of the concepts 
employed must be solid and clear if the mental tools are to function effectively. This is 
not to argue that all users must classify the same - replicative validity, - merely that 
where this is not achieved, at least the difference is understood as a substantive 
difference in strategic objectives rather than a semantic confusion. 
 
 So, it is evident in many aspects of the respective texts that Bowman conceives 
competitive strategy differently to Porter. His application views things from a customer 
perspective, and is in terms of two customer-facing dimensions; perceived price and 
PUV. It is no less valid an approach, but it is different. Thus, Route 4 (south-east) - 
increasing price, whilst reducing PUV- is described as ‘only feasible in a situation 
where there are supply constraints. Even then it is likely to lead to market disillusion, 
and can only be sustainable in the short term….In the longer term it is a route to decline 
and failure’ (op cit p 15). Such comments make perfect sense from a market positioning 
perspective. A more rounded perspective, however, considering the best option for a 
firm to pursue, might consider this as a potentially attractive strategy where the 
conditions demand withdrawal whilst maximising returns for reinvestment elsewhere. 
Route 5 (south) - reducing value whilst holding price steady - might be seen as an 
excellent value engineering strategy for improving profitability (if one could pull it off), 
but is described by Bowman as an inadvertent strategy ‘likely to result eventually in a 
reduction of market share.’ (op cit p15). Most revealing is the Summary section which 
shows a one dimensional construction of strategy as in ‘the only sustainably winning 
option is that which combines increased PUV with lower Perceived Price.’ (op cit p 22). 
This reveals Route 8 as the objective; all others are, to a greater or lesser degree, ersatz.  
 
 Elsewhere in chapter 2 of Faulkner & Bowman (1995), guidance is offered to 
the construction of a customer matrix to assess the relative standing of a firm against its 
competitors. The relevant dimensions being entirely focused upon the customer’s utility 
or satisfaction, with no mention of factor supply, value chain, or efficiency other than as 
necessary and subservient conditions to offering value. The subsequent chapter ‘The 
Producer Matrix’ does greatly round out the presentation of strategy, with recognition of 
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both contingency and resource based views of strategy, and discussion of core 
competences, the ‘activity chain’, strategic resources and gaps, etc. It also sets out the 
Producer Matrix as a vector of relative unit costs v key value-creating competences 
which are termed ‘Effectiveness’ and acknowledges the indirect linkage between 
production and the customer matrix. Thus, the overall treatment in the book achieves 
greater balance, with supply and production figuring in this complementary chapter to 
that on demand and market positioning. But, the fact remains that the generic strategies, 
described here as points on Bowman’s customer matrix, are essentially concerned with 
market positioning options. 
 
4.2 Motivated kind or heuristic classification scheme ? 
 
 Consideration of whether Bowman’s scheme qualifies as a motivated kind or is 
simply a heuristic is quite central to this thesis. But it must be acknowledged (and 
regretted) that such questions don’t trouble most organisational and management 
scientists. Unfortunately, the answer is not unambiguous. 
 
 The claimed causal mechanism underpinning the Miles and Snow typology is 
explicitly called into play as the adaptive cycle in their account. The underlying logic 
drawn from microeconomic axioms for competitive markets that bring into being 
Porter’s generic strategies are made explicit in his pedagogy. Both are, therefore, 
claimed here as putative motivated kinds. There is no equivalent explicit appeal to 
causal mechanisms or structures in Bowman’s scheme. To a more limited extent, there 
is an implicit appeal to common sense ~ a weak form of some ‘naturalness’ ~ in some 
aspects of the way in which Bowman has presented both his charts and the customer 
matrix. This can be evinced in five ways:- 
 
 First, there is, at times, an axiomatic flavour to the presentation:- When, for 
example, Bowman writes that he assumes his illustrative set of competitors are all 
charging the same price for the same PUV and ‘we would expect all firms to have the 
same market share’ (Faulkner & Johnson, 1992, p 84), the reader suspends disbelief in 
the credibility of that assumption order to follow the argument being advanced by 
Bowman. One would, however, be entirely justified in rejecting the premiss put forward 
on the grounds that market shares do not reflect the current value for money 
propositions offered by competitors as much as they do the histories, reputations and 
resources of the various firms. This is little different from the suspension of disbelief 
associated with accepting, for the sake of grasping the argument and its consequences, 
the unrealistic conditions of perfect competition such as ease of entry and exit or 
substitutability upon which Porter’s conceptualisation and explication of the generic 
strategies rely. As soon as one accedes to the quasi-theoretical fiction one is opening the 
way for a certain epistemic license to a quasi-scientific construal of the whole. 
 
 Secondly, there is frequent recourse to what might be termed basic commercial 
logic or applied basic economic reasoning in much of Bowman’s descriptions of the 
consequences of adopting one or other of his directions. For example his route 3 on the 
customer matrix ‘has the firm increasing prices without adding any PUV. This move 
can succeed in increasing profitability, but only if competitors follow suit.’…. or ‘Route 
4 (increasing prices and decreasing value) is only feasible in a situation where there are 
supply constraints. Even then it is likely to lead to market disillusion and can only be 
sustained in the short term.’ (Faulkner & Bowman, 1995, p 15). There is, thus, a 
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conditionality of outcomes of strategic choice depending upon the affordances and 
restraints provided by the business environment that, to some (minor) degree, could be 
held as equivalent to the accommodation requirements of social kinds (Boyd, 1999). 
 
 Third, Bowman presents his scheme as in some manner derived from his 
empirical work on managers’ perceptions of generic strategy. It is described as a 
‘conceptual framework’ and is juxtaposed after a discussion of Porter’s generic 
strategies with the tacit assumption that he was offering a (better) alternative scheme, 
implicitly of equivalent scope and ambition. 
 
 Fourthly, Bowman’s scheme, particularly that of the 1995 customer matrix, 
contains a normative element. This less in terms of downplaying the viability of certain 
options (as with Miles & Snow’s ‘reactor’ or Porter’s ‘stuck-in-the-middle’), and more 
in terms of his conditional privileging of Route 8. Once a performance association is 
projected of a category it is implicitly warranting that some internal or external factors 
are shaping outcomes. It is a claim to motivation of some sort.  
 
 Lastly, Bowman equips some of his strategic directions with well chosen 
illustrations from contemporary business behaviour ~ they are real strategies worked by 
real companies with real outcomes. 
 
 All this adds to a ‘soft’ motivation; no specific mechanism, nor appeal to theory, 
but a lot of circumstantial factors which, when combined with an innate ‘psychological 
essentialism’ in some of his readers, may be seen to situate the Bowman schemes as 
potentially motivated. However, there are no hard sortals as regards types of 
classification schemes and it is argued here that, since these schemes have such a strong 
claim to act as heuristics, that this is their prime type. There are two powerful reasons 
justifying this categorisation: First and foremost is the fact that this is a scheme based 
on sorting the world on the basis of logic. And this is the logic facing a decision-making 
individual or group. It is offered as a means of structuring and methodically addressing 
options for change (or not) of (market) positioning. Bowman’s options are those created 
by the permutations of up - no change – or down on each of his two dimensional 
constructs, creating in all 9 alternative combinations. These he then examines and 
comments upon, but the starting point was logical analysis and the intension is 
optimising the decision-making processes. The second reason is that Bowman made no 
overt claims to (strong) motivation. Even though, in many ways, the ‘adaptive cycle’ is 
no less circumstantial than Bowman’s implicit implications of (soft) motivation, as 
outlined above, the fact remains that Miles and Snow supplied a purported set of 
homologating forces in the interplay of their three components of the cycle. A 
mechanism of sorts was projected as behind the homologies they noted in their studies. 
The only mechanism required directly of Bowman’s scheme is the dimensional 
constructs and the logic of the permutations. Thus, although Bowman’s scheme has 
some characteristics of a motivated kind, it is principally as a simple heuristic device 
that its utility is examined next. 
 
5 BOWMAN’S   HEURISTIC V  MINTZBERG’S  NOMENCLATURE. 
 
 Compared to Mintzberg’s comprehensive scheme of generic strategies, which 
set out to provide a foundational lexicon of strategic practices, Bowman’s framework of 
(marketing) strategic choice categories is less ambitious. Mintzberg’s presentation was 
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not normative, whilst Bowman inclines to favour certain of his options or routes as 
leading to increased market share. Above all, Mintzberg’s scheme is complex both to 
represent and explicate, whilst Bowman’s is well illustrated by a single diagram and is 
amenable to a simple exposition. However, Bowman lacked the international renown of 
Mintzberg. Overall, both failed to become entrenched due to a combination of intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors to do with their utility. This is where we look next. 
 
6 EPISTEMIC AND PEDAGOGIC UTILITY. 
 
 Thus, Bowman has produced a reasoned set of generic market positioning 
strategy options in his ‘customer matrix’. They have clear provenance and logical 
structure. The two dimensions of Perceived Price and Perceived Use Value are 
recognisable conceptually, even if challenging at times to define, requiring some 
contextual adjustment to the tool in its application. It is represented, compass-like, in an 
easily explicated and comprehended manner. Like Porter’s generics, the directional 
options are conceived very much within a competitive market place. However, the 
theoretical underpinning is less contingent upon that market being highly competitive,  
and Bowman’s presentation and accompanying narrative elicits a rather pragmatic 
consideration of competitors’ responses. Furthermore, the pedagogic presentation of 
Bowman’s ‘Customer Matrix’ requires less by way of background understanding than 
Porter’s generics. In any application, both require grasp of competitive markets, but 
Porter’s comes from a broader and more demanding hinterland of concepts from 
microeconomics. However, in one respect Porter vastly outguns Bowman ~ his 
classification scheme achieved entrenchment and thus discursive utility across contexts 
and specific communities of practice. Bowman’s did not:- see Table 4.1. 
 
TABLE  4.1. PHRASE  RECOGNITION AND BOOK / ARTICLE  CITATIONS. 
 
Phrase       Recognition   Book author(s) & year Citations. 
 
Porter AND ‘generic strategies’ 4,680   M. E. Porter 1980 / 1998       9,863 
Mintzberg AND ‘generic strategies’ 2,280   Mintzberg’s article 1988          269 
Bowman AND ‘customer matrix’           19   Faulkner & Johnson 1992            24 
Bowman AND ‘producer matrix’        4   Faulkner & Bowman 1995   3 
 
Source: Google Scholar 28th July 2011. (Search confined to ‘Business, Administration, 
Finance and Economics’.)  
 
 In addition, it could, with justification, be claimed that the Miles and Snow 
typology and Porter’s and Mintzberg’s generics are more ‘generic’ than Bowman’s on 
three grounds:- 
 
 1 Arguably, the business objective of maximising profitability is superordinate 
to that of maximising market share. Porter and Mintzberg adopt the wider scope. 
 
 2 There is a ‘gestalt requirement’ that generic strategy covers the entire 
organisation’s efforts. The scheme for categorisation must embrace the whole 
organisation if it is not to be merely a functional strategy requiring still some 
superordinate strategy to integrate the various functions. This applies to all three 
comparative schemes. Within Bowman’s body of work is the ‘Producer Matrix’ as a 
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complement to his ‘Customer Matrix’, but there is not the facility to integrate the two 
through a single mechanism. So it fails to achieve this overall perspective. On the other 
hand, Porter achieves the remarkable feat of combining the lot in an extraordinarily 
parsimonious scheme. 
 
 3 There is about our conventional conception of generic strategy a belief that it 
is something deeply rooted in the culture of the organisation, enduring and stable. 
Change of strategic positioning can be achieved, but only with expenditure of 
considerable effort, some time and, probably, some personal cost. (The literature refers 
to this a ‘change’ management’). The Miles and Snow typology and Porter’s generics 
look the part, and Mintzberg discusses strategy as major shifts of direction embracing 
the whole organisation (Mintzberg & Waters 1982). By comparison, Bowman’s 
directional conception almost implies frequent course correction. Since a new pricing 
strategy can be implemented overnight the inference appears that it is not profound. 
 
 Because Bowman was unable to integrate in an accessible form his ‘producer 
matrix’ with the customer matrix, his scheme was inevitably partial. On the other hand, 
the intrinsic potential utility of Bowman’s simple scheme within the context of strategic 
discourse concerned with market positioning is quite evident. That it has not achieved 
any significant recognition, in its own right, or as adopted by others (see part two of this 
case study) , is more circumstantial, relating to promulgation, rather than to do with 




 If it is accepted that one is dealing with generic market positioning strategic 
options in a competitive market, Bowman’s customer matrix has much to commend it 
as a conceptual scheme listing available options for discursive purposes in strategy-
making. That is to say that it offers a robust and serviceable heuristic of potentially wide 
application. The selection of eight positions, plus a ‘stay put’ option, has much to 
commend it as being sufficiently versatile to discriminate between strategic directions in 
the marketplace, without being overly complex (Miller, 1956).Yet it is also collectively 
exhaustive as a typology ~ logically, firms must follow one or other of the paths. The 
intention and extension is clear, being drawn from logic rather than from observation; 
boundaries being set by the user’s conception of their market place and competitors. 
Thus, it is epistemologically sound and grounded in a plausible and accessible 
representation.  
 
 One must register the fact, however, that it has not achieved the intersubjective 
utility that comes from entrenchment. That it has failed to flourish in widespread 
research or practice owes something to the fact that Bowman could not command the 
awareness of his work achieved by Miles and Snow or Porter. Not even that achieved 
by Mintzberg’s framework. Why that is so is, in all probability, due to a combination of 
factors, most of which are circumstantial:- the fact that it was put forward in the UK 
rather than USA, and that Bowman did not achieve the international renown required to 
transcend this disadvantage are of import. But so too is the fact that Bowman was less 
than clear about the nature of his scheme in its promulgation. In so far as it was 
associated with claims to an evidential base regarding Porter’s generics and was unclear 
as to the partial nature of the business strategy being explored, Bowman may have 
inadvertently obscured its simplicity and ease of use as a marketing strategy heuristic. 
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 There is also some ambiguity in Bowman’s treatment as regards the 
performance aspects of his nine generic strategies and ‘equifinality’ would not describe 
his position. Yet, conceptually, as remarked above, equifinality might be more 
supportable in principle, with variations contingent upon industry/firm context. In 
addition, the customer matrix might benefit from further consideration of nomenclature 
- catchy labels do help in the promulgation of mental tools - as Miles and Snow’s 
‘defender’, ‘prospector’, etc labels show. (Miles & Snow 1978). Additional, well-
chosen labels, (such as was achieved by Bowman with ‘no frills’, ‘upmarket’ and ‘stay 
put’) might have assisted in the scheme’s adoption.. 
 
 This study has found no empirical research of any note seeking to justify or 
validate Bowman’s work. The fact that firms can choose to operate on their price / value 
offerings in the way set out by Bowman is hardly worth ‘proving’ in such an exercise. 
The text provides a general description of the strategy routes and their possible 
implications for the firm and its competitors, drawing at times upon actual 
contemporary examples. This helps create plausibility, but does not aspire to provide a 
causal account. The strategy routes are situated in logic not ‘nature’. Neither Bowman, 
nor general understanding of socio-economic forces, provide reasoning of why it should 
be that firms would conform to his strategy routes, since logic is all that is required to 
explicate and validate the heuristic. Yet the fact that Bowman’s heuristic has no strong 
claim to being a motivated kind seems, surprisingly, not to have been a significant 
drawback to its adoption, at least in that other causes of neglect offer more proximate 
reasons. 
 
 Notwithstanding the very rough equivalence of Bowman’s customer matrix with 
the Miles and Snow typology or Porter’s generics as regards potential epistemic and 
pedagogic utility, or its advantages of simplicity over Mintzberg’s nomenclative scheme, 
other, very practical, considerations arise in explaining why the scheme has languished 
as a stand alone. But it was picked up and successfully promulgated by other British 















 The representation of Bowman’s work that will be familiar to many British 
strategists and students of strategy is through its incorporation in the leading European 
general textbook on strategy with over 750,000 copies sold worldwide ~ ‘Exploring 
Corporate Strategy’ (Johnson et al 2008). The relevant section is headed ‘Bases of 
Competitive Advantage: The “Strategy Clock”’ and is given in their exhibit, 6.2 (figure 







 This illustration is subscripted with ‘The strategy clock is adapted from the work 
of Cliff Bowman (see D Faulkner and C Bowman, The essence of Competitive Strategy, 
Prentice Hall, 1995). However, Bowman uses the dimension “Perceived Use Value.”’.  
 
Source: Johnson et al, 2008.  
FIGURE  1 THE  STRATEGY  CLOCK. 
 




1.1 Bowman’s version gradually subsumes Porter’s generics. 
 
 In this section the history of the treatment of ‘generic strategies’ through the 
eight editions of ECS (1984-2008) is briefly explored. The first edition of 1984 did not 
discuss Porter’s generics at all, albeit other concepts from Porter’s 1980 Competitive 
Strategy were included in the book with suitable acknowledgements. In the second 
edition, of 1988, Porter’s generics are briefly, but effectively described and illustrated 
using a figure taken from Porter’s book. The generics are referred to as being ‘of central 
importance’ (Johnson & Scholes, 1988 p 149) and described unequivocally. In the third 
edition of ECS Porter’s generics are again effectively summarised and illustrated. They 
are also described as having ‘entered the language of management’ (Johnson & Scholes, 
1993, p 204), but the text is less positive than before, dwelling  on some of the literature 
raising problems associated with Porter’s concepts. This latter passage leading to a 
section where ‘These and other questions are now taken up in a framework for 
considering generic strategies which is based on research on managers’ perceptions of 
competitive strategy undertaken by Cliff Bowman.’ (ibid, p 209). The new section 
‘Market-based generic strategies: the “strategy clock”’, is of greater length to that 
devoted to Porter’s generics and presents a version of Bowman’s ‘customer matrix’ 
with labels (some ex Porter) similar to that given in Figure 5.1 above. 
 
 By the fourth edition, there is no separate treatment and description of Porter’s 
generics at all. Porter’s contribution to strategic options is referred to in terms of 
providing a language for considering the bases (sic) of competitive advantage. However, 
the text then reads; ‘Here Porter’s arguments are developed in the light of their 
subsequent critique by others….’ (Johnson & Scholes, 1997, p253) and the text then 
sets out and illustrates the strategy clock, described as ‘Bowman’s competitive strategy 
options’. There is little exposition of Porter’s concepts, albeit his definition of ‘cost 
leadership’ is given and, of course, the terms ‘focus’ and ‘differentiation’, used in 
Porter’s sense, are deployed in the strategy clock. There is little relevant difference in 
the similar passages of the fifth edition (Johnson & Scholes, 1999).  
 
 The sixth edition (2002) carries little change to the presentation of the strategy 
clock, but the prefix ‘market-based’ or ‘Bowman’s’ no longer figures ~ these are simply 
‘competitive strategy options’. Secondly, Porter’s contribution to the background 
thinking is not acknowledged in the main text and his cost leadership definition has 
moved to another section on sustaining competitive advantage. Porter’s work is, 
however, recognised as significant in the Recommended Key Readings and in the 
references to the chapter. (In fact Porter’s 1980 and /or 1985 texts are mentioned in the 
key readings and references in the relevant ‘options’ chapter of all editions of ECS, 
apart from the first). The same observations apply to the seventh edition (2005). 
However, by the eighth edition (2008) the acknowledgement of Porter’s foundational 
work has returned to the main body of the text, but as a lead-in to the strategy clock. i.e. 
‘Michael Porter proposed three different ‘generic’ strategies by which an organisation 
could achieve competitive advantage: ‘overall cost leadership’, ‘differentiation’ and 
‘focus’. There is much debate as to exactly what each of these categories means. In 
particular many confuse Porter’s ‘cost leadership’ with ‘low price’. To remove such 
confusions this book employs ‘market-facing’ generic strategies similar to those used by 
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Cliff Bowman and Richard D’Aveni’ (Johnson et al, 2008, p 224). Apart from that 
reference and the (moved) reference to low cost leadership, Porter is again recognised 
only in the Key Readings and references sections of the chapter.  
 
 Thus, Porter’s generic strategies are gradually subsumed by the strategy clock as 
the various editions of ECS are issued. Yet Johnson and Scholes have employed his 
concepts of differentiation and focus, and to a lesser extent, cost leadership throughout 
their treatment of the strategy clock. 
 
1.2  The Strategy Clock as a construct  ~  a critique. 
 
 Albeit similar in format to Bowman’s representation of the customer matrix,  
some significant changes have been introduced in the ECS version of the strategy clock, 
beyond the acknowledged change to the PUV terminology (in fact ‘Perceived 
product/service benefits’ seems not to have changed the meaning intended by Bowman). 
Apart from the presentational differences, (for example, the numbering has changed ) 
there are 7 significant variations from Bowman’s and also Porter’s conceptualisations:- 
 
1 There is considerable, not entirely successful, effort to reconcile the Strategy 
Clock with Porter’s generics (which, as mentioned, are not diagrammatically 
represented in the ECS text after the second edition). Commenting on the confusion that 
arises where Porter’s ‘cost leadership’ is conflated by others with ‘low price’, and, inter 
alia, confirming the market positioning orientation of the Strategy Clock, the authors 
say (continuing the quote given above):- 
  
 ‘ To remove such confusions this book employs “market facing” generic 
 strategies similar to those used by Cliff Bowman and Richard D’Aveni. These 
 are based upon the principle that competitive advantage is achieved by 
 providing customers with what they want, or need, better or more effectively 
 than competitors. Building upon this proposition, the strategy clock….. 
 enshrines Porter’s categories of differentiation and focus alongside  price.’ 
 (Johnson et al, 2008, p 224). 
  
 An overarching problem here is that Porter conceives of prices as being market 
determined and the leverage of the firm as more to do with cost reduction or additional 
product functionality enabling the firm to command higher prices in the market. In fact 
none of the strategy clock’s options map directly onto Porter. Those labelled 3 ‘Hybrid’, 
4 ‘Differentiation’ and 5 ‘Focused Differentiation’ involve differentiation that as a 
concept (premium prices achieved upon adding ‘value’ at proportionately lower costs), 
accords broadly with Porter’s conceptualisation. However, the sub-headings can fail to 
work (and see point 6 below). Market scope - broad or narrow - is an important 
dimension for Porter’s overall scheme that is not encompassed in the clock’s 
diagrammatic representation, which creates an overall incommensurability. However, 
the ‘Focused differentiation’ strategy is described in the accompanying text as 
‘perceived added value to a particular segment, warranting price premium’ and that 
does coincide with Porter’s Focused Differentiation. The remaining two differentiation 
categories are, however, compromised. 
 
2 The treatment of ‘cost strategies’ point 1, No frills and point 2, Low Price differ 
from Porter’s in ignoring scope and in being about gaining market share via price 
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positioning, rather than achieving profitability through cost reduction. However, they 
accord with Bowman’s similarly described positions 6 ‘cheap and cheerful’ and 7 
‘cheaper’. (But see point 6 below). 
 
3 Bowman’s ‘stay put’ strategy is difficult to represent within the customer matrix 
or strategy clock conceptualisations. Yet the framework of the strategy clock is one of 
market positioning (only price and PUV changes are considered) and there may be no 
imperative within the market environment to make a change on either of the 
dimensional constructs i.e. staying put may be the optimum choice (even in the face of 
changes by competitors). It is, therefore, unjustified (and possibly misleading) to leave 
the ‘stay put’ option out of the list of generic choices of market positioning. It is 
logically and practically an indispensible component of choices facing the firm. 
 
4 One could predict that Porter would question the attainability of sustainable 
competitive advantage with a ‘hybrid’ strategy (point 3) ~ it is his ‘stuck-in-the-middle’ 
strategy. It is the strategy he would likely single out as being ‘destined for ultimate 
failure’. Yet, as described in case study 4, this is Bowman’s ultimate ideal. He writes 
‘Route 8 [equivalent to position 3 on the Strategy Clock] is clearly a winning strategy as 
the product is perceived to be both cheaper and better than those of its rivals.’ (Faulkner 
& Bowman 1995, p 16). The conflict between the source paradigms is recognised, but 
left unresolved, in ECS. When describing the hybrid strategy; they observe ‘Indeed, 
there is a good deal of debate as to whether a hybrid strategy can be a successful 
competitive strategy rather than a suboptimal compromise between low price and 
differentiation. If it is the latter, very likely it will be ineffective.’ (Johnson et al, 2008, p 
230). 
 
5 Most significantly, the strategies 6-8  are now grouped under a label ‘Strategies 
destined for ultimate failure.’ The accompanying texts, both that given with Exhibit 6.2 
and the general text in section 6.3 of ECS (p 224-231) support this assertion, indeed an 
accompanying glossary definition is provided here;-  ‘A failure strategy is one that does 
not provide perceived value for money in terms of product features, price or both.’(op 
cit p 231). This goes significantly further than Bowman, who a) recognises that such 
positions are logical consequences of his framework and offers examples of 
circumstances where such strategies have been adopted, whilst b) cautioning that such 
strategies can only work in specific circumstances and/or for a limited time. 
 
 The strategy clock presentation of Routes 6-8 as ‘destined for ultimate failure’ 
owes much to the framework’s origins in the conceptualisation of the strategy question 
as one of maximising market share. If, instead, the objective were seen as maximising 
future profitability from the current position, then such strategies as increasing prices (6) 
or reducing benefits (8) or some mix of the two (7)  are surely not simply viable options, 
but highly attractive to any Chief Executive seeking to maximise profit. That is to say 
that, whilst Routes 6-8  are not how Porter frames his generic strategies, they are 
commensurate with his underlying theoretical framework. In practice, increasing prices 
without adding value is commonplace, especially where the price elasticity of demand is 
less than unity, and one may observe firms adopting options such as ‘withdrawal’ or 
‘consolidation’ successfully where this is appropriate to the market conditions and their 
relative strengths.  
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 There is, thus, no appropriate grounds for substructing these conceptual 
positions generated within the framework from the list of those deemed potentially 
worth consideration. In fact, quite the opposite.  
 
6 A representational difficulty with the strategy matrix is made more serious by 
the fact that a clock has designated points against the two axes of PUV and price, 
whereas Bowman’s customer matrix gave them as directional arrows. One consequence 
is that if one ‘reads’ positions on the clock against the axes provided by the ECS 
illustration the results are such that, for example, point 4 ‘Differentiation’ reads as an 
increase in PUV without any increase in price ~ certainly not the authors’ intention. Or 
point 1 ‘no frills’ (reduced PUV and reduced price) can be read off the clock’s 
horizontal axis as implying higher price than point 2 ‘Low price’ ~ again not the 
authors’ intended meaning. The same difficulty occurs at other points. A clear case of 
the diagrammatic representation conveying an interpretation contradictory to the 
authors’ intended meaning. 
 
7 Finally, the text accompanying the Strategy Clock implies it has potential 
application and relevance to non-market institutions: ‘For public service organisations, 
the equivalent concern is the bases on which the organisation chooses to achieve 
superior quality of services in competition with others for funding; that is how it 
provides “best value.”’ (Johnson et al, 2008, p 224).This re-representation may or may 
not have merit, but it is certainly not within the conceptual frameworks of goals of 
sustainable profitability or market share as set out by either Porter or Bowman. The 
brief exposition of this interpretation of significant organisational strategic objectives 
for non-profit organisations (such as universities or Oxfam) is inadequate to provide 
adequate rationale and justification for this very significant scope extension. 
  
2 EPISTEMIC  AND  PEDAGOGIC UTILITY.  
 
 It will be clear from the above, that in terms of knowledge creation through tool 
application and in terms of knowledge transfer by means of pedagogic representation, 
the mixed model of the ‘strategy clock’ is deemed significantly inferior to either of the 
alternatives - Porter’s generics or Bowman’s customer matrix. There is no claim by its 
authors for inductive origination - the strategy clock clearly was not derived a posteriori 
by taxonomic means from empirical studies. The origination is clearly that of a 
deductive typology. Yet the strategy clock, as presented here, lacks its own accessible 
supporting framework derived from independent theory or fully characterised 
conceptualisations. It rests vicariously upon selective and partial support derived from 
Porter - largely decontextualised from his own corpus of work and concepts - and 
Bowman, again with significant variation, without explication of the mix. It is hard for 
third parties to divine and explicate the principles, if any, that drive the clock’s 
mechanism. The conflation of two incommensurable classification systems, with 
entirely different theoretical foundations, only serves to dilute the effectiveness of either. 
(Boshuizen & {Tabachneck}-Schijf, 1998). Even as an ‘orienting metaphor’ (Chaffee, 
1985), the ‘strategy clock’ is confusing and confused when the principles for its 
application are sought, making for lack of consistency between users and problems in 
pedagogy. It is, to adapt Porter, ‘stuck in the muddle.’ 
 
 Many of the points made earlier in this case study  with regard to Bowman’s 
‘soft’ motivation (see section 4.2) could be called in aid as regards the Johnson et al’s 
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presentation of the clock. However, there is little point in dwelling upon the possible 
motivation of the strategy clock’s various positions, since the logical, theoretical and 
empirical warrants are so confused. The fact is that the strategy clock does not ‘work’ in 
any coherent and convincing manner to create its options. It is, at best, an attempt at a 
potential nomenclature and possible heuristic, that, despite its many failings, still has 
been regarded by many as a projectable set of categories. 
 
 This leads to consideration of a second aspect of these observations in that it 
reflects also upon the nature of the strategy community. From edition three of ECS, 
from 1993 onwards, the problems referred to above have been evident to any diligent 
and critical observer. That these limitations had not been properly addressed over the 
next 15 years in the best-selling European general textbook on strategy is something 
that should give cause for critical reflection. It might imply that the critique offered here 
is unfounded, but, assuming this is not so, there are a number of potential factors to 
evaluate.:- 
 
 (a) Is the general attitude to ‘strategy tools’, such as the strategy clock, one 
 whereby there is an expectation that potential users expect and accept the need 
 to adjust and adapt, such that inconsistencies are of little import ? For the 
 categories are still projectable and adjustable to our purposes.  
 
 (b) Or, is there an implicit nominalism about attitudes to categorisation of 
 strategies that means that if Johnson and Scholes wish to label and describe 
 this way, there is no intrinsic problem ? One can take it or leave it, but there is 
 little one can say by way of principled critique that elevates any one 
 formulation above another. 
 
 (c) It would be the case that, as a general strategy textbook, ECS is not a text 
 that would excite much attention from the strategy research community to 
 critique and, since the claims for the strategy clock are ‘unmotivated’, little to 
 invite empirical research. 
 
 (d) Or is it that, this being a general strategy textbook for undergraduate 
 courses, this is simply a case where the teacher elects to substitute alternatives, 
 such as Porter’s generics (Note 2). Alternatively, the newer teacher finds the 
 strategy clock acceptable faute de mieux. 
 
3 ONTOLOGICAL  PLAUSIBILITY 
 
 The ecological validity (Hodgkinson et al, 1999), or ontological plausibility, of a 
typology or taxonomy is judged against three sets of criteria - i) the classification must 
rest upon a sound theoretical base; ii) it must be capable of being deployed with 
methodological rigour; and iii) it must produce results that are practically relevant. So 
far the concern has been with the epistemic and pedagogic uses of the strategy clock. 
The question of ontological plausibility is dealt with only very briefly here since it does 
not arise in the way it would were the strategy clock a claimed motivated kind of 
strategy. To be ontologically plausible as a motivated kind a social science classification 
must provide an accommodation between our epistemic needs and the causal structure 
of the domain in which it putatively applies. (Boyd, 1999). 
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 Like Bowman’s customer matrix, Johnson et al make no overt ontological 
claims that the strategy clock reflects the outcome of socioeconomic forces bringing 
about conformity to certain categories of strategy. For example, that firms would 
naturally select one or other of their options or face inevitable failure. It is, instead, 
essentially a nomenclative and heuristic device, albeit the logic of the eight positions is 
less obviously simply the various permutations of:- increase / or keep unchanged / or 
decrease:- on price and perceived benefits dimensions of the customer matrix. ‘Less 
obvious’ due to the various inconsistencies discussed above resulting from a conflation 
of schemes based upon different paradigms and using mixed terminology. Also, ‘less 
obvious’ because the text is fairly discursive and associates contemporary business 
examples with the discussion of each option i.e. they are plausibly situated in familiar 
terms. And ‘less obviously’ so because it contains a normative element (described as 
implausible above, unless the goal of business strategy is identical to that of sales 
maximisation alone). Any classification that makes a normative claim based upon 
commercial success criteria is implicitly calling into play some causal economic (or 
socio-political) structures and mechanisms determining enterprise success and failure. 
 
 It is significant that a literature search has found no equivalent body of empirical 
investigation or critique of the customer matrix or strategy clock to that found relating 
to Porter’s generics or the Miles and Snow typology. This finding is unsurprising, given 
the dominance of North American research in the academic literature. In addition, 
Porter’s work was earlier than Bowman’s and benefits from the reputation of Harvard 
and Porter’s own eminence within the field. However, it should be noted that the British 
strategy teaching scene (particularly at undergraduate level) has been dominated by the 
ECS textbook. The third edition (1993) presented both Porter’s generics and the strategy 
clock. However, the authors had dropped separate treatment of Porter’s generics in sole 
favour of the strategy clock by the 4th edition of 1997. So, there has been plenty of time 
for empirical work on the validity and reliability of these alternative representations to 
have been reported in the peer-reviewed literature. The conclusion here is, therefore, 
that both the Miles and Snow typology and Porter’s generics have far greater superficial 
ontological plausibility than either Bowman’s customer matrix or the strategy clock. 
They have not been deemed worthy of equivalent investigation against real 
organisations and their strategies. 
 
4 PLACE IN THE ACADEMIC CANON 
 
 A discerning feature of a linguistic artefact when applied to a categorising 
generic noun is the degree to which the usage and implicit classification system to 
which it attaches is recognised and employed as part of an intersubjective lexicon. Here, 
our labels are generic strategies and our community of practice is that of ‘strategists’ in 
general. Thus, the question is that of the degree to which the terms from part of the 
canon of our practice. In Goodman’s terms has the strategy clock become entrenched ? 
Albeit an argumentum ad hominem, it seems apposite therefore to enquire how 
recognised are the terms ‘Porter’s generic strategies’, and ‘strategy clock’ to see where 
each stands in relation to that part of the canon that resides in written academic form. To 
do so the broadly based, yet academically and professionally oriented, search engine 
‘Google Scholar’ was deployed as in exhibit 5.1. The search domain was confined to 
Business, Administration, Finance and Economics, and in each case the search term was 
exact phrase only, except where authors’ names were associated.  
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TABLE  5.1 WORD / TITLE  RECOGNITION 
 
Search term       No of ‘hits’ ( about ) 
 
Competitive advantage             967,000 
Competitive advantage AND Porter              79,000 
Generic strategy / strategies      8,680 
Generic strategies AND Porter        6,610 
Exploring corporate strategy      2,090 
ECS AND Johnson OR Scholes OR Whittington   2,070 
Strategy / strategic clock                  103 
Strategy / strategic clock AND Johnson OR Scholes OR Whittington   51   
 
Source: Google Scholar 29th July 2011. 
 
 The most outstanding lines of this table seem to be those for term recognition 
associated with ‘generic strategies’ and Porter at over 6,500, compared with the 
‘strategy clock’ and Johnson, Scholes or Whittington at just 50 odd. A very crude 
allowance for the fact that Porter’s 1980 / 1998 book is better known in this data base is 
obtained by dividing the 6,610 times his generic strategies are recognised into the 
79,000 book recognitions to give around 12 to one ratio. The comparative ratio for the 
strategy clock and the ECS text is around 40, indicating that the strategy clock is 
comparatively under-represented in research that employs the ECS text in one form or 
another. 
 
 That Porter’s generics would figure more prominently than the strategy clock is 
of no surprise. A poll by the Strategic Management Society in 1999 voted Porter as the 
most influential scholar in that field in the past quarter century (Barney, 2002). That his 
books on strategy should be so well recognised is likewise unsurprising ~ the 1980 text 
had been re-printed over 53 times and translated into 17 languages by 2002 (Argyres & 
McGahan, 2002). However, the citations to Bowman’s and Johnson et al’s strategy 
classification schemes, (see above and Table 4.1) disappoint in terms of academic 
quality and nature of use. In the main, it appears these nomenclative and heuristic 
classification schemes have been little used in strategy research. Thus, whilst Porter’s 
generics are central to the strategy canon, Bowman’s and Johnson et al’s schemes are 
somewhat peripheral. However, no account of in-company use (after all the prime 
object of a heuristic) has been undertaken. Had it been, and in the UK, there is little 





5 DISCUSSION –  BOWMAN,  PORTER, AND THE ‘STRATEGY CLOCK’ 
 
 Both Porter and Bowman suggest typologies with discernable theoretical or 
principled foundations, yet both are somewhat weak on clarifying their warrants and 
claims through attaching appropriate scope conditions thereto. Porter’s generics, being 
based upon the axiomatic systems and stylised facts of microeconomics has, perhaps, 
greater depth and nomological or predictive validity. It is a purported motivated kind. 
Porter’s generics are put forward within a normative framework of ‘choose one of these 
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three or four paths’ to achieve sustainable competitive advantage and don’t be less than 
wholehearted in that choice if you wish to avoid being ‘stuck in the middle’. That 
nomological characteristic has two consequences. First, the linkage between generic 
strategies, industry structure and firm performance will attract the attention of both 
researchers and practitioners / consultants seeking the ingredients of competitive 
advantage. Which leads to the second, that Porter’s generics have attracted a host of 
academic researchers attempting to establish the ontological plausibility of his typology 
through correlations, regressions, causal modelling, cluster analysis, and the like. 
However, this empirical assault on the typology may be an underestimate, on the one 
hand of the heterogeneous, complex and multifaceted nature of ‘strategy’ and 
‘competitive advantage’, and, on the other, the specific, but tacit, theoretical conditions 
of competition that underpins the concepts which underpin the typology.  
 
 On the other hand, Bowman’s typology is not under suspicion, since it has 
hardly been investigated and reported upon in the academic literature. It is only weakly 
motivated as discussed here and acts more as a heuristic with associated nomenclative 
value in the designated directions. Bowman’s customer matrix has had far less exposure 
than even the ‘strategy clock’ and has, perhaps, both benefitted and suffered as a 
consequence. Moreover the lack of effective linkage between his empirical work on 
Porter’s generic strategies and his own charts or the customer matrix means that it is not 
a genuine observational product, but an a priori typology ~ a set of labels of heuristic 
potential. Thus, follow-up validational research work, replications and extensions, has 
just not followed. The more rigorous version of the construct has not been tested by 
third parties; at least not as reported in the relevant literature. As the two dimensional 
matrix - i.e. shorn of its associations with cost reduction strategies - it has a logical and 
straightforward appeal. The conditions for application - the identification and 
categorisation criteria - are relatively straightforward; one follows short, simple 
principles. Within the scope conditions of market positioning strategy (for competitive 
markets), the typology is collectively exhaustive and the whole scheme is internally 
consistent. Bowman provides relatively little by way of characterisation and exemplars 
and, had he done so, the fact that all 9 positions are logically tenable and, moreover, 
found in strategic practice might have been more evident. 
 
  Bowman’s typology is, however, one of market positioning, a necessary but not 
sufficient ingredient of ‘strategy’. For the latter to work as an integration of both supply 
conditions and marketing strategy within the organisation another dimension, that of 
production positioning has to be offered. This is recognised in the ‘The Producer 
Matrix’ which accompanies the exposition of the customer matrix in Bowman’s 
writings. Here he posits a scheme based upon the relative unit costs of production and 
the key value-creating competences or the effectiveness. There is here, perhaps, an 
incipient, fully characterised, generic strategy typology waiting to be explored. One that 
reconciles the positioning and resource-based views of strategy. This, however, would 
require a complementary production positioning typology (based upon such features as 
comparative resource costs; cost control / reduction / elimination; R&D, engineering 
and plant investment; new product development; collaborative ventures and networks; 
etc; etc.) that has yet to be developed with the inherent simplicity of the customer 
matrix as described above. 
 
 The impetus to this research was a certain frustration with the ‘strategy clock’ 
which has been excised with the conclusion that it is an unsuccessful conflation of the 
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conceptual schemes of two strategists. Michael Porter’s generic strategies are well 
known, but the original work of Cliff Bowman was unfamiliar. The two schemes have 
not blended successfully in the ‘strategy clock’, which has been consigned to the 
category of ‘stuck in the muddle’. However, it is hoped that this work is suggestive to 
others that the heuristic scheme offered by Cliff Bowman is worthy of further 
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